

## **Chapter III**

### **Deadly Desires**

Desire is the driving force behind creation and societal relation and it is the true formative force in society, culture and nature. Alison Ross states:

'Desire' is one of the central terms in Deleuze's philosophical lexicon. In his work with Guattari, Deleuze develops a definition of desire as positive and productive that supports the conception of life as material flows. In each of the features used to define this conception of desire, an alternative conception of desire as premised on 'lack' or regulated by 'law' is contested. The psychoanalytic conception of desire as an insatiable lack regulated by Oedipal law is one of the main inaccuracies of desire that Deleuze tries to correct. Instead of desire being externally organised in relation to prohibitions that give it a constitutive relation to 'lack', for Deleuze desire is defined as a process of experimentation on a plane of immanence. (64)

Desire does not operate as a universal principle governing existence, instead it lies outside or alongside existence and posits itself as an autonomous

drive. Yet it cannot be counted as an objective force, a specific enquiry, a transcendental presupposition or a sexual practice. Peter Goodchild notes:

The philosophy of desire emerges through the differentiation of several layers of differences; differences that shape and associate ideas; differences that express feelings and forces, differences that synthesise forces into actual bodies, differences that are implicated in an entity's emergence and reproduction itself. The integrity of desire is only attained when each of these layers of thought, emotion, body and ontology interact with others.(2)

Deleuze and Guattari in *Anti-Oedipus* focus on Wilhelm Reich's classic question "How could the masses be made to desire their own repression?" and redefine this question in pursuance to the Nietzschean concept of will to power. They attempt to restructure the concept of desire in psychoanalysis and explain the emergence of desire in a socio-political context.

Desire was unconstructive and hence rejected by the traditional practitioners of Western philosophy. Most recently Lacan saw desire as a drive to achieve an object produced by a lack. At the discussion of desire and lack, Deleuze and Guattari follow Nietzsche's philosophy proposing that desire is

not born of lack but is a machine and that the object of desire (what Lacan would call *Objet petit a*) is yet another machine. The circuits these desiring machines create are what Deleuze and Guattari call desiring-production. Deleuze and Guattari elucidate in *Anti – Oedipus*:

The truth of the matter is that *social production is purely and simply desiring-production itself under determinate conditions.*

We maintain that the social field is immediately invested by desire, that it is the historically determined product of desire, and that libido has no need of any mediation or sublimation, any psychic operation, any transformation, in order to invade and invest the productive forces and the relations of production.

*There is only desire and the social, and nothing else. (31)*

Desiring-production theoretically counters Freud's unconscious. Deleuze and Guattari state that Freud was wrong to see desire as something rooted in lack, as an attempt to fantasize a missing object like the mother's breast. For them, the unconscious is a productive and potentially transformative force – a force that could change the world. The unconscious, as they saw it, was a deliriously innovative 'factory', ceaselessly producing new and transgressive combinations of desires. Reality is none other than the

construction of the Desiring-production which is responsible for social forces and relations.

The production of reality and the subsequent formation of society take place through desiring-production. History need not be read as the dialectics of class struggle, it can also be understood through the surges and blockages of desire. Desire is a relentless and impersonal flow, an electric current moving through the social body and interrupted only by 'desiring machines' that seek to direct and channel it. A desiring machine could be anything from a breast, a machine that produces milk, to a revolutionary political movement, and its aim is to connect with other machines like the infant's mouth, the masses, and produce a shift in reality. Desire has virtually no limits, it is omnipresent and passes through everyone without belonging to anyone.

Deleuze pursues Nietzsche who said that the transcendent moral opposition (between Good and Evil) is to be replaced with immanent ethical difference (between noble and base modes of existence). The mode of existence of a man will be considered to be 'good' or free, or rational, or strong, provided he exercises his capacity for being affected in such a way that his 'power of acting' increases, to the point where he produces active affections and adequate ideas. Daniel W. Smith remarks:

The fundamental question of ethics is not “What must I do?” (which is the question of morality) but rather “What can I do, what am I capable of doing (which is the proper question of an ethics without morality). Given my degree of power, what are my capabilities and capacities? How can I come into active possession of my power? How can I go to the limit of what I “can do”? What an ethics of immanence will criticize, then, is anything that separates a mode of existence from its power of acting—and what separates us from our power of acting are, ultimately, the illusions of transcendence.( 68 )

The question of desire linked with the theme of an immanent ethics, becomes a political question. Desires are always assembled or arranged in different ways, in different individuals, in different cultures and in different eras. Desire is nothing other than the state of the impulses and drives which are simply the desiring-machines themselves. Like Nietzsche, Deleuze insists that the drives never exist in a free and unbound state, nor are they ever merely individual; they are always arranged and assembled by the social formation.

The French psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan is unavoidable in the exposition of the concept of desire in the sense that he argued that desire was constituted as a lack impossible to be fulfilled. Deleuze and Guattari viewed desire as distinctly political unlike Lacan, and defined desire as having two

alternatives. It may affirm itself, go along and as far as it can, or it may choose power as its centre and the establishment of order as its purpose. Desire is all pervading and is an integral part of society but is always and everywhere repressed by established orders and the orthodox reality.

