Chapter II

The Grounding of The Self And The Subject

The question of Self, Identity and Subject is invariably linked to the question of Centre and Origin Vis-a-vis individual and the universe. Critics have invented variegated ways to map the Centre. The re-viewing of originality towards a different conception of knowledge based on intertextuality and constructed by archival methods has made possible the celebration of border stories which by their very nature, work always within transgression. Interestingly the construction of the self, a recurrent movement in Canadian fiction, has always transformed the condition of displacement into a powerful tool of intervention. While cultural studies have produced its own theories of the subject. It has also been confronted by the juxtaposed self. Recent developments in literary theory and criticism have offered new insights into subject and their significance. Literature paves a way for the very idea of theorising the subject, of asking how the idea of a self has been thought and represented since time immemorial. From Aristotle ‘subjectivity’ has come a long way to the postmodernist and cultural studies assertions that the meaning is multiple and a discourse. These insights have changed the conception of the self and the subject. Today the emphasis has shifted from the unified self to the decentralised subject. This chapter examines the multiple perspective and conception of subject from Aristotle to recent theorists like Freud, Lacan, Foucault Stuart, Hall, Derrida, Sassure, Roland Barthes, Jean Baudrillard, Lyotard, and so-on to demonstrate the ways in which the subject is implicated in and linked to other subjects, general truths and shared principles. But the issue of the subject is central in modern and postmodern models and posits. The issue of Subject in Robert Kroetsch’s novels indicates that there is no one transcendental meaning from Subjects to their referents. Robert Kroetsch’s subject enables the
question of who “am I” to be brought into focus, and analysis, question and critique without which cultural studies could not exist or proceed.

Self-mediates through discourse as a culture and subject represents a development within this series towards understandings, readings and interpretations of key thinkers, Ideas and social project, that go beyond the specific politics of location, as significantly, they utilise theories from a wide range of discursive formations in the service of their specific and situated cultural analyses. it is appropriate to begin with The ‘self’ which is the subject of grammar, the initiating or driving principle of my argument. Self means that, “we know and use the word ‘I’ first and foremost in this sense, as the origin of the actions, feelings and experiences that we collect together and report as our lives “(pp3) so as “the ‘I’ is thus a meeting point between the most formal and highly abstract concepts and the most immediate and intense emotions .

Thus, this chapter focuses on the “self as the centre” (p.115. Subjectivity). For Jean-Jacques Rousseau Self is a Politico-legal subject with fixed codes and powers and respects one’s our individual rights and concludes by opining that the self has a social contract.

Immanuel Kant outlines the issues that define the problem of the subject of philosophy and explains the subject ‘I’ as both an object of analysis, for understanding truth and knowledge. Humanitarians analyse subject as human person, whose immediate experience defies system, logic and order that he or she lives in an open ended yet known, measured yet adventurous journey which results in experience, though through which one generally understands what is ‘self’. On the other hand linguist views subjectivity in terms of rigorously maintained disciplinary borders.
The theorisation of subjectivity in the twentieth century has produced a wide range of different models and approaches. Yet, consistent set of disagreement have always emerged, resulting in variegated interestingly Metaphysical investigation which aims to determine through systematic analysis and scrutiny of ideas. The scrutiny of the ‘self’ over the years has resulted in divergent opinions. For instance:

There is no longer a tripartite division between a field of reality (the word) and a field of representation (the book)and field of subjectivity(the author). Rather an assemblage establishes connections between certain multiplicities drawn from these order, so that a book has no sequel or the world as neither its object nor one of several authorise as its subject. In short we think that one cannot write sufficiently in the name of an outside.(p23, Deleuze and Guattri 1987,quoted in Subjectivity, p139)

The destination of this historical ascent was in Jacques Derrida’s terms “the subject of absolute knowing (Derrida 1984, p219. Subjectivity  p 138). Every moment of the human quest for truth is an:

attempt to contribute to the invention of this huge common subject as we learn analyse and discover, each of us is partaking of this massive collective enterprise, with the goal of total knowledge as its imaginary end.

The subject of absolute knowing is the ideal thinker, the hypothetical essence of human endeavour, simultaneously gaining greater and greater knowledge of the world and of itself.(p.138, Nick Mansfield)

Incidentally, in humanism the ‘self’ is defined as a conscious being which has the power of logic and rationality to discover the truth about the world and art. It is able to think reflexively about the status of its being. The poststructuralist notion of
subject radically dissenters the idea of the ‘self’, stripping it of its autonomy and its ability to deduce ‘truth’. This chapter discusses how the shift from the self to subject changes the fashion in which one thinks about literary studies.

Although the origin of the subject can be traced back as far as to the times of Plato and Aristotle, subjectivity emerged as a self-conscious theory only at the beginning of the twentieth century, in the writings of Ferdinand de Saussure. Humanists like plato-427-347, prefer reason over emotion, as he views the truth of mathematics over the ‘truth’ of human feeling, for him reality resided in eternal and unchanging. For him, things exist externally in their most perfect form, and never change their static condition, and therefore it becomes the source or essence of all the things that exist in the human material world. For Plato objects in the world are mere copies of the forms, and are necessarily less perfect than their original forms. For one can substitute the words ‘truth’ ‘essence’ and ‘ideal’ only through reasons and the process of logical argument. Plato goes on to argue that an artist’s work is always twice removed from the world of truth and ideal perfection because artists creations are copies of copies. In a penultimate part of Book IV, Plato warns that “The gods shall not be misrepresented as sorcerers who change their shapes or as liars who mislead us in word or deed.” (Book 2, p. 54, line 383. *The Republic*)

Aristotle’s (384-322) view on extraordinary art of senses about ‘self’ comes as a sharp contrast in his *Poetics*. In “ *De Anima,*”(p.6,book II) Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of perception of the self. namely perception of proper sensible -colours, sounds, and tastes which lie on the surface of things and can be mimicked directly for sense perception. This in a way makes us understand the philosophy of the ‘self’ as a “development out of our enjoyment of sight-seeing”. (*Metaphysics* I, 1).
Aristotle’s idea of an art and of the ‘self’ is not necessarily an imitation or a reproduction of nature. He views art as a process of collaborating the events of nature into a medium, object and mode of imitation that improves on or completes nature. To Aristotle a drama must stick to one issue, through a proper use of language, and ‘complete itself’ otherwise, the audience will be lost in the plot, Aristotelian criticism directed at discovering the essential qualities of each of the different kinds or forms of Literature, and then goes on to determine how and in what proportion all the elements of any particular form should come together to form one unified literary work.

Horace in Ars poetica: Epistles to The Pisos, book II, outlines ‘self’ and ‘subject’ in an interesting way. To him, the self is an independent source to explore and acquire things which the individual desires. Horace avers:

You who write, make choice of a subject suitable to your abilities; and revolve in your thoughts a considerable time what your strength declines, and what it is able to support. Neither elegance of style, nor a perspicuous disposition, shall desert the man, by whom the subject matter is chosen judiciously. (Epistles, Book II, Ars Poetica, p.3)

Since literature provides pleasures and the pleasure of poetry makes it popular and accessible, its lessons thus can be widely learnt. Horace argues that with Nature, poets should imitate other authors as well as imitate Nature, To Horace, it is important for a poet to know a literary tradition, and respect the inheritance and heritage and conventions, as well as create new works, for when the self-imitates, the world discloses its bareness and universality.

On the other hand, An Apologie for Poetrie or Defence of Poesie in 1583 by Sir Philip Sidney (1554-86) argues about self-creations, creations in interesting fashion
poetry stresses on the vitality of nature, leaves incomplete and partial by teaching us the inner meaning of the things and events of the external material world. In his view, the self should be presented as a chronicle. He shifts the subject from the self to the other self-presentation of historians:

The historian...loaded with old mouse-eaten records, authorizing himself (for the most part) upon other histories, whose greatest authorities are built upon the notable foundation of hearsay; having much ado to accord differing writers and to pick truth out of partiality; better acquainted with a thousand years ago than with the present age, and yet better knowing how this world Goethe than how his own wit runneth; curious for antiquities and inquisitive of novelties; a wonder to young folks and a tyrant in table talk, denieth, in a great chafe, that any man for teaching of virtue, and virtuous actions is comparable to him.(p.89, *Defence of Poesie*)

History becomes the tool of ‘self-search’ to find truth. The mimetic quality of poetry written on a history, rather than presenting an inferior world, in fact presents a higher level of reality where the ‘speaking picture’ tells us forms of truth that would not be available through the raw observation of Nature unshaped by poetic form. Humanist rhetoricians provide a timely operating environment for such pursuits, because their foregrounding of the provisional status of any assertion help the courtiers to understand the self-image as a work in progress rather than as a cynical device.

In the *Advancement of Learning* (1605) Sir Francis Bacon (1561-1626) argues that history, fact, and reason are necessarily tied to human experience and can only present the world as it is, he observes: “my praise shall be dedicated to the mind itself. The mind is the man, and the knowledge is the mind. A man is but what he knoweth. The mind is but an accident to knowledge, for knowledge is the double of that which is known to our
senses”. (Francis Bacon, *Advancement of Learning* (1605), Book II). For him, the soul is greater than the world and imagination, because, “The essential form of knowledge…is nothing but a representation of truth: for the truth of being and the truth of knowing are one, differing no more than the direct beam and the beam reflected.” (Francis Bacon, *Advancement of Learning* (1605), Bk I.) Since desire, hope imagination, and fantasy are not tied to the physical laws of nature, and reason can only observe the pre-existing material world, and not alter it, poetry allows the mind to create its own world and to rule over.

