

CHAPTER-III

**CONTRIBUTION OF VĀCASPATI MIŚRA TO
EPISTEMOLOGICAL AND ONTOLOGICAL
CONCEPTS IN SĀÑKHYA SYSTEM**

INTRODUCTION

Sāñkhya is undoubtedly one of the oldest Systems of Indian Philosophy. Sāñkhya System occupies a prominent place in all the śāstras, since this is either supported or controverted by every philosophical System. Therefore, the importance of this śāstra is recognized by all the systems. Śrī Śaṅkara says “The doctrine, stands somewhat near to the Vedanta doctrine since, it admits the non-difference of cause and effect, and it, moreover, has been accepted by some of the authors of the dharmasūtras. For all these reasons we have taken special trouble to refute the Pradhāna doctrine.”¹ So also in the Mahābhārata it is said: “There is no knowledge like that of Sāñkhya, no power like that of Yoga. You should have no doubt as to Sāñkhya being the highest knowledge.”²

John Devis observes: “The system of Kapila called the Sāñkhya or Rationalistic, in its original form and its theoretic development by Patañjali, contains nearly all that India has produced in the department of pure philosophy.”³ Richard Garbe, an eminent critic of Sāñkhya opines “In Kapila’s doctrine, for the first time in the history of the world, the

complete independence and freedom of the human mind, in full confidence in its own powers, were exhibited. It is the most significant system of philosophy that India has been produced.”⁴ Yoga is intimately allied to Sāṅkhya. Patañjali is the traditional founder of the Yoga system. Yoga means spiritual action and Sāṅkhya means knowledge. Sāṅkhya is theory, Yoga is practice. For all practical purposes Sāṅkhya and Yoga may be treated as the theoretical and practical sides of the same system.

The Sāṅkhya System

Tradition regards Kapila as the founder of Sāṅkhya Philosophy. Īsvarakṛṣṇa’s SK seems to be the earliest available and the most popular work of this system. Besides this Gauḍapāda’s Sāṅkhyakārikābhāṣya, Vācaspati Miśra’s STK and Vijñānabhikṣu’s Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya is very much relevant in this system. The Sāṅkhya is an exponent of dualistic realism. It agrees with the Mīmāṃsā System in vehemently criticizing the Nyāyā-Vaiśeṣika theism and strongly advocating atheism. The Sāṅkhya of the Mahābhārata is theistic. The Classical Sāṅkhya System is atheistic. The Yoga System grafts theism on the Sāṅkhya metaphysics, and is therefore called ‘theistic Sāṅkhya’.

The word Sāṅkhya

The word Sāṅkhya is derived from the word 'Sāṅkhyā'. The word Sāṅkhyā is used in the sense of thinking and counting "Carcā Sāṅkhyāvicāraṇā."⁵ Thinking may be with reference to basic principles or knowledge of self. Counting refers to the twenty-four principles. The double implication of the word has been set forth by Vijñānabhikṣu in his preface to Sāṅkhyapravacanabhāṣya, by a quotation from the Mahābhārata "संख्यां प्रकुर्वते चैव प्रकृतिं च प्रचक्षते तत्त्वानि च चतुर्विंशस्तेन सांख्यं प्रकीर्तितम्।" So, Sāṅkhya means knowledge of self through right discrimination. Garbe is of opinion that the word Sāṅkhya was originally used in the sense of counting, and it was then applied to the system of Kapila which enumerates the twenty-five principles.⁶ Sāṅkhya means the philosophy of right knowledge. Right knowledge is the knowledge of the separation of the Puruṣa from the Prakṛti.

Sāṅkhyakārikā, the basic text of Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī

The SK is hardly a "philosophical" text as that designation is understood in an Indian Intellectual environment. There is very little of the polemical give and take so typical of darśana or philosophical literature. Instead, the SK is a philosophical poem, laying out the contours of the Sāṅkhya System in a related and artful manner. It presents its content in serious and elegant 'āryā' verses that flow easily

and make use of striking similes and metaphors throughout.⁷ If the term ‘darśana’ is to be taken in its original sense as an “intuitive seeing” that nurtures a quiet wisdom and invites ongoing thoughtful meditations then surely the SK must stand as one of the most remarkable productions of its class. In any case, the seventy verses of Īśvarakṛṣṇa have been remarkably influential both as a summary of the Sāṅkhya’s contribution to India's philosophical and cultural heritage. STK of Vācaspati Miśra stands out as the oldest extant explication of SK.

Place of Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudī

STK of Vācaspati Miśra is a fairly simple and straight forward exposition of the SK. The text has been historically very important, however, for it has inspired a long tradition of sub commentaries coming down to the present day. So this commentary became a milestone in the development of Sāṅkhya literature and philosophy.

G.J. Larson opines that “According to Vācaspati Miśra, Sāṅkhya had the double effect of, on the one level, decisively destroying the old Sāṅkhya dualism, but, on another level, of reviving and refurbishing many of the old Sāṅkhya notions, this latter effect helps to explain, why an important thinker like Vācaspati Miśra, composed a major commentary on the SK in the ninth or tenth century. His work on Sāṅkhya actually inaugurated an independent tradition”.⁸ Moreover, it is fair to say that it is by far the

best-known text of Sāṅkhya all over India. It is noted that Vācaspati Miśra's reading of Sāṅkhya is more than a little influence by the emerging and in the sense it should be distinguished from Pre-Kārikā-Sāṅkhya and Pātañjala-Sāṅkhya. For convenience it can be designated simply as Kārikā-Kaumudī-Sāṅkhya, that's to say, the SK as read through Vācaspati Miśra's STK. Many of the Sāṅkhya texts after the tenth century are based on Vācaspati Miśra's reading on SK. The most important among them are Vamśīdhara's Tattvavibhākara, Kavirāja Yati's Tattvapradīpa, Śrī Bhārati Yati's Sāṅkhyatattvakaumudīvyākhyā, Pañcānana Tarkaratna's Pūrṇimā etc. works ranging from the 17th to the 20th centuries.

STK of Vācaspati Miśra starts with the salutation⁹ of Prakṛti and Puruṣa, which are the eternal principles of Sāṅkhya System. This 'maṅgalaśloka' is more or less similar to the 'mantra' in Śv.Up.¹⁰ STK is the word by word interpretations of SK. In it, he adopted the analytical method of interpretation. For the clarity he includes his own ideas where ever necessary. Pramāṇanirūpaṇa in SK is an example. Īśvarakṛṣṇa states that pramāṇas are three. There are no further explanations about that. But Vācaspati Miśra elaborately explained the definitions of the three pramāṇas and also he included the other pramāṇas in the three.¹¹ In his commentary he includes the views of

other philosophers like Mīmāṃsakas, Cārvākas, Buddhas and Naiyyāyikas as pūrvapakṣa and refuted their concepts. Etymological explanations are widely used. This is also very helpful to understand the deep philosophical concepts. For example: "प्रकरोतीति प्रकृतिः, दुःखानां त्रयं दुःखत्रयम्।"etc.

The contribution of Vācaspati to Sāṅkhya philosophy made far reaching effects in the later development of Sāṅkhya System. That was at once multifaceted and multifarious. For the convenience of the study the same may be classified into five major topics such as Epistemology, Ontology, Psychology, Phenomenology and Ethics.

Epistemology

In the modern age epistemology is considered as an essential part of the Indian philosophy. In the course of the development of the Indian system interest in epistemology increased and it began to claim a large share in the philosophical discussions of almost every school. The reason can be found in the fact that all schools of Indian philosophy, without exception, regarded ignorance as the root cause of human suffering, so that they were all bent upon discovering the means and processes of true knowledge by means of which reality could be known and life could be so lived as to overcome misery or minimize suffering.

The term “epistemology” has been derived from ‘episteme’ meaning knowledge and ‘logos’ meaning science or theory. Epistemology, therefore, is the theory of science of knowledge. Epistemology is a science which enquires into the nature, origin, range and conditions of knowledge. It is especially concerned with the conditions of the validity of knowledge. It can be explained as a systematic reflection concerning knowledge and which takes knowledge itself as the object of science. To study and generalize the origin and development of knowledge, the transition from non-knowledge to knowledge, is dealt in epistemology.

Epistemology enquires into the general conditions of the validity of knowledge. It does not enquire into the details of the various process of proof. Logic is the special enquiry into the confirmation of evidence. Epistemology is more a general study than logic, which enquires into the various kinds of proof and the conditions of valid knowledge. Epistemology is more metaphysical than logic. It thus becomes closely linked up with metaphysics or ontology and both of them again with ethics.

Three kinds of pramāṇas

Vācaspati Mīśra closely follows Kārikā-Sāṅkhya, but there are at least two important extensions beyond what is found in the Kārikā itself.

First, regarding the problem of inference, Vācaspati Miśra discusses the threefold inferences in terms of positive (vīta) and exclusionary (avīta) types placing both Pūrvavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa under vīta, and śeṣavat under avīta. Vācaspati Miśra's discussion shows a familiarity with logical problems and technical logical issues that arose considerably later than the time of the Kārikā itself, problems and issues that were becoming prominent in the various traditions of Vedānta Philosophy after Śrī Śaṅkara. Second, regarding the problem of perception, Vācaspati Miśra argues that the sense capacities are only capable of mere sensing (ālocanāmātrā), for they apprehend sense objects without any mental ordering or verbal characterization whereas the mind performs the task of ordering and verbalizing the impressions of the senses. Such a distinction had perhaps been hinted at in the earlier texts, but it was Vācaspati Miśra who spelled out this important distinction. In Vācaspati Miśra's view, the Sāṅkhya system accepts the three pramāṇas viz. perception, inference and valid testimony and includes three other means of cognition posited by other systems, i.e. upamāna, arthāpatti, anupalabdhi in these three.

In the Sāṅkhya-Yoga concept of pramāṇa, Patañjali holds that pramāṇa is the function of citta.¹² He says that the buddhi through the discipline of Yoga gets truth-bearing knowledge, having no trace of

wrong or perverted knowledge.¹³ This knowledge comprehends the particularity residing in the Puruṣa or in the subtle elements, which is not known through any of the worldly means of knowledge. Patañjali, like the Sāṅkhya, recognizes three pramāṇas, perception, inference and testimony.¹⁴ Vyāsa defines perception as the mental mode, which apprehends a real object possessing generic and specific characters, which particularly apprehends its specific properties, when buddhi goes out to an external object through the channel of the external sense organs and is modified into its form.¹⁵

Perception

Perception or pratyakṣa pramāṇa is defined as the definite cognition of particular objects obtained through the contact of the sense organs.¹⁶ Inference is depending on perception, and valid testimony on both perception and inference. Moreover, perception as a means of correct knowledge is universally recognized. Hence it can be considered as the most important pramāṇa among the three means of cognition.

The definition of perception shows it as distinguished from other means of definite knowledge, such as inference, memory and so on. It gives the 'genus' and the "differentia"¹⁷ because it produces definite or certain knowledge without doubt and error, and it is the result of the contact of sense organs with the objects of knowledge. Perception is the

primary and fundamental of all the sources of valid knowledge. It is most powerful among the means of valid knowledge, because it gives a direct or immediate knowledge of the reality of an object and therefore is the root of all other pramāṇas.

Vācaspati Miśra states that perception is a modification of the mind which gives definite cognition of objects affected by the sense object contact. In his opinion, through buddhi, ahaṁkāra, citta and the senses, the external object is apprehended by the subject when an object incites the senses, the mind arranges the sense impression into a percept, the ego, refers it to the self and the intellect forms the concept.¹⁸ In Sāṅkhya works, Vācaspati Miśra is the pioneer to subdivide perception into two subclasses, viz. savikalpa and nirvikalpa.

Divisions of perception

Vācaspati Miśra interprets alocaṇajñānamas indeterminate perception (nirvikalpa) which does not determinate the two elements of an object viz. the particular from the universal. He states that the determinate perception (savikalpa) is due to the operation of the mind. Mind alleviates the doubt regarding the definiteness of the object cognized. Ahaṁkāra then determines the relation of an object with the cognizer. Finally buddhi decides whether to accept or to reject the object. This is the final state called determinate knowledge

(adhyavasāya). At this stage knowledge is turned into determinate.¹⁹ Adhyavasāya is defined by Vācaspati Miśra himself as the form of determinate knowledge.²⁰ Thus Vācaspati Miśra gives a clear exposition of the pratyakṣapramāṇa according to the Sāṅkhyas by explaining the different constituents of the definition of pratyakṣa given in the SK.

Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines perception as determinate knowledge of an object due to its intercourse with a sense organ.²¹ Vācaspati Miśra further explains the characteristics of Perception. First, it must have a real object, either external or internal. This characteristic distinguishes perception from illusion. Secondly, a particular kind of perception is brought about by the intercourse of a particular sense-organ with a particular kind of object. Visual perception is brought about by the intercourse of the visual organ with color. This characteristic distinguishes perception from inference, memory and the like. Thirdly, perception involves the operation of buddhi. When the sense organs are stimulated by their objects, tamas of buddhi is overcome and its sattva becomes manifest and brings about determinate knowledge. Determinate knowledge consists in the reflection of the self in buddhi modified into an object.²² This characteristic distinguishes perception from doubt or indefinite knowledge.