Desires are actualization, a series of practices, bringing things together or separating them, making machines and making new reality. It disrupts the binary opposition between the thinking subject and the object of thought. Deleuze expounds the theory of desire as a strong force of motivation which does not arise out of external stimuli, but is ingrained in the human need for joy and transgression. Desire is produced by an aggregate or ensemble and is not the desire for someone or something. It is for the aggregate of the object that desire operates and not for an object alone. Desire flows into an assemblage and it is an act of constructivism creating an assemblage, which is a physical phenomenon. Accentuation of motifs renews through their assembling into a constructive machine that is capable of production. The production does not repeat predetermined processes and hence the machine is singular and the production entirely new. The product can then react back upon and affect its condition of production thus becoming a component of further machines. Machinic relations are created as immanent where machine acts as productive assemblage of components. Deleuze and Guattari write in *A Thousand Plateaus*:

“Assemblages are passionate, they are compositions of desire. Desire has nothing to do with a natural or spontaneous determination; there is no desire but assembling, assembled desire. The rationality, the efficiency, of an assemblage does not exist without the passions the assemblage brings to play, without the desires that constitute it as much as it constitutes them” (465).

Deleuze states that an assemblage implicates territories created by an individual by just walking into a room for example. An assemblage also engages processes and movements of deterritorialization and desire flows within its components. Deleuze differs from psychoanalysts in postulating the theory of desire which is positive and constructive in character. He regards psychoanalysts as priests who are obsessed with castration, the father, the mother and the phallus and considers unconscious as theatre. Deleuze treats unconscious as a factory for production even as desire operates on ontological and pre-empirical level. Alexander Styhre remarks:

In general, Deleuze operates within what is often called a poststructuralist tradition; Deleuze criticizes the idea of essences, the Cartesian separation between mind and body, and emphasizes creation, novelty, and becoming over criticism and analytical thinking (in the Anglo-American sense). Deleuze

points out in numerous texts that philosophy is aimed at creating new, useful concepts that enables for new forms of thinking.(3)

Deleuze attempts to dismantle Platonism and classical theories of representation through his theory of subjectivity rooted in the concept of radical immanence. Styhre points out: “Following Spinoza’s parallelism, Deleuze does not give primacy to the mind over the body, but rather conceptualise a plane of immanence wherein various bodies (in its broadest sense) are related to one another” (4). Overlooking the transcendental end or finality, there are just movements and changes within the plane of immanence. Styhre continues: “Desire which is the innate force capable of producing changes, is not governed by transcendental values, but instrumental in the becoming and “therefore, the notion of desire operates between the endpoints of being a brute force or a personal dispositional quality” (4).

*Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* sums up Deleuzian approach of philosophy: “The aim of philosophy is not to discover the eternal or the universal, but to find singular conditions under which something new is produced. In other words – and this is a pragmatic perspective from which Deleuze never deviated – philosophy aims at stating the condition of knowledge qua representation, but at finding and fostering the conditions of creative production” (4).Deleuze expounds that desire is positive and

productive and through the exercise of desire, fundamental changes in politics are effected. Desire does not originate from lack – desiring what we do not have – but germinates from the connection with other desires which enables the perpetuation and enrichment of life. The enhancement of desire leads to power and the formation of new socio-political culture and becomes a radical instrument in the materialization of new communities and states.

An individual cannot act unless he is driven by desire which in turn affects will to power. The faculties of desire and will to power become authentic in the individual's self actualization triggering further refinement of his objectives and the production of the mind force that enables the individual to command. Will to power is directed by desire and the presence of strong desire motivates will to power to overcome itself and also to force socio-political reorientation. *Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy* notes:

Desiring production is thus not anthropocentric; it is the very heart of the world. Besides its universal scope, we need to realize two things about desiring-production right away: (1) there is no subject that lies behind the production, that performs the production; and (2) the “desire” in desiring -production is not oriented to making up a lack, but is purely positive. Desiring-production is autonomous, self-constituting, and

creative: it is the *natura naturans* of Spinoza or the will- to- power of Nietzsche. (14)

Will to power is germinated in desire and reaches the ontic state of action in the political. When an idea or a thought comes to the mind, it creates desire in the mind which in the process of development becomes will to power. The earnest attempt of an individual to actualise himself produces will to power which is the higher end of desire. The meaning of existence is made tangible through the progress of desire into will to power where the physical and emotional attains the force of action.

In Deleuze's conception desire becomes abnormal, and excessive, the opposite of rational. It is a dark creative force which has to be controlled and channelized. Deleuze defines desire as neither a psychic existence, nor a lack, but an active and positive reality, an affirmative vital force. Having neither an object nor a fixed subject it is, like labour, a productive endeavour actualisable only through practice.

Desire once transmuted into the higher form of will to power intervenes in reality in that it posits the rational individual as a free causal agent in the real world. Human being is determined to exercise its power of thought and rationality in pursuit of that which will increase its powers. Moira Gatens clarifies: "Human freedom, though not free will, amounts to the power

that one possesses actively to select one's encounters rather than suffer chance association" (166).