Incidentally, Joseph Addison (1672-1719) collaborates the self and the object for the first time in ‘On The Pleasures of The Imagination’, in his essay in the ‘Spectator’ published in June 1712, following John Locke’s psychological exploration. Addison describes two kinds of pleasures in imagination. Primary pleasure which comes from the immediate experience of objects through sensory perception: secondary pleasure that comes from the experience of ideas, from the representation of objects (in words or pictures) when those objects are not present. Addison is of the view that reason can investigate the cause of things; imagination is content with experiencing them, either directly or through representations. To Addison ‘self’ remains as the original for it is sensory:

There are few words in the English language which are employed in a more loose and uncircumscribed sense than those of the fancy and the imagination. I therefore thought it necessary to fix and determine the notion of these two words, as I intend to make use of them in the thread of my following speculations, that the reader may conceive rightly what the subject is which I proceed upon. I must therefore desire him to remember, that by the pleasures of the imagination, I mean only such pleasures as arise originally from sight, and that I divide these pleasures into two kinds
my design being first of all to discourse of those primary pleasures of
There are few words in the English language which are employed in a the
imagination, which entirely proceed from such objects as are before our
eyes; and in the next place to speak of those secondary pleasures of the
imagination which flow from the ideas of visible objects, when the objects
are not actually before the eye, but are called up into our memories, or
formed into agreeable visions of things that are either absent or fictitious
(Spectator. ‘Pleasures of Imaginations’ essay by Joseph Addision, No.
411, June 21, 1712)

A Philosophical Enquiry into the Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful is a
1757 treatise on aesthetics written by Edmund Burke. Perhaps it is the first complete
philosophical exposition approaching the concept of for separating the beautiful and
the sublime as respective rational categories. The Beautiful, according to Burke, is what
is well-formed and aesthetically pleasing, whereas the Sublime is what has the power to
compel and destroy us. The preference for the Sublime over the Beautiful marks the
transition of the self-representation say from the Neoclassical to the Romantic era.

For Burke the origins, the sublime also has a causal structure that is unlike that
of beauty. Its formal cause is thus the passion of fear (especially the fear of death); the
material cause is equally related to aspects of certain objects such as vastness, infinity,
magnificence, and so forth; its efficient cause is the tension of the nerves. View the self
and the object move hand in his hand in through their casual structures.

Immanuel Kant critiques Burke for not understanding the causes of the mental
effects that occur in the experience of the beautiful or the sublime. According to Kant,
Burke merely gathers data so that some future thinker could explain them:
To make psychological observations, as Burke did in his treatise on the beautiful and the sublime, thus to assemble material for the systematic connection of empirical rules in the future without aiming to understand them, is probably the sole true duty of empirical psychology, which can hardly even aspire to rank as a philosophical science. (Immanuel Kant, First Introduction to the *Critique of Judgment*, p. X.1790)

The ‘self’ which is discoursed in the poems and in essays had its impact on fiction too. The universal ‘self’ started revolving in the writings of authors like Samuel Johnson (1709-84) in his essay ‘On Fiction’, which appeared in the ‘Rambler’ on March 31, 1750, and this marks the beginning. He contends that its “province, is to bring about natural events by easy means, and to keep up curiosity without the help of wonder” (p.317). Johnson follows Plato in insisting that criticism of literature, especially fiction has to be based on an assessment of its moral effect as novels are the more realistic form, which are more easily believed or mistaken for descriptions of real life. In fact this comes from self or authors who have the direct knowledge of human nature, gained through interpretation with other humans. He argues that the works of fiction are “such as exhibit life in its true state, diversified only by accidents that daily happens in the world and influenced by passions and qualities which are really to be found in conversing with mankind” (p.317). Thus novelists should be careful in opting for subjects. He warns the reader as well as writers that their representation of the ‘self’ is misleading others and that is going beyond the centre which never paves way to trace the origin of the ‘self’.

The critics and theorists from Sir Philip Sidney to Johnson were the early thinkers of enlightenment and are of these debates about the relative importance of reason and imagination. These critics insist that the eighteenth century art,
remarkable for its artifice of self-experience and artificiality, and that the highest forms of art come from, and are appreciated most by, those with well-trained sensibilities. The enlightenment can be seen to span the period from Francis Bacon (1561-1626) to the French revolution of 1789.

Enlightenment no doubt is not a single entity or project and is full of complications. Early modern enlightenment thinkers first posed the question of the ‘self’ as a free, autonomous and rational being which one calls the individual. Some of the radical thinkers have attempted to replace it with a different model, the very fact that, it became necessary to define ‘self’ at a certain moment in western thought. This self-search, “opened field of contention, crisis and perpetual re-evaluation of the self ,the self-became an issue, a point of fundamental instability in the world. It was the enlightenment that made the modern era the era of the subject.”(p.14,Nick Mansfield). To the enlightenment thinkers, ‘self’ retained the form from ‘self’ to the subject “I”.

Enlightenment thinkers like Rene Descartes (1596-1650) propounded the philosophy of knowledge with the shibboleth - “cogito ergo sum” (I’ think therefore I am) in his Meditations. To Descartes, any act of judgment, such as the affirmation “I think, therefore I am,” (p.59,Meditations) involves both the intellect and the Will. The intellect represents the content of the judgment; the Will affirms or denies that content. In the face of genuine clarity and distinctness, “a great light in the intellect” is followed by “a great inclination of the will” (7:59). The inclination of the Will is so strong that it amounts to compulsion; we cannot help but so affirm. The philosophy considered knowledge in terms of the meaning of the word ‘I’ individuality, in the hands of Descartes the word ‘I’ and I am shows the beginning of a new understanding of the human place in the world. “I am precisely taken refers only to a conscious), an intellect, a reason words whose meaning I did not previously know. I am a real being
and really exist, but what sort of being? As I said, a conscious being.” (Descartes 1970, p 69)qt15).

When Descartes refers to consciousness, he seems to mean a general awareness, or experience for him the image of the ‘self’ as the ground of all knowledge and experience of the world. The ‘self’ as defined by many rationalists as an order of the world. In the fifth set of Objections to the Meditations, Gassendi suggests that there is difficult regarding:

what possible skill or method will permit us to discover that our understanding is so clear and distinct as to be true and to make it impossible that we should be mistaken… we are often deceived even though we think we know something as clearly and distinctly as anything can possibly be known. (7:318)

Gassendi has asked, if clarity and distinctness is the mark of truth, what is the method for recognizing clarity and distinctness? In reply, Descartes claims that he has already supplied such a method (p.379). What could he have in mind? It cannot be the simple belief that one has attained clarity and distinctness, for Descartes, individuals can be wrong in that belief (p.35, 361). Nonetheless, We have a clear and distinct perception of something if, when we consider it, we cannot doubt it (p.145). That is, in the face of genuine clear and distinct perception, our affirmation of it is so firm that it cannot be shaken, thus Descarte proves the definite ‘self’ as an infinite being.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712-78) whose work The Confessions is the fruition of the new emphasis on the ‘self’ as the ground of human existence in the world, it explains the absolute governing freedom of individual experience. He observes:
I have resolved on an enterprise which has no precedent and which once complete will have no imitator. My purpose is to display to my kind a portrait in every way true to nature, and the man I shall portray will be myself. Simply myself. I know my own heart and understand my fellow man but I am made unlike any one I have ever met, I will even venture to say that I am like one in the whole world. I may be no better, but at least I am different. (P.17 Rousseau 1953 quoted in subjectivity.p.165)

For him the individual at its centre will always tell a new and original story. The unity of the works is grounded in the feeling, living being at its centre. Rousseau’s *Confessions* sought to bare the entire life of its author subject, detailing all his imperfections, virtues, individual neuroses, and formative childhood experiences as a means of explaining and justifying the views and personality of his adult self.

Although Rousseau states that *The Confessions* should not be read as an unerring account of dates and events and admits that most likely he often gets such factual data wrong when his memory fails him, dates and exact events are not the point of the work. Jean-Jacques Rousseau portrays his own life and humankind as ‘natural man as an end in himself,’ recognizing the significant shift in anthropological perspective during the historic eighteenth century, J.M.Cohen, in his introduction to Rousseau’s Confession, explains the measuring of the Genevan’s earthy portrait of humanity in this way:

By Roussseas’s age however men had begun to see themselves not as atoms in a society that stretched down from god to the world of nature but as unique individuals, important in their own right. It was possible for the first time, therefore, for a man to write his life in terms only of his worldly experience. (p.7)
In documenting in his autobiography, this essential shift from theism to humanism paves the way facilitating the shift from the pre-modern to the modern era. What Rousseau presents to his readers is in a radically new understanding of the nature of the human self, and a starting new answer to the ancient question: Who and What am I? Which is totally opposing the Plutarchian vision of humanity in which man is understood and defined in relation to the opinion of others and in community with them. ‘Living, within our self’.

Hence Rousseau’s ‘self’ is an inner private, self-created, fixed, sovereign, solipsistic self-re-occupied with its own musings imaginings feelings, and thinking.