Vācaspati Mīśra opines that there are two stages of perception, indeterminate and determinate, and regards them as valid. He defines indeterminate perception as the immediate apprehension of an object, pure and simple, devoid of the relation between the qualified object and its qualifications, like the apprehension of a baby and a dumb person. He defines determinate perception as definite cognition of an object as qualified by its generic and specific characters and other properties. It is a perceptual judgment which distinguishes between the qualified objects and its qualifications and relates them to each other. It involves analysis and synthesis, assimilation and discrimination.

Indeterminate perception is the function of the external sense organs of knowledge. Determinate perception is the function of the internal organ, mind. The external senses apprehend an object as merely 'this' or 'unlike this'. It assimilates the object to like objects, and discriminates it from unlike objects. Assimilation and discrimination involved in indeterminate perception are the functions of mind. The external senses yield indeterminate perception or non-relational apprehension of an object. Mind yields determinate perception involving analysis and synthesis, assimilation and discrimination, subject - predicate relation. It is the relational apprehension of an object.²³

But Vijñānabhikṣu holds that both indeterminate and determinate perceptions are given by the external sense-organs. Vācaspati Miśra wrongly holds that the external senses give the indeterminate perception while mind turns it into determinate perception. Vijñānabhikṣu cites the authority of Vyāsa who holds that the external senses perceive an object as endowed with generic and specific characters.²⁴ But Vācaspati Miśra seems to be right. Assimilation and discrimination are the functions of mind and they cannot be ascribed to the external senses.

Vācaspati Miśra describes the functions of the external and internal sense-organs in the process of perception. An external sense organ stimulated by an external object gives the indeterminate perception of it. Then mind turns it into determinate perception by analysis and synthesis, assimilation and discrimination. Then ahaṁkāra appropriates and perceives it, and turns the impersonal apprehension of the object into a personal experience. Then buddhi turns it into definite knowledge and assumes a practical attitude to react to it. Then the self is reflected in the mode of buddhi modified into the form of its object. The self wrongly identifies itself with its reflection in buddhi assuming the form of the object, and has knowledge of the object. In dim light a person at first apprehends an object as something indiscriminate, then attentively reflects upon it and knows it to be a terrible thief by his bow

and arrow, then thinks him in reference to himself (e.g. He is running towards me) and then resolves 'I must fly from this place'. This example illustrates the successive functions of an external sense organ, the mind, ahaṅkāra and buddhi. Sometimes the succession of the functions of the external and internal organs is so rapid, that they seem to occur simultaneously. When a person perceives a tiger in utter darkness illuminated by a sudden flash of lightning, and runs away from it at once, the functions of the visual organs, mind, ahaṅkāra and buddhi seem to occur at the same moment, though really they are successive.²⁵

The external sense - organs can apprehend external objects, while the internal-organs can apprehend internal objects, pleasure, pain, and the like. The former can apprehend only present objects, while the latter can apprehend past and future objects as well.²⁶

In TV also Vācaspati Miśra brings out the implications of the definition of perception. He opines that first, perception as valid knowledge apprehends a real object. It does not mistake one object for another. It apprehends an object as it really is. Secondly, the perception apprehends an external object directly. It does not apprehend the form of cognition. It does not indirectly apprehend an external object through the medium of cognition. Perception is direct or presentative.²⁷ It is not indirect or representative. Thirdly, the form of cognition corresponds to

the external object because buddhi goes out of it and is modified into its form. Fourthly, perception apprehends neither generality (सामान्य) only, nor particularity (विशेष) only, nor a substance in which they inhere, but both generality and particularity characterizing an object (सामान्यविशेषात्मा), in which apprehension of particularity is the predominant factor (विशेषावधारणप्रधाना).

The Advaita Vedāntist holds that indeterminate perception apprehends generality or Being only. The Buddhist holds that it apprehends specific individuals (स्वलक्षणा) only. The Nyāya-vaiśeṣika holds that it apprehends a substance in which both generality and particularity in here.

Inference

The SK defines inference or anumāna pramāṇa as the knowledge derived from sign and signate.²⁸ Vācaspati Miśra explains the definition elaborately. He states that līṅga means pervaded (व्याप्यम्) and līṅgi means pervasive (व्यापकम्).²⁹ He states that in the wording of SK līṅga and līṅgi stand for inferential knowledge. Thus, inferential knowledge arises through the knowledge that līṅga like smoke is pervaded and līṅgi like fire, is pervasive.³⁰ Vācaspati Miśra further realizes that mere knowledge of invariable concomitance cannot lead to inferential

knowledge. Everything like light on burnt up ashes existing on the mountain is not helpful in inferring fire from smoke. Therefore, it requires, in addition, on application of liṅga on the subject or the place whence liṅgi, is inferred.

In TV Vācaspati Miśra opines that the object of inference is the substance endowed with the inferable property (जिज्ञासितधर्मविशिष्टो धर्म्यनुमेयः।).³¹ When the existence of fire is inferred from the existence of smoke perceived in a hill, the generality of fire is already known, the hill is perceived, but the hill possessing fire is inferred. Vyāsa defines inference as definite knowledge in which apprehension of generality is the predominant factor (सामान्यावधारणप्रधानम्।) and which depends upon the knowledge of invariable concomitance between the mark of inference and the inferred property, the latter pervading the former and being present in all homogeneous instances and being absent from all heterogeneous instances. Yogabhāṣya says "अनुमेयस्य तुल्यजातीयेषु अनुवृत्तो, भिन्नजातीयेभ्यो व्यावृत्तः संबन्धो यः, तत् विषया सामान्यावधारण-प्रधाना वृत्तिरनुमानम्।"

Types of Inference

Various divisions of Inference based on various principles are found in the system of Sāṅkhya. The SK refers to the division of

anumāna into three kinds, pūrvavat, śeṣavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa and Vācaspati Miśra incorporate division of inference into vīta and avīta. Īśvarakṛṣṇa defines inference as the knowledge which is preceded by the knowledge of the sign (लिङ्गः) and the signate (लिङ्गिन्) and the middle term (व्याप्यम्) and the major term (व्यापकम्). Vācaspati Miśra explains it as the knowledge which is preceded by, or based on, the knowledge of the relations of the middle, the major and the minor terms to one another. Inference is the knowledge derived from the major and minor premises.³³

According to SK, the pūrvavat is that in which an effect is inferred from its cause, e.g. from the rise of cloud it is inferred that it will rain. The śeṣavat is that in which the cause is inferred from its effect, e.g. seeing the water of river as different from that in the past, as also the fullness of the river, i.e. stream and the swiftness of the current, it is inferred that it had rained. The sāmānyatodṛṣṭa is illustrated as the perception of something at some other place is caused by movement, as the moon is observed at different place. Therefore, it is inferred that there is movement of the moon, though imperceptible.

Vācaspati Miśra in his “STK” mentions twofold divisions of inference, vīta and avīta.³⁴ The vīta is based upon affirmative concomitance or universal agreement in the presence. For instance,

whatever is smoky is fiery, the hill is smoky, and therefore the hill is fiery. The avīta is based upon negative concomitance or universal agreement in absence. For instance, what is non-different from other elements has no smell; the earth has a smell; therefore the earth is different from other elements. He subdivides the vīta into two kinds, Pūrvavat and sāmānyatodṛṣṭa.³⁵ Purvavat inference is based on observed uniformity of concomitance of the middle term and the major term. For instance, fieriness of the hill is inferred from its smokiness on the ground of the observed uniformity of concomitance of smokiness and fieriness in the kitchen and other places.

Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa inference is not based on observed uniformity of concomitance between the middle term and the major term, but on the similarity of the middle term with what is invariably concomitant with the major term. For instance the existence of the sense- organs, which are imperceptible, is inferred from the perception of colour, sound, and the like, because they are of the nature of actions, like the act of cutting.

The existence of an axe an instrument, which is required for the act of cutting, has been observed. But the sense-organs, which are supersensible, are inferred as organs or instruments of perceptions because perceptions are actions like the act of cutting. Here, the sense organs are not inferred from the observed uniformity of concomitance

between perceptions and the sense-organs. They are inferred from the fact that perceptions are actions, like the act of cutting, and require instruments in the shape of the sense-organs, like it.

The *avīta* is *śeṣavat* or-*pariśeṣa* inference. It is inference by exclusion of all other alternatives to it. It is inference by elimination. For instance, sound is a specific quality of ether, because it is not a specific quality of earth, water, fire, air, space, time, the mind and the self. So by elimination of the ether alternatives it can be inferred that sound is the specific quality of ether the remaining substance.³⁶ Here in the construction of *anumāna* Vācaspati Miśra deviates from the traditional line of *Naiyāyikas*.

Verbal testimony

Verbal testimony or *śabda pramāṇa* is a matter of common observation that a sentence or a statement is not sufficient to denote any knowledge of things. Nor the mere perception of words of a sentence does give any knowledge about objects. It is only when one perceives the words and understands their meaning that he acquires the knowledge of a verbal statement. Hence, *śabda* or testimony as a source of valid knowledge consists in understanding the meaning of the statement of a trustworthy person.³⁷ It is, however, in the context of verbal testimony that ‘*śabda*’ has aroused a long discussion in the domain of Indian

philosophy. The Sāṅkhya admits verbal testimony as an independent means of knowledge in addition to perception and inference.³⁸

Vācaspati Miśra brings out the purpose of the term 'āpta' in the definition of 'śabda', stands for the assertion of the reliable persons such as theist, and 'mlecchas' but not of those thinkers who are pervaded by delusion such as Bouddhas, Jainas, etc. It is to be noted that, by taking the instance of 'mlecchas', Vācaspati Miśra means to say that the word of even a 'mleccha' could be true and reliable.³⁹ Hence, He asserts that for being an 'āpta' it is not necessary that one should be completely free from all defects. Vedic testimony is authoritative statement. It is another source of valid knowledge. Valid testimony is a true revelation.⁴⁰ The Vedas are revelations of supersensible realities, which are beyond the range of perception and inference, to inspire Seers.⁴¹ They are not composed by any person. They are impersonal.⁴² They are not composed by God, since there is no proof of His existence. God is nonexistent. So the Vedas are not of divine origin.

Vācaspati Miśra opines that Vedic testimony is self-evident.⁴³ It is free from doubt and discrepancy, since it is not of a personal origin.⁴⁴ The Vedas have an intrinsic power of revealing truths. Vedic testimony is self-evident. It is not irrational. The assertions of the Buddha are irrational and antagonistic to the Vedas. So they are not-trustworthy.

Testimony is an authoritative statement. It takes the form of a sentence. The meaning of a sentence is the object to be proved by it. The sentence is not its property which may serve as the mark of inference. Nor does a sentence, expressing a meaning, depend upon the knowledge of the relation between a mark of inference and the object inferred. A sentence composed a new poet can express its meaning and denote an unknown object. So testimony is not an inference.⁴⁵ By putting forward these arguments Vācaspati Miśra establishes the distinct nature of verbal testimony as a source of knowledge.

Trustworthy instructor communicates his valid knowledge to another person for the latter's attainment of good and the avoidance of evil. Perception is stronger than inference and testimony, as a means of valid knowledge. Inference, and testimony both apprehend generality. Testimony is verbal knowledge. It is derived from the words. Words denote classes, and not individuals. So, all subtle, hidden and remote objects cannot be apprehended by inference or testimony. Nor can they be apprehended by normal perception. They cannot be said to be non-existent because they are not objects of ordinary perception. They are apprehended by the highest yogic intuition, which apprehends all truths.⁴⁶ It is different from testimony and inference since it apprehends

all supersensible individuals. It is absolutely valid. It is free from all taint of falsehood.

Inclusion of other Pramāṇas

Vācaspati Miśra includes all the other means of cognition posted by other systems in these three: perception, inference and valid testimony. He deals with five other means of cognition namely analogy (upamāna) presumption (arthāpatti) absence (abhāva) probability (sambhava) and rumour (aitihya). He splits the first, upamāna, up into perception, inference and valid testimony.⁴⁷ The following example is given for upamāna.

