CHAPTER - III

IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATION IN CULTURE

Ideologies map the political and social worlds. Nothing is done without ideology because individuals cannot act without making sense of the world he/she inhabited. Making sense let it to be said, does not always mean making well or right sense. But ideologies will often contain a lot of common sense. At any degree, political facts never speak for themselves. Through diverse ideologies, humans provide competing interpretations of what the facts might mean. Every interpretations, each ideologies, is one such instance of imposing a pattern-some form of structure or organization – on how to read political facts (material), events, occurrences, actions or how to see image and hear voice. Ideological maps to denote an objective, external reality.

The initial coiner of the term ‘ideology’ Antonie Destutt de Tracy, writing in the aftermath of French Revolution, intended to create a proper breach of study concerned with ideas. He sought to establish ideas of thought and action on an empirically verifiable basis form which both the criticism of ideas and a science of ideas would emerge. That enterprise was very much in line with the positivist movement in 19th century France, which held out the possibility of studying society with the precise tools
characteristic of a natural science. As he said: “It is an appropriate name, because it does not hint of anything doubtful or unknown; it does not bring to any mind any idea of cause. Its meaning is very clear to all, if only that of the French word ‘idea’ is considered, for everyone knows what he means by an ‘idea’, though few people know what it really is. This is appropriate, for ‘ideology’ is the literal translation of the science of ideas”.

In its widest sense, the term ideology signifies a set of ideas ranging from one desiring no change in prevailing order to another crying for a total transformation of society. Likewise, it contains the rejection of one and the justification of another set of ideology as an ‘utopia’ or a ‘false consciousness’. The ideas may also be in a form of explanation of some fact, or a justification of some claim or a quest for some truths or a manifestation of some convictions and the like. In other words, ideology refers to an ‘action related system’ of political ideas in the sense that there are sets of structures and relationships. Ideology consists of commitment and action as a part of the political process. It ‘may or may not’, hold a logical or philosophical character, i.e., a content without which it cannot be described as ideology -a guide to direct political action.

S. E. Finer explains, an ideology “is a system of thought which has been intellectually worked out and organized usually in written form by scholars and intellectuals with their help, mentality denotes a way of
thinking and feeling which is more emotional than rationalized- something like a cast of mind”.²

3.1 Some Characteristics of Ideology

a. Ideology is not the same as values and attitudes of the political culture. It is both a program for action and an instrument of evaluation. It is a response to and a means of defending or changing existing political system; it provides a language to conduct an examination of political process.

b. It is not the content of the ideologies alone that distinguishes one from another; it is the function of the ideology within the political and cultural system that creates differentiation. Ideological emphasis is a significant characteristic of the totalitarian states, but in liberal democracies the role of the underlying ideologies is often less obtrusive but no less important in different respects.

c. Ideologies do change, but this is not necessarily due to their being ‘corrupted’ or the ‘death’ of their role in a political process, nor is the changes simply the result of political opportunism. An ideology is impossible to translate directly into practice; there was to be accommodation to political realities, a translation which may result in ideological splits between ideologies need ‘enemies’ to establish their credibility.
d. Ideologies may be classified according to their role in relation to the political system as rightest or leftist, reactionary or progressive, conservative or revolutionary, reformist or radical and the like. No political system is, however absolutely free from the bond of ideology. It is a different thing that the adherents to the ideology of liberalism may claim and cry for the ‘end of ideology’.

e. It is the ideology that constitutes the keystone of the arch of a political party or a group. It may found that a scuffle between two groups or between two countries is conducted within the framework of ideological arguments.

f. An ideology being a set of ideas connect sustain itself if it stems from faith. Since it rejects metaphysical and abstract notions, it should be based on proper scientific analysis, and political action should be directed towards the objective requirements of the society. Political action should aim at determining the interests of various social groups and not the subjective opinion of any individual or group of elites.

g. Ideology has become an instrument where by the leaders motivate people to take part in political action, or they accord the character of ‘legitimacy’ to their political system. Moreover, others beat their opponents with the stick of their own more or less persistent and integrated doctrines a set of which constitutes their own ideology.
It is said that all powerful political ideas of our time are almost part of some ideology or other – a fact that makes the modern period an ‘age of ideology’. The result is that ideology means different things to different persons. For instance, while the liberals lay emphasis on the values of liberty, equality, justice and humanism, the Marxist look down upon ideology and desire to expunge it from the society.

If ideologies are the sets of norms and values that dominate each society as well as its each section, they cover a wide spectrum ranging from a loose variety relying largely on economic freedom and glorified pattern of the way of life to a rationalized and intolerant one smoking of a mental interim unwillingness to go beyond the established frame of reference.

3.2 Marxist Interpretation

Marx and Engels responded to the existing cultural and philosophical approaches they had experienced and stated in the book *Germen Ideology*. They argued that German philosophers simply fought against phrases rather than coming to terms with the real world. One of these attributed independent existence of ideas, thought and consciousness when attempting to exchange illusory thought for correct thought. Philosophy thus concealed reality and adopted the form of what Marx and Engels called ideology. They maintained that ‘in all ideology men and their circumstances appear upside-downs in a camera obscure’. By that similarity they projected that ideology was an inverted mirror-image of the material world. The fact is
that the material world itself subject to dehumanizing social relations with
the contradictions. The illusory world created by the ideology itself making
them appear as necessary, normal and congruous. That way social unity
could be maintained and enhanced. Ideology was sublimation- in its several
guises such as morality, religion and metaphysics- of material life. Ideology
was also distributed by those who expert in the mental activity of
submission: priest offering ‘salvation’ was an early example of that
‘emancipation’ from the real world. The distribution could be an act of
deliberate manipulation. For Engels - it is an unconscious, or self-
deceptive, process. Ideology was the manifestation of the malicious effects
of the division of labour.

Another view of ideology proposed by Marx and Engels had further
dimension from the earlier and which was to be highly significant. They
related ideology and class, stating that the ruling ideas of the society were
the ideas of the ruling class. Ideological illusions were an instrument in the
hands of the rulers, through the state and other institutions, they were
engaged to exercise the control and domination; indeed to ‘manufacture
history’ according to their interests. Ideology itself is to be represented as
truth-claims that possessed universal, rational validity. That representation
assisted the wielders of ideology in falsifying the myth of a unified political
community, through illusory laws, cultural direction and ‘verbal
masquerading’, that is the power over language.
The members of the subservient class - the proletariat believed that the dominant bourgeois ideology was theirs as well. The controller of human conduct and thought even convinced this ideology to the people of subservient class - the proletariat. An exploited worker naturally believed that it was a good idea to get up in the morning and work 14 hours for a pittance in his/her employer’s factory. He/ She had internalized the ideological view that such dehumanizing work was a free act on their part. Ideology thus concentrated on external appearances, not on a real understanding of what was essential. The abnormal becomes normal through ideological sleight of hand and through commodities and the markets in which they are circulate.

In his later work, Capital - Marx focused on the actual capitalist practices from which ideology emanated, rather than on the distorted ideas of philosophers and ideologues. Understandably, a major mission of what later becomes known as Marxism was to remark and demystify the dissimulative nature of ideology. The critical exposition of ideology would expose the false aspiration of its promoters and install instead a set of whole some social practice provided the empirical basis of true social consciousness.