Late eighteenth century German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) and his Critique of Pure Reason (1781) emphasizes on simple grasping power which turns into representations as they enter our minds and become things to think about all that is perceived and representations get grounded in the ‘self/I’. For him before one perceives anything, something must be there, and dealing with the world is impossible without it being channelled through the ‘I’, since all experiences are connected with the thinking self, they all appear to be happening to a single being. Hence to him, it is the self which connects all our perceptions, and the collection point of our thoughts. It grasps positive art and connects it with things, gives a purposeful sense of the selfhood. Nick Mansfield is of the view that Rousseau fulfilled the first theme one discovered in Descartes (that) the self is a sufficient starting-point for the analysis of the world), Kant fulfils the second; the equation between selfhood and consciousness, for Kant, self can only have content through awareness of the world. For him, what circulates within ones interior lives is a collection of mere representations. This representation creates enlightenment through reasons. In “What is Enlightenment?” Kant articulates that each of us “have the courage to use our own reason” he says:
Enlightenment is the human being's emergence from his self-incurred immaturity. Immaturity is the inability to use one's own understanding [= reason] without the guidance of another. This immaturity is *self-incurred* if its cause is not lack of understanding, but lack of resolution and courage to use it without the guidance of another. *Sapereaude!* [Dare to be wise!] Have courage to make use of your *own* understanding [= reason]! Is thus the motto of enlightenment? (8:35)

Such enlightenment leads to form ideas and a self–sufficient conclusion through metaphors by imitating and placing ‘him’ in the sphere of the ‘other’. Kant explains the in *Critique of Judgment*, where those ideas are more closely related to the *theoretical* use of reason. This occurs in a famous section on the *sensuscommunis* or “community sense,” which Kant describes as:

> a faculty for judging that… takes account (a priori) of everyone else's way of representing in thought, in order *as it were* to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. (p.293)

That is, the maxims are precepts for judging in accordance with “reason as a whole” and avoiding the distortions that can arise from “subjective private conditions. Such metaphors that uses more reason are especially prominent in the Preface to the second edition of the *Critique*, where he writes:

> Reason, in order to be taught by Nature, must approach Nature with its principles in one hand, according to which the agreement among appearances can count as laws, and, on the other hand, the experiment
thought out in accord with these principles—in order to be instructed by nature not like a pupil, who has recited to him whatever the teacher wants to say, but like an appointed judge who compels witnesses to answer the questions he puts to them. ( p.B.xiii)

To unearth the truth of knowledge one has to undergo multiple experiences. In achieving this, ‘self’ must be free from sociological clutches. According to Kant, that is possible in the world of imaginary. the conception of freedom of the self is explained in Heidegger’s *Being and Time* positive and negative constraints which, will make it easier to understand the meaning that behind the essence of truth is freedom. Idegger argues that the ‘positive’ conception of freedom finds its meaning only in the ‘light’ of its historical constraints. Such an understanding of freedom stands as an alternative to the common, ‘ordinary’ understanding of what may be called ‘Negative’ freedom, an uncritically conceived notion of freedom understood as a simple freedom form. For him, Historical form reveals the truth of time Martin Heidegger emphasises that the philosophers from Descartes onwards have attempted to see the human passage through the world as dependent on a fixable and self-aware entity called the ‘subject’, which is the fundamental form and the very ground of the possibility of experience. They have not looked beneath the structure of the self /subject to an even more basic issue. He writes:

In the course of this history certain distinctive domains of being have come into view and have served as the primary guides for subsequent problematic: the *ego cogita* (I think) of Descartes, the subject, the ‘ I,’ reason, spirit, person. But these all remain uninterrogated as to their being and its structures in accordance with the thorough going way in which the question of Being has been neglected. (p.44, Heidegger 1962,)
Heidegger claims that in his *Cogito, ergo sum*, Descartes leaves *sum* (I am, I exist) he analysed; Descartes conceives the ego as a substance. Existence is uniform across substances (except for God who exists necessarily). For Heidegger, on the other hand, existence as ‘activity’ rather than ‘state’ is a key to understand how “Dasein” (p.16) is different from occurrent things. Marquarrie and Robinson’s footnote on “Dasein.” explains that, “Dasein” means ‘being-there’ in the sense of an activity. Dasein is a living being, one that acts. Dasein does not exist as a thing, or even a thing of a certain kind. Its identity is a function of its activity. Descartes gave one interpretation of that activity (it is the activity of thinking), persons are bodies plus minds, and this characterization is front and center in Heidegger’s account of subject/object metaphysics. But to distinguish Dasein from Descartes’ “conscious subject,” Heidegger wants a term that is as neutral as can be, uncommitted to any of the interpretations within the world-view he is deconstructing. The basic activity of Dasein is, then, inquiry into being—especially into the nature of its own being.

Thus Heidegger does not use “person” or “mankind” because these involve specific histories and interpretations. In the hands of enlightenment thinkers, self-search transforms the dimension of a self-centred structure to a deconstructed layer as self into subject and object form. It is clearly indicated in Heidegger’s thought. For him, to inquire into the being of an entity means to see how it is involved in the world. (co-ordination of subject and object) Descartes’ fails to identify the connection between conscious self or thinking with material world. For Heidegger, there is nothing especially interesting about consciousness or thinking until it is connected with (or seen as) the special kind of involvement Dasein has with the world. Before Heidegger, Philosophers had defined subject in terms of reason, human spirit or the simple act of perception. These various subjectivities selected some arbitrary feature of
human experience. This was highly artificial and selective to Heidegger. His project, therefore was to define one’s place in the world not in terms of some artificial construct, for him the unique kind of human being that could be theorised beneath the level of the artificial and selective subjectivities of earlier philosophers in the German word Dasein (existence) but a term invariably left untranslated because the fact that it is in the world and belongs to it. The world concerns us, and our relationship to it is one of care, we are not aliens enclosed within our fortress-selves, ‘I’ in a world that is absolutely foreign to us. Our experience conjoins us to the world of enlightenments.

The early romantic conception of art and artists challenged the beliefs of the enlightenment, particularly in insisting on the superiority of all things natural (based on self or self is the fundamental for all) over anything artificial.

Sir Joshua Reynolds (1723-92) in his Discourses on Art (1797) discusses about the ideas of representation and he echoes Plato in arguing that the highest kind of art and criticism refers to an eternal immutable nature of things which “he ought to know something concerning the mind, as well as a great deal concerning the body of man”(p.92). Like Burke, he argues that Painting and Literature are not strictly mimetic or imitative. Evaluations of imitation cannot be based upon the accuracy of a representation. For Reynolds him an extraordinary knowledge is required to attain the wisdom of mind and accuracy of self-representation. In the most significant lecture “Every Man,” he Reynolds avers: “whose business is description, ought to be tolerably conversant with the poets in that he may imbibe a poetical sprit, and enlarge his ideas. He ought not to be whole unacquainted with that part of philosophy which given an insight into human nature (Discourses. vii, p.91-92). It shows that he tried to be far from the subject of ‘self ‘though he revolved around it unknowingly. Ellis .K. Water House comments that the Discourses would be greatly enjoyed for their eloquence, but
would disappoint those who “hope to discover a philosophical system from them” (p.35) Indeed Ellis House gives reasons that the direct imitation constitutes the lowest style or level of art and for Reynolds it is suitable only for uncultivated minds as the more accurate a representation is, the more obvious it is refined in taste or sensibility.

The romantics replaced the ‘self’ centric self-search into ‘subject and language centric’. According to them the language used to present the interaction between natural world/human and their efforts to find the originality through communication between the self and the object. But it took the diversion towards rural and urban language for romantics, this interaction that works to re-create naturalness. In general, they set up a value system in which the rural is valued over the urban. They found that Nature is better than Culture, their value of uneducated is much against to Reynolds’ view of uneducated mind but for Wordsworth and Coleridge the uneducated and simple are closer to Nature than the educated mind and imagination. William Wordsworth’s Preface to *Lyrical Ballads*, proposes some general observations and object of representation of poetry. To Wordsworth Art holds a mirror up to Nature. He argues that poetry is the “most philosophic of all writing” (p.441) because its “object” (441) is “truth, not individual and local, but general, and operative” (442). Wordsworth stresses that he has above all sought “to look steadily at”his“ my subject”(439) that his “principal object” (438)of description (or subject matter) was to represent “incidents and situations from common life” (438). His purpose in depicting commonplace incidents and situations is to trace the “primary laws of our nature” (438), in particular, the “manner in which we associate ideas in a state of excitement” (438). Wordsworth is concerned with the relation between poet and the poem than with the poem and its reader and even less interested in the moral effects of poetry. His proclaim is not the
product of reason or of art and artifice, but is the “spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings which takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity,” (p.438) thus feeling originates from the self, becomes the subject of Wordsworth’s central element. For him the poet produces authentic expression of feeling and it is a kind of superhuman being and a receptive soul.

Samuel Taylor Coleridge (1772-1834) opines that reason creates divisions and categories, art values the unity of subject and object, the union of human and nature he elevates the artist to the status of a god. Who can create worlds that have never before existed. His writings on the Principles of Genial Creticism (1814) his Biographia Literaria (1817) presents the idea of organisms as central to the romantic world view. In investigating the organic principle of poetic composition, he examines the faculty of the imagination, dividing it like Burke, into primary and secondary form, primary is the living power of human perception, the presence in each and every human soul of the divine spark of creative power which is the life force itself. He describes:

The Imagination then I consider either as primary, or secondary. The primary Imagination I hold to be the living Power and prime Agent of all human Perception, and as a repetition in the finite mind of the eternal act of creation in the infinite I Am. The secondary I consider as an echo of the former, co-existing with the conscious will, yet still as identical with the primary in the kind of its agency, and differing only in degree, and in the mode of its operation. It dissolves, diffuses, dissipates, in order to re-create; or where this process is rendered impossible, yet still at all events it struggles to idealize and to unify. It is essentially vital, even as all objects (as objects) are essentially fixed and dead.”(chapter 13 Imagination)
Coleridge divides imagination into two: the primary and secondary imagination. As the "living Power and prime Agent," the primary imagination is attributed a divine quality, namely the creation of the self, the "I Am." However, because it is not subject to human will, the poet has no control over the primary imagination. It is the intrinsic quality of the poet that makes him or her Creator; if one goes back to Wordsworth, the primary imagination can be likened to the poetic genius. The secondary imagination is an echo of the primary. It is like the primary imagination in every aspect except that it is restricted in some capacity. It co-exists with the conscious will, but because of this, the secondary imagination does not have the unlimited power to create. It struggles to attain the ideal but can never reach it. Still the primary governs the secondary, and imagination gives rise to our ideas of perfection. In other words Primary imagination perhaps can be viewed as experience itself while secondary imagination might be the ability to take experience apart and put it back together again in a new form. In this fashion, Coleridge and Shelley share the belief that inimitable forms of creation can only exist in the mind.