A man who has not seen a 'gavaya' recognizes that in the forest, with the help of the previous knowledge he infers that 'gavaya' is like a cow. This process of cognition can be split up into three stages. First of all he acquires the knowledge that 'gavaya' is like a cow, which is purely verbal. In the second stage when he sees, 'gavaya' the perception is at work; though the cow recalled to the mind is not present at the moment to the organs of cognition, the attributes common to it and the animal 'gavaya' are perceived by him. In the last stage, the knowledge that this is 'gavaya' is inferential.⁴⁸ The term 'gavaya' is used by exile person in inference to the animal similar to the cow. Therefore, the term 'gavaya' must be regarded as denotative of that animal. Thus; upamāna

is included under verbal testimony, perception and inference. Other commentators differ with Vācaspati Miśra. Māṭharavṛtti regards upamāna to be anumāna.⁴⁹ Jayamaṅgalā includes upamāna under anumāna and śabda.⁵⁰ Gauḍapāda bhāṣya regards it as śabda.⁵¹

Vācaspati Miśra includes arthāpatti under inference. A famous example for arthāpatti is as follows. Caitra, who is alive, is not in the house. This leads to the presumption of his being somewhere outside. This presumption is based upon the knowledge that if a living being is absent in one place, he is present elsewhere. It can be easily recognized the premise that when a finite object is not present in one place, it is present in another place, and also that ‘when a finite object is present in one place it is absent in another place’. Therefore, when it is found that the living Caitra is not in the house, from this minor premise, it can be deduced the conclusion that he must be somewhere outside the house. Thus, all presumptions can be included under inference.⁵² Arthāpatti is a kind of anumāna, which is vyatireki anumāna. Vedānta School does not accept this kind of anumāna. In their view arthāpatti is a separate source of knowledge. But Sāṅkhya accepts vyatireki anumāna and hence it includes arthāpatti in anumāna.⁵³

According to Vācaspati Miśra ‘abhāva’ (absence) is only a form of perception.⁵⁴ ‘Abhāva’ can be perceived through "संयुक्तादात्म्यसन्निकर्षः"⁵⁵

For example the absence of a jar at a certain place is not anything distinct from a modification at the place itself in the form of vacancy. Thus, all the cases of abhāva are only modification and all these diverse modifications are perceptible by the senses. Hence abhāva is not a separate pramāṇa in Sāṅkhya. Jayamaṅgalā includes it as perception.⁵⁶ Māṭhara regards it under inference.⁵⁷ But Gauḍapāda consider it under śabda or anumāna.⁵⁸

According to Vācaspati Miśra ‘saṁbhava’ comes under inference. Cognition of the lighter weights such as droṇa, aḍhaka and prastha in the heavier weights such as khāri, etc., is an example of probability. In this example the heavier weight has been found to be invariably associated with the lighter weights. It is this invariable relation that helps one to infer the existence of the lighter weights in the heavier weights.⁵⁹ Jayamaṅgalā and Māṭhara also include saṁbhava under anumāna.⁶⁰ But Gauḍapāda includes it under śabda.⁶¹

Sāṅkhya does not accept ‘aitihya’ as a valid means of cognition. Vācaspati Miśra says; “If the original source of rumour is trustworthy it includes under śabda; if not, it is invalid”⁶² but Māṭhara includes it in Anumāna.⁶³ Gauḍapāda joins with Vācaspati Miśra and includes aitihiya in śabda.⁶⁴

The Sāṅkhya accepts only three pramāṇas and includes all others in these three. Vācaspati Miśra elaborates the three pramāṇas accepted by SK and he establishes that the other five pramāṇas recognized by other philosophers can be included in these three. So he doesn't reject the other five pramāṇas but only establishes their existence in these three pramāṇas. This is also one of the notable contributions of Vācaspati Miśra to Sāṅkhya.

Ontology

Epistemology is the theory of knowledge and it enquires into the general conditions of the validity of knowledge, while ontology is the theory of being or reality. Ontology must be preceded by epistemology; since if one cannot investigate the ultimate nature of the reality without prior criticism of the organ of knowledge. As a matter of fact, epistemology and ontology are so intimately related to each other that one cannot stand without the other. The question of the nature and validity of knowledge and the question of the ultimate nature of what is known are, in reality, two aspects of the same study. So after discussing the epistemological contribution of Vācaspati Miśra, his ontological contribution to Sāṅkhya is discussed.

Classical Sāṅkhya is rigidly dualistic. It accepts the independent reality of Prakṛti and Puruṣa which are radically different from each

other. Prakṛti is the mass of undifferentiated being and as such the ultimate ground of the world. Puruṣa is the fact of consciousness, the ultimate ground of man. Thus Puruṣa and Prakṛti, the radical concepts in the Sāṅkhya System come under the ontological discussion.

Prakṛti

In Sāṅkhya, the analysis of experience and existence is as important as the knowledge of the transcendental self. The system makes a naturalistic approach to the phenomenal world and explains the same with reference to a primordial substance called Prakṛti, which comes under the second of the four major categories. Prakṛti is the material principle.⁶⁵

Four divisions of padārthas

Vācaspati Miśra explains Prakṛti as ‘Prakarotīti Prakṛtiḥ’.⁶⁶ It can never be a ‘vikṛti’ or a product. Why it is so is explained by the term ‘mūla’ i.e., it is that matter, which is the root of the universe and which is an aggregate of the products. Prakṛti or Pradhāna is the first category of Sāṅkhyas. After speaking about the original source, which is not a product the author proceeds to speak of certain products of Prakṛti which are also the source of the other products, i.e., those that are ‘prakṛtayaḥ’ as well as ‘vikṛtayaḥ’. They are spoken to be seven in number. The first one is mahat. Mahat is the source for ahaṁkāra, is the

product of mahat. It is further the source of five tanmātras and the senses and these are the forms of subtle-matter.⁶⁷ These five subtle elements are again the sources of five gross elements such as ‘pṛthvi’, etc. The seven categories involved here are mahat, ahaṁkāra and pancatanmātras. The five tanmātras are; pṛthvi-tanmātra, ap-tanmātra, tejo-tanmātra, vāyu-tanmātra and ākāśa-tanmātra.

The principle of ahaṁkāra which is the root of the five subtle primary substances together with the eleven sense organs is itself the product of mahat. Similarly the five subtle substances which are the root of the gross elements, ākāśa and the rest, are the products of ahaṁkāra. The pure and simple products are sixteen. The five gross substances and the eleven sense organs are mere products. They are not productive.⁶⁸ The individual effects are manifold, while Prakṛti is one. They subsist in their causes, while Prakṛti does not subsist any other cause. They are determinate, while Prakṛti is indeterminate. They are composed of parts, while Prakṛti is part less. They are differentiated and heterogeneous while Prakṛti is undifferentiated and homogeneous. They are subordinate to Prakṛti, while Prakṛti is self-subsistent and independent.⁶⁹ Prakṛti is the matrix of the whole psychological universe. It is the first cause of matter, life, mind, buddhi and ahaṁkāra. The unintelligent

world cannot be transformation of an intelligent principle, since spirit cannot be transformed into matter.

Existence of Prakṛti

In STK the existence of Prakṛti has been proved as follows. Whatever the effects of the properties are; there is a cause behind it. The example quoted here is that of a cloth. The cloth has the same properties of the yarn. Likewise the mahat and 22 others are bestowed with the attributes like pleasure, pain, and delusion and all these are due to the respective causes existing in it. Thus the existence of the cause in the unmanifest in the form of primordial matter is proved.

The Prakṛti is also said to have these properties and it is established too. तथा महदादिलक्षणेनापि कार्येण सुखदुःखमोहरूपेण स्वकारणगतसुखदुःखमोहात्मना भवितव्यम्। तथा च तत्कारणं सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं प्रधानमव्यक्तं सिद्धं भवति॥⁷⁰ Here Jha opines that “The author proves this by the means of Aristotelian deductive reasoning. “Properties of the effect (mahat) are the properties of the cause (Prakṛti), Pleasure, etc., are properties of the effect (Intellect). Therefore Pleasure, etc., are properties of the cause (Prakṛti). And again: -Whatever has pleasure, etc. has indiscreetness etc. Prakṛti has pleasure, etc., (at first proved). Therefore Prakṛti has indiscreetness etc.”⁷¹

The Vaiśeṣikas and the Naiyāyikas declare that the manifest is born out of manifest. They say that the atoms are apparent and they give rise to the manifest as the outcome. "व्यक्तात् व्यक्तमुत्पद्यते इति कणभक्षाक्षिचरणतनया। परमाणवो हि व्यक्ताः, तैद्वर्धणुकादिक्रमेण पृथिव्यादिलक्षणं कार्ये व्यक्तमारभ्यते॥"⁷² The dual products like earth and water along with their qualities are produced in accordance with the constituents of the atoms itself.

The Prakṛti exists as the cause is due to the predetermined trait of a particular object, the uniform appearance of the objects, the origin, which is based on the cause, the disunity between the cause and its outcome and lastly the blending of the entire world. It has been said earlier that the outcome has been already ongoing in the cause of it. As the limbs of the tortoise that protrudes out at times is distinguished from it. The limbs of the tortoise enter into the body of the tortoise and disappear or become unmanifest. So also the products which already exist in a specific shape emerge out of its respective cause.⁷³ These products are called primary elements and these become distinguished from it.

The primary elements which are the outcome of the cause along with the I-principle is distinguished from the cause. The 'I' principle which is there in the cause becomes distinguished from the mahat and

finally the Great Principle is distinguished from the Highest unmanifest that is the Prakṛti. This is finally called as the distinction between the cause and the effect. In short the effect of evolution which takes the shape of a jar or crown dissolute into the things made of its cause and at last becomes the unmanifest.

The reality is that the fruition's outcome is dependent on the competence of the cause. If the cause is not competent then there will be no outcome. The dormant competency in the cause is nothing else than the unmanifested form of outcome or result. The proposition is that the effect is said to exist and so there is no other form of contributory efficiency except the dormant form. This difference is compared to that sand and sesame by saying that the oil is hidden only in the sesame and not in the sand which helps its growth and also adds that the oil existent in it is in the form of unmanifested condition.

The objection raised against this is that why there is another unmanifest entity beyond the first one. The answer given is that the particular objects which are under study that is the Great Principle and the others are said to have an unmanifested being on the base of its cause. They are regarded as being in the shape of a jar or so and the cause of this jar or other shape is also getting as clay, gold, etc., and this is said to be the unmanifested form of that being. These situations lead

the cause of the mahat to be the summit of the unmanifest which is considered as the final cause because there is no other way to put forward another reality concerned with the unmanifested. This is so because the Prakṛti which is unmanifested is infinite and so also its effects. Moreover, if this is stressed too much the case would be a ceaseless one.⁷⁴

For these reasons we can understand the particular objects which are under discussion should have such causes which make them unmanifested. The term homogeneous means similarity and here the similarity of various objects are taken for granted. The Great Principle and its adjuncts is said to manifest itself in the form of preference and the like are homogeneous, that is they are found in the pleasure, pain and delusion. The theory is that the object connected with a particular form, is said to have as its cause that which has the same form of the object. Thus, it is proved that the particular object and the unmanifested Prakṛti have the cause similar to the effect. The mahat and its attributes are habitually united with the pleasure, pain, and delusion and also with their cause Prakṛti and all of these are said to be in the unmanifested form till the evolution takes place.

The unmanifest as the cause functions on the basis of three attributes. The process is by amalgamating and adjusting, owing to the

dissimilarity which sprouts up from the dominance of one of the three attributes. The best example of this is water. At the time of the cosmic termination the three attributes, sattva, rajas, and tamas, is in the homogeneous form even during the alterations. The very characteristic of these attributes is altered and they can never be in a stagnant or rigid state. These attributes, even during the time of cosmic dissolution, acts according to their own whims and fancies, that too in a specific form. This is the status of equilibrium of the attributes which results in the evolution.⁷⁵

There is another mode of function pertained to the attributes. This is by amalgamating the attributes. This amalgamation is possible only if there is some sort of being in a lesser important position and this in turn needs some kind of discrepancy among the attributes. This discrepancy is possible only when one of the attributes is oppression of the other. This second method of functioning gives rise to the Great Principle and its adjuncts. The disturbance of the equilibrium of the attributes leads to the process of evolution, which awakens the dormant energy of the Prakṛti and results in the manifestations of intellect and so on.

The attributes having many forms take part in various operations. Vācaspati Miśra explains this by with the example that water is one, but it can accept various forms, shapes, smell, taste, and so in accordance

with the alteration and situations it is in. When it comes to earth it assumes the form of fruit juices and so on. Likewise the attributes of Prakṛti are prevalent and is subject to be the cause of many modifications.

The Guṇas

Sāṅkhya postulates Prakṛti as the ultimate cause of all worldly existence.⁷⁶ It is the equilibrium of three guṇas, i.e. sattva, rajas and tamas. The term ‘guṇa’ does not stand for quality or characteristic. The guṇas are to be understood in the sense of the constituents or components of Prakṛti. These three constituents, though essentially distinct in their nature, are conceived as interdependent, so that they can never be separated from one another. It means that they are not mechanically placed together, but reciprocally involves one another and form a unity in trinity. That is, they not only coexist, but also cohere.

One important point to be noted here is that Sāṅkhya conceives of Prakṛti as ever active. The reason behind it is that if the movement of Prakṛti be stopped in the state of dissolution, there would be no further evolution. There is no other outward agency which can move it into action. The only other reality apart from Prakṛti is Puruṣa, which is supposed to be completely inactive and indifferent. Sāṅkhya does not postulate any third principle of God. Hence, Sāṅkhya conceives of

motion as inherent in Prakṛti. The fact that Prakṛti is always in motion implies that every object of the world, being an effect of Prakṛti, is also in a state of constant motion.