Ideology was the product of a number of basis. One was the need for simplified and easily marketable accounts of the world around us. A second was the desire of some individual and groups for power and control over
others. A third was a growing tendency to breakup human activity in to
different compartments – the division of labour – and to alienate thought
and action from each other. Ideology reinforced all that and it kept societies
in a state of ignorance and suffering. One might justifiably conclude that
Marxism accorded ideas considerable power, and so it did – to ideas that
appeared in the form of ideology. But for Marx such concentrated power
was wrong, as it blocked the possibility of human emancipation.

In Marxist theory of ideology, they depend on the important
difference between true consciousness and distorted or false beliefs. In
order to claim that our understanding of the (political) world is based on an
illusion, and must be confident that non-illusory knowledge is attainable.
Marx supposed that truth would emerge once falsehood was removed. In
other words, that true human and material relation were both a default
position that was covered by social and ideological distortions and a
scientifically anticipated outcome of future social development.

Another is about those arguments based on the fleeting nature of
ideology. If ideology is a distortion, it will disappear once true social
relations have been (re)introduced. And if it consolidated a power
relationship between ruling and ruled classes, once it will disappear such
power relationship are transformed in to a democratic sense of social
community and equality. So ideology is dispensable; it is a pathological
product of historical conditions and it will wither away when they progress.
The Marxist view of ideology has contributed to a unitary understanding of ideology. If ideology is really an unfortunate smokescreen that cover-up reality, the faster we dispose of it the better. For many Marxists, ideology is part of a ‘superstructure’ that has no intrinsic value. As a result, their approach to ideology has discouraged any interest in the nature and variation of the covering smokescreen.

Another side of the unitary character of Marxist ideology is that ideologies are a part of a single, even total, account of the political world. They are the linchpin that holds together a seamless view of the world, papering over its internal contradictions. This image of co-ordinated totality prevailed for a long time in portrayals of ideology contributing to its inclusive nature and to an insistence by some ideologists that they were infallible.

The role of ideologists has been exaggerated. Although Marxist logic points to the social Provence of ideology, its source has frequently turned out to be much smaller than an entire class. The Marxist linking of ideology to power relations as well as to the manipulation of the masses has often resulted in the identification of a professional group of ideologies, and even in the detection of the impact of single individuals. For some scholars, ideologies are intellectual with a dangerous sense of mission namely, to change the world according to a specific absolute vision. The Marxist theory of class assists in supporting such views, though the intellectuals
that figure in those theories sometimes act independently, less determined by their own material bases then Marxist assume. The association of ideology with such intellectuals was also contributed to the commonly held view that ideologies are a priory, abstract, and non-empirical.

Besides the Marxist concept, ideas and ideologies are assumed as the product of groups. They are also part of the control situation that shapes, and is shaped by our activities. Second, ideas matter. Marx may have seen the current domain of ideology as a harmful illusion, but even in that sphere the implication is that ideas are not merely rhetorical. If ideas appear not only as truths but in such commanding guises as ideology, they need to be taken very seriously indeed and accorded an even more central role than Marx himself had done. Third, ideologies endowed with crucial political functions. They order the social world, direct it towards certain activities, and legitimate or illegitimate its practices. Ideologies exercise power, at the very best by creating a framework within which decisions can be taken and make sense. That power doesn’t have to be exploitative or dehumanizing, but then only some anarchists would argue that power-even as an enabling phenomenon- can be dispensed with completely. Fourth, the Marxist method has left something of importance even to non-Marxist. It is simply, that what you see is not always what you get.
3.3 The Social Roots of Ideology

Societies had several different social groups and class situations; therefore, such multiplicity of ‘ways of thinking’ could produce more than one ideology. This pluralist potential of ideologies becomes very important in later theories of ideologies. The key insight of Karl Mannheim (1883-1947) was sociological, for him, ideology was a reflection of all historical and social environments. Marx fated the social conditions under capitalism as the source of ideological illusion, which Mannheim realized that it was a feature of any social environment to influence the thought processes of human beings and, moreover, that knowledge was ‘a co-operative process of group life’. In those acute senses, ideology was not a passing fantasy. In his opinion ideology is; “The total conception of ideology raises a problem which has frequently been adumbrated before, but which now for the first time acquires broader significance, namely the problem of how such a thing as the ‘false consciousness’ (falsches Bewusstsein) – the problem of the total distorted mind which falsifies everything which comes within the range – could ever have arisen. It is the awareness that our total outlook as distinguished from its details may be distorted, which lends to the total conception of ideology a special significance and relevance for the understanding of our social life.”

Ideology was not only employed to manipulate intentionally those under its control. He also emphasized the unconscious beliefs that guided
human thinking, as well as the irrational foundations of knowledge. After all, social groups operate on the basis of shared rituals, prejudices, stories and histories—elements that ideologies incorporate. For, Mannheim, ideology had both social and psychological manifestation. “At first, in the course of this ever-deepening disintegration, native distrust becomes transformed into a systematic particular notion of ideology, which however, remains on the psychological plane.”

It is quite difficult to see ourselves from a different viewpoint and note the customs and habits that we internalize unthinkingly and uncritically. At a more advanced stage of social developments the unconscious and the irrational could be unmasked. It needs a rational approach to justify them. The effectiveness of that unmasking was often limited. Mannheim began his understandings by adopting the Marxist view of ideology as the obscuring of the real condition of society by the interest of a ruling class. But to this static view of ideology he added the parallel notion of Utopia. Utopia was a vision of a future of perfect society, held by oppressed groups, who bent on changing and destroying existing society, saw only its negative aspects and were blind to the situation as it really was.

For Mannheim, there are two types of ideologies ‘particular and total’. According to Mannheim, “The particular conception of ideology is implied when the term denotes we are skeptical of the ideas and representations advanced by our opponent. They are regarded as more or
less conscious disguise of the real nature of a situation, the true recognition of which would not be in accord with his interest”.  

He further adds that:

“The particular conception of ideology therefore signifies a phenomenon intermediate between a simple lie at one pole, and an error, which is the result of a distorted and faulty conceptual apparatus, at the other. It refers to a sphere of errors, psychological in nature, which unlike deliberate deception, are not intentional, but follow inevitably and unwittingly from certain causal determinates”.

Mannheim related it to specific arguments, more or less deliberately misrepresented by individuals. But the total conception of ideology was a weltanschauung, an all-encompassing view of the world adopted by a given group, always reflecting the general ideas and thought-systems of a historical epoch. In acknowledging the holistic nature of the total conception of ideology, Mannheim was working his way towards understanding it in an ordered and systematic way. For him total conception of ideology is; “This conception of ideology, which has only gradually become differentiated from the commonsense notion of the lie, is particular in several senses. Its particularity becomes evident when it is contrasted with the more inclusive total conception of ideology. Here we refer to the ideology of an age or of a concrete historico-social group, e. g. of a class, when we are concerned with the characteristics and composition of the total structure of the mind of this epoch or of this group”.
interdependent structure of thinking, typical of social systems that could not be reduced to the aggregated and psychologically comprehensible view of concrete individuals.

A ‘total’ conception of ideology indicated the broad origins of ideology in group and even mass attitudes and views. This, Mannheim believed, was a gradual process. In his opinion; “The second stage in the development of the total conception of ideology is attained when the total but super-temporal notion of ideology is seen in historical perspective - this is mainly the accomplishment of Hegel and Historical school”.

An intelligentsia was a group ‘whose special task it is to provide an interpretation of the world’ for this society. As society's evolved and social mobility increased, the members of an intelligentsia began to be recruited from a more varied social background. They were no longer associated with a determined and closed body. For Mannheim an intellectual was not necessarily a person of education or culture, but one who could detach herself or himself from their conditioning social background and ‘free float’ among the different social and historical perspective a valuable in their society.