For Deleuze, desire is a social force and not an apolitical mental state since it is positive and productive. Thus reinterpreted, desire is regarded not just as experiential feeling, but as a political force able to form societal connections and also to enhance the power of bodies in these connections. Christian Kerlake remarks: "Desire has immanent modes of existence constructed on noble and slave mode of existence in opposition to transcendent moral of good and evil" (3).

Deleuze's reconstruction of Nietzsche's concept of will to power begins with this conception of reality as a field of quanta or quantities of force. These forces are virtual capacities to affect and be affected by other forces which are actualised in their determinate form in a given material. According to Deleuze, forces are essentially related to other forces and the will to power must be understood as the inner principle of the relation between forces. Chance brings particular forces into relation with one another, but will to power determines the character and outcome of the relations between forces: whether a force is primarily active or reactive and which force prevails in a particular encounter given that active forces do not always prevail over reactive forces. In any event, both the dominant and dominated forces are manifestations or expressions of will to power. Taking the differential calculus

as his model, Deleuze argues that the will to power is the differential and genetic element which is realised in the encounter between forces or capacities of different kinds. There is a relation of mutual presupposition between the forces or capacities of particular bodies which are only realised in such encounters and the will to power which is inseparable from the existence and interrelation of particular determinate kinds of force. Paul Patton points out in *Deleuze and Political*: “That is why the will to power is an ‘essentially plastic principle’ that is no wider than what it conditions” (52).

Deleuze’s desire is associated with the psychical, the moral, the social and the political and hence it is material, not transcendental. Desire generates force which overrides the rule of law, to establish a reversal of law which engenders a socio-political action. The force thus generated becomes power. Individual bodies enhance their power through alliances with other bodies. Patton notes in *Deleuze and Political*: “Interpersonal relations such as friendship may involve alliances that reinforce the powers of both parties, but so may political movements or institutional arrangements” (54). Power is the effect of relations between different forces and the power of a body does not mean individual physical strength, but the relations to other bodies. The power of a single body is dispersed in such a manner that power is everywhere, not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from everywhere. Within the terms of the definition of power as a relation between forces, power

relations can take a variety of forms: attraction, repulsion, incorporation, decomposition of one force by another and power is a product of set of actions upon other actions. He continues:

Because human bodies are complex and possess a range of ‘natural’ powers, including the power of imagination, they are capable of many different kinds of interaction with other bodies. The kinds of action of which a human body is capable will depend upon its physical constitution, the enduring social and institutional relations within which it lives, and the moral interpretations which define its acts. In *Daybreak*, Nietzsche points out that moral interpretations of phenomena are among the most important means by which human beings act upon themselves and others: it is by such means that an individual can enjoy his own magnanimity or arouse pity in others. (55)

The nature of social institution and possible forms of action are the expression of new forms of human self interpretation. Patton observes: “Desire is productive in the sense that it produces real connections, investments and intensive states within and between bodies. In this sense, Deleuze and Guattari suggest ‘desire produces reality’ (70)”. Patton agrees that Deleuzian desire and Nietzschean will to power are interlinked:

Whether or not the claim of inspiration is historically accurate with regard to Nietzsche, it is around this affective dimension of the exercise of power that we can trace the outlines of a zone of indiscernability between the Deleuzian concepts of power and desire. For we also noted that Deleuze explicitly aligns his conception of desire with Nietzsche's conception of life as will to power. This implies that, like Nietzsche's expansive force, desire seeks its own enhancement and tends to reproduce itself on an ever-expanding scale. In other words, both Deleuze's concept of desire and his concept of power involve an inner principle of increase. (74)

Another component of the Deleuzian concept of desire which corresponds to Nietzsche's notion of power is the concept of intensity. The principle of increase implies that desire will be enhanced in proportion with the range and degree of intensities available. Freedom is manifest in moments of becoming which is the exercise of radical power, in the personal or the social sense. The self realisation demands that one has a sense of one's identity, of who or what one is, based on which one can discriminate between one's authentic or essential desires and those that are inauthentic or inessential.

Desire is a crucial element in Deleuze's critique of philosophical dualism because it first distinguishes the domain of existence from those transcendent values that arrange it in relation to ordering principles. Psychoanalysis designates desire as the subject's sexuality and turns it into a problem of interpretation. Deleuze attempts to de-sexualise and de-individualise desire breaking away from the traditional approach of psychoanalysis. Ross states: "Sexuality is one flow that enters into conjunction with others in an assemblage. It is not a privileged infrastructure within desiring assemblages, nor an energy able to be transformed, or sublimated into other flows" (65).

Deleuze opposes the association between desire, pleasure and lack since desire is misunderstood as either an insatiable internal lack, or as a process whose goal is self-dissolution in pleasure. He underpins the constructive aspect of desire to make the immanence of ethics in which desire is continuous. Pleasure or lack cannot influence desire since it is an act of plenitude. Desire is connected to the other, the outside, which forms the key ingredient in Deleuzian concept of desire.