Each of the guṇas stands for a distinct aspect of physical reality. Sattva signifies whatever is pure and fine: rajas, whatever is active: and tamas, whatever is solid and offers resistance. The existence of Prakṛti and Puruṣa has been reached through reason on the principle, i.e., Prakṛti is postulated effects. The guṇas are not perceived, but are inferred from their effects or modifications. They are super sensible.⁷⁷ They are of the nature of pleasure, pain and delusion. They are feeling substances. Sattva has the function of manifestation. Rajas has the function of activity. Tamas has the function of restraint. Sattva manifests an object of consciousness. Rajas makes an object move and act. It is the principle of activity. Tamas is the inertia, resistance, or restraint.⁷⁸ Sattva rajas and tamas have the functions of manifestation, activity and restraint respectively, and which produce pleasure, pain and delusion respectively.⁷⁹ Sattva is light and illumining; it is buoyant and ended with power of manifestation. Rajas urges sattva and tamas to act. It is an incentive to action. It is the principle of motion. Sattva is the essence to be realized or manifested; tamas is the obstacle to its realization or manifestation; rajas is the energy which overcomes the

obstacle and realizes the essence. They coalesce with one another, and function in cooperation with one another.

As guṇas are the ultimate elements in the constitution of Prakṛti. Prakṛti is regarded as essentially dynamic. Even in dissolution there is a homogeneous change in Prakṛti when all the three guṇas are in the state of equilibrium. It is only when heterogeneous change takes place and rajas vibrates and makes sattva and tamas vibrate then the equilibrium is disturbed and evolution takes place.

Sattva, the principle of manifestation and rajas, the principle of activity were formerly held in check by tamas, the principle of non-manifestation and non-activity. But when rajas, the principle of activity vibrates and makes the other two vibrate, the process of creation begins, and creation is not the new creation of the worldly objects, but only their manifestation. It is only made explicit that which was formerly implicit. There is no continuous progress in one direction, but alternating periods of evolution and dissolution in a cyclic order.

Evolution is again said to be teleological and not mechanical or blind, Evolution takes place for serving the purpose of the Puruṣa. Prakṛti, the guṇas, the senses, the mind, the ego, the intellect, the subtle body all are constantly serving the end of the Puruṣa. This end is either worldly experience or liberation.⁸⁰ Sattva is responsible for the lightness

in things; the upward movement of the burning fires the downward flowing of the water or the blowing across of the wind. Tamas weighs down things and renders them inactive. Neither of these would have the energy to have its proper functions, but from the stimulative activity of the rajas.⁸¹

Sattva, rajas, and tamas are infinite in number. An infinite number of individual sattva, rajas and tamas bring about the diversity of effects and diminution. If they were single and ubiquitous, they could not bring about the diversity of effects, which is due to the conflict of the guṇas. If they were single individuals, they could not bring about an increase and diminution.⁸² They cannot be created or destroyed. They cannot be changed into one another. All changes are due to the combination and separation of the guṇas, which are always integrating and disintegrating. All effects are due to particular arrangements and collocations of the guṇas which are indestructible and eternal.⁸³ In fact, the evolution and envelopment of the guṇas themselves called the āvirbhāva and thirobhāva of Mūlaprakṛti.

Theory of Pariṇāmavāda

The Sāṅkhya clearly enunciated the doctrine of evolution. The manifold world is not created by God out of nothing. It is evolved from Prakṛti, which is the first cause. It is the matrix of the whole world of

effects, physical and psychical. The world is unconscious. It cannot be the transformation of a spirit which is unchangeable and immutable (कूठस्थः). It is the transformation of the unconscious Prakṛti. All objective existence is the transformation of sattva, rajas and tamas. Production is transformation. Prakṛti and its evolutes (विकृतिः) are subject to transformation (प्रसवधर्मिन्). They can never be deprived of their essential nature of modifiability, evolution and dissolution. Evolution is the transformation of the homogeneous into the heterogeneous (विरूपपरिणामः). Dissolution is the transformation of the heterogeneous into the homogeneous (स्वरूपपरिणामः).⁸⁴

Evolution is due to excess of one guṇa and diminution of others. The excessive guṇa overpowers the other guṇas owing to disturbance of this equilibrium and produce heterogeneous effects. Evolution is transitioning from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous from the undifferentiated to the differentiated. It is due to the integration (samudaya) of the guṇas. Dissolution is the opposite process. It is due to the disintegration of the guṇas. It is a counter evolution (pratisarga). Sattva, rajas and tamas are transformed into their similar modification. In dissolution the heterogeneous is transformed into the homogeneous.⁸⁵

At first, Prakṛti is transformed into mahat or the cosmic intellect. Mahat is transformed into ahaṁkāra or the cosmic egoism. Ahaṁkāra is transformed into the eleven sense organs and the five tanmātras or subtle essences of sound, touch, colour, taste and smell. The five subtle essences are transformed into the five gross elements of ether, air, fire, water and earth. These are the twenty four principles.⁸⁶ In addition to these there is Puruṣa. These are the twenty five principles according to the Sāṅkhya.

Prakṛti evolves into mahat or buddhi. It is the unindividuated cosmic intellect. The cosmic buddhi becomes individuated and evolves into the cosmic egoism or ahaṁkāra or asmita. The cosmic ahaṁkāra is bifurcated into the subjective series and the objective series. Vācaspati Miśra holds that ahaṁkāra in its sāttvika aspects evolves into means, the five organs of knowledge, and the five organs of action. Ahaṁkāra in its tāmasa aspects (भूतादिः) evolves into the five subtle essences (तन्मात्राः). Ahaṁkāra in its rājasa aspect plays its part in both. This aspect is also called the taijasa aspect. The five subtle essences evolve into the five gross elements of earth, water, light, air and ether by a preponderance of tamas. Sattva and tamas are inactive in themselves. They are energized and moved to function by rajas which is, therefore, not ineffective.⁸⁷ In the evolution of these modifications sattva, rajas and tamas are all

present and perform their functions, though sattva predominates in the evolution of the psychical apparatus and tamas predominates in the evolution of the physical universe.

Two kinds of Pariṇāma

Prakṛti is the substratum of the changing phenomena of the world. Sāṅkhya conceives of Prakṛti as consisting of mass, energy and illumination in the form of tamas, rajas and sattva. Therefore, it contains all the potentiating for creating the world all by herself out of herself. According to classical Sāṅkhya due to the transcendental influence of Puruṣa, the equilibrium of Prakṛti gets disturbed. When the equilibrium of the guṇas is disturbed, some guṇas overpower the other guṇas, and start the process of evolution. Production is a manifestation or evolution. Destruction is non- manifestation or envelopment.

During the state of dissolution of the world, the guṇas change homogeneously, sattva changes into sattva, rajas in to rajas and tamas in to tamas. This change does not disturb the equilibrium of the guṇas and evolution cannot take place. However, when the guṇas exert mutual influence upon one another or start interacting, it is called heterogeneous.

Theory of Satkāryavāda

The problem of causality has a prominent place in Indian thought. In Sāṅkhya, Prakṛti is the upādānakāraṇa of this universe.⁸⁸ Pariṇāma is that process by which the unmanifested Prakṛti becomes transformed into this manifested state of the objects of experience. This involves the problem of causality or the relation between cause and effect. The theory that the effect exists beforehand in its cause is one of the central features of the Sāṅkhya System. This theory of causality of Sāṅkhya is called pariṇāmavāda or 'satkāryavāda', which establishes that both cause and effect are existent and that effect is not a non- entity, which has become an entity by the operation of the cause.

The Vedāntins hold that all effects are an illusory imagination from the existent and not themselves really existent. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the nonexistent is produced from the existent. But according to Sāṅkhya the existent is produced from the existent.⁸⁹ The modern conception of the functional interpretation of the change that it is not material things that change, but the patterns of change and relations are foreshadowed the above traditional Indian thoughts on the theory of causality. In asking whether this new conception has been foreshadowed traditional Indian thoughts the suggestive possibilities latent in the purely functional view of causality recommended in the Buddhist

doctrine of ‘pratityāsamutpāda’ is not left out. The doctrine bids to seek not material things that change, but patterns of change and relations.

According to Sāṅkhya the effect pre-exist in the cause. Vācaspati Miśra in his STK elaborates the cause-effect relationship with ample evidence that was covertly suggested by Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK. The Sāṅkhya offers the following arguments to prove the pre-existence of the effect in the cause.

Asadakaraṇāt

This is the first argument of this theory, that what is non- existent can never be made existent (असदकरणात्). Vācaspati Miśra explicates the theory thus: if the effect were really non- existent, no agency whatever could bring it about any more than a thousand craftsmen could turn blue into yellow or extract oil from sand. Oil is getting from sesame because the oil was existing in the sesame.⁹⁰ Thus pariṇāma is the manifestation of something already existing. All that remains to be done by the cause is the manifestation of the pre-existing effect.

Upādānagrahaṇāt

A particular effect can be produced out of a particular material cause (उपादानग्रहणात्). A jar can be produced out of clay only: cloth can be produced out of threads only: curd can be produced out of milk only. There is a law that particular causes can produce particular effects

(उपादाननियमात्). This proves that the effects are pre- existent in their causes in a latent condition. If they are nonexistent in their causes, the causes will be devoid of specified powers to produce non- existent specific effects. If they are admitted to have specific powers, these powers are nothing but the latent condition (अनागतावस्था) of the specific effects. The effects are pre-existent in their causes prior to their operation, since they are related to their material causes. The cause produces the effect when it is related to it. No relation can exist between the existent cause and the non-existent effect. Hence the effect must be existent.⁹¹

Sarvasambhavābhāvāt

If the effect unrelated to the cause could be produced, then every effect would arise from every cause. But every effect does not arise from every cause (सर्वसम्भवाभावात्). So the effect is pre-existent in the cause, and the cause produces the effect when it is related to the effect: a non- existent effect unrelated to the cause; only an existent effect related to the cause can be produced by an existing cause related to the effect.

Śaktasya Śakyakaraṇāt

The efficient cause can produce only that effect for which it is efficient (शक्तस्य शक्यकरणात्). The author of STK vivifies this idea taking the former example from a different view. The oil is produced out of

sesame because sesame is efficient to produce oil. But the soil is not efficient to produce oil. So oil cannot be produced out of the soil. This is also a limitation. This limit is in the form that only what is competent to produce that effect can produce it and that something produce only what is capable of being produced by that something as the cause so there is special 'capacity' in the cause for which capacity the effect is the object.⁹²

Kāraṇabhāvāt

The effect pre-exists in the cause, since it is identical in nature with its cause (कारणभावात्). The effect is not different from the cause. The cause is existent. The effect, therefore, cannot be non-existent. There can be no identity between an entity and a non-entity.

The effect is existent in the cause; because what is non-existent can never be brought into existent; because a determinate relation subsists between the material cause and its effect; because all effects are not produced in all places, at all times; because a competent cause only can produce an effect for which it is competent; and because the effect possesses the nature of the cause.⁹³ Vācaspati Miśra even quotes from Bhagavat Gītā to establish his argument in proving Satkāryavāda.⁹⁴

As a preliminary to the establishment of the acclaimed Sāṅkhya theory, i.e., satkāryavāda, Vācaspati Miśra presents the different views

of other systems with regard to the nature of effect as follows; 1) The Bauddha view of the effect being an entity arising from non-entity.⁹⁵ 2) The Advaitavedānta view of the whole series of effect being a mere illusory evolution out of a single entity, and not real entities in themselves.⁹⁶ 3) The Nyāyā and Vaiśeṣika view of the effect being a non-entity arising from entity.⁹⁷ 4) The Sāṅkhya view of the effect being an entity arising from an entity.⁹⁸ Thus presenting the various views on causation Vācaspati Miśra refutes other theories one by one.

As regards the Buddha theory that, the existent effect emanates from the non-existent cause. Though it is true that products like ‘sprout’ and the ‘jar’ are found to be produced after the destruction of the seed and clay-lump, yet the causal efficiency cannot be attributed to destruction, which is pure negation. It can belong only to positive entities in the shape of the constituent particles of the seed and the clay lump. If positive entity were produced out of mere negation, then, in as much as such negation of things would be easily available everywhere, it would involve the absurd contingency of all things being produced at all places and at all times.⁹⁹ Vācaspati Miśra refutes the Advaita Vedānta theory of causation as follows. The belief in the existence of the phenomenal world cannot be said to be illusory unless we have some

proof invalidating its existence. Hence the effect cannot be regarded as a mere illusory evolution from a single real entity.¹⁰⁰

The Nyāyā and vaiśeṣika views are criticized by pointing out the above mentioned five proofs which were quoted to establish the Sāṅkhya view. First of all no instance of the manifestation of what is non-existence is got. What is non-existence is never found to be either manifested or produced. Then, there could be no relation between cause and effect; every effect would arise from every cause without restriction. But one's experience is that there is some relationship between cause and effect because the efficient cause can produce only that effect for which it is efficient. Lastly, in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view is also the cause of existence. The effect also, is of the same essence as the cause that also is existent.¹⁰¹ Thus, refuting the Nyāya Vaiśeṣika view, Vācaspati Miśra establishes Satkāryavāda.