It was only with the developments of the total conception of ideology that the sociology of knowledge could surface. He stated, “The final and most important step in the creation of the total conception of ideology
likewise arose out of the historical-social process. When ‘class’ took the place of ‘folk’ or nation as the bearer of the historically evolving consciousness, the same theoretical tradition to which we have already referred, absorbed the realization which are while had grown up through the social process- namely- that the structure of society and its corresponding intellectual form vary with the relations between social class”.

That allowed the term ideology to shift in its meaning from being ‘simply’ designated as a means of exercising or resisting political domination to bring a critical analytical tool that made sense of ideological arguments themselves. The question was no longer merely what ideologies did, but what kind of thinking ideology was.

In his book *Ideology and Utopia*, we can witness the approaches and concept of ideology, in this he says, “Both these conceptions of ideology, accordingly, make these so-called ‘ideas’ a function of him who holds them, and of his position in his social milieu. Although they have something in common, there are also significant differences between them. Of the latter we mention merely the most important:

(a) Whereas the particular conception of ideology designates only a part of the opponent’s assertions as ideologies-and this only with reference to their content, the total conception calls into question the opponent's total Weltanschauung (including his conceptual apparatus), and
attempts to understand these concepts as an outgrowth of the collective life of which he partakes.

(b) The particular conception of ‘ideology’ makes its analysis of ideas on a purely psychological level. If it is claimed for instance that an adversary is lying, or that he is concealing or distorting a given factual situation, it is still nevertheless assumed that both parties share common criteria of validity. It is still assumed that it is possible to refute lies and eradicate sources of error by referring to accepted criteria of objective validity common to both parties.

(c) Corresponding to this difference, the particular conception of ideology operates primarily with a psychology of interests, while the total conception uses a more formal functional analysis without any reference to motivations, confining itself to an objective description of the structural differences in minds operating in different social settings. The former assumes that this or that interest is the cause of a given lie or deception. The latter presupposes simply that there is a correspondence between a given social situation and a given perspective, point of view, or apperception mass.”

Ideologies, he observed were always changing and dynamic, and so was knowledge. Ideas could be studied objectively; more significantly, they could be generated objectively; as knowledge of social reality. Mannheim
believed that a group of individuals capable of rising above this class and historical context would break the hold of the ideologies emanating from that context. He assumed that the intelligentsia would all arrive at a single point of agreement, and that such a point would be non-ideological. Mannheim clearly wanted to avoid a situation in which all ideological positions assert their exclusive worth, and he anticipated instead ‘a new type of objectivity’.

In order to realize political thought, much of it had to be approached and interpreted as ideology, a product of historical and social circumstances. Marx had applied the critical core of his notion of ideology to eliminating its distortion of reality. Mannheim applied the critical core of his notion of ideology to highlighting the impermanent and malleable nature of all human thought.

3.4 Antonio Gramsci: The Turn towards Culture Criticism

The contribution of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist theorist and activist (1891-1937) to the exploration of ideology is indicated in ways both different from and parallel to Mannheim’s. Gramsci modified the Marxist understanding of the term ‘ideology’ active within a broadly Marxist tradition. He defined the concept of ideology through his concept of hegemony. In his opinion the Ideological hegemony could be exercised by a dominant class, the bourgeoisie, not only through using state force but through various cultural means and actions. According to him “The
separation of powers, together with all discussion provoked by its realization and the legal dogmas which its appearance brought in to being, is a product of the appearance brought in to being is a product of the struggle between civil society and political society in a specific historical period. This period is characterized by a certain unstable equilibrium between the classes which is a result of the fact that certain categories of intellectual are still too closely tied to the old dominant class”.

Gramsci shifted ideology away from being merely a tool of the state. Ideology is produced and functioned in society, the province of non-state individual and group activity. The intellectuals appeared as the major formulators and conductors of ideology and as non-governmental leaders using cultural authority. Their permeation of social life was naturally based on the manufacturing of consent among the population at large, so that the masses would regard their own assent as spontaneous. That process of forming consent—which Gramsci termed leadership as distinct from domination- necessarily preceded, and paved the way for the dominance exercised through governmental power. Gramsci was therefore inclined to sharpen the distinction between ideologies as a more unconscious one for its consumers.

One insightful move forward of Gramsci’s in investigating ideological hegemony was his sensitivity to its importance. The formation of hegemony involved the co-ordination of different interests and their
ideological expressions, so that an all-embracing group-possibly society as a whole, world be emerged. Hegemony creates compromises - an equilibrium that took some account of the subordinate groups.

Gramsci saw the concept of hegemony as a great advance, both philosophical and political towards a critical and unified understanding of reality. In the course of historical process a new intellectual and moral orders could evolve, an ‘autonomous and superior culture’ with ‘more refined and decisive ideological weapons. Gramsci’s theory of hegemony tries to raise some questions Marx had left unasked. What are the forms of that ideological control takes? What are the relationship, and the difference between ideological and political domination? Can we account for the multiplicity of ideologies, and for their rise and fall? In what sense, if any, do people choose to believe in an ideology? With these questions the agenda, a range of possible answers would be proved during the remainder of the 20th century.

Gramsci’s concept of hegemony not with-standing, its role is retrospectively more important for another aspect of analyzing ideology- as against the abstract and complex nature of Marxist conception of ideology, exposed as a way of concealing and inhibiting correct social practice in the world. Ideology might refer as a thought practice; this simply means a frequent pattern of (political) thinking, one for which there is evidence in the lies in our actions and utterance. Our thought-practices interment with
and inform material and observable practices and acts. Sometimes it makes more sense to trace a movement from theory to practice; at other times the theory can be extracted from the practices itself.

For example, a belief in free choice is a recurring pattern among liberals, applied to numerous situations such as voting, shopping, or choosing a partner. In the case of voting it can be held as a conscious general ideological principle. Voting is deliberate exercise of political choice at the heart of liberal ideologies, linked to the core notion of consent. Shopping is an involvement in economic free-market transaction, though shoppers are really aware that their practice denotes the principle of free-trade. Selecting a partner for emotional and sexual relationship is a conscious ideological thought-practice only when put in the context of arranged marriages. Otherwise it is an ideologically unconscious practice that has to be decoded by analysts as an embodiment of the voluntary principle. The outcome of all this is to see ideologies are situated in concrete activities, not as floating in a stratosphere high above them. The contradiction between doing and thinking is challenged, for thinking is an activity that shows its own regularities. Political thinking is evident in reflection on how to organize collective behaviour, but it may also be recovered through unpacking empirically observable acts.
3.4.1 Gramsci on philosophy

Marx and Engels had discussed German philosophy as a metaphysical form of ideology, practiced by a few professionals. Gramsci wanted to bring philosophy down to earth by signifying that most people were philosophers in so far as they engaged in practical activity, actually constrained by views of the world they inhabited. At a knock, Gramsci interpreted philosophy and reintegrated it into the normal thought-processes of individuals. In the *Prison Note Books*, Gramsci endure a firm belief in the authority of the ‘philosophy of praxis’ as a body of enduring truth which “at the level of theory…cannot be confronted with or reduced to any other philosophy”.\(^\text{12}\) Meanwhile the philosophy of the praxis is the best dependable guide to human action, Gramsci considers philosophical activity as a universal system of education, as well as a developing process designed to create a system of Marxist social ideals to be achieved by all men in a society marked by advanced political and economic institutions. In Gramsci’s view philosophy is a partisan, class determined enterprises since, in his words: “According one’s conception of the world one always belongs to a particular grouping which is that of all the social elements which share the same mode of thinking and acting”.\(^\text{13}\) This shows that Gramsci blindly follows Lenin’s dictum that ‘modern philosophy is just as partisan today as it was thousand year’s age’.