Coleridge goes on to explain that the soul is the imagination and his assertion that the imagination is both synthetic and magical only reaffirms what is already known about his strong views. His works, especially in the *Lyrical Ballads*, deal with the supernatural in so far as they express real emotions regardless of whether one believes in the phenomena. Similar to William Blake's philosophy, this power of the imagination is revealed in oppositions. For instance he gives an example of Sir John Davies 'Doubtless,' who observes the soul as Doubtless.

Coleridge opines that his views may with slight alteration be applied, and even more appropriately to the poetic IMAGINATION. And goes on to state that GOOD SENSE is the BODY of poetic genius, FANCY its DRAPERY, MOTION its LIFE,
and IMAGINATION the SOUL which is everywhere, imagination forms all into one graceful and intelligent whole. Thus for him truth is one with constructed nature which in impermissible to break.

2.1. Decoded Self And The Era of Science

The era of science was ushered in by Aristotle in the form of rational thinking which in front was suppressed by the then thinkers of philosophy but when John Keats states the same Rational thought in 1817 he strengthens the notion of Aristotle as rational thoughts breaks the world into ‘subject’ and ‘object’. For the purpose of classification and analysis in the Aristotelian process known as ‘science’, sensations, empathic experiences and poetry however break down the boundaries between subject and object and insist on the interplay between poetry and science. Empathy and reason are incompatible and oppositional, Keats polishes this through “negative capability.” John Keats (1795-1821) conception of poetry as articulated in his letters to Benjamin Bailey and George and Thomas Keats in 1817 follows the romantic ideology and path established by Wordsworth and Coleridge. For Keats, The poet must possess a quality that Keats calls ‘negative capability, he articulates the central conflict in literary studies. Keats first coined the term "Negative Capability" in his discussion of the qualities of "Man of Achievement" in one of his letters to his brothers George and Thomas Keats dated on 22nd December 1817. In that very letter Keats observes: “…several things dove-tailed in my mind, and at once it struck me what quality went to form a Man of Achievement, especially in Literature, and which Shakespeare possessed so enormously – I mean Negative Capability”.(p.76 Maurice Buxton Forman ed., The Letters Of John Keats. London: oxford university press, 1948.)

In the western civilization, and thought the word "negative" has many connotations; it may refer to rejection, refusal, nothingness, or disagreement. However,
Keats used the word to signify nothingness or free of something; mainly troubles and worries. On the other hand, the word "capability" has a Greek origin namely "capacious" which means able to hold much; roomy, or spacious. Thus, capability is related to "capacity" as well as "ability" used together to refer to the largest space that can be held and developed by a container for a particular purpose. Brought together, Negative Capability refers to the space in one's mind which is free from life's troubles, and can be used and developed for certain purposes. (Wehmeier, Sally and others ed. Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary. London: Oxford University Press, 2005).

Hence, the negative space of the poet’s mind, which is free from the troubles, conflicts and uncertainties of real life, acts as a container to the emotions and imagination which are symbolized by an object. However, in the letter negative capability is described as the most puzzling of Keats letters, his concept of reaching beyond space in the mind is a rational thought process which paves way for the ‘Science’ and ‘Linguist Centric’ calculations.

The Enlightenment and Humanist universal model of the self has been complicated by more recent developments especially in the hands of Formalists, New critics, Post-structurists and postmodernist. Self is also discussed by Psychologists like Freud and Lacan through the idea of conscious/unconscious. In the twentieth century ‘self’ is examined in terms of system, segment, and sign in the way of practicality. Further, developments in literary theory and criticism have offered new insights into signs and their signification. From the Saussurean formulation of meaning as the product of differential and relational aspects of signs, it has come a long way to the post-structuralist and postmodernist assertions that meaning is plural due to the infinite signification of signs. These insights have changed the conception of human identity both in life and art: the emphasis has shifted from the unified individual to the ever
changing, enigmatic subject. It is essential to understand the development of criticism and its preoccupation with the subject, object, signs meaning and identity in the twentieth century. For instance, formalist criticism focuses on finding a resolution or an explanation for the unity of elements, while poststructuralist recalls Keat’s ‘negative capability’ and the need for ambiguity and flux, rather than answers. Authors who encouraged objectivity and who are impersonal in their views have maintained aesthetic distance as opposed to subjective concepts. It is appropriate to begin with Newcriticism which marks the beginning of a new scientific era in Anglo-American Literary Criticism; from New criticism the link to formalism becomes inevitable; Formalism, in turn, is succeeded by Structuralism. It is Structuralism, which is closely associated with Semiotics and later this lead to the Poststructuralist phase of language and this self search through syntax reshaped the hands of postmodernist.

The whole enterprise of various posits of Newcriticism to Structuralism, to Semiotics to Poststructuralism and to Postmodernism as a movement in changing conception or transformation of subject, sign and meaning is being attempted in this chapter. There is a considerable amount of energy, intellect and thinking involved in the shift from the New critics work of a ‘closed reality’, to be deciphered by the critic for definite meanings, to see it as plural entity, and possessing an endless play of signifiers which is never fixed to a single centre, essence or meaning.

The new era of Applied Science on the Self, Subject and object emerged when Mathew Arnold (1822-88) articulated the central premise of Humanism. Influenced by Plato’s belief that the objective, absolute truth can be known, Arnold insists on a ‘disinterested’ model of reading that aspires to be objective about both the meaning and value of the work in question (i.e. both what the work is about and its moral impact) and which, even though it appears very outdated today in the light of recent theoretical
developments, it profoundly influenced upon Literary Criticism until the 1960's. In “The Function of Criticism at The Present Time” (1864), Arnold begins by defending the role of the critic against the accusation that the role and the key quality on the part of the critic is, Arnold argues, “disinterestedness.” Arnold states that the goal of criticism is:

Keeping aloof from what is called ‘the practical view of things;' by resolutely following the law of its own nature, which is to be a free play of the mind on all subjects which it touches. By steadfastly refusing to lend itself to any of those ulterior, practical considerations about ideas, which plenty of people will be sure to attach to them . . . but which criticism has really nothing to do with. Its business is . . . simply to know the best that is known and thought in the world, and in its making this known, to create a current of true and fresh ideas. Its business is to do with inflexible honesty, with due ability; but its business is to do no more, and to leave alone all questions of practical consequences, and applications. (p.597)

To see the object as in itself it really is; free of polemics, agendas and preconceptions, in order to provide disinterested observation and assessment. He defines such disinterestedness as, in short, the “free play of mind upon all subjects being a pleasure in itself, being an object of desire, being an essential provider of elements without which a nation’s spirit . . . must, in the long run, die of inanition” (p.596).

Critics who assess Literature in this fashion will be in a position to make judgements about the quality of Literature itself which in fact will enable them to find ‘the best that has been thought and said’ For Arnold the best Literature has the power to create “our organs of criticism are organs of men and parties having practical ends to serve, and with them those practical ends are the first thing and the play of the mind the
second. (p.597) what he calls ‘sweetness and light.’ Arnold argues that Literary Education in ‘the best’ texts will indeed make us all better human beings, and make our world an easier and more humane place to live. Such an assumption of the humanist world–view in fact led to the establishment of the ‘liberal arts’ which became the heart of New criticism, where the method of examining a literary text without reference to anything outside of the text itself or a close reading of a text. Before analysing Semiotics, it is relevant to see how the text itself, devoid of authorial and historical dimensions, became the focus of literary criticism in the hands of New Critics.

As a revolt against the Romantic theory of Subjectivity New Criticism which got evolved from the Literary Theories and critical practices of the British literary critics, laid an emphasis on text as the centre of critical thought and on explicating the text’s meaning. Although many Critics have contributed their views to this new criticism the chapter limits the boundary within self-decoding, discussing important and vital works which are much relevant and essential of research chosen to the topic. The term New criticism set current by the publication of John Crowe Ransom’s *The New Criticism* in 1941 and it came to be applied to a theory and practice that was prominent in American literary criticism till late 1960s. It emphasized “close reading,” (Richards 203) particularly of poetry, to discover how a work of Literature functioned as a self-contained, self-referential aesthetic object. John Crowe Ransom’s specially Allen Tate, Cleanth Brooks, and Robert Penn Warren, had a greater hand in developing many of the key concepts (like "close reading") which later came to define what is New Criticism.

I.A Richards “Practical Criticism” (1929) which provides space for scientific approach reports and analyses the results of his experiments. He observes:
Original difficulty of all reading, is the problem of making out the meaning, is our obvious starting-point. The answers to these apparently simple questions: ‘What is a meaning?’ ‘What are we doing when we endeavour to make it out?’ ‘What is it we are making out?’ are the master-keys to all problems of criticism. If we can make use of them the locked chambers and corridors of theory of poetry open to us, and a new and impressive order is discovered even in the most erratic twists of the protocols. (p.174).

He suggests to achieve an 'organised response’ or a critical view from the listeners and readers, and starts that the “Total Meaning we are engaged with is, almost always, a blend, a combination of several contributory meanings of different types”. This is because “language as it is used in poetry . . . has not one but several tasks to perform simultaneously”. For this reason, “we shall misconceive most of the difficulties of criticism unless we understand this point and take note of the difference between these functions” (174). There are four “types of functions and four kinds of meaning” (175) found in all uses of language and they are Sense, Feeling, Tone and Intension which leads to several kinds of meaning. He further describes meaning in a context in his Meaning of Meaning by C.K Ogden and I.A Richards. As is common in the field of Semantics, Richards begins his enquiry into the meaning through of meaning a distinction between signs and symbols. He opines that a sign is something we directly encounter, yet at the same time it refers to something else. For him thunder is a sign of rain. A punch in the nose is a sign of anger. He argues that the Words are also signs but in a special way. Most symbols have no natural connection with the things they describe. They are because, words are arbitrary symbols. They have no inherent meaning. Words according to Richard, take on the meaning of the context in
which a person encounters them. This suggests that words may pass from context to context by changing their meanings and context becomes the key for meaning. He also argues that, context is the whole field of experience that can be connected with an event including thoughts of similar events.