Lacan maintains that desire creates the essence of man and the human existence per se. In his psychoanalysis, Lacan talks about desire which is tantamount to the unconscious desire. Dylan Evans notes: "This is not because Lacan sees conscious desire as unimportant, but simply because it is

unconscious desire that forms the central concern of psychoanalysis. Unconscious desire is entirely sexual; ‘the motives of the unconscious are limited...to sexual desire... The other great generic desire, that of hunger, is not represented’ (37). Desire is recognizable when it is expressed in words and in psychoanalysis it becomes mandatory that the subject should be taught to name, to articulate, to bring his desire into existence. Evans explains:

However, it is not a question of seeking a new means of expression for a given desire, for this would imply an expressionist theory of language. On the contrary, by articulating desire in speech, the analysand brings it into existence: That the subject should come to recognise and to name his desire; that is the efficacious action of analysis. But it isn’t a question of recognising something which would be entirely given.... In naming it, the subject creates, brings forth, a new presence in the world. (37)

But it is to be noted that desire cannot be articulated completely in speech because of the basic incongruence between desire and speech which explains the irreducibility of the unconscious. Evans states: “Although the truth about desire is present to some degree in all speech, speech can never articulate the whole truth about desire; whenever speech attempts to articulate desire, there is always a leftover, a surplus, which exceeds speech” (37).

In Lacan's psychoanalysis, the concept of desire is connected to the concepts of 'demand' and 'need' and it led to confusion and criticisms of the psychoanalytic theories of his day. Lacan, in order to overcome the confusion, distinguishes among these three concepts. According to him, need is a purely biological instinct, an appetite which emerges according to the requirements of the organism and which abates completely though temporarily when satisfied. The human subject, who is born in a state of helplessness, depends on the Other to satisfy his needs. Evans points out:

In order to get the Other's help, the infant must express its needs vocally; need must be articulated in demand. The primitive demands of the infant may only be inarticulate screams, but they serve to bring the Other to minister to the infant's needs. However, the presence of the Other soon acquires an importance in itself, an importance that goes beyond the satisfaction of need, since this presence symbolises the Other's love. Hence demand soon takes on a double function, serving both as an articulation of need and as a demand for love. (37)

Despite the fact that the Other can provide the objects which the subject requires to satisfy his needs, the demand for unconditional love of the subject remains unfulfilled. Hence even after the needs which were articulated

in demand have been satisfied, the other aspect of demand, the craving for love, remains unsatisfied, and this leftover is desire. Evans suggests:

Desire is neither the appetite for satisfaction, nor the demand for love, but the difference that results from the subtraction of the first from the second. Desire is thus the surplus produced by the articulation of need in demand; Desire begins to take shape in the margin in which demand becomes separated from need.  
(38)

Desire is continuous and eternal unlike a need, which can be satiated at the point at which it ceases to motivate the subject until another need arises.

There is only one object of desire, ‘object petit a’ and it is the cause of desire as well. Lacan asserts that man’s desire is the desire of the Other. Evans clarifies, “Desire is essentially ‘desire of the Other’s desire’, which means both desire to be the object of another’s desire, and desire for recognition by another” (38). When desire is the desire of the other and not the desire of the other’s body but a desire for recognition, it becomes human. What makes an object desirable is not any intrinsic quality of the thing in itself but simply the fact that it is desired by another.

Deleuze and Guattari separate instinct, need, want and interest which are produced with the appearance of a fixed status and metaphysical pre-

existence in certain social arrangements from desire. The former are real but they are the products of certain machinic social arrangement, desire by contrast, is arrangement itself which means that it is auto-productive. There is no reason to suppose that needs and interest will bear any resemblance to desire. Consequently unconscious desire is produced in such a way that it acts against interest and unconscious wishes. There are innumerable forces that operate in society to thwart desire and creation from coming into existence. Goodchild opines: “Desire is the machinic relation itself, in respect of both its power of coming into existence and the specific multiplicity to which it gives a constituency” (4).

Man is the creation of desire and not of need. Need corresponds to actuality and superfluity, but desire corresponds to potentiality and an individual driven by desire moves from actuality to potentiality. Desire is purpose oriented and the object of desire is the point of departure for action. Desire produces pleasure and culture which is the mark of humanity. Styhre substantiates:

Following Deleuze and Guattari’s idea of conceiving of desire as being the immanent force that produces creativity, novelty, and changes, desire could be pinpointed as the plane of immanence for any motivational theory; without desire, no motivation. Desire produces motivation as it produces subjects.

The assemblage of activities causing pleasure, joy and transgression may seem “theoretical”, abstract, or removed from everyday managerial practices. Organizational and managerial life is firmly grounded in intellectual, instrumental rationalities. Nevertheless, there is no desire isolated from everyday life; it is in the middle, always present. (8)

Deleuze and Guattari discuss society and politics in terms of desire machinic assemblages, becomings, nomadism, forms of capture and processes of deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation. They define machine as a combination of resistant parts, each specialised in function, operating under human control to transmit motion and perform work which is very different from the Anglo-American political theory. Patton remarks in *Deleuze and Political*:

Their conception of freedom is closer to Nietzsche’s ideal of ‘self overcoming’ than it is to ideas of negative or positive freedom. This points to a further difficulty in reading their work as political philosophy, namely that they propose concepts that do not readily map on to even the most enduring fictions of Western political thought. In their social theory as well as in their account of individual subjectivity, Deleuze and Guattari privilege the processes of creative transformation and

the lines of flight along which individuals or groups are transformed into something different to what they were before. They do not refer to individual subjects of freedom or autonomy, much less to notions of contract or consent. Their work is couched entirely in non-subjectivist terms and refers only to abstract lines, movements and processes of various kinds. They appear to be more interested in ways in which society is differentiated or divided than in ways in which it is held together. They are concerned neither with the legitimation of government, nor its delegitimation, but rather with the processes through which existing forms of government of self and others are transformed. (2-3)

Some critics allege them to be the proponents of a new set of anarchist ideas because of their anti-statist and minoritarian political tenor. Man as machine desires to be individualistic; working on its own, creating and recreating new social formations. This could be misconstrued as anarchism. Traditional Anglo-American thinking defines politics as that which inhibits individual preoccupation for the sake of democratic union of the individuals when the private is put down for the public. Patton reads Deleuzian scholar Todd May:

Todd May has suggested that the political perspective which they share with some other poststructuralists such as Foucault and Lyotard may be considered an offshoot of the anarchist tradition. He argues that this new anarchism 'retains the ideas of intersecting and irreducible local struggles, of a wariness about representation, of the political as investing the entire field of social relationships, and of the social as a network rather than a closed holism, a concentric field, or a hierarchy' (May 1994:85). However, May also notes that, in common with other poststructuralist thinkers, Deleuze and Guattari abandon several key assumptions of classical anarchist thought, such as the repressive conception of power and a belief in the essentially benign and cooperative character of human nature. (42)

Deleuze and Guattari emphasize revolutionary becoming rather than a wholesale social change and their approach belies a tactical style of political thought. In tandem with Nietzsche they propose a constructivist conception of philosophy and advocate that philosophers shall not accept concepts as a gift, something to be purified and polished, but create concepts to present them and make them convincing. For them, the creation of new concepts is an inherently political activity whose goal should be not just the recognition of status quo or

its justification, but the absolute deterritorialisation of the present which will then create a new earth and a new people.

Revolution is the social power of difference which also implies the affirmation of an active force and the registering of higher forms of existence, ready to challenge the boundaries, if it has to be done. The realization of higher forms becomes possible through the moments of creative disorder or inspired chaos. Patton continues in *Deleuze and Political*:

If by revolution is meant a rupture with the causal determinations previously at work in a given social field, then ‘only what is of the order of desire and its irruption accounts for the reality this rupture assumes at a given moment, in a given place’ (Deleuze and Guattari 1977:377). By this, they mean more than just that revolutions only occur when the configurations of desire shift in such a way that old allegiances no longer hold sway and authorities can no longer rely on their orders being carried out. They mean that desire must be understood to embody the power of differential reproduction or becoming-other which is the condition of creativity in culture as well as in nature. (70)

Deleuze and Guattari agree that politics of desire is instrumental in making revolution a possibility. Positivity is the dominant feature of the theory of desire outlined in *Anti-Oedipus* where desire is a primary pro-active force and not a reactive response to the unfulfilled need. Desire is productive because it produces real connections, investments and intensive states within and between bodies, in short it produces reality. Desire is constituted by the ever-renewed and impossible attempt to attain a lost object of satisfaction. It is natural that disgruntled desire will be instrumental to the development of phantasmatic satisfactions but the essence of desire is not its dissatisfaction. Deleuze and Guattari termed desire as constructivist in view of the fact that desire always requires a machine or assemblage. Patton states in *Deleuze and Political*: “Desire is present in a given assemblage in the same way that, in a musical work, the principle of composition is present in the silences as much as in the audible sounds: ‘Lack refers to a positivity of desire and not desire to a positivity of lack’” (71).

Desire is, as a matter of fact, not directed at the production of stable subjects whose own conscious desires respect the familial and social order. It is the vital force in the formation of ego and evolvment of the subjects through the action of social codes, family structures and behaviour pattern towards other individuals. Desire produces intensities and the consumption of intensities and subjectivity is the consequence of this process. Desire, which is

treated as a process of production, is a machine or circuit of libidinal energy and it is called a desire-machine.

The emergence of subjectivity is a residual effect of the consumption of intensive states which accompanies the connections and recordings of desire. It is the force that animates the process of connection, encoding and consumption. As the principle of co-function or composition which determines the existence of any machinic assemblage, the concept of Desire echoes Deleuze's account of the will to power as the differential principle of force relations.