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In Gramsci’s stand, “It is essential to destroy the wide spread prejudice that philosophy is a strange and difficult thing just because it is the specific intellectual activity of a particular category of specialists or of professional and systematic philosophers”.\textsuperscript{14} It is this prejudice, Gramsci asserts that contributes to the reputation of philosophy as the domain of long, complex arguments and of extremely technical and metaphysical interpretations of man’s existence, many a times discovered from social reality as we know it.

He did this, however, while retaining a threefold structure of political thought. There were individual philosophies created by philosophers; broader philosophical culture articulated by leading groups; and popular ‘religions’ of faith. The second type was an embodiment of hegemony, and displayed the features of coherence and critiques that hegemonic form among the masses, for which general conception of the world emerged in sudden and fragmented plashes. Importantly for Gramsci, each of these three levels of could be combined in changing propositions to produce a different ideological cocktail. The philosophical and the ideological began to evaporate the moment and the political thought was situated in the concrete world and directed at it.

Gramsci put an end to that, in most of its aspects, the common sense of the popular masses is incapable of truthfully knowing the world: “The popular element ‘feels’ but does not always know or understand”.\textsuperscript{15} This
insufficient system of things, Gramsci describes is because the common sense of the subordinate group is actually ‘sedimentations’ of the prevalent philosophy of the bourgeois ruling class. Gramsci considers that the strength of the capitalist system does not rest fully on the forced power of the bourgeois state; the interest of the bourgeoisie predominate, to a great extent, because of the ruling philosophy of the affluent classes which reflects the ethical or philosophical direction and the ideology of the class it serves. In the theory of hegemony, the conception of the world of the ruling class undergoes a complex procedure of the vulgarization as it is filtered down to the subordinate class. The end of this process is the beginning of a philosophy of the masses – a popular common sense, widespread in the community of average ordinary man. With the increasingly far-ranging acceptance of popular common sense, the mass-man is subjected to an imposed morality, customs and behaviour which conforms the rules established by the ruling institution of the dominating bourgeoisie class. In this type of society, the inferior groups follow the value of the bourgeois authorities. These values are generally instrumental in creating the limited and uncritical world view of the mass-man, who becomes a conformist to some conformism or other.

3.4.2 Gramsci on Ideology

Gramsci raised ideology to the status of a different phenomenon worthy of, and open to study as with Mannheim. His concept of ideology
occupied a broad political arena that included moral and cultural norms and understandings, disseminated through the mass media and voluntary associations. In Gramsci’s opinion “In according such transformation a distinction between the material transformation of the economics conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, aesthetic or philosophic - in short, ideological forms in which men become conscious of this conflict and fight it out”.16 The other important source for Gramsci’s conception of the relationship between ideology and political power is Marx and Engels’s Communist Manifesto (1848), where it is announced that ‘the ruling ideas of the age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class’. This is the so called ‘dominant ideology thesis, which suggests that the class which is economically dominant will try to impose its own peculiar way of seeing the world on society as whole.

By introducing the term ‘hegemony’ Gramsci means the interconnection of material and ideological instruments, through which the ruling class maintains its power. Hegemony is thus a form of praxis. This allows Gramsci to resolve the term ‘ideology’ for pure consciousness; and he propose to distinguish between historically organic ideologies, those which are necessary to a given structure and ideologies that are arbitrary, rationalistic, or “willed”.17 The former may be specific to an accurate
expression of that group’s material interest. For Gramsci, the theories of ideologies are merely pale reflection of material influences.

In Gramsci’s opinion “the bad sense of the word has become widespread, with the effect of that the theoretical analysis of the concept of ideology has been modified and denatured. The process leading up to this error can be easily reconstructed:

1) Ideology is defined as distinct from the structure, and it is asserted that it is not ideology that change the structure but vice-versa;

2) It is asserted that a given political situation is ‘ideological’- i.e., that it is not sufficient to change the structure, although it thinks that it can do so; it is asserted that it is useless, stupid etc.

3) One of them passes to the assertion that every ideology is ‘pure’ appearance, useless stupid etc.”

Gramsci said, “To the extent that ideologies are historically necessary they have a validity which is ‘psychological’; they ‘organize’ human masses, and create the terrain on which men move, acquire consciousness of their position, struggle etc. to the extent that they are arbitrary they only create individual ‘movements’, polemics and so on.”

So Gramsci reacts against the notion of ideology as the false consciousness, and he asserts “all ideological side by side with the assertion
that all systems have a historical validity, and are necessary (Man acquires
consciousness of social relation in the field of ideology). This also
involves a reaction against the belief that ideology is a mere reflection or
material circumstances. The effect of these advances is to trust an immense
importance to the sphere of ideas. In fact Gramsci points out, “material
factors are only ever expressed developments in the history of
consciousness can thus be more significant than economic change; it may
be ruled out that immediate economic crisis of themselves produce
fundamental historical events; they can simply create a terrain more
favourable to the dissemination of certain mode of thought”. Because “a
‘popular belief’ and similar ideas are themselves material forces” any
revolutionary theory must deal with class conflict on the level of ideas at
least as much as in the economic arena. In fact Gramsci is unwilling to
distinguish between those two levels, preferring his notion of ‘hegemony’,
which constitute a ‘historical block’, i.e., “unity between nature and spirit
(structure and superstructure) unity of opposites and of distinct”. And
crucially it was to be found at various levels of articulation. True ideology
inclined to unity created to the consensus and solidarity at forged because
the leading intellectuals through the attraction of their ideas, and directed
the masses. The intellectuals, unlike Mannheim’s did not dispense with
ideology; his mission was to modify it in line with the needs of the time.
Part of such a modification would reflect the common sense of the masses,
implicitly manifest in art, in law, in economic activity and in all manifestation of individual and collective life’.

Finally, Gramsci leaves us somewhat uncertain of the nature of ideology, but equips us with tools that enable us to proceed further. In his view the term “‘ideology’ itself must be analyzed historically, in the term of the philosophy of praxis, as a superstructure”.24 He confusingly hesitated between the Marxist view of ideology as dogma and a brave attempt to release ideology from its negative connotations. He observed ideology as achieving unity within a ‘social bloc’- a cohesive social group – and held out hope for a total and hegemonious ideology that would attain social truth. Even more than Mannheim, a unified expression of the social world would develop out of ideological pluralism. But Gramsci had a good grasp of the concrete and diverse forms in which ideology presented itself, in particular of it qualitatively variable voices.

3.4.3 Hegemony: A Conceptual Analysis

Consent, like several other terms of political theory, is capable of a multitude of ambiguities and meanings. Certain concept of consent as describing the relation of subjects with their government has been present throughout virtually the whole history of political thought. Historically the concept have functioned within a theory of political obligations; since its beginning, the notion of consent has been projected as a ground or
foundation of the right to exercise political authority, and as a moral limit on the extent and nature of that authority.