Refutation of other schools

The origin or creation of all the basics from the buddhi to the minutest thing is done by bringing about changes in the Prakṛti. This is caused because to liberate each Puruṣa and it is for the cause of somebody else in the guise it is done in the case of Prakṛti. The Prakṛti herself is the one which evolutes things from the buddhi to the tiniest element. This is not the play of God or Brahman or there is any specific

cause. If the evolution was entrusted to the later there would be no evolution at all and the Brahman is also inactive here because the pure intelligence is unchanged. In the process of evolution the Prakṛti is uncontrolled by God as the God is inactive here like the carpenter who is inactive does not put to use his tools.¹⁰²

There is a doubt then if the Prakṛti is ceaselessly active then how the Puruṣa is liberated. The author says that it is just as if the cook who, after the tedious task of cooking retires for a rest similarly the Prakṛti is urged to liberate the Puruṣa and then takes rest.¹⁰³ Though this task is for the sake of others it in turn is beneficial to the one takes its responsibility. Then another doubt which arises is that only the conscious things can take up the work of others, but how the Prakṛti which is insentient takes up the task. The argument is that the Prakṛti needs the control of sentient beings and the Puruṣas which dwells in the body cannot help Prakṛti in this process. This is so because the Puruṣa is ignorant of the possibilities of the Prakṛti and so there should be some other force which helps the Prakṛti and this is explained in the next Kārikā.

Vācaspati Miśra says that though the Prakṛti is insentient it has a definite end of liberating the Puruṣa as the milk of the cow which flows for the nourishment of the calf when it drinks it. The flow of milk

cannot be regarded as the action of God and prove that the sentient beings control the insentient beings.¹⁰⁴ It can thus be said whatever the sentient being does is either out of selfishness or for the good of others. In the case of the creation of the universe this does not prove to be correct. So it cannot be said that the creation is due to the powers of sentient being.

The God on the other hand is the one who has immense and infinite powers to create as He is considered as the Lord of the universe. He does not have any selfish motive, nor has pity or think beneficial for others. If ever God went for pity or benevolence or selfishness the mortal, he creates would be of various nature. Then the deeds of the past would be inactive, which in turn would affect their bodies. Coming back to Prakṛti's insentient action, the motive behind its ability to create or the urge to create is just for another's sake. 'परार्थ्यमात्रन्तु प्रयोजकमुपपद्यते।'¹⁰⁵

Prakṛti does the creation as if for its own purpose is explained by the author as the human beings who are immersed in the deeds to comply with their desires so also the Prakṛti is engaged in the process of liberating the Puruṣa. The yearning when fulfilled will die away. The desired object is the goal of the cause and the result of the deed is the object which is desired. Here the similarity is clear when it is said that

the Prakṛti is the one which is in favour of emancipating the Puruṣa.

"पुरुषस्य विमोक्षार्थं प्रवर्तते तद्वदव्यक्तम्" इति।¹⁰⁶

Puruṣa

The term Puruṣa is used to denote the self in Sāṅkhya. The object of this system of philosophy is to attain the discriminative knowledge between Prakṛti and Puruṣa. It is said in the Kārikā that liberation is possible only by this discriminative knowledge.¹⁰⁷ The reason for suffering due to the three kinds of sorrow is said to be avidyā. Avidyā is identical with the want of the discriminative knowledge between the unconscious Prakṛti and conscious Puruṣa. The knowledge of Puruṣa means to know that he is not any other principle except consciousness.

Existence of Puruṣa

Puruṣa is not the cause of this universe, the experience that this universe exists arises from the existence of Puruṣa. The subject - object relation results from the apparent contact between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. This apparent contact is the cause of the empirical self. The combined effect of the intellect and individuation (महत् अहङ्कारः च) can be considered as the empirical self. Puruṣa falsely identifies this empirical self with the pure self. Puruṣa is the pure self or the pure consciousness. Īśvarakṛṣṇa in the SK puts forward four arguments to establish the

existence of Puruṣa.¹⁰⁸ Vācaspati Miśra explains these arguments as follows.

1. Vācaspati Miśra shows that prakṛti and its evolutes are the composite objects because they are made up of triguṇas and as such possess the three natures of sukha, dukha and moha. These composite objects are for the use of another. Hence it is necessary to accept Puruṣa as the one for whom the prakṛti and its evolutes are meant.¹⁰⁹

2. Secondly, there must be one, as the reverse of what is composed of the three constituents. Here it is treated as an independent reason with reference to the statement of the SK¹¹⁰, that the spirit is different from the uninvolved.

3. Puruṣa must be accepted as the controller of matter, i.e., prakṛti and its evolutes. The objects coming under the category of matter are constituted by triguṇas and characterized by dukha and moha. These cannot function without some other control since these objects are to be controlled. Vācaspati Miśra gives the example of the chariot and the charioteer to highlight the fact that all evolutes are controlled by some controlling power. This controlling power is Puruṣa, the Ātman, who is free from guṇas and their consequent characteristics.¹¹¹

4. The existence of Puruṣa must be accepted, because of the fact that ‘there should be someone as the enjoyer of sukha, dukha and moha’

which are to be enjoyed (पुरुषोऽस्ति भोक्त्रृभावात्). Prakṛti and its evolutes are characterized by sukha, dukha and moha. Whether the objects bring pleasure, sorrow or delusion is known only with reference to the response of the enjoyer. Hence, it is necessary to accept Puruṣa.

5. The fifth argument is Prakṛti acts for the liberation of somebody that is Puruṣa. (कैवल्यार्थं प्रवृत्तेश्च।) Prakṛti which is non-intelligent cannot experience or enjoy its evolutes. There must be an intelligent experience and enjoyed of the evolutes of prakṛti: that is Puruṣa. There is the striving for release. This implies the existence of Puruṣa which strives for and obtains release.¹¹² There must be a transcendental synthetic unity of pure consciousness to coordinate all the experiences. Vācaspati Mīśra interpreted the bhokṛṭbhāva in the sense of draṣṭṛbhāva (passive observation).¹¹³ But both bhokṛṭbhāva and draṣṭṛbhāva are not contradictory terms as some scholars consider and can go together with bondage.

The first three arguments seek to prove the existence of the soul as the controller and the enjoyer of the world of composite things. The last argument is based on the observed facts of the world which is striving for freedom and that it is the supreme goal.

Plurality of Puruṣa

An important feature of the Sāṅkhya Philosophy is that it accepts the ‘plurality of the self. Dr.S.Radhakrishnan says: “Throughout the Sāṅkhya there is confusion between the Puruṣa and the jīva”.¹¹⁴ The Puruṣa, according to Sāṅkhya is not one; rather there is the multiplicity of Puruṣa and all of them are infinite, unchangeable, all-pervasive and eternal. Though there is the numerical plurality, there is also the qualitative identity with the self. But qualitative identity cannot go with numerical plurality. Multiplicity without some kind of distinction is unthinkable. “Plurality would involve limitations, and an absolute, immortal, eternal and unconditional Puruṣa, cannot be more than one”¹¹⁵. SK tries to prove that the plurality of Puruṣa certainly follows from the distributive nature of the incidence of birth, death and of the endowment of the organs of cognition and action, from engaging in action, not all at the same time, and also from differences in the proportion of the guṇas.¹¹⁶

In fact, the Sāṅkhya arguments for the existence of Puruṣa turn out to be proof for the existence of the empirical individuals and not on the transcendental subjects. Sāṅkhya System recognizes plurality of Puruṣa agreeing with Advaita view. The Sāṅkhya argues the ātman, the spirit, the subject; the knower is neither body nor the mind, nor ahaṁkāra nor

buddhi. It is not a substance which possesses the quality of consciousness as is held by the system of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. It is consciousness which is pure and innumerable.

Vedānta says that this plurality of the self is by upādhi. Vācaspati Miśra raises the objection and argues as follows: to explain this nānātva by upādhi, then you will land yourself in another absurdity. For, as a body is the upādhi of Atman, so the limbs are the upādhis of the body. When we see the appearance and disappearance of the limbs in a body, will the Vedāntin call these phenomena births and deaths of the same body. In other words, one Puruṣa cannot be divided into many by more adjuncts, then hands and feet will also represent separate Puruṣas. The distinction between the released and the bound will disappear because the portion of space that falls vacant with the rain of a pot can be filled in by procuring another pot.¹¹⁷ Though there is the numerical plurality, there is also the qualitative identity with the self.

The Puruṣa have different sense organs and motor organs and they undergo death and birth separately. If the soul were just one, the knowledge gained by one would mean the knowledge gained by all i.e., the liberation of all. The above argument, strictly speaking, is not helping to prove the plurality of the Puruṣa which is explained in the

Kārikā.¹¹⁸ It is applicable only to the Puruṣa who has a body complex since birth and death are related only to the body complex.

Diversity in activities in the universe is because of the multiplicity of Puruṣa. If it were only one, the activities of men will be the same and simultaneous and the characterizations of human beings as sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa, will not occur. Here the varieties of qualities and characters are the proof for the multiplicity of the Puruṣa.¹¹⁹

The evidence in favour of the multiplicity of the Puruṣa is that from the time of birth, some are happy with goodness sattva, dominant in them, e.g. superhuman beings and saints: some are with rajas dominating e.g. ordinary men and yet others with the tamas aspect prominent in them, e.g. beasts etc. This is because of the difference in guṇas which remain in their subtle forms as liṅga sārīra at the time of transmigration.

Discriminative knowledge

In Sāṅkhya the discriminative wisdom which will result in liberation, the eternal release from the material life. Sāṅkhya recognizes two ultimate realities namely Prakṛti and Puruṣa. Apavarga can be attained by the viveka between the evolved, uninvolved and the knower. The knowledge of Avyakta can be attained through knowledge of the vyakta and through that the existence of the spirit is inferred i.e., the

discriminative knowledge arises ultimately from the cognition of the nature of the spirit.

According to Vācaspati Miśra “The knowledge of the discrimination of spirit from matter arises from right cognition consisting in meditation and contemplation uninterruptedly and patiently carried on for a long time, of the manifested, etc.”¹²⁰ Again he says: “Doubt and error are the two impurities of wisdom and as the above wisdom is free from these, it is called pure. This is what is meant by the term "अविपर्ययात्".¹²¹ The practice pertaining to truth results in the direct perception of the reality. So this knowledge is called pure knowledge. It is also said that this knowledge is complete. There is nothing left unknown after the attainment of such knowledge and the want of that knowledge leads to bondage.

In Yoga, Vācaspati Miśra holds that the validity of knowledge consists in certainty (undoubtedness), correspondence to the object and novelty. He defines *pramā* as the *cittavṛtti* which apprehends an object that is undoubted, real and unknown. "तच्च असन्दिग्धाविपरीतानधिगत-विषया चित्तवृत्तिः।"¹²² Vijñānabhikṣu holds that the pure self is the knower (प्रमातृ), that the mental mode (बुद्धिवृत्तिः) apprehending on an object is the means of valid knowledge (प्रमाणम्), that the reflections of the

mental mode assuming the form of the object in the self is valid knowledge (प्रमा), and that the object apprehended by the reflected mental mode is the object of valid knowledge (प्रमेयम्).

Vācaspati Miśra further says that the self is reflected in the mental mode and identifies itself with it which is modified into the form of an object. The reflection of the self in the apprehending mental mode is valid knowledge. The mental mode is not reflected in the self. The knowledge is not generated in the self. The self is the knower, that the mental mode is the means of valid knowledge, and that the object apprehended by the mental mode is the object of valid knowledge.¹²³

Vācaspati Miśra defines valid knowledge as knowledge of an object which was not known previously (अनधिगत) leading to fruitful action (व्यवहारहेतुः).¹²⁴ Novelty excludes recollection from valid knowledge. Workability is the pragmatic test of truth. It consists in attainment of good (हितप्राप्तिः) and avoidance of evil (अहितपरिहार).¹²⁵ Vyāsa points out that error is contradicted by valid knowledge.¹²⁶ This implies that valid knowledge is not contradicted.

Means to Discriminative knowledge

In Sāṅkhya System the discriminative knowledge is the realization of self which is identical with Apavarga. It cannot be attained all of a

sudden. There are several steps to attain this knowledge. The attainment of the discriminative knowledge is called 'siddhi' in Sāṅkhya. Describing the intellectual creation 46th Kārikā says that virtue, wisdom, dispassion and power and the reverse of these four are the forms of the buddhi and that they can be grouped again into four i.e., viparyaya, aśakti, tuṣṭi and siddhi. Among these, viparyaya, āsakti and tuṣṭi are hindrances to siddhi.¹²⁷

Vācaspati Miśra says "It is well-known that siddhi is the most desired by all and, as the other three are checked to this siddhi, they are over to be abandoned".¹²⁸ It is said that there are eight steps to this attainment. They are through study or adhyayana, oral instruction or śabda, proper reasoning or 'ūha', friendly discussion or 'suhṛtprāpti', purity of discriminative knowledge or 'dāna', the suppression of the intrinsic pain or 'ādhyātmikadukkhavighāta' and lastly the suppression of the super human pain or 'ādhidaivikadukhavighāta'. Vācaspati elaborates these eight steps as follows.