Deleuze's concept of power is based on the measure of the capacity of a body to affect other bodies and the capacity to be affected by other bodies, paralleling Nietzsche's theory that Will to Power is manifest both as capacity to affect and capacity to be affected. The Deleuzian concepts of power and desire is built around this affective dimension of the exercise of power and Deleuze explicitly connects his conception of desire with Nietzsche's conception of life as will to power. It becomes clear that, like Nietzsche's expansive force, desire seeks its own enhancement and tends to reproduce itself on an ever-expanding scale. Deleuze's concept of desire and power involve an inner principle of increase. Patton substantiates in *Deleuze and Political*:

From the point of view of the affective dimension of power, this principle of increase implies that a body will be more powerful the more ways in which it can be affected, and the greater its range and degree of sensitivity to different kinds of intensive states. A body will increase in power to the extent that its capacities to affect and be affected become more developed and differentiated. (76)

Increase in a body's power of acting leads to positive affirmation and the decrease in power produces despair and dejection. Nietzsche's concept of feeling of power also supports the affective states which accompany transitions in the state of a body's power in terms of enhancement and depletion. The feeling of power is a sign of our own power to act. If the actions are successful, the feeling of power will be enhanced and when the actions fail, the feeling of power will decrease. The feeling of power is the strongest force in human beings responsible for the creation and destruction of morality and culture. The feeling of power denotes an affect which is associated with a process of becoming, another than what one was before. The enhancement of power stems from activities or forms of engagement with the world and with other bodies, which are inseparable from action upon the actions of others. Deleuze conceived desire as a distinctly revolutionary force which demands endless connections and assemblages.

Ethics, as postulated by Deleuze, is an ethics of freedom described in terms of assemblages, power and desire. The processes of creative transformation and metamorphosis are indispensable for the individual and collective bodies if they want to be transmuted to achieve critical freedom. Patton describes critical freedom in *Deleuze and Political*:

Implicit in this theory is a concept of critical freedom, where ‘critical’ is understood not in the sense that relates to criticism or judgement, but in the technical sense which relates to a crisis or turning point in some process. In these terms, a critical point is an extreme or limit case; a point at which some state or condition of things passes over into a different state or condition. Critical freedom differs from the standard liberal concepts of positive and negative freedom by its focus upon the conditions of change or transformation in the subject, and by its indifference to the individual or collective nature of the subject. By contrast, traditional liberal approaches tended to take as given the individual subject and to define freedom in terms of the capacity to act without hindrance in the pursuit of one’s ends or in terms of the capacity to satisfy one’s most significant desires. (85)

Freedom is the convergence of the individual's capacity to act without fear and inhibition in accordance with his or her fundamental values and the capacity to evaluate and revise those values. Freedom means the courage and capability to enquire into the established canons and question them and challenge in practice one's inherited cultural system. The questioning spirit spurs a profound and pervasive shift in an individual's ultimate mission. Freedom reinvigorates an individual to transgress the limits of what one is presently capable of being or doing.

For Deleuze and Guattari, deterritorialization and reterritorialization are used to characterize a constant process of transformation and they are interrelated. Deterritorialisation is defined as the movement or process through which constituent elements break off from a specified and prearranged territory. Deterritorialisation is physical, mental or spiritual and it is a movement producing change which indicates the creative potential of an assemblage. It frees up the fixed relations that contain a body all the while exposing it to new organisations. It is the process of undoing what has already been done which causes reterritorialization. Reterritorialization is the process of re-doing what has been undone to what has already been done where the act of re-doing is to incorporate new power. For Patton, "Reterritorialisation does not mean returning to the original territory, but rather refers to the ways in

which deterritorialised elements recombine and enter into new relations in the constitution of a new assemblage or the modification of the old” (102).

Political interaction leads to the disorganisation and subsequent re-organisation of society. Deleuze and Guattari state that the purpose of revolutionary task is to realise the machinic status of the subjectivity, and to turn it against oppressive and regressive forces for the construction of new institutions with new aims.

The life of an individual becomes a challenge when he is confronted with revolutionary task because the ontological questions of how one should live and act has more often than not ended in a history of despair and dejection. Man is timid and fails to assert his rights before authorities who represent power. Every man castigates himself with a transcendent, be it God or the Good that he can never achieve and whose only function is to reinforce that very castigation. Todd May states:

We define ourselves not by what we might create but by what we might hold back from creating; we are our self-denial. In the meantime, what we might be capable of goes not only unanswered but unasked. Those who have the temerity to ask are quickly silenced or removed to the social margins. (7)

The life of an individual becomes meaningful with the growth of individualism and the eradication of inequality which shape the course of one's life. Nietzsche says that, it is the death of God and the subsequent disappearance of transcendence that reopens the questioning spirit of human beings to enlarge their lives beyond the limits of fixed history. With the death of God man can realise his capacity to make himself in this world where he inhabits. Dreams and projects which are denied in the name of a transcendence that judges the lives, become active and free the individual for noble action on earth.

Deleuze followed Nietzsche's philosophy that the question of how one might live is opened up by the death of God, the ontological transcendence that sets free human thought and action. May writes about Nietzschean influence on Deleuze:

Deleuze is no exception. He can be read as a straightforward disciple of Nietzsche. His concepts can be interpreted as extensions of Nietzsche's, from immanence to difference to nomadism. Deleuze's anti-conformism sometimes seems, even to Deleuze, to be of a piece with Nietzsche's. "Marx and Freud," Deleuze writes, "perhaps, do represent the dawn of our culture, but Nietzsche is something entirely different: the dawn of counterculture" (58).