Pre-modern idea of consent had nothing to do with individual acceptance by each and every human being; nor did they express choice or deliberate authorization. They simply admitted that the authority of the ruler somehow follows, at least in part, from the fact that his subjects understood as a corporate community transcending individual preference—allow or a knowledge it. Such an assessment of consent was suitable to an organic conception of society, infused with the idea that every man has his appointed status and functions in a natural hierarchy. The problems of political ethics are problem owes to his community, his people, his lord, his king, the church or his God, by virtue of his role in the universal order. This model of society could not survive in the face of an advancing individualism, expressing itself theologically in Protestantism, economically in mercantile capitalism, and politically and philosophically in the theory of natural light and social contract.

In contemporary political and philosophical thought, ‘consent of the governed’ has been modified to take account of the earlier liberal definition and to express a new demand. ‘Consent’ has come to indicate the manner in which individual citizens ought to be individual directly or indirectly in the activity of governing, the manner, that is, in which political society should be organized and constituted. ‘Consent’, then has come to be observed as
specifying the nature or resan de etre of the whole system of familiar
democratic institution. In its absorption in to modern liberal ideology, the
concept has inclined to require a restricted, somewhat arbitrary meaning.

When Gramsci speaks of consent, he refers to a psychological state,
involving some kind of acceptance – not necessarily explicit – of the socio-
political order of certain vide aspect of that orders. A hegemonic order need
not include liberal institution and practices; indeed, it may be oppressive in
the strictest sense. Gramsci’s concept of hegemony embodied a hypothesis
that with a constant social order, there must be a withdrawal of agreement
so powerful that it can counter at the division and disruptive forces arising
from conflicting interests. And this agreement must be in relation to
specific objects-persons, beliefs, values, institutions or whatever.

At times, Gramsci implies that consent in a hegemonic situation take
the form of active committed, based on a deeply hold that superior position
of the ruling group is legitimate. The fact of hegemony undoubtedly
presupposes that account be taken of the interest of the groups over which
hegemony is to be exercised, that the leading group makes sacrifices of an
economic corporate kind. Consent - is an expression of intellectuals and
moral direction through which the masses feel permanently tied to the
ideology and political leadership of the state as the expression of their
belief and aspirations. Hegemony, as Gramsci understood it, was not just a
tool of historical and social analysis; it was also a guiding concept for political practice.

The initiation for Gramsci’s concept of hegemony is that a class and its representatives exercise power over subordinate classes by means of a combination of coercion and persuasion. For him the Hegemony is a relation, not of domination by means of force, but of consent by means of political and ideological leadership. It is the organization of consent.

3.4.3.1 The Leninist Introduction

The basics of the concept of hegemony were put by Lenin. The term hegemony was first used by Plekhanov and other Russian Marxists in the 1880s to indicate the need for the working class to lead an alliance with the peasantry for the overthrow of Tsarism. The Russian working class should, in alliance with the peasantry, act as the leading (hegemonic) force in the bourgeois-democratic revolution for the overthrow of the Tsarist autocracy. In this way the working class, then a small minority of the population, would be able to win the support of the great majority of the people.

3.4.3.2 Hegemony Develops as a Concept

Lenin considered hegemony as a strategy for revolution, a strategy which the working class and its representatives should adopt to gain the support of the great majority. Gramsci adds a new aspect to this by extending it to include the Practices of a capitalist class or its
representatives, both in achieving state power, and in sustaining that power once it has been achieved. Lenin perceived hegemony mainly in terms of an alliance of classes or parts of classes. Gramsci adds a very important new aspect with his notion of national-popular: a class can achieve national leadership, and become hegemonic, if it limits itself only to class interests; it must take into account the popular and democratic demands and struggles of the people which do not have a purely class character, that is, which do not arise directly out of the relations of production.

Gramsci defines that the Supremacy of a social group or class manifests itself in two different ways: 'domination' or coercion, and 'intellectual and moral leadership'. Gramsci distinguished between domination and ‘intellectual and moral leadership’: “A social group can, indeed must, already exercise ‘leadership’ before winning governmental power (this is indeed one of the principal conditions for the winning of such power); it subsequently becomes dominant when it exercises power, but even if it holds it firmly in its grasp, it must continue to ‘lead’ as well”.

This latter type of dominion constitutes hegemony. Social control, in other words takes two basic forms: besides influencing behaviour and choice externally, through rewards and punishments. It also affects them internally by moulding personal beliefs in to a reproduction of prevailing norms. This type of ‘internal control' is based on hegemony, which refers to an order in which a common, social and moral language is spoken. In which
one concept or reality is dominant, informing with its spirit all modes of thought and behaviour. It follows that hegemony is the predominance obtained by consent rather than force or one class or group over other classes. And whereas 'domination' is realized, basically, through the coercive machinery of the state, 'intellectual and moral leadership' is objectified in, and chiefly work out through, 'civil society', the collective of educational, religious and associational institutions. Hegemony is achieved through the numerous ways in which the institutions of civil society operate to shape, directly or indirectly, the cognitive and affective structures whereby men perceive and evaluate problematic social reality. Moreover, this ideological dominance must have solid economic roots: if hegemony is ethico-political, it must also be economic, and it must also have its foundation in the significant function that the leading group exercises in the decisive core of economic activity.

3.4.3.3 Passive Revolution

In evaluating the war of position carried on by the two fundamental classes for hegemony, Gramsci identifies a basic difference between the strategy employed by the capitalist class and that which is appropriate for the working class. The strategy of the bourgeoisie has a special quality which he called passive revolution. He developed this concept out of his analysis of the Risorgimento, the movement for the unification of Italy in the mid-nineteenth century.
Gramsci proposes that a strategy of passive revolution is the typical response of the bourgeoisie whenever its hegemony is entirely threatened and a process of wide restructuring or reorganization is necessary to re-establish its hegemony or domination. A passive revolution is involved whenever relatively far-reaching modifications are made to a country’s social and economic structure from above, through the agency of the state, and without depend on the active participation of the people. Social reforms which have been demanded by the opposing forces may be carried out, but in such a way as to disorganize these forces and damp down any popular struggles. It shows that the proper strategy for the working class is an anti-passive revolution established on the constant extension of class and popular-democratic struggles. Gramsci wrote, “The war of position demands enormous sacrifices by infinite masses of people”.26

3.4.3.4 Intellectual and Moral Reform

The task of creating a new hegemony, in opposition to that of the capitalist class, can only be achieved by means of a transformation of popular consciousness, of people’s ways of thinking and feeling, of their ‘conceptions of the world’, and of their standards of moral conduct. Gramsci compared this with the wholesale transformation of popular consciousness brought about by the Protestant Reformation in the sixteenth century and by the French Revolution. He adopted the term ‘intellectual and moral reform’ from the French writer Georges Sorel. In his opinion
“Every social group, coming in to existence on the original terrain of an essential function in the world of economic production, creates together with itself, originally, one or more strata of intellectuals which give it homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields”. 27

3.4.3.5 Common Sense

In viewing the process of intellectual and moral reform, Gramsci was concerned to break down the separation between Marxism as a philosophy and people’s actual consciousness. He argued that ‘all men are philosophers’, because all men and women have some conception of the world, some set of ideas which enables them to make sense of their lives. But the way in which many people perceive the world, their philosophy, is often confused and contradictory, containing ideas absorbed from different sources and from the past, which tend to make them accept inequality and oppression as natural and unchangeable. Gramsci used the term *common sense* to denote this uncritical and partly unconscious way in which people perceive the world. Common sense is not to be seen in purely negative terms; it contains positive elements as well, and people’s practical activity, their resistance to oppression, may often be in contradiction with their conscious ideas. Common sense is the site on which the dominant ideology is constructed, but it is also the site for the resistance to that ideology.
3.4.3.6 Civil Society

Capitilist society is understood as a complex system of relations between classes and other social forces, dominated by the struggle between the two fundamental classes, capital and labour. These social relations are embodied in indifferent types of organizations and institutions including churches, political parties, trade unions, the mass media, cultural and voluntary associations. One set of institutions, the apparatuses which make up the state, are separated from all the rest in having a monopoly of coercion. All these social relations and the organizations which embody them are called by Gramsci civil society. The social relations that make the civil society are distinct from the relations of production, and the organizations within civil society are distinct from the apparatuses which make up the state. Civil society is the domain of class struggles and of popular-democratic struggles. Thus it is the province in which a dominant social class organizes consent and hegemony. It is also the realm where the subordinate social groups may organize their opposition and construct an alternative hegemony- a counter hegemony.