Adhyayana

According to Vācaspati Miśra adhyayana or a thorough study of the philosophical texts is the first step to acquire the discriminative knowledge. The study consists of reading in due form, with the

preceptor of the philosophical texts. This is the cause of other attainments. This attainment is known as t̄ara.¹²⁹

Śabda

Śabda is the next stage in the path of the realization of the truth. The term implies the comprehension of the meaning of the texts by hearing the explanations of the teacher. This is called Sutāra.¹³⁰ Vācaspati Mīśra says that this attainment also includes ‘śravaṇa’ which, along with ‘manana’ and ‘nididhyāsana’, is the means of realizing the higher truth. Śravaṇa means the study and hearing of the explanations of the preceptor of the philosophical texts. This ‘śravaṇa’ leads to ‘manana’. So this explanation of Vācaspati Mīśra is very apt.

Ūha

This is the investigation of the meaning of the scriptures itself. This investigation consists in establishing the ultimate truth setting aside all doubts and objections with regard to it. This attainment is known as t̄arat̄ara.¹³¹ This is the second stage in the realization of the ultimate truth. This process is also called ‘manana’.

Suhṛtprāpti

After the process of reasoning one must test the validity of his attainment by friendly discussion. Then only he becomes confident in his conclusions. First of all he must win the agreement of his teacher.

Then he must discuss the matter with his fellow-students and win their agreement, also.¹³² Kālidāsa also says "आपरितोषाद्विदुषां न साधु मन्ये प्रयोगविज्ञानं, बलवदपि शिक्षितानां आत्मन्यप्रत्ययं चेतः।". This attainment is called 'ramyaka'.¹³³

This can be considered as the second step of manana. To attain self-confidence in the course of manana, it is necessary to have a friendly discussion about the very difficult points in philosophy with the preceptor and the fellow students. It is very useful to attain the purity of the discriminative wisdom which is the next attainment in the course of tattvābhyāsa.

Dāna

This is the aim of the previous attainments. Vācaspati Mīśra says that dāna means purity of the discriminative knowledge. "दानं" च शुद्धिर्विवेकज्ञानस्य, "द्वैप् शोधने" इत्यस्माद्धातोर्दानपदव्युत्पत्तेः। सेयम्पञ्चमी सिद्धिस्सदामुदितमुच्यते॥"¹³⁴ But Gauḍapāda says that dāna is the generosity because true wisdom is imparted by the teacher duly propitiated with such gifts as tridaṇḍa, kuṇḍi, grāma etc.¹³⁵ The first explanation of Vācaspati Mīśra seems to be more correct because the word 'purity' is seen along with the word 'wisdom' in the SK.

Vācaspati Miśra identifies the first two attainments with śravaṇa and the third with manana. But he does not identify any of the other attainments with nididhyāsana.¹³⁶ But one can infer that dāna can be identified with nididhyāsana because continuous practice of concentration of buddhi is necessary for the purification of the mind.

The above five attainments are recognized by Vācaspati Miśra as the preliminary ones and the next three of the principal ones. The five preliminaries are also divided into two, as causes and effects. The first, ‘study’ is only a cause and those of the most important kinds are only effects, while the rest of the middle class, and are both cause and effect.

Three attainments

The three suppressions of pain are the last three attainments. The three kinds of pain are described in the first Kārikā and they are minutely elaborated by Vācaspati Miśra in his STK.¹³⁷ Duhkhavighāta is the aim of other siddhīs and it is to attain the discriminative knowledge or to attain Apavarga. Hence, these attainments are very important to the final goal of liberation.

Vācaspati Miśra himself gives another explanation for the first five attainments. The perception of truth, without the instruction of others, brought out purely by means of practices during past lives, is the first attainment called ‘ūha’. The knowledge got by listening to another

person reading the texts is called 'śabda', which is the second attainment. The third attainment adhyayana is the learning of the Sāṅkhya texts with the help of a teacher. The fourth attainment called suhṛtprāpti is that of wisdom through contact with a friend who has already got it. Fifthly, dāna is the wisdom obtained from gifts to the teacher. He also leaves the propriety of either interpretation to the learned reader to judge.

The above interpretation is given by Jayamaṅgalā. But Vācaspati Miśra's first interpretation seems to be more correct because it is more logical. In the second explanation dāna is only a means of adhyayana. Then it has not the status of a siddhi. S.S.Sūryanārāyaṇa Śāstri rightly observes, "If we remember that we are reading with a digest of a highly rational science, we cannot help in feeling of partiality for Vācaspati Miśra's view".¹³⁸

Tattvābhyāsa

All over the above said means of discriminative knowledge, Sāṅkhya System firmly suggests that tattvābhyāsa is the means of attaining pure knowledge. Tattvābhyāsa means not the more learning of the Sāṅkhyatattvas, but 'the abhyāsa of the eight attainments.' Gauḍapāda does not explain the word abhyāsa, but simply says that abhyāsa is necessary for realizing the nature of Puruṣa by attaining the

knowledge of the twenty five principles in Sāṅkhya.¹³⁹ Vācaspati Mīśra explains the word ‘abhyāsa’ as a long course of repeated and devoted exercise. Then only the discriminative knowledge between sattva and Puruṣa arises.¹⁴⁰ Not only the ontological acumen, but also the psychology of Sāṅkhya System aptly deserves an in depth study.

Prakṛti binds itself with its seven forms.¹⁴¹ They are dharma, adharma, ajñāna, vairāgya, avairāgya, aiśvarya and anaiśvarya.¹⁴² The remarkable thing is that it is Prakṛti herself who succumbs to these forms. She uses one of the forms, to bring about benevolence for the Puruṣa. The seven forms are the virtue along with the properties of the buddhi excluding Wisdom. Prakṛti with the help of knowledge and liberation provides benefit for the Puruṣa. The one form she uses is that of wisdom which means the discriminatory powers. One thing to be noted is that she does not impart knowledge or liberate the same Puruṣa again and again.

The practice of truth leads to wisdom which is in the form, “I am not, naught is mine and not I”.¹⁴³ This wisdom is absolute as it is free from the doubt and error. The truth here means the comprehending the real truth which leads to wisdom which is the one that helps to discriminate the Puruṣa from the Master. Whatever be the practice it will lead to the acquisition of the knowledge of the particular object to

which the practice is related. Here the practice is related to the truth and the outcome is the direct discernment of the truth. The wisdom which leads to this goal is named as pure. This is called pure as it is free from the evils of doubts and error. This is what is meant by the term 'aviparyayāt'. "नियतमनियततया गृह्णन्संशयोपि विपर्ययः, तेन 'अविपर्ययात्' इति संशयविपर्ययाभावो दर्शितः।"¹⁴⁴ The doubt is such a thing which makes one think that what is certain is uncertain and so this is included in the forms of error. When it is said the absence of error it means that there is an absence of both doubt and error. Here the word error gives the connotation of mistake. The absence of error is due to the action of wisdom which is intertwined with truth.

It is agreed that the practice of knowledge leads to the truth, but it is not specified which kind of knowledge is achieved. If the knowledge one acquires is the false knowledge, then the result will be sorrows and miseries which will lead to the cycle of births and deaths. The knowledge which is gained by practice is absolute which is free from the traces of error. It should not be forgotten that there is always a tendency for the human mind to be attracted to the error but this can be overcome by gaining the knowledge of truth. The gaining of such a pool of knowledge of truth is also encouraged by the Buddha, which is the characteristic of a Will or buddhi. It is said that, "No amount of

contradiction can set aside the flawless knowledge of the true character of objects, for such is the partiality of the buddhi.”¹⁴⁵

The knowledge so gained has a form which is, as said earlier, “I am not, naught is mine and Not-I.” Here the “I am not” is the one which disqualifies all the exploits of the Puruṣa. Consequently the external as well as internal actions like the strength of mind, self-consciousness, surveillance, and anxiety are disqualified by the Puruṣa. When all the actions of the Puruṣa are disqualified then the notion of ‘Not-I’ springs up. In this circumstance the ‘I’ is used as the agent of activeness like that is ‘I eat.’ When there is no action there is no active agent and so it is said ‘Not-I.’ This leads to the brainchild of “Naught is mine”. This is merely an agent of activeness and so is the possessor. The disqualifying of the exploits or action leads to the disqualification of possession too. These three forms can be described in another manner as thus: “I am not” is the one which means that, “I am the Puruṣa, which is unproductive and so the “I” has no action which leads to “Not-I” which without action has no possession which in turn leads to “Naught is mine”.

The wisdom is the superior one which places one on the highest summit. If the acquired knowledge is not proper or to the right extent, then the result will be repressed. Once the discriminative wisdom is

acquired or caused the experience of the Puruṣa occurs. When the Prakṛti is contended with the work it shares with the Puruṣa and when the work is completed it will retire from the activity in which it was involved. It is said that “the operations of Prakṛti continue only till the attainment of discriminative knowledge”.¹⁴⁶

According to Vācaspati Miśra bondage or repression is of three kinds. They are natural (प्राकृतिकं), evolutionary (वैकृतिकं) and the personal (दाक्षिणकं).¹⁴⁷ The people who revere the Prakṛti as the Spirit is called the natural bondage. Those who worship the elements of Prakṛti like the sense organs, the principle of I and the buddhi of the Puruṣa is known as the evolutionary bondage. They are also called ‘videhas’. Those who are engaged in the work of charities with selfish motives are said to be in the personal bondage.

The nature of the discriminative knowledge in SK and STK can be clearly understood from the TV of Yogasūtra IV.22-30. The realization of consciousness can be attained by concentrating our mind on our consciousness until the mind in its subtlest form is transcended and the reality hidden beneath it is revealed. It is quite free from the limiting and obscuring action of citta and it is only then that its true nature is realized.¹⁴⁸ The mind coloured by the knower and the known is all apprehending. Citta becomes co-extensive with Prakṛti and both are

transcended simultaneously. In this stage Citta does not stand as a medium through which the human intellect finds expression, but it stands for the all inclusive medium through which phenomena of every kind are perceived. This is called “sarvajñatva”.¹⁴⁹ The discriminative knowledge is said to be the states of being i.e. Who was I? How was I? What is this? How shall we become?¹⁵⁰ This shows that the nature of the discriminative knowledge in Sāṅkhya is not very different from that in Yoga.

Liberation or Apavarga

The earthly life is full of three kinds of pain. The first kind, called ‘ādhyātmika’, is due to intra-organic psycho-physical causes and includes all mental and bodily sufferings. The second, ‘ādhibhoutika’ is due to extra-organic natural causes like men, beasts, birds, tamas etc. The third ‘ādhidāivika’, is due to supernatural causes like the planets, elemental agencies, ghosts, demon etc. Wherever there are guṇas there are pains. Even the so called pleasures lead to pain. Even the life in heaven is subject to the guṇas. The end of man is to get rid of these three kinds of pain and sufferings. Liberation means complete cessation of all sufferings which is the summum bonum, the highest end of life.¹⁵¹

Sāṅkhya believes that bondage and liberation alike are only phenomenal. The bondage of the Puruṣa is a fiction. It is only the ego,

the product of Prakṛti, which is bound. And consequently it is only the ego, which is liberated. If Puruṣa were really bound, it could not have obtained liberation, for real bondage can never be destroyed. It is Prakṛti which is bound and Prakṛti which is liberated. Īśvarakṛṣṇa says: Puruṣa is neither bound nor liberated nor does it transmigrate. Bondage, liberation and transmigration belong to Prakṛti in its manifold forms. In reality the Puruṣa is not liberated or is migrated. There are many means of expression to make it possible for the Prakṛti to be liberated or migrated. It can be thus explained that the soldiers wage wars and succeed, but it is said that the King is victorious, though the soldier risked his life, so also the terms bondage, release and migration is burdened on the Puruṣa. The emancipation and experience are the qualities of the Prakṛti and these qualities are passed on to Puruṣa as if it were its qualities.¹⁵² It has been said earlier that there is no discrimination between the Puruṣa and Prakṛti so there is no confusion about the attributes of these two. Curiosity springs up again as to what gain the Prakṛti gets by sharing her qualities with the Puruṣa.

Just as a dancing girl retires from the stage after entertaining the audience, Prakṛti also returns after exhibiting herself to the Puruṣa. Vācaspati Mīśra compares the cessation of Prakṛti's task of emancipating the Puruṣa with that of a dancer. The dancer when she,

after showing off or exhibiting all her abilities, including that of the music and body, stops her dance and retires from the stage, the Prakṛti too after all her performances ceases to emancipate.¹⁵³ The Prakṛti favours the purpose of the Puruṣa or rather stands for the purpose of the Puruṣa, if so, will stands Prakṛti be paid for the pains she receives from the Puruṣa. The author compares this as the servant receiving a gift when she satisfies the needs of the master flawlessly. If the Prakṛti is rewarded then it cannot be said that it is for the purpose of Prakṛti that the creation takes place.