Interestingly William Empson’s *Seven Types of Ambiguity* (1930) is organized around seven types of ambiguity that Empson finds in the poetry he criticises and it “occurs when the author is discovering his idea in the act of writing, or not holding it all in his mind at once”. (p.155) this in fact became the guide to a style of literary criticism. Empson represents ambiguity as a word puzzle. He faces ambiguity when alternative views might be taken without sheer misreading. Thus he reads poetry as an exploration of conflicts within the author. For Empson it is the kind of ambiguity that would seem inevitable to those who read poetry in a particular way. Empson remarks: “when not being able to think of a comparison fast enough [...] compares the thing to a vaguer or more abstract notion of itself, or points out that it is its own nature, or that it sustains itself by supporting itself.’ (P.160-161) to achieve this, he suggests seven types of ambiguity; the first type of ambiguity is basically the metaphor. When two things are said to be alike which have different properties. This concept is similar to that of Metaphysical Conceit/Conceit. Second is that two or more meanings are resolved into one. Empson characterizes this as using two different metaphors at once. The third, two ideas that are connected through context can be given in one word simultaneously. Fourth, suggests the two or more meanings that do not agree but combine to make clear a complicated state of mind in the author. In the Fifth type of ambiguity, he argues that when the author discovers his idea in the act of writing. Empson describes a simile that lies halfway between two statements made by the author. Sixth, when a statement says nothing and the reader is forced to invent a statement of their own, most likely in
conflict with that of the author. Lastly, his emphasis is that two words that within context are opposites that exposes a fundamental division in the author’s mind. Here Empson sought to enhance the reader’s understanding of a poem by isolating the linguistic properties of the text. He suggested that words or references in poems are often ambiguous and, if presented coherently, carry multiple meanings that can enrich the reader’s appreciation of the work. He argued that the complexities of cognitive and tonal meanings in poetry form the basis of the reader’s emotional response.

In defence of the objective approach like Empson, Ransom in ‘Criticism as Pure Speculation’ (1941) argues that a poem is to be studied in and of itself and not in relation to everything outside it. He suggests that the ‘Form’ is not merely a vehicle for content. But opines that, form and content are, rather, inseparable from each other; and are like two sides of the same coin. He argues that the “house” is a useful “trope under which to construe the poem”. For instance:

a poem is a logical structure having a local texture. These terms . . . are architectural. The walls of my room are obviously structural; the beams and boards have a function; so does the plaster, which is the visible aspect of the final wall. The plaster might have remained naked, aspiring to no character, and purely functional. But actually it has been painted, receiving colour; or it has been papered, receiving colour and design, though these have no structural value; and perhaps it has been hung with tapestry, or with paintings, for ‘decoration.’ The paint, the paper, the tapestry are texture. It is logically unrelated to structure. (p.462)

Ransom explains his standard as the “intent of the good critic becomes therefore to examine and define the poem with respect to its [logical] structure and its [local] texture” (p.462) Ransom’s argument, in short, is that poetry is an organic unity
of theme (logical core) and form (local texture). For Ransom, a poem consists simultaneously of a universally recognisable idea, theme, situation or object, on the one hand, and, on the other, the “local development of detail”. These two constituents are inextricably linked by a relationship which he terms “accretion” (p.461) as a result of which neither ought to be ignored in favour of the other. In other words, a poem is to be studied in and of itself and not in relation to everything outside it.

Cleanth Brook develops an idea of ‘context’ through which the meaning emerges. In his essay “Irony as a Principle of Structure” (1971) he observes that, each word is understood according to the words which surround it. It is the relationship between each of these words which creates a context out of which meaning evolves. For instance: he provides an example which does not give meaning, in “Two plus two equals four,” or “The square on the hypotenuse of a right triangle is equal to the sum of the squares on the two sides.” He argues that the meaning of these statements is unqualified by any context; if they are true, they are equally true in any possible context. These statements are properly abstract, and their terms are pure denotations. He means that, if “two” or “four” actually happened to have connotations for the fancifully minded, the connotations would be quite irrelevant: they do not participate in the meaningful structure of the statement. He suggests to adopt connotations which are important in poetry and do enter significantly into the structure of meaning, namely the poem.

Brook is of the new that specific, concrete particulars are a must for the form of a poem. The particular become the units or metaphors and references. Brook claims that metaphors, even as they risk obscuring larger themes, are absolutely necessary because direct statement lends to abstraction and threatens to take us out of poetry altogether whereas indirect statements appeal in a poem. Brooks finds poetry as
effective vehicle for conveying meaning instead of concrete language according to him.

Poetry creates metaphors which instead of giving us abstract thoughts leads us to ideas in an indirect manner. Poetry takes human beings as its subject, for no other reason than because language which is its structural element is a human device. Poetry attempts to provide a picture of the human condition in terms of cause and effect of human actions.

Thus the elements of structure are metaphors and symbols which make the meaning in a poem according to Brooks, irony and plot function similarly to create indirect meaning both refuse direct statement of abstract ideas and rely on an organic unity of parts to produce universal truths. So meaning is inherent to the structure of the artifact.

Brooks begins the essay by stating that the modern poetic technique is a rediscovery of the metaphor. The metaphor is so extensively used by the poet that it is the particular through which he steps into the universal. The poet uses particular details to arrive at general meanings. But these particulars must not be chosen arbitrarily. This establishes the importance of our conventional habits of language.

T.S Eliot takes a step forward by discussing about the relationship of an author and the reader in the theory of ‘objective correlative’ which is undoubtedly one of the most important critical concepts of T.S. Eliot. American Painter Washington Allston first used the term "objective correlative” during 1840, but T. S. Eliot made it famous and revived it through an influential essay “On Hamlet” in 1919 and formulated in “Hamlet and his Problems” and published in The Sacred Wood (1920). It exerted a tremendous influence of the critical temper of twentieth century. In the concept of the ‘objective correlative’, Eliot’s doctrine of poetic impersonality finds its most classic formulation in the essay and popularises the concept and defends it he writes:
The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an 'objective correlative'; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. (qtd. in J. A. Cuddon's *Dictionary of Literary Terms*, page 647)

If an author wants to create an emotional reaction in the audience, he has to bring in the combination of images, objects, or description evoking the appropriate emotion in a single track. He argues that the source of the emotional reaction is not in a single object, one particular image, or one particular word. Instead, the emotion originates in the *combination* of these phenomena when they appear universally. T. S. Eliot suggests that, if an author inspires the right emotion, the creator has found justice or he is on the track of right ‘objective correlative’. If he fails in arousing this or invokes the wrong emotion from the one appropriate for the scene, that particular ‘objective correlative’ may not work.

According to Eliot, the concept of objective correlative is extraordinarily further elaborated in an essay “what is objective correlative”. For instance he provides an example and asks us to consider the following scene in a hypothetical film:

As the audience watch the movie, the scene shows a dozen different people all dressed in black, holding umbrellas. The setting is a cemetery filled with cracked gray headstones. The sky is darkening, and droplets of rain slide off the faces of stone angels like teardrops. A lone widow raises her veil and as she takes off her wedding ring and sets it on the gravestone. Faint sobbing is audible somewhere behind her in the crowd of mourners. As the widow starts to turn away, a break appears in the clouds. From this gap in the grey sky, a single shaft of sunlight descends and falls down on a
green spot near the grave, where a single yellow marigold is blossoming. The rain droplets glitter like gold on the petals of the flower. Then the scene ends, and the actors names begin to scroll across the screen at the end of the movie.

The essay explains the applicability of Eliot’s ‘objective correlative’ by questioning the spectators that:

What was your emotional reaction after watching this scene?” Most (perhaps all) of the watchers would say, "At first, the scene starts out really sad, but I felt new hope for the widow in spite of her grief." Why do we all react the same way emotionally? The director provided no voiceover explaining that there's still hope for the woman. No character actually states this. The scene never even directly states the widow herself was sad at the beginning. So what specifically evoked the emotional reaction? ("What is objective Correlative, [www.cument], URL. http://www.documentsandcorrelative.htm\2006.)

Further the essay explains that, by looking at the passage, we cannot identify any single object or word or thing that by itself would necessarily evokes hope. Our emotional reaction seems to originate not in one word or image or phrase, but in the combination of all these things together, like a sort of algebraic formula. The objective correlative is that formula for creating a specific emotional reaction merely by the presence of certain words, objects, or items juxtaposed with each other. When the formula is implemented the story has break in to number of pieces like "black clothes + umbrellas + cracked gray headstones + darkening sky + rain droplets + faces of stone angels + veil + wedding ring + faint sobbing + turning away" is an artistic formula that equates with a complex sense of sadness. When that complex sense of sadness is combined with "turning away + break in clouds + single yellow marigold blossoming +
shaft of sunlight + green spot of grass + glittering raindrops + petals," the new
ingredients create a new emotional flavour and an artist intuitively sense this symbolic
or rhetorical potential.

Thus I.A Richards pointed out, the requirement of “close reading” - “all
respectable poetry invites close reading” (Richards 203) accordingly, the literary work
becomes an object of critical thought detached from not only authorial intention but
also from historical and casual explanation. As Robert Scholes observes, it repudiated
both the author Oriented approach of E.D Hirsch and the reader – oriented approach of
Culler. It offered instead, “an exercise of textual ingenuity supported by the dictionary
and grammar book in place of the alternatives of authorial domination or anarchy of
readers” (scholar). According to Scholes, the strengths and weakness of New Critical
interpretation arise from this extreme attention to the work as “a uniquely meaningful
work’ (p.11)

Although New Criticism met with severe criticism from the beginning, it began
to lose its place by the 1950’s for several reasons of which one can note only the
prominent ones. In the chapter entitled “beyond interpretation” of his the pursuit of
signs, Culler complains that New Criticism left the readers and the critics with only one
function. “They must interpret the poem; they must interpret the poem; they must show
how its various parts contribute to a thematic unity, for this thematic unity justifies the
work’s status as autonomous artefact”(4) New Criticism is closer to Russian formalism
due to its critical focus on the Literary work alone. It is also remotely related to
Structuralism, as it believes in meaning as something determined by a Structure within
the text. All these approaches are a historical, rejecting anything outside the text and
concentrating on language.
New criticism in Canada alters critical directions and the observers of New Critics advocacy of language and text as autonomous entities can be traced in the argument put forward by critics and writers such as Frank Davey, Louis Dudek, Robert Kroetsch, Eli Mandel, Northrop Frye, Russell Brown, Michael Dixon, Barry Cameron, and soon. But at the beginning of the twentieth century James Cappon protested against criticism and demanded for “candid…criticism” (capon.1905 p.3) which would help the Canadian writers to get the right material to place their nation among the world. It is appropriate here to discuss briefly Northrop Frye’s *The Anatomy of Criticism* (1957) which in a way retains some of new critical and formalistic approaches by contiguity stances, his critical theory became the founding movement of thematic criticism in Canadian Literature. His work makes criticism scientific in the new critical fashion rejects value judgements. He wishes to introduce discipline in criticism as an objective system, because his understanding of literature is like ones hand in others pocket, that is to mean Literature is made out of Literature. Frye’s *The Anatomy of Criticism*, discloses the idea of “autonomous verbal structure” (p.120). He insists that a student should learn criticism, not literature, just as a student learns physics, not Nature: “The difficulty often felt in ‘teaching literature’ arises from the fact that it cannot be done: the criticism of literature is all that can be directly taught. Literature is not a subject of study but an object of study” [*Anatomy of Criticism* 11]. He comments on “archetypal criticism, which can do nothing but abstract and typify and reduce to convention, has only a ‘subconscious’ role in the direct experience of literature, where uniqueness is everything” [361]. He adds that it often has only a “subconscious” relation to the literary materials from which it pretends to derive and that its “central expanding pattern of systematic comprehension” [12] often appears to exist only by virtue of its remoteness from many of the facts it pretends to comprehend.
In the Third Essay “Archetypal Criticism: Theory of Myths,” Frye emphasizes on “the broken links between Creation and Knowledge, Art and Science, Myth and Concept” [354]—which Frye conceives should be the work of criticism and in the end, an attempt to understand that art is a symbolic form, like language, myth, and science is made by him. M.H Abraham in his review on *The Anatomy of Criticism* (1959) observes that:

The concept of “displacement” is, of course, taken from Freud, and it is constructive to consider Freud’s canons of natural, or unintended, symbolic meaning, which include all the standard interpretive devices used by symbolist critics of Literature. Freud’s system permits him to apply alternatively, according to circumstance, the canon of literal meaning (A is A), displacement or substitution (A is B), condensation (A is A+B+C+D . . .), and inversion or trans valuation (A is the contrary of A). It may be that such rules of reasoning are necessitated by the inherent nature of symbolism, whether in the sleeping or waking (i.e., literary) dream, but they serve incidentally to leave considerable room for logical maneuver between the Law of Contradiction and the Law of Excluded Middle. The cardinal mode of proof, however, in Freud’s theory as in all theories of natural symbolism, is analogical. The implicit canon here is that analogy justifies identification: if A is in some respects like B, then A is identifiable as B. This appears to be the standard formula of archetypal reasoning. If the stories of Hermione, Esther Summerson, Pamela, and Belinda are in some respects like the Proserpine archetype, then these stories are all instances of the Proserpine archetype. (Abraham. 4)
In “Polemical Introduction” Frye argues that the only alternative to futility in criticism is to adopt the belief “that scholars and public critics are directly related by an intermediate form of criticism, a coherent and comprehensive theory of literature, logically and scientifically organized, some of which the student unconsciously learns as he goes on, but the main principles of which are yet unknown to us” [11]. He wants “systematic” or “progressive.” terms to indicate that criticism can be an organized structure of learning, the principles of which are to be inductively derived from literature itself. The main difficulty of criticism now, he writes, is that it languishes in a state from which the physical sciences liberated themselves some time ago. The phenomena are still regarded as constituting the framework of the subject; there is no structure of criticism itself. Frye considers literature as a collective enterprise of human experience rather than self-expression of individual authors. Terry Eagleton questions the validity of Frye’s attempt to leave actual history, and considers Frye’s approach in a sense “anti-humanistic” as it dismantles the individual subject. Being a Marxist himself, Eagleton sees Frye in the liberal humanist tradition of Arnold, desiring for “society as free, classless urbane” (Eagleton 82)

Many Structuralists considered Frye’s work a foundation for structural concepts but it is relevant to explain formalism which provides the necessary link between New Criticism and Structuralism.

Formalism flourished in Russian in the second decade of the twentieth century and became known as a distinctive literary theory due to its focus on the distinguishing features of Literature. Its origin and development can be traced to Moscow Linguistic Circle, founded in 1915 by Roman Jakobson, Petr Bogatyrev and Grigorii Vinokur, and the Petrogard OPOIAZ (acronym for the Study of Poetic Language ) founded in 1916 by Viktor Shklovsky, Boris Eikenbaum, Osip Brik, and others. Whereas the members
of the former school were primarily linguists, those of the latter were literary historians.

The key figure of the formalist movement Roman Jakobson (1896-1982), promoted an approach to literature that was ordered and scientific and he introduces the term ‘literariness’ in 1921. He declared in his work *Modern Russian Poetry* that ‘the object of literary science is not literature but literariness, i.e. what makes a given work a literary work’ (1921, p. 11). Victor Shklovsky’s view is in correlation to Jacobson. Shklovsky is one of the most central figures of the formalist movement, and views likened this methodological approach to an “algebraic formula”. Shklovsky even considered an ‘algebraic methodology’ to be an “ideal expression” of the practice of literary analysis (P.5). He opines that to understand a text on its own terms, it is important to understand words. In turn, in order to understand words, the formalists believed that it is crucial to understand the relationship between the symbol and the object, experience, or emotion being signified. Ekegren traces that for Victor Shklovsky, ‘literariness,’ or the distinction between literary and non-literary texts, is accomplished through “defamiliarization” (Ekegren 1999, p. 44). He also comments that the main characteristic of a literary text is that they make the language unfamiliar to the reader and deviate from the ordinary language. He writes, “They have the capacity to defamiliarise our habitual perceptions of the real world and the capacity to estrange it.” (Ekegren 1999, p. 44). Lemon highlights a similar notion that “Defamiliarised language will draw attention to itself: as our perceptions are automatic, it will force the reader to notice the unfamiliar through a variety of different techniques i.e. wordplay, rhythm, figures of speech and so on” (Lemon 1965, p. 5). Another key term in defamiliarisation and literariness introduced by Shklovsky is the concept of “plot”. For Shklovsky, plot is the most important feature of a “narrative” and goes on that there is a
distinctive difference between “story” and “plot”. “The story of a narrative entails the normal temporal sequence of events whereas the plot is a distortion of the normal storyline and thus associated with defamiliarisation.” (Williams 2004, p. 5).

On the other hand Bennett provides an example to illustrate the new perspective or referential meaning of the formalists as: “It was a sunny day and the sky was like a new sheet of blotting paper with the blue ink tipped into the middle of it” (17). What Bennett explains is that the reader has a fixed assumption about and association with the sky being blue. Yet, written in this creative, poetic way, the reader is forced to stop and reconsider the quality of that blue, and link the colour to other, or to the fresher associations as formalists argue for word play. In this way, the formalists achieved the identification of “devices through which the total structure of given works of literature might be said to defamiliarize, make strange or challenge certain dominant conceptions [and] ideologies…” (Bennet.17). In this respect, formalists were deeply interested in the disciplines of Semantics and Linguistics and aspects of form more than content. He highlights the fundamental source, the “word “as, “The image, then—the symbol, the metaphor, the simile—is important, but so too is the very unit of language itself, the word” (Bennett 36). This led Jacobson to distinguish between poetic and practical language. In relation to the usage of words in poetry, he points out: “The distinctive feature of poetry lies in the fact that a word is perceived as a word and not merely a proxy for the denoted object or an outburst of an emotions, that words and their arrangement their meaning, their outward and inward form advice weight and value of their own “(Erlich 183).The meaning which he uses here enriches ones understanding of how referential meanings and various signs used in different ways help one to bring out the multiple meanings. in a particular ethnic setup.
But the formalist movement only lasted for approximately thirty years, their arguments and areas of interest eventually became the principal features of the theorists known as Structuralists, who followed the Formalists in the development of a mechanistic literary theory. Formalists believe that Literature is a self-sufficient entity and not a window through which other elements can be perceived. Its intention is to draw attention to its own existence and function. Structuralists who got influenced from Formalism are the French Structuralists such as Tzvetan Todorov, Roland Barthes and Gerard Genette and Eagleton in his chapter entitled “Structuralism and Semiotics” of his *Literary Theory: An Introduction*, points out the difference between Formalism and Structuralism. He avers: “It(formalism)views literary texts ‘structurally’, and suspends attention to the referent to examine the sign itself, but it is not particularly concerned with the meaning as differential or, in much of its work, with the ‘deep’ laws and structures underlying literary texts”(p.85). For Eagleton it is Roman Osipovich Jakobson who provides a major link between formalism and structuralism. Theorist views Jacobson as a formalist and Structuralist because of his contribution for the development of semiotics in literature.

Jakobson points out that poetics deals with the dominance of the poetic function in any form of discourse, poetry or the novel or advertising jingles. He warns that the “question of relations between the word and the world” (33) and, thus, the whole issue of “truth-values” (33) the question of realism, in short are extra linguistic concerns which accordingly remain outside the province of purely literary analysis. He asserts, poetics is a form of “objective scholarly analysis” (33) that is not reducible to those evaluative modes of criticism with which poetics has been misidentified over the years. It is Jakobson’s view that literary analysis must come to terms with both the *synchronic* and the *diachronic* dimension that inhere in literature. He has in mind obviously here
the “literary production of any given stage” (34) as well as “that part of the literary tradition which for the stage in question has remained vital or has been revived” (34). From this point of view, any “contemporary stage is experienced in its temporal dynamics” (34). As a result, a “historical poetics” (34) (i.e. a diachronic approach to the study of literature) is a “superstructure . . . built on a series of successive synchronic descriptions” (34). The crucial question where poetry is concerned for Jakobson is this: what is the “indispensable feature inherent in any piece of poetry?” (39) and which serves to distinguish poetry from other kinds of utterances? Jakobson argues that, like any speech act or utterance, poetry is a function of the two axes.

In Saussurean terms the paradigmatic and syntagmatic are what he calls the metaphoric pole (the axis of selection) and the metonymic pole (the axis of combination). This also influenced modern literary theorists like Jacques Lacan and Claude Levi-Strauss. Their views, meaning and the terms which they employ will be discussed later in this chapter. For Jakobson Meaningful communication occurs at the intersection of these two axes.

Poetic discourse is distinguished by great emphasis on figurative language. However, what Jakobson calls ‘poeticalness’ is not, in his view, merely a “supplementation of discourse with rhetorical adornment” (55) Jakobson points out that the “supremacy of poetic function over referential function does not obliterate the reference but makes it ambiguous” (50)

This relation is an inverse correlation. The more the message "talks" about itself and refers to itself (the poetic function), the less it talks about the context and refers to it (the referential function) and vice versa. Jakobson remarks that the context is what is known as the "referent' in another, somewhat ambiguous, nomenclature" (1960, p. 353). This does not stop him from using the term "referential" for the
function whose target factor is the context. Moreover, the term "context" is no less ambiguous, both in general and in this particular case. Jakobson says that the context is "either verbal or capable of being verbalized". As for the referential function, Jakobson gives the synonyms "denotative" and "cognitive" (1960, p. 353), but unlike all the other functions, this one is not presented in detail, he suggests two main ways of interpreting this function in the work of Jakobson and those who use his model. 1. The referential function relates to the thing "spoken of" (Jakobson, 1960, p. 355). 2. The second way of viewing the referential function seems more useful and operative than the first. The referential function is associated with an element whose truth value (true or false status) is being affirmed (or questioned), particularly when this truth value is identical in the real universe and in the assumptive or reference universe that is taking it on.

A universe of assumption (such as the universe of a character in a literary work) may be reinforced or contradicted by the universe of reference (as defined by the omniscient narrator.), which stipulates what is ultimately true or false (or undecidable) in the more or less "realistic" universe constructed by the semiotic act. Jakobson says that unlike declarative sentences, imperatives (linked to the conative function) cannot be tested for their value of truth. The imperative "Drink!" "cannot be challenged by the question 'is it true or not?' which may be, however, perfectly well asked after such sentences as 'one drank', 'one will drink', 'one would drink'." (Jakobson, 1960, p. 355) Considering that declarative sentences clearly activate the referential function, then the "truth value test" becomes a test we can use to identify the referential function. work as the only worthwhile area for interpretative focus (Dawson 75).

Swiss linguist Ferdinand de Saussure laid the foundation for modern linguistics, and his lecture notes delivered between 1907 and 1911 were collected by his students Charles Bally and Albert Sechehaye, and published as course in general linguistics in
The most important concept of Saussure’s linguistics that Jokobson adopts for his own model for a systematic research into the relational aspects of language are langue/parole, (language/ speech or utterance) signans/ signatum (signifier/ signified). Synchrony/ diachrony (study confined to a particular period / study through historical development). Structuralism cuts across the traditional disciplinary areas of the humanities and social sciences by understanding to provide an objective account of all social and cultural practica in a range that includes mythical narratives, literary texts, advertisements, fashions in clothes and patterns of social decotum. It views these practices as combinations of signs that have a set significance for the members of a particular culture. As Jonathan culler, put it in his lucid exposition, the aim of Structuralist criticism is “to construct a poetics which stands to literature as linguistics stands to language (Structuralist Poetics 1975, p.257). Saussure intended to re-establish it on a firmer footing by examining more carefully its hidden assumptions in his Course in General Linguistics (1915)]. Far from seeking to discard diachronic linguistics, he reasoned that languages could be reconstructed only after they had been studied in one given state in time (synchronic linguistics), a program that would require a fundamental reorientation of linguistic research. In brief, he argues, sound change cannot be explained solely in terms of phonetics, language contact, and so forth, for language is a system of signs and its sounds are functionally related to each other in a given historical stage. This system constrains the extent to which sounds may change. It acts as a kind of filter, accepting some variations but excluding others.

According to Saussure, communication takes place only if the properties of Sound-image (signifiant) and the elements of meaning (signifier) in a sign are invariant across all those contexts in which the sign is used. This invariance also holds for relations of opposition among signs, what Jakobson would call the principle of
"relational invariance" (p. 775 *selected writings*) and constitutes the generalized and collectively shared (i.e. social) language system (*langue*). It was Saussure’s famous dictum that linguist study this system rather than the mechanical, voluntary, accidental, and variable realizations of speech (*parole*).

Two well-known postulates attach to Saussure’s definition of the sign. The first has to do with the sign’s supposedly "arbitrary" nature— the claim that there is no intrinsic (i.e. iconic) connection between the word’s sound-image and its meaning. The sign’s "arbitrariness" is discussed by linguists like Benveniste in his *Problems in General Linguistics*, (1971) Friedrich in *Language, Context and the Imagination*, (1979) and Jakobson in *Selected Writing* , (1971). The second concerns its linear nature, unfolding as it does in time when manifested in *parole*. These two are the important theoretical consequences of Saussure’s formulation. It privileges reference and cognition making language a ‘speculative instrument.’ In addition, Saussure explicitly rules out the nonverbal ‘object’ or referent in his consideration of the linguistic sign, a move he felt is necessary in order to simplify analysis and to realize his project of a ‘self-contained’ domain of study. Like his contemporaries Sigmund Freud and Emile Durkheim in their respective fields and the Russian Formalists in literary criticism, Saussure struggles to establish an autonomous discipline, independent of history, political economy literary studies, and sociology. In his words "language must, to put it correctly, be studied *immanently*; heretofore language has almost always been studied in connection with something else, from other viewpoints." (p. 16)

According to Saussure, Signification without system is impossible. For example, we might think that the sound-image of *love* is merely associated with the meaning of ‘love’. But that idea, Saussure asserts is merely an illusion fostered by our folk theories of language as basically a naming process. To grasp the sound-image and
the concept, we must place the sign in a whole web or system of oppositions with other signs in the language: lover, lovingly, lover-ly, and so forth, as well as hate, affection, desire, etc. This system becomes the most fundamental contribution of structural linguistics, in the light of Saussure’s comments are apt here:

In language there are only differences without positive terms. Whether we take the signified or the signifier, language has neither ideas nor sounds that existed before the linguistic system but only conceptual and phonic differences that have issued from the system. The idea or phonic substance that a sign contains is of less importance than the other signs that surround it proof of this is that the value of a term may be modified without either its meaning or its sound being affected, solely because a neighbouring term has been modified. (p.120)

The above lines reveal that language is a closed and stable entity, because the signs in it produce meaning by their differential nature within the system. Accordingly, signifies denote signifiers that are arbitrarily associated with each other. The very idea of value is influential to the ideas of Levi-Strauss, Barthes and many others.

Saussurean system introduces two types of oppositional relations as one is ‘associative’ (and later would acquire the term "paradigmatic") and other is ‘syntagmatic’. The sentence the dolphin swam into the Bosphorous is one of those "combinations supported by linearity" (p 123) that is made up of linearly ordered syntagms. The signs of a syntagm are obviously related to each other by opposition to signs that precede it in the sequence and signs that follow it. Saussure confuses matters somewhat by referring to these as "discourse relations among signs" (p. 123). Paradigmatic relations are defined negatively as those relations that "are not supported by linearity" (p. 123). Thus, paradigmatic relation exists, for example, between a (an)
and *the*, and one can substitute one for the other in the same syntagmatic slot to produce a different, yet meaningful utterance. He suggests perform the same kind of substitution for other signs in the syntagm. These ideas seem to be self-evident when applied to language vis-a-vis words or even syntactic phrases. This demonstrates that language also operates as a system through significant sounds or phonemes. Saussure was one of the first to show that phonemes are negative, opposable, and correlative entities, and hence they can function to signal different word meanings. But the end result of Saussure’s analysis was merely a “phonological inventory, a mechanical sum of phonemes, without any clear exposition of how these phonemes relate to each other as a system or a whole.” (Steven C.Caton p.227). It is this shortcoming that the new Structuralism of Jakobson (66-68, 81) attempted to redress. Jakobson managed to show that the Structuralist view of phonemes is more than mere segments or blocks of sound. He writes, "Every scientific description of the phonology of a language must above all contain a characterization of its phonological system, that is to say, a characterization of the repertory, proper to this language, of distinctive differences..." (120, p. 8). Jakobson’s distinctive feature system is more explicit realization of Saussure’s dictum that linguistic form is abstract (pp. 137-39).

Jakobson’s first criticism is against Saussure’s notion of the ‘sign’. Saussure’s claim that the sign is fundamentally linear was seen to be an Oversimplification once distinctive features were discovered. It was clear that the phoneme is not a homogeneous segment of sound but resembles a "chord in music" (130), composed of several more primitive signalling units. Thus the linearity of the sign is better seen as a product of a more fundamental structural principle of speech signs: hierarchy. Jakobson’s model of language is the Saussurean injunction to "study form, not substance" (p. 113). This reminds the famous chess analogy. “The signs of language,
Saussure argued, are like the pieces on a chess board. In Chess, the rules according to which pieces may be moved on the board are important, not the substance from which the pieces are made.” (p.230. Steven) Regardless of material, what matters is that each piece can be distinguished from every other on the board. This opposition is called as binaries in linguistics by Jakobson. He criticizes Saussure for failing to draw out additional implications for language theory. In his 1928 Prague Manifesto "The Concept of the Sound Law and the Teleological Criterion" he states: "The revision of the traditional tenet leads to the recognition of the fact that language (and in particular its sound system) cannot be analyzed without taking into account the purpose which that system serves.

The purpose of communication for Saussure is referential; language is used to communicate propositional meaning. But the Jakobsonian/Prague School model, language is composed of many different kinds of subsystems, each subsystem being the means to accomplish a particular goal or “purpose of communication”( 95). Language is viewed as "system of systems" with cross-cutting properties such as binaries, hierarchy, and paradigmatic and syntagmatic oppositions. This multifunctional, polysystemic view is a radical departure from Saussure, for whom langue is homogeneous in function and in system. Built into the Jakobsonian model are (in a certain restricted sense) Bakhtin’s homogeneous v/s heteroglossic poles of language, which will be discussed later. Saussure’s vision is that a monolithic or uniform language informs almost all of transformational linguistics. Jakobson has claimed that the notion of language is goal oriented. Jakobson took strong exception to Saussure’s formulation of synchrony as "static" and diachrony as "nonsystematic." He argued that a teleological view of language led to a quite different conclusion—namely, that whatever historical changes occur must "fit" the pattern of a "dynamic" system as
viewed in the perspective of a particular communicative goal. When French structuralism got inaugurated in the 1950s by the Cultural Anthropologist Clauds Levi-Strauss, Saussure’s linguistic model was reanalysed as cultural phenomena and ethnography such as mythology, Kinship, relations and modes of preparing food. The other theorists such as Roland Barthes, Gerard Genette, Julin Kristeva, and Tzvetan Todorov were prominent cultural constructers. Levi-Strauss’s *Structural Anthropology* (1963) lays foundation for general Structuralism. He uses Structuralist phonemic model as an analogy for understanding non-linguistic cultural data such as myth, kinship relations, marriage, art, and so forth. In his article "Structural Analysis in Linguistics and Anthropology," (1945) Levi-Strauss asserted that linguistics "will certainly play the same renovating role with respect to the social sciences that nuclear physics, for example, has played for the physical sciences." He then explicitly compared kinship terms with phonemes as "elements of meaning "that are unconsciously integrated into "systems" (p. 32). Even more than in his kinship studies, Levi-Strauss invoked this model in his analysis of myth, particularly in the so-called "mytheme" (159). In his essay “The Structural Study of Myth” the emphasis is on transfers of an idea from phonology to analysis of culture. Levi-Strauss’s initial exposure to structural linguistics came in the early 1940, when he attended lectures in which Roman Jakobson outlined phonemes’ character as ‘negative relative’ positions in a language specific total configuration of significant distinctions. The model of language levi-strauss thus acquired is that of langue or *linguistic system* set forth by saussure . In the lectures, Jakobson emphasized the uniqueness of phonological signs, as the only linguistic signs that are purely differential and negative in Saussurean manner. For levi-strauss, Linguistic signs of all other levels possess characteristics and functions that are not determined exclusively by their position in a system of other
signifiers. Far from heeding to this point, levi-strauss saw the phonological model to be directly useful in deepening anthropological understanding of vast areas of human sociocultural life beyond linguistic codes. Levi-strauss applied metaphorically phonological styles of analysis to hundreds of anthropological subjects bending the ‘+’ and ‘−’ formalism of feature analysis to characterize the whole social relationships. He suggested that in particular societies the moral and emotional quality of ties between different categories of kin is not determined by those kin relations in themselves but by their place in a configuration of other relations (levi-1963b). He argued that the categorization of particular kinds of relatives as marriageable and others are unmarriageable (such as the common pattern of categorizing children of a brother and sister as marriageable ‘cousins’ while categorizing the children of same-sex siblings as unmarriageable ‘siblings’) in a given society instantiates a society level distribution of significant distinctions and that a commitment to relations, as such (in the form of a principle of reciprocity, or dependency on others for spouses) is the distinct kin categories and of marriage rules. Levi-strauss sought to document a pan-human faculty of proliferating classificatory order in relation to all concrete things and qualities in the world, through analogic mapping between sets of categorial distinctions. Saussure’s distinction between langue and parole, one being the structural side of language, the other the statistical aspect of it, where langue belongs to a ‘reversible time,’ while parole is ‘non-reversible’. Levi-Strauss is of the view that “If those two levels already exist in language, then a third one can conceivably be isolated”. The third which he introduces is the ‘Myth’ he argues that:

There is a very good reason why myth cannot simply be treated as language if its specific problems are to be solved; myth is language: to be known, myth has to be told; it is a part of human speech. In order to
preserve its specificity we should thus put ourselves in a position to show
that it is both the same thing as language, and also something different
from it. (p.430)

In numerous works on myth, he argued that at multiple scales mythological
narratives are elaborately organized around basic categorial oppositions between
minimal signifying elements termed mythemes. Through myth, he looks at another kind
of human universe and he describes the similar kinds of myths in different culture. He
notices that cultures widely separated by geography or time still have distinctly similar
myths, for instance in regard to the creation of the world, the creation of language, the
difference between sex, and other facts of human existence. He observes that myths
could contain anything, as they are stories not bound by rules of accuracy or laws of
probability. He goes on to state that their structures are almost identical. Levi-strauss
insists that myth as ‘language’ consists of both langue and parole, both the
synchronic, a historical structure and the specific diachronic details within that
structure. Levi-strauss adds a new element to Saussure’s langue and parole, pointing
out that langue belongs to what he calls ‘reversible time’ and parole to ‘non-
reversible time’. Saussure means that a parole as a specific unit, instance or event, can
only exist in linear time, which is unidirectional. Langue on the other hand is simply
the structure which remains the same in the past, present, and future. For instance
it is like, yesterday is same as today and tomorrow thus he calls this structure as
‘reversible time’ because it does not matter that it goes forward or back. Myth
according to Levi-Strauss is both historically specific, a kind of parole existing in ‘non
reversible time’ as a story, and a historical part of langue that exists in’ reversible time’
as a timeless structure. He also says that myth exists on a third level, in addition to
langue and parole which also proves that myth is a signifying system of its own, and
not just a subset of language. He explains that third level in terms of the story that the myth can be altered, expanded, reduced, paraphrased, and otherwise manipulated without losing its basic shape or structure, for instance ‘princess, stepmother, prince’ no matter what details we add to the story the structure among the units remains the same.

Levi-strauss observes:

Myth, like the rest of language, is made up of constituent units. These constituent units presuppose the constituent units present in language when analyzed on other levels, namely, phonemes, morphemes, and semantemes, but they, nevertheless, differ from the latter in the same way as they themselves differ from morphemes, and these from phonemes; they belong to a higher order, a more complex one. For this reason, we will call them gross constituent units. How shall we proceed in order to identify and isolate these gross constituent units? We know that they cannot be found among phonemes, morphemes, or semantemes, but only on a higher level; otherwise myth would become confused with any other kind of speech. Therefore, we should look for them on the sentence level. The only method we can suggest at this stage is to proceed tentatively, by trial and error, using as a check the principles which serve as a basis for any kind of structural analysis: economy of explanation; unity of solution; and ability to reconstruct the whole from a fragment, as well as further stages from previous ones. (p.431)

According to Levi-strauss myth as structure looks like language as structure, myth is actually something different from the language. He says it operates on a higher or more complex level. Myth and language both consist of units put together according to certain rules and these units form relations with each other, based on binary pairs or
opposites. But myth differs from language as Saussure describes it because the basic units of myth are not phonemes but what Levi-Strauss calls ‘mythemes’. A mytheme is the ‘atom’ of a myth the smallest irreducible unit that conveys meaning. Levi-Strauss analysis of myth identifies the mytheme and then examines the sets or bundles of relations among mythemes. He thus creates for myth a two dimensional structure which allows for a different kind of reading than the one dimensional linear structure of language. Saussure’s language is a line; one word is connected to the next in a grammatical structure. Levi-Strauss’s myth however is like a square or rectangle it has both a horizontal and a vertical dimension. A Structuralist analysis of myth finds the smallest component parts the mythemes which are usually one event or position or action in the narrative, the story, of the myth. Then the Structuralist lays these mythemes out so that they can be read both horizontally and vertically, diachronically and synchronically, for plot and for theme. The story of the myth exist on the vertical left to right axis; the themes of the myth exist on the horizontal up and down axis the relations formed by any two of the mythemes in this array constitute the basic structure of the myth. Levi-strauss insists that the logic of structuralist analysis is just as rigorous as the logic of science. He suggests interpretation to gain the same kind of cultural authority that scientific analysis has and he thus invokes the machanisms that give science its truth value that is its logic and objectivity. Thus he asserts that myth is just as true as science. He avers:

In the same way we may be able to show that the same logical processes are put to use in myth as in science, and that man has always been thinking equally well; the improvement lies, not