3.4.3.7 Historic Bloc

A class which is advancing towards hegemony in civil society must also achieve leadership in the realm of production. It is only because the bourgeoisie acquires a significant control over the productive process that it can also become the hegemonic class in civil society and achieve the state
power. But the control of the capitalists over production has never been absolute; it has always been contested by the workers, and there have been struggles by them and their trade unions over the circumstances of work and over the terms for the introduction of new machines. The metaphor of base and superstructure is therefore unsatisfactory. It is misleading to think in terms of a sharp separation between a field of economics (production of surplus value) and a field of politics (struggle for state power). On the contrary, the social relations of civil society interpenetrate with the relations of production. Gramsci’s *Prison Notebooks* contain several references to base and superstructure, the direction of Gramsci’s thought, and his rejection of economism, is against it. He uses the term *historic bloc* to indicate the way in which a hegemonic class combines the leadership of a block of social forces in civil society with its leadership in the sphere of production.

### 3.4.3.8 The Nature of Power

Gramsci suggests that power is best understood as a relation. The social relations of civil society are also relations of power, so that power is diffused throughout civil society as well as being embodied in the coercive apparatuses of the state. Gramsci used the term *integral* state to describe this new conception of the nature of power, which he summed up as ‘hegemony armoured by coercion’. It follows that the political struggle of the working class cannot be confined to the winning of state power, but has
to be extended to the whole of civil society. It is necessary to win a substantial measure of hegemony in civil society as a condition for gaining control over the state. The achievement of control over the state is only part (though a decisive part) of the transition from the existing system. Some thinkers like Hobswarn criticizes Gramsci that he is a Hegelian. But he try to resolve the existing power relations and its consequences.

3.5 Louis Althusser; out of State Apparatus

Althusser is regarded as a major redefinition of ideology within the Marxist tradition. Althusser followed Marx in assigning the ruling ideology the role of ensuring the submission of the workers to the ruling class. That was achieved by disseminating the rule of morality and respect required to uphold the established order. Official ‘apparatuses’ such as the state, the church, and the military practical control over the ‘know-how’ that was necessary to secure repression and ensure the viability of the existing economic system. But Althusser departed from Marx in acknowledging that ideology was a ‘new reality’ rather than the obscuring of reality. He linked the ideological superstructure to the top story of a three- storied house. It was superimposed on the economic and productive base- the ground floor- and on the middle floor, the political and legal institutions. These were also part of the superstructure, but one that intervened directly in the base. Although the upper floor was held up by the base, they exercised ‘relative autonomy’.
Althusser deeply examines the concept put forwarded by Marx in his German ideology, he says, “In the German ideology, this formulation appears in a plainly positivist context. Ideology is conceived as a pure illusion, a pure dream, i.e., as nothing less. All its reality is external to it. Ideology is thus although as an imaginary construction whose status is exactly like the theoretical status of the dream among writers before Freud”.  

Ideology merely considered as imaginary as semblance, by Marx, Althusser defines this as; “Ideology, then, is for Marx an imaginary assemblage (bricolage), a pure dream, empty and vain, constituted by the ‘day’s residues’ from the only full and positive reality, that of the concrete history of concrete material individuals materially producing their existence. It is on this basis that ideology has no history in the German Ideology, since its history is outside it, where the only existing history is, the history of concrete individual’s etc.”

3.5.1 Ideology as ‘Representation’

Althusser considered, “ideology represents the imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence. We commonly call religious ideology, ethical ideology, legal ideology, political ideology etc. So many ‘world outlooks’ of course, assuming that we do not live one of these ideologies as the truth (eg. believe in God, Duty, Justice etc. ) we admit that the ideology we are discussing from a critical point of
view, examining at as the ethnologist examines the myths of a ‘primitive society’, that these ‘world outlooks’ are largely imaginary. i.e., do not ‘correspond to reality’.

3.5.2 Ideology has Material Existence

Later with the study of Althusser the traditional way of understanding as base of superstructure model has been modified. Althusser actually brought forth a break in the interpretation of ideology by showing its materiality. Unlike the old beliefs, Althusser show that an idea becomes a matter since it has its existence only through certain material apparatus. Ideology has a material existence. “The ‘ideas’ or ‘representation’ etc., which seem to makeup ideology do not have on ideal (ideale or ideelle) or spiritual existence, but a material existence. I even suggested that the ideal (ideale or ideelle) and spiritual existence of ideas arises exclusively in an ideology of the ‘idea’ and of ideology, and let me add, in an ideology of what seems to have ‘founded’ this conception since the emergence of the science, i.e., what the practitioners of the science represent to themselves in their spontaneous ideology as ‘ideas’ true or false”.

An ideology always exists in an apparatus, and its practices, or practices. This existence is material. Althusser explains his views that “An individual believes in God or Duty or Justice etc., this beliefs derives (for everyone i.e., for all those who live in an ideological representation of ideology, which reduce ideology to ideas endowed by definition with a
spiritual existence) from the ideas of the individual concerned, i.e., from as a subject with a consciousness, which contains the ideas of his belief. This way, i.e., by means of the absolutely ideological ‘conceptual’ device (dispositittif) thus set up (a subject endowed with a consciousness in which he freely forms or freely recognize ideas in which he believes) the (material) attitude of the subject concerned naturally follows”.

In this context Althusserian explanations of ideological and repressive apparatus become relevant. All ideas including religion, rituals and faith have direct relation with certain state apparatus. So the model of cultural interpretations based on economy superstructure binary is being further developed. Although economy is the fundamental aspect of life and ideology is not a mere reflection of it. Besides, ideology itself is capable of producing behaviour patterns, activities and the culture in general. So the interpretation of ideology as put forth by Althusser has become an inevitable part of culture studies. The very idea of culture and its various implications have certain relation with ideology. So Althusser’s definition of ideology as the representation of the relation is noteworthy. In society which is controlled by profit motive owing to capitalist interest actually paves way for certain kind of ‘interpellation’. So an individual is being interpellated in order to become a particular type of individual doing a particular kind of work. It is not the individual freedom of creativity which is the criterion of such position. On the other hand the individual is
ultimately formed by the interest disseminated through the ideology. With regard to this Althusser’s ISA and RSA are to be explained.

3.5.3 State Apparatus

The Repressive State Apparatus (RSA) was the dominating political force, but ideology developed a life of its own as the symbolic controller. The ideological state apparatus (ISA) were placed in religious, legal and cultural structure, in the mass media and the family and mainly in the educational system. One impact of Althusser in changing understandings of ideology was to know the diversity of its institutional forms- the multiplicity of ideological apparatuses as against the singularity of the illusion that Marx and Engels has directed.