Deleuze's use of Nietzschean concepts reopened Nietzschean reading and Deleuze formed his concepts as apparent re-inscriptions of Nietzsche's philosophy. May adds:

Nietzsche is Deleuze's Holy Ghost. The two are brothers in spirit, even where they are not philosophers of the same concepts. They are fellow travellers, fellow nomads, even where Deleuze's own interpretation – or appropriation – of a Nietzschean concept inverts the interpretation we have come to associate with it. As is the case with the eternal return. (58)

Deleuze's studies on Nietzsche was an affirmation which meant an unburdening, not burdening, of life with the weight of higher values. His attempt was to create new values of life and make life light and active. Nietzsche's distinction between active and reactive forces enabled him not to segregate between active and reactive. Active force goes to the limit of its power and engages in action that it can perform to the extent of its ability. Social changes are executed by the exercise of active forces and hence they are creative. May explicates:

Active forces are creative, because they seek to exercise themselves, to make whatever can be made of themselves.

What gets created is not only up to the active force. It also

concerns the context in which that force expresses itself and its own ability to reach its limit. The universe does not necessarily cooperate with active forces, which means that their creativity may be channelled in unexpected directions, or even undermined altogether. All creativity is an experiment. (66)

Active forces may also be destructive as destruction is creative in Deleuzean insight. It is not out of hatred or malice but out of the joy of going to the limit that active forces are engaged in creative destruction. Reactive forces threaten active forces and impede creation. May comments:

If active forces go to the limit of their power, create through their self-expression, reactive forces operate by cutting active forces off from their own power. Reactive forces do not overcome active forces; they undermine them. They do not create; they stifle the creativity of active forces. (66)

Affirmation of creativity demands experimentations that the future would offer to an individual rather than clinging to the illusory identity offered by the present. The prospect of pain will not intimidate an individual who is capable of creativity because creation is liberation and joy and affirmation. In the process of affirmation there is no sadness, resentment, pangs of

conscience, or self-denial, instead the opposite of it all suffice the life of the one who is involved in it. Deleuze writes in *Nietzsche and Philosophy*:

Against this fettering of the will Nietzsche announces that willing liberates; against the suffering of the will Nietzsche announces that the will is joyful. Against the image of a will which dreams of having established values attributed to it Nietzsche announces that to will is to create new values. (85)

The idea of affirmation and creation is palpable with the belief that there is only one world, one substance and a single being not governed or judged by a world or Being outside it. There is no transcendence called God, essence, the good or truth which is considered as a value superior to life.

Deleuze and Guattari developed their own political theory through their critique of Freudian and Lacanian desire, studying individuals in terms of the political (lack), which broke away from psychoanalytic argument that desire was chasing a missing mother figure. The lack is not within individuals, it lies in the disjunction between their interests and the environment where the environment does not immediately provide the resources to realize their interests. If there were no lack, in this sense, there would be no motivation to fulfil the interest. The individuals need others to satisfy their desires or realize their interests and the idea of lack is central to liberal political theory,

motivating the social contract. It is what binds the fates of individuals to the fates of other individuals.

Machines do not operate out of lack nor strive to fulfil needs. They produce connections which are not pre-given and the operation of machines is productive though unpredictable. The machine acts as a central political concept of the new form of thought Deleuze develops. May elaborates:

It imports into politics three characteristics of Deleuze's general ontology. First, machines retain Deleuze's concept of difference as positive rather than negative. Recall his critique of traditional concepts of difference. Difference is subordinated to identity; difference is what is not identical. This is difference seen as lack: difference is the lack of identity, the privation of sameness. But difference does not have to be cast in the role of lack or negativity. The appeal of the concept of difference to Deleuze is that if one can conceive it positively rather than negatively, it shows that there is more to the world than meets the eye. That is how machines function. In their distinction from mechanisms, machines are mobile producers of connections. They are not reducible to any one set of connections, any particular identity. Even when they are connected in a particular way they are capable of other

connections and other functions. We can call this the Nietzschean character of machines. (125)

Machines when connected with other machines actualize new moments of the virtual. Machines are more powerful in group than being single where groups do not stifle and remain chained. Deleuze compares creativity with the life of nomads who are known for their restlessness and strange adventures. May notes: “They seek. They seek not to something, because there is not a something to be found. There is no transcendence to comfort them. They seek not to discover but to connect. Which is to say they seek to create” (150). Nomads live to discover new lands and are not afraid of the risk involved in their journey. Deleuze equated creators with nomads, the minorities in search of adventures; and to become a nomad one has to connect with the marginalized movements in the social body.

To be on the side of the minor it is to disrupt the majoritarian identity to investigate new possibilities, new ways of becoming, unaffected by the dominant molar structures, to reinterpret the real obscured by the molar lines of the majority and to break with identity of the majority for self actualization. Social changes are implemented through the deterritorialisation of existing structures and their reterritorialisation.

Desiring production is social production achieved through continuous coordination and control of the flow of matter and desire in non-state societies governed by the territorial machine with its systems of alliance and filiations. This machinic ontology presents a world of interconnected machinic assemblages born through the deterritorialisation of existing assemblages and their reterritorialisation in new forms. The deterritorialisation and reterritorialisation work in such a way that the minoritarian becomings take radical ascendancy over majoritarian being.