Apavarga in Sāṅkhya Philosophy is a state of freedom from pain. It is not a state of pleasure or even the state of Ānanda because it is the cessation of both pleasure and pain. If Ānanda is only the cessation of both pain and pleasure it can be considered as a state of bliss. It is Puruṣas freedom from Prakṛti because the cause of pain is avidyā by which Puruṣa falsely identifies himself with Prakṛti. Avidyā itself is a product of Prakṛti. Puruṣa and Prakṛti will be perfectly discriminated from each other through the purification of buddhi. Puruṣa realizes that his relation with Prakṛti was based on ignorance. By the dissolution of that relation, Puruṣa attains isolation and realizes himself. From the standpoint of Prakṛti, realization is the merging of the evolutes in their

cause and from the standpoint of Puruṣa it is the realization of his true nature.

According to the Sāṅkhya System bhoga and Apavarga are the aims of creation or evolution.¹⁵⁴ Without bhoga there is no Apavarga at all. Bhoga brings the experience of pleasure and pain. Prakṛti, which is constituted of the three guṇas, is the cause of this experience. There is no pleasure without pain. So to avoid pain completely one must avoid pleasure also. So Puruṣa must avoid Prakṛti completely and remain in his own nature of Pure Consciousness. The ultimate goal is the absolute cessation of pain which is the total extinction of all experience. This state is not a mere void, but is positive to the extent that it is Pure Consciousness and also total calmness.

The nature of Apavarga

In SK the nature of Apavarga is explained in Kārikas 55 to 68. According to Vācaspati Mīśra, Puruṣa is akartā hence all the actions are done by Prakṛti. These actions are its evolution and involution. Through the course of evolution Prakṛti brings the experience of pleasure and pain to Puruṣa which is called 'bhoga'. After the purpose of 'bhoga' is accomplished Prakṛti retires from further creation and then the involution takes place. Puruṣa is said to be the spectator. Prakṛti once

aware of having been seen by Puruṣa disappears from the sight of that particular Puruṣa and never again comes into contact with him.¹⁵⁵

Vācaspati Misra explains the Apavarga of Puruṣa in detail with suitable examples. The Prakṛti has been blessed with many qualities is the one responsible for bringing about bhoga and Apavarga for the Puruṣa. The Puruṣa is nirguṇa and so it is unable to reward the Prakṛti who does benevolence for it. This is explained by taking the example of a servant who has noble qualities, without expecting anything in return helps his master, without expecting any reward, so also the Prakṛti who is generous helps in emancipating the Puruṣa.¹⁵⁶ The pure, noble, and unselfish characteristics of Prakṛti are highlighted here.

The Prakṛti is the most modest than anything, says Vācaspati Misra. So once she is aware that she has been seen, she hides herself and never exposes herself again to the Puruṣa. The term modesty here is used in the sense that the Prakṛti is very delicate and also very shy to be exposed in front of Puruṣa. She covers herself from the Puruṣa as it is unbearable for her to be seen by Puruṣa. The author compares Prakṛti to a modest lady who never comes before the Sun or casts her eyes down when she sees the Sun out of modesty, if by chance happens to be seen naked covers herself with what all things she gets and hides herself from the sight of the viewer, so also the Prakṛti who is the modest thing, once

seen by Puruṣa never lets a chance to see her.¹⁵⁷ In reality, the changes are taking place in Prakṛti itself. Puruṣa in Sāṅkhya is Pure Consciousness devoid of attributes and modifications. Hence, no Puruṣa is bound or released, nor does he migrate. It is Prakṛti alone that is bound or released or migrates.

The Puruṣa after gaining the Absolute knowledge becomes pure and observes the Prakṛti which has retired from the action of creativity. The Prakṛti has reversed from different varieties of evolution that is seven forms of evolution, which are virtue, vice, error, dispassion, passion, power, and weakness, being influenced by the objective of the Puruṣa.¹⁵⁸ The Prakṛti puts an end to her productivity because she had determined to be in action in the areas of ‘experience’ and ‘perception of truth’. As these two creations are completed the Prakṛti is free and so it is said that Prakṛti stops the process of creation. By saying that the Prakṛti is influenced by the purpose of the Puruṣa one means that it comes under the influence of the discriminatory knowledge that is the Wisdom. The seven forms of evolution mentioned above occur due to ajñāna. Even dispassion occurs through the mistaken knowledge, even though some find contentment by acquiring it. This mistaken knowledge can be cleansed off by the gaining of the true knowledge. By doing so,

the cause and effects of this flawed knowledge are erased off. So it is said that the Prakṛti ceases from the seven forms of evolution.

Here the word at ease is used to denote inactiveness which in turn means pure. The Puruṣa not blended with the impurities of the Buddha, which is caused by the attributes of the rajas and tamas, till the last minute with the help of sattva attribute is able to flourish in the buddhi which helps it have the vision of the Prakṛti which is otherwise impossible. The doubt the scholars point out here is that evolution is possible only when the Puruṣa and Prakṛti are blended together and this is the potential of these two. The potentiality of experience is said to make up the Puruṣa's sentience as it is the ability of it as an object of experience and this also comprises the insentience and objectivity of the nature. These two potentials can never be terminated.¹⁵⁹

Vācaspati Miśra says that the word 'pure' means that Puruṣa is unmixed with the impurities of the buddhi due to rajas and tamas. Buddhi is, then, abounding in the Sattva attribute. It is said that Puruṣa beholds Prakṛti. "प्रकृतिं पश्यति पुरुषः।"¹⁶⁰ Hence in this stage Puruṣa is in slight touch with Prakṛti abounding in the sattvaguṇa.¹⁶¹ Thus this is only a stage in the course of attaining the final release.

SK says, "Puruṣa is indifferent, thinking that Prakṛti has been seen by him, and Prakṛti desists from evolution, thinking that she has been

seen by Puruṣa. Hence, though their connection is still there, there is no motive for further evolution. Following SK Vācaspati makes it clear thus; the Puruṣa feels that the Prakṛti has seen him and so he is not interested anymore. The Prakṛti also feels that she has been seen stops her action. Even though their bond continues, there is no scope for evolution. The Prakṛti when make happen the discriminative knowledge of wisdom stops the creation of experience or rather enjoyment as the enjoyment belongs to the erroneous knowledge. This can be compared to the sprouts. If there is a seed only then sprout can appear so also only if erroneous knowledge is there then only the wisdom can be attained.¹⁶² The need of discriminative knowledge makes the Puruṣa thinks it as his possession and immerses in the comforts and displeasures, being misled by the changes in the Prakṛti, the sense objects and so on. This very wisdom or rather the discriminative knowledge is also considered by the Puruṣa as his possession. At the time of right discrimination the bond between the Puruṣa and Prakṛti stops. This is the moment when all the enjoyments of the Puruṣa ends and the Puruṣa is not capable of causing the discriminative knowledge of wisdom by itself because it is the adaptation of the Prakṛti as wisdom originates from Prakṛti.

After attaining wisdom Puruṣa does not have any purpose of its own. The motives of the Prakṛti like experience and emancipation are

supplied by the Puruṣa and when the purpose of the Puruṣa is stopped then the motivation of the Prakṛti is stopped automatically. This leads to the saying that there is no motive for evolution. Here motive, means that one which pushes forward the Prakṛti to carry on the process of evolution. This motive ceases when the purpose of the Puruṣa dies.

When wisdom is attained the body becomes null and it is doubted that how the body less Puruṣa observe the Prakṛti. If the answer to this is that salvation cannot be attained as soon as wisdom is attained due to the past deeds then how can these deeds be erased off. The implicit saying that “emancipation follows from the knowledge of the distinction between the manifest, the unmanifest, and the Puruṣa,”¹⁶³ is meaningless when this theory is applied. Even the saying that “emancipation would be obtained on the destruction of the residual of Karma by means of experience extending to an uncertain period of time” is too optimistic to be fulfilled. The answer to these doubts is given in the next Kārikā.

The achievement of flawless wisdom, virtue, and so on by the Puruṣa makes it lack fundamental vigor and for a short time it will stay back in the body. This is compared by the author to a potter’s wheel which revolves even after the work is done due to the momentum given to it previously.¹⁶⁴ The spark of true knowledge destroys the kārmic residuum which has no beginning and the result of it cannot be

calculated too. The fruits of experience, the birth, life and experience will be unable to be produced. If watered by kleśas, the seeds of karma sprout up and then these kleśas will be drained off by the heat of the true knowledge which ceases the sprouting up of the kārmic seeds.

It can be said that even after attaining the discriminative knowledge of wisdom the body clings for some time as mentioned earlier and it becomes exhausted and thus become inactive. When in the body the force is applied by the virtue and vice whose end result starts to function. It has been already underlined that the experience which is attained by any means leads to heavenly happiness. In the Ch.Up.¹⁶⁵ it is stated thus, “the delay is only so long as beatitude is not attained.” After all these sayings there arises a question that if the Puruṣa remains in the body by some force then how can the final liberation take place. Answering this question the 68th Kārikā states that “When the separation from the body has at length been attained, and by reason of the purpose having been fulfilled, Prakṛti ceases to act, then he attains eternal and absolute isolation.”

From the above, we may conclude that a motive is that which moves Prakṛti to act towards evolution. Before attaining discriminative knowledge, Puruṣa also is in apparent connection with the body, but having attained the discriminative knowledge the motive for creation

ceases. The 'saṁyoga' of Prakṛti and Puruṣa with motive is the cause of creation. But saṁyoga without motive does not produce anything. This stage leads to Jīvanmukti. Jīvanmukta has experienced alone to the saṁskāra which remains as the rest of 'prārabdhakarma'. When this 'saṁskāra' also perishes, he attains 'Videhamukti'.

Resumé

STK of Vācaspati Miśra is a fairly simple and straight forward exposition of the SK. The contribution of Vācaspati Miśra to Sāṅkhya philosophy may be outlined into five major topics. They are Epistemology, Ontology, Psychology, Phenomenology and Ethics. The Epistemological and Ontological concepts are discussed in this chapter.

Epistemology is concerned with the conditions of the validity of knowledge. The Sāṅkhya System accepts the three pramāṇas perception, inference and valid testimony. In Vācaspati's view, perception is the primary and fundamental of all the sources of valid knowledge. It is most powerful among the means of valid knowledge, because it gives a direct or immediate knowledge of the reality of an object and therefore is the root of all other pramāṇas. Vācaspati Miśra argues that the sense capacities are only capable of mere sensing for they apprehend sense objects without any mental ordering or verbal characterization whereas the mind perform the task of ordering and verbalizing the impressions of

the senses. He divides inference into two kind viz. *vīta* and *avīta*. He discusses the three fold inferences in terms of positive and exchasionary types placing both *Pūrvavat* and *Sāmānyatodṛṣṭa* under *vīta*, and *śeṣavat* under *avīta*.

Vācaspati says that Vedic testimony is self-evident. It is free from doubt and discrepancy since it is not of a personal origin. He elaborates the three *pramāṇas* accepted by SK and establishes that the other five *pramāṇas* recognized by other philosophers which are included in these three. So he doesn't reject the other five *pramāṇas* but establishes their existence in these three *pramāṇas*. This is also one of the notable contributions of Vācaspati Miśra to Sāṅkhya.

The Sāṅkhya philosophy advocates the ontological dualism of *Prakṛti* and *Puruṣa*. Sāṅkhya postulates *Prakṛti* as the ultimate cause of all worldly existence. It is the equilibrium of three *guṇas*, i.e., *sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas*. *Prakṛti* is the substratum of the changing phenomena of the world. Sāṅkhya conceives of *Prakṛti* as consisting of mass, energy and illumination in the form of *tamas*, *rajas* and *sattva*. Therefore, *Prakṛti* contains all the potential powers for creating the world all by herself out of herself. This theory of causality of Sāṅkhya is called 'satkāryavāda' or *pariṇāmavāda*, which establishes that effect pre-exists

in the cause. Here Vācaspati Mīśra refutes the causation theories of other systems like asatkāryavāda, sūnyavāda and vivartavāda etc.

Puruṣa is the only sentient principle in Sāṅkhya System. They accept the plurality of Puruṣa and it is changeless, immutable, and eternal. Bondage of Puruṣa is caused by non-discrimination between Puruṣa and Prakṛti. The attainment of the discriminative knowledge leads to 'siddhi' in Sāṅkhya. When the Puruṣa realizes its aloneness from prakṛti it becomes liberated and completely freed from all types of sorrow. The author of STK accepts two types of liberation viz. Jīvan-mukti and Videha-mukti.