Althusser recognizes the widespread dispersal of ideology beyond the public domain to the private. Political views of the world were present in all walks of life. Ideology was plural only the Marxist function of exercising integrated hegemonic power so as to maintain existing capitalist relations of exploitation. Althusser refused to formulate a theory of particular ideologies, nor was he interested in aspect of ideology that was unrelated to oppressive power.

An ideology has fundamental features irrespective of the historical forms specific ideologies adopt. It is one with which contemporary scholars of ideology have much sympathy. Althusser stated that ‘ideology is
eternal’. By this he intended that individual inevitably think about the real conditions of their existence in a particular manner; they produce an imaginary account how they relate to the real world. Ideology was a representation— an image, of those relations. Ideology permits societies to imagine that such actions really do further the cause of freedom. It provides a view of their real world that explains it and reconciles them to it. Ideology does that by obscuring from a society the illusory and distorted nature of that representation. Ideology is inevitable because our imagination cannot avoid such distortions.

In Althusser’s opinion ideology exists in a material form in social practice, or the institution he called social apparatus. From a Marxist perspective, this was an integrating statement, as it implied that ideologies were, unlike the position of the early Marx, located in the material-world—the world that mattered. The ideological understanding that propelled individual activities, even if those understanding were ‘distorted’ or imaginary representations they actually existed. Ideologies were not just the illusory expressions of a camera obscure reflecting the distorted consciousness of individual subjects, but an aspect of reality. Ideas existed in action, an observation Gramsci had made in a slightly different way. We had to respect the ideologically inspired provenance of individual action, even if we knew they did not reflect proper human relations. After all, those were specifically the actions were rituals on which the human imagination
conferred social significance. Football matches, harvest celebrations, political party conference, or religious worship. For Althusser, even thinking was a material practice, in that it actually took place. He referred to external verbal discourses (speeches and texts, one presumes) but also to ‘internal’ verbal discourse (consciousness). That insight further opened up the possibility for analysis of ideology to claim that political thinking was a central feature of the empirical regularities of political life. Althusser reaches the conclusion that, due to the fact that ideas are expressed and transmitted by material institutions, ideas are themselves material. Gramsci states, “the ideal and spiritual existence of ‘ideas’ arises exclusively in an ideology of the ‘idea’ and of ideology, and let me add, in an ideology, of what seems to have ‘founded’ this conception since the emergence of the science, i.e. what the practice of the science represent to themselves in their spontaneous ideology as ‘ideas’, true or false, of course, presented in affirmative form, this thesis in unproven. I simply ask that the reader be favourably disposed it, say, in the name of materialism. A long series of arguments would be necessary to prove it”.  

The polemical commitment to naturalism which characterizes his work enables Althusser to slide from the presupposition that matter determines ideas into an assumption that ideas do not exist: “the existence of the ideas of (the subject) belief is material in that his ideas are his material actions inserted in to material practice governed by material rituals
which are themselves defined by the material ideological apparatus from which drive the ideas of that subject”.

If ideas are material than the subject, which has ideas must, in fact, be an object. The very notion of an autonomous subject, like the concept of non-material ideas, is described by Althusser as ideological; “the category of the ‘subject’ is constitutive of ideology, which only exist by constituting concrete subject as subject… the existence of ideology and hailing or interpellation of individual as a subject are one and the same thing”.

According to Althusser concrete individual subject was made to serve as carrier of ideology, thus serving the inevitability of its link with class. “Throughout this scheme we observe that the ideological representation of ideology is itself forced to recognize that every ‘subject’ endowed with a ‘consciousness’ and believing in the ‘ideas’ that this ‘consciousness’ inspires in him and freely accepts, must ‘act according to his ideas’ must therefore inscribe his ideas as a free subject in the action of his material practice. If he does not do so ‘that is wicked’.” That is why; the very notion of ideology itself depended on the ideological concept of the subject – individual constituted by ideology as bearer of consciousness, will and agency. In other words, ‘ideology’ and ‘subject’ were naturally defining. Althusssser express, “In every case, the ideology of ideology this recognize, despite its imaginary distinction, that the ‘ideas’ of a human subject exist in his actions, or ought to exist in his action, and if that is not
the cause, it lend him other ideas corresponding to the actions (however preserve) that he does perform”.

The term, Althusser used to explain the relationship between subject and ideology, is ‘interpellating’ or naming. He stated, “Ideology Interpellates individual as subject. The category of the subject is only constituted of all ideology insofar as all ideology has the function (which defines it) of constituting’ concrete individual as subjects. Man is an ideological animal by nature”. He adds, “All ideology hails or interpellates as concert subject, by the functioning of the subjects”.

Althusser reproduced the abstractness of ideology, as well as its status solely as a group product. He empowered future students of ideology to appreciate that ideology is both something that happens in us and to us. In as much as it is in us, we sufficiently astute, we can acknowledge that we identify each other through ideology, as individual possessing certain features rather than others. The ambiguity of the term ‘subject’, Althusser argued, catches the essence of ideology beautifully. It refers to the free initiative of the individual, but also to the domination of the individual by a higher authority. For instance, being enterprenential, cowardly, caring—all those are particular features that our ideological imaginations deem important for one reason or another. These are all categories we apply in order to make sense of human action. They all define the characteristics of individual subject, thus placing them within a recognized social network.
They are linked to practices of which we approve or disapprove, but crucially- all those are permanent aspects of social life.

Althusser says, “Ideology exists before the individual. When the concrete individual ones along, ideology, has ‘always already’ determined specific set of rules, a particular subjectivity, in to which the individual will be slotted. This occurs through a process of ‘interpellation’ which basically means that a person will be systematically addressed or ‘hailed’ in such a way as to force him or her in to this pre-allocated ‘subject-position’. Nor is this process unique to twentieth century capitalism for ‘the same’”.41 Ideology is not a historical phenomenon but it seems, cannot bear very much reality. For Althusser, ‘ideology’ is the imaginary way in which people experience their real lives, the ideal representation of a material process. Althusser calls the ideology ‘knowledge of ideology is generally used as an approximate term for materialism, whose task it is to explain the source of these ideas, and so reveal their role in maintaining the power of the capitalist class, or bourgeoisie’.

The initial task of any economic system, according to Althusser, is to reproduce its own conditions of production. This contains reproducing the kinds of people who will be able to participate in the process of production. The power of the modern capital state to do this is depend on two types of institutions; the ‘Repressive State Apparatus’ such as the police, law, court and army, and the ‘Ideological State Apparatus’ which include church, the
family, political parties, the media, and most importantly, the education system. As we might expect, the ‘RSA’ functions by ‘violence’, whereas the ‘Ideological State Apparatus functions by ‘ideology’.

3.5.3.1 ISA (Ideological State Apparatus)

Ideological state apparatus is encompassed with numerous and different particulars, concepts and institutions. Throughout his investigation Althusser was very enthusiastic about the new form or understanding and functioning of ideological state apparatus. In Althusser understanding he means that “ideological state Apparatus a certain number of realities, which present themselves to the immediate observer in the form of distinct and specialized institutions. I propose an empirical list of these which will obviously have to be examined in detail, tested, corrected and recognized. With all the reservations implied by this requirement, we can for the moment regard the following institutions as ideological state apparatus.

- The religious ISA (the system of different church)
- The educational ISA (the system of the different public and private schools)
- The family ISA

The family obviously has the ‘function’ of an ISA. It intervenes in the reproduction of labour power. In different modes of production it is the unit of production and/or the unit of consumption.
The legal ISA

The law belong both the (repressive) state apparatus and the system of ISA

The political ISA (the political system, including the different parties)

The trade union ISA

The communication ISA (press, radio and television etc., )

The cultural ISA (literature, the arts, sports etc.)

It is clear that there exists the ideological state apparatus at the same time where the repressive state apparatus prevails. It does not have any constant body same as the repressive state apparatus have. The most part of ideological state apparatus prevails in the private sphere of a society but the repressive state apparatus is functions and exists in the public sphere of the society. Repressive state apparatus is functioned by violence at the same time ideological state apparatus functions by ideology.

3.5.3.2 RSA (Repressive State Apparatus)

In Marxist understanding the state apparatus (SA) contains different kinds of social or political institutions; namely the state, government army, police, courts etc. Generally these type of apparatus known as Repressive state apparatus that functions predominantly by force or violence. According to Althusser “the state Apparatus (SA) contains the government, the Administration, the army, the Police, the courts the prison etc. which
constitute what is known as the Repressive State Apparatus. Repressive suggest that the state apparatus in question ‘function by violence’- at least ultimately (since repression e.g. Administration, may take nonphysical forms).\(^{43}\)

State itself as a repressive force in the reproduction of the labour force by using the violence and force. By using the repressive force state tries to get hegemony over the productive power the productive labour or the proletariat. Althusser says, “The state is explicitly conceived as a repressive apparatus. The state is a ‘machine’ of repression which enables the ruling class (in the nineteenth century the bourgeois class and the ‘class’ of big landowners) to ensure their domination over the working class, thus enabling the former to subject the latter to the process of surplus-value extortion (i.e., to capitalist exploitation).”\(^{44}\)

The ruling class has the control over the political power in a state and this ruling class uses the apparatus as they wish and it is very active in the ideological apparatus too. Both these RSA and the ISA functions and it paves the way or create smooth condition for the ruling class and its ideologies. Basically these types of ideological apparatus both by repressive and ideological functions or intervenes to create a condition for the exploitation through reproducing the productive forces in society “The state apparatus, which defines the state as a force of repressive execution and intervention in the ‘interest of the ruling classes’, the class struggle

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conducted by the bourgeoisie and its allies against the proletariat, is quit
certainly the state and quite certainly defines the base of the function”.

There are different sorts of institution beside the state that also serve
the state to control and regulate the society by using force or violence. In
his words “This term means; not only the specialized apparatus (in the
narrow sense) whose existence and necessity I have recognized in relation
to the requirements of legal practice, i.e., the police, the courts, the prison,
but also the army, which (the proletariat has paid for this experience with
its blood) intervene directly as a supplementary repressive force in the last
instance, when the police and its specialized auxiliary corps are ‘outrun by
events’; and above this ensemble, the head of state, the government and the
administration”.

The main features of the repressive force are specified below and it
functions basically by the force or violence, Althusser explains, “This is the
fact that the (Repressive) State Apparatus functions massively and
predominantly by repression (including physical repression), while
functioning secondly by ideology. (There is no such theory as purely
repressive apparatus). For example the Army and Police also function by
ideology, both to ensure their own cohesion and reproduction, and the
‘values’ they propound externally”.
Althusser expresses his view that both the repressive and ideological state apparatus are functions by violence and ideology. The police, army and the government are functions to protect their values by their own and hegemony or the reproduction of its ideology. Both the church and school have their own strict rules, punishments and marginalization people to control or protect their ideology. It is same in cultural ISA in the form of censorship or other forms of social control. In his view, “In the same way, but inversely, it is essential to say that for their part the ideological state apparatus function massively and predominantly by ideology, but they also function secondly by repression, even if ultimately, but only ultimately this is very attenuated and concealed, even symbolic (there is such thing as a purely ideological apparatus). Thus school and church use stable methods of punishment, expulsion, selection etc. to ‘discipline’ not only their shepherds but also their folks. The same is true of family…. The same is true of the cultural ISA apparatus (censorship, among other things) etc.”

In particular, as a result of Althusser’s emphasis on the constructive role of ‘ideology’, significant doubt has been cast on the concept of ‘false consciousness. All terms of idealism, he argues are ideological. And yet it is impossible to imagine a society which did not think to some degree in idealist terms. It follows that ‘ideology’ is not an aberration or a contingent existence of history: it is a structure essential to the historical life of societies’.
Terry Eagleton is one of the important figures in the contemporary philosophical analysis and critical studies in the world who further enquire about ideology and culture. He was very much equipped within the field of culture and in ideology and the critical theories. Here he is critically examining the philosophical explanations about the concept of ideology and in his opinion “The word ‘ideology’ one might say, is a text woven of a whole tissue of different conceptual strands: it is traced through by divergent histories, and it is probably more important to assess what is valuable or can be discovered in each of these lineages that to merge than forcibly in to some Grand global theory”. There are numerous explanations and definition prevailed in the society on the concept of ideology; and to indicate this variety of meaning, Eagleton in his book Ideology gives a list more or less at random some definition of ideology currently in circulation:

He explains, “On the one hand, ideologies are passionate, rhetorical, impelled by some benighted pseudo-religious faith which the sober technocratic world of modern capitalism has thankfully outgrown; on the other hand they are aired conceptual system which seek to reconstruct society from the ground up in accordance with some bloodless blueprint”. It is true that people sometimes use the word ideology to refer to systematic belief in general, as when someone says they abstain from meat’ for practical rather than ideological reasons. “Ideology here is more or less
synonymous with the broad sense of the term ‘philosophy’ as in the phrase”\textsuperscript{51} Lastly he explains, “The term ideology, in other words, would seem to make reference not only to belief system, but to questions of power”\textsuperscript{52}

3.6 Culture as a Product of Dominant Ideology

Ideology is the ruling idea of an epoch. It is the dominant form of thinking in other words the production of meanings determined by the ideology. Ideology is mere ideas. It is the idea of the ruling class. “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas: i. e. the class which is the ruling material force of society is at the same time its ruling intellectual force. The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production, so that thereby generally speaking, the ideas of those who lack the means of mental production are subject to it. The ruling ideas are nothing more than the ideal expression of the dominant material relationships, the dominant material relationships grasped as ideas, hence of the relationships which make the one class the ruling one, therefore the ideas of its dominance”\textsuperscript{53}

In every writings, it doesn’t matter whether it is philosophy or literature, ideology is a determining factor. It is the factor, which controls the writing as a signifying system like any other form of writing, philosophy, too exhibits both sides of culture. The one side in the support
given to the dominant culture and the other is the criticism levelled against the dominant culture. There are as many cultures as social organization. But there is a single hegemonic culture since the ruling force on the political power is in the hands of a single class. All other culture lies dominant beneath the ruling ideology. In every epoch there is a dominant form of social organization depending upon the material made of production. Today we have global capital and global village, the offsprings of late capitalism, if we approve of the contention of Frederic Jameson.

References


5. Ibid, p. 49.


7. Ibid, p. 49.


10. Ibid, pp. 50-51.


15. Ibid, p. 418.


40 Ibid, p. 117.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid, p. 96.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid, p. 92.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid, p. 96.


50 Ibid, p. 4.

51 Ibid, p. 5.

52 Ibid.