Bell defines the philosophy of immanence: “Put simply, a philosophy of immanence is an attempt to understand the emergence of identities, whether social, political, individual, ontological, etc., in a manner that does not entail a condition that transcends the conditioned” (2). A philosophy of immanence emphasises that the condition is in the conditioned. Bell speaks about Spinoza’s view on God and nature “God is Nature (*Deus sive Natura*), or the condition (God) is in and inseparable from the conditioned (Nature)” (3). What defines an immanent cause is that, its effect is in it which means that the creation contains the creator. Immanence is the equality of being, or the non-hierarchical nature of reality. Bell states; “Deleuze is clear on this point: “From the viewpoint of immanence the distinction of essence does not exclude, but rather implies, an equality of being: it is the same being that

remains in itself in the cause, and in which the effect remains as in another thing” (3).

Deleuze categorically denies Plato who said that the form is the condition that is beyond the conditioned and transcends it. An immanent condition is higher because it contains the conditioned within it, not as an inferior imitation but as a modification of the being of the condition itself. Desire is far from being predetermined by identity and it is understood to be the multiplicity that produces identities. The desiring-production is pure multiplicity, an affirmation that is irreducible to a unity. For Deleuze desire is a force that causes the production of an identity and it entails the desiring-productions that elude and transgress the limits set forth by an assemblage.

Desire is termed a multiplicity in the sense that it operates as an immanent cause and during the operation it does not reduce itself to a predetermined unity of the one or the multiple. The irreducibility occurs because it operates without the predetermining causation, also called emanate causation, of the one or the multiple. Desiring-production is forever a two-fold assemblage (assemblages), an assemblage with two sides. On one side there are the identifiable elements and on the other the non-identifiable; one side which allows for the constitution of identity and the other which constantly undermines and dismantles these identities. Desire is inseparable from complex assemblages which are connected to molecular levels and from

micro-formations which shape postures, attitudes, perceptions, expectations, semiotic systems, etc. Bell remarks:

Desire is an assemblage. As such the products and identities that are inseparable from desire forever subject to the undermining effects of nomadic flows, lines of flight, that transgress the segments and cause a transformation of the assemblages. This is the creativity of desire, the possibility it has to transform assemblages, whether they be political, artistic, philosophical, etc. (13)

For Deleuze and Guattari, the abstract machines of desire and power define the nature of a given society, the concept of desire becoming the tangible source of the process of production.

Deleuze's political theory signifies that there is no social entity that transcends the desires, interests, and freedoms of individuals. Individuals are also not treated as transcendent predetermined unities because both the individual entities and social entities are constructs; they are assemblages. Deleuzian political theory prefers the revolutionary to a reformer.

The term revolutionary is different from revolutions as revolutions are destined to come to a bad end. In *Nietzsche and Philosophy* Deleuze admits that:

It is said that revolutions have a bad future, . . . one never ceases to confuse to choices, the future of revolutions in history and the becoming revolutionary of the people. They are not the same people in the two cases. The only chance for man is in becoming revolutionary, for only then can the shame be averted so that one can respond to the intolerable. (22)

Deleuze's creative-function allows for the emergence of identifiable assemblages and that which assures the transformation of these assemblages, consequently becoming revolutionary entails becoming creative. It entails tapping into a line of flight, shamelessly asking the right questions, in order to transform the system or assemblage of power. Deleuze's distinction between becoming a reformer and becoming a revolutionary is worth study. The aim of reformers is to establish what is believed to be a pure, true unity. A conservative or reactionary reformer strives to re-establish a past unity that has been lost, like traditional morals, to a true religious faith and practice. A liberal and radical reformer stands for the realization of a better future condition than the one at present. But Deleuze defines revolutionary change as that which brings in an unlimited immanent system which will continually create and encourage a multiplicity of desires. The revolutionary desire will undermine and transform the immanent normalized and homogenized system to allow endless multiplicity of desires. Becoming revolutionary demands

predominantly the becoming revolutionary of the molecular segments which will cease desiring the normalization and homogenization of an individual.

Deleuze maintains that the societies of control act as impediment to the creativity because they presuppose that they are real sources of creativity and resist desires and beliefs of becoming revolutionary by posing counter desires and beliefs. Deleuze and Guattari explicate in *Anti-Oedipus*:

The fact that there is massive social repression that has an enormous effect on desiring- production in no way vitiates our principle: desire produces reality, or started another way, desiring production is one and the same thing as social production. It is not possible to attribute a special form of existence to desire, a mental or psychic reality that is presumably different from the material reality of social production. Desiring – machines are not fantasy – machines or dream- machines, which supposedly can be distinguished from technical and social machines. (32)

Assemblage theory allows us to re-think cultural appropriation bringing into light the transformative potentials of the event in question, as opposed to the fixed moralistic conclusions already drawn. Shifting our perspective to theorise the role of assemblages and their affective dimensions

will transform our capacity to act by virtue of bringing new ideas to surface. Further, experimenting with assemblage may help move an individual towards an immanent ethic in which a new imperative calls out: to increase our capacity to affect and be affected, to open ourselves to transformation. In this sense, it can be said that the challenge to dominant modes of thinking provided by assemblage opens up a productive theoretical dimension. What assemblage theory can do is yield surprising results that point toward new directions for matters as diverse as political strategies and popular culture.