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यन्त्रोऽतीवकृतो नाण्वादिकारणवादप्रतिषेधे।
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वासना च निगद्यते"॥ Amarakośa, I.V.3
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अजा ये तां जुषमाणां भजन्ते जहत्येनां भुक्तभोगां नुमस्तान्।
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Translation and notes, p.13 and also see SK.5

18. STK on SK.5
19. सङ्कल्पेणरूपेण मनोलक्ष्यते। 'आलोचितमिन्द्रियेण वस्त्वदम्' इति सम्मुग्धम् 'इदमेकं नैवं' इति सम्यक् कल्पयति विशेषणविशेष्यभावेन विवेचयतीति यावत्। STK on SK.27
20. "अध्यवसायश्च बुद्धिव्यापारो ज्ञानम्। उपात्तविषयाणामिन्द्रियाणां वृत्तौ सत्यां, बुद्धेस्तमोभिभवे सति यः सत्त्वसमुद्रेकः सोऽध्यवसाय" इति।।
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यत्तत्पूर्ववत्, पूर्वं प्रसिद्धम्, दृष्टस्वलक्षणसामान्यमिति यावत्, तदस्य
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कैश्चिदेव म्लेच्छादिभिः पुरुषापसदैः पशुप्रायैः परिग्रहाद्बोद्धव्यम्।
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यथा' इह वटे यक्षः प्रतिवसति' इति, न तत् प्रमाणान्तरम्,
अनिर्दिष्टप्रवक्तृकत्वेन सांशयिकत्वात्। आसवक्तृकत्वनिश्चये त्वागम एव।
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प्रधानम्, सत्वरजस्तमसां साम्यावस्था, सा अविकृतिः, प्रकृतिरेवेत्यर्थः।
कुत इत्युक्तम्-"मूलेति" मूलञ्चासौ प्रकृतिश्चेति मूलप्रकृतिः। विश्वस्य
कार्यसंघातस्य सा मूलम्, न त्वस्या मूलान्तरमस्ति, अनवस्थाप्रसङ्गात्। न
चानवस्थायां प्रमाणमस्तीति भावः। STK.3

67. Contribution of Vācaspati Miśra to Indian Philosophy, p.147
68. SK.3 and also Ibid, p.148
69. J.N. Sinha: Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p.11
70. STK on SK.14
71. The Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī (trans.), p.70
72. STK on SK.14
73. कारणे सत् कार्यमिति स्थितम्। तथा च यथा कूर्मशरीरे सन्त्येवाङ्गानि
निःसरन्ति विभज्यन्ते-'इदं कूर्मशरीरं, एतान्येतस्याङ्गानि-' इति; एवं
निविशमानानि तस्मिन् अव्यक्तीभवन्ति। STK on SK.15
74. Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī (trans.), P.75
75. "प्रवर्तते त्रिगुणतः" इति। प्रतिसर्गावस्थायां सत्त्वं रजस्तमश्च
सदृशपरिणामानि भवन्ति।" STK on SK.16
76. Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, 1.76
77. Jayamaṅgalā on SK.12
78. Gauḍapādabhāṣya on SK.13
79. SK.12
80. Mukta Biswas: SāṃkhyaYoga Epistemology, p.23
81. K.P.Kesavan Nampoothiri: The concept of Apavarga in
Sāṃkhya Philosophy, p.63
82. Sāṃkhyapravacanabhāṣya, I.127
83. Yogabhāṣya, IV.13
84. स्वरूपविरूपपरिणामाभ्यां न कदाचिदपि वियुज्यत इत्यर्थः।
STK on SK.11
85. STK on SK.15 and 16
86. SK.22
87. तदुभयस्मिन्नपि कार्ये सत्वतमसोः क्रियोत्पादनद्वारेणास्ति रजसः
कारणत्वमिति न व्यर्थोरज इति। STK on SK.25

88. STK on SK.15 and 16
89. STK on SK.9
90. Ibid
91. Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p.5
92. STK on SK.9
93. Ibid
94. "नासतो विद्यते भावो नाभावो विद्यते सतः" इति॥ Ibid
95. 'असतः सत् जायते' इति। STK on SK.8
96. एकस्य सतो विवर्तः कार्यजातं न वस्तु सत्। Ibid
97. 'सतः असत् जायते' इति। Ibid
98. 'सतः सत् जायते' इति वृद्धाः॥ Ibid
99. "अभावात्तु भावोत्पत्त्वौ, तस्य सर्वत्र सुलभत्वात्, सर्वदा सर्वकार्योत्पादप्रसङ्ग इत्यादि न्यायवार्तिकतात्पर्यटीकायामस्माभिः प्रतिपादितम्॥" STK on SK.9
100. प्रपञ्चप्रत्ययश्चासति बाधके न शक्यो मिथ्येति वदितुम् इति॥ Ibid
101. Ibid
102. नेश्वराधिष्ठितप्रकृतिकृतो निर्व्यापारस्याधिष्ठातृत्वासम्भवात्। न हि निर्व्यापारस्तक्षा वास्याद्यधितिष्ठति॥ STK on SK.56
103. यथौदनकाम ओदनाय पाके प्रवृत्तः ओदनसिद्धौ निवर्तते, एवं प्रत्येकम्पुरुषान् मोचयितुं प्रवृत्ता प्रकृतिर्ये पुरुषम्मोचयति तं प्रति पुनर्न प्रवर्तते। STK on SK.56
104. न च-'क्षीरप्रवृत्तेरपीश्वराधिष्ठाननिबन्धनत्वेन साध्यत्वान्न साध्येन व्यभिचार' इति साम्प्रतम्।
105. STK on SK.57
106. STK on SK.58
107. 'ज्ञानेनचापवर्गः।' SK.44

108. पुरुषः अस्ति, अव्यक्तादेर्व्यतिरिक्तः। कुतः? "संघातपरार्थत्वात्"।
सुखदुःखमोहात्मकतया अव्यक्तादयः सर्वे संघाताः।
STK on SK.17
109. 'यद्यत्सुखदुःखमोहात्मकं तत्सर्वं परेणाधिष्ठीयमानं दृष्टम्, यथा
रथादिर्यन्त्रादिभिः।' STK on SK.17
110. त्रिगुणादि विपर्ययात्। SK.17
111. Contribution of Vācaspati Misra to Indian philosophy, p.173
112. Invitation to Indian philosophy, p.218
113. भोक्तृभावात् द्रष्टृभावात्, दृश्येन द्रष्टुरनुमानादित्यर्थः।
दृश्यत्वं च बुद्ध्यादीनां सुखाद्यात्मकतया पृथिव्यादिवदनुमितम्॥
STK on SK.17
114. S.Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.323
115. Ibid, p.422
116. "पुरुषबहुत्वं सिद्धम्" । कस्मात्? "जननमरणकरणानां प्रतिनियमात्"।
STK on SK.18
117. Ibid
118. Indian Philosophy, Vol.II, p.321
119. The Sāṃkhya System, P.88. SK.V.13
120. "व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानात्" इति। व्यक्तं च अव्यक्तं च ज्ञश्च व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञाः, तेषां
विज्ञानं विवेकेन ज्ञानम्, व्यक्ताव्यक्तज्ञविज्ञानम्। STK on SK.2
121. "अविपर्ययात्" इति। संशयविपर्ययो हि ज्ञानस्याविशुद्धी, तद्रहितम्
विशुद्धन्तदिदमुक्तम्- "अविपर्ययात्" इति। STK on SK.64
122. STK on SK.5

123. "न हि पुरुषगतो बोधो जायतेऽपि तु चैतन्यमेव बुद्धिर्दर्पणप्रतिबिम्बितं बुद्धिवृत्याऽर्थाकारया तदाकारतामापद्यमानं फलम्।" TV on YS, I.7
124. अनधिगततत्वबोधः पौरुषेयो व्यवहारहेतुः प्रमा। Ibid
125. श्रोतृहिताहितप्राप्तिपरिहारोपायतया प्रज्ञाप्यते। Ibid
126. Yogabhāṣya.I.8
127. सिद्धेः पूर्वोङ्कुशस्त्रिविधः। SK.51
128. "ऊह" इति। विहन्यमानस्य दुःखस्य त्रित्वात्तद्विघाताश्रय इतीमा मुख्यास्तिः
सिद्धयः, तदुपायतयात्वितरा गौण्यः पञ्च सिद्धयः, ताः अपि
हेतुहेतुमत्तयाव्यवस्थिताः। STK on SK.51
129. Ibid
130. "शब्द" इति पदं शब्दजनितमर्थज्ञानमुपलक्षयति, कार्ये कारणोपचारात्। सा
द्वितीया सिद्धिः सुतारमुच्यते। Ibid
131. "ऊहः" तर्कः आगमाविरोधिन्यायेनागमार्थपरीक्षणम्। परीक्षणञ्च
संशयपूर्वपक्षनिराकरणेनोत्तरपक्षव्यवस्थापनम्। तदिदं मननमाचक्षते
आगमिनः। सा त्रितीया सिद्धिस्तारतारमुच्यते। Ibid
132. सुहृदां गुरुशिष्यसब्रह्मचारिणां संवादकानां प्राप्तिः सुहृत्प्राप्तिः
सा सिद्धिश्चतुर्था 'रम्य' उच्यते। Ibid
133. Śākuntalam, I.2
134. STK on SK.51
135. Gauḍapādabhāṣya on SK.51
136. STK on SK.51
137. "दुःखत्रयाभिघातात्" इति। दुःखानां त्रयम्। तत्खलु आध्यात्मिकं,
आधिभौतिकं, आधिदैविकं च। STK on SK.1

138. Sāṃkhyakārikā with an introduction, Translation and notes, p.96
139. Gauḍapādabhāṣya on SK.64
140. STK on SK.64
141. रूपैः सप्तभिरेव तु बध्नात्यात्मानमात्मना प्रकृतिः। सैव च पुरुषार्थं प्रति
विमोचयत्येकरूपेण॥ STK on SK.63
142. "बध्नाति धर्मादिभिः सप्तभी रूपैर्भावैरिति।" Ibid
143. Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī (trans.), p.162
144. STK on SK.64
145. Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī (trans.), p.16
146. "विवेकख्यातिपर्यन्तं ज्ञेयम् प्रकृतिचेष्टितम्" इति। "विपर्ययात्" अतत्त्वज्ञानात्
"इष्यते बन्धः"॥ Ibid, p.130
147. "स च त्रिविधः-प्राकृतिको वैकृतिको दाक्षिणकश्चेति।" STK on SK.44
148. TV on YS, IV.22
149. Ibid.23
150. Ibid.25
151. Sāṅkhya Yoga Epistemology, P. 25
152. न कश्चित् पुरुषो बध्यते, न कश्चित् संसरति, न कश्चित् मुच्यते । प्रकृतिरेव तु
नानाश्रया सती बध्यते संसरति मुच्यते चेति। बन्धमोक्षसंसाराः पुरुषेषूपचर्यन्ते।
यथा जयपराजयौ भृत्यगतावपि स्वामिन्युपचर्येते। STK.62
153. रङ्गस्य दर्शयित्वा निवर्तते नर्तकी यथा नृत्यात्।
पुरुषस्य तथाऽऽत्मानं प्रकाश्य विनिवर्तते प्रकृतिः॥ SK.59
154. भोगापवर्गलक्षणः पुरुषार्थ एवानागतावस्थः प्रवर्तयति करणानि, कृतमत्र
तत्स्वरूपाभिज्ञेन कर्त्रा। एतश्च "वत्सविवृद्धिनिमित्तम्" इत्यत्रोपपादयिष्यते॥
STK on SK.31
155. STK on SK.60 and 61

156. "यथा गुणवानुपकार्यपि भृत्यो निर्गुणेऽत एवानुपकारिणि स्वामिनि
निष्फलाराधना, एवमियम्प्रकृतिस्तपस्विनी गुणवत्युपकारिणि पुरुषे
व्यर्थपरिश्रमेति पुरुषार्थमेव यतते न स्वार्थमिति सिद्धम्।" Ibid.60
157. "एवम्प्रकृतिरपि कुलवधूतोऽप्यधिका दृष्टा विवेकेन न पुनर्द्रक्ष्यत इत्यर्थः।"
Ibid.61
158. कारणनिवृत्या च सप्तरूपाणि निवर्तन्त इति "सप्तरूपविनिवृत्ता प्रकृतिः"
"अवस्थित" इति निष्क्रियः, "स्वच्छः" इति रजस्तमोवृत्तिकलुषय-
बुध्याऽसम्भिन्नः। Ibid.65
159. Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī (trans.), p.166
160. SK.65
161. सात्त्विक्या तु बुद्ध्या तदाप्यस्य मनाक् सम्भेदोस्त्येव,
अन्यथैवम्भूतप्रकृतिदर्शनानुपपत्तेरिति। STK on SK.65
162. "अविवेकख्यातिनिबन्धनो हि तदुपभोगो, निबन्धनाभावे न तद्भ्रवितुमर्हति,
अंकुर इव बीजाभावे।" Ibid.66
163. Sāṃkhya-Tattva-Kaumudī (trans.), p.169
164. "उत्पन्नतत्त्वज्ञानोऽपि च संस्कारवशात् तिष्ठति, यथोपरतेऽपि कुलालव्यापारे
चक्रं वेगाख्यसंस्कारवशात् भ्रमत् तिष्ठति।" STK on SK.65
165. Ch.Up. V1.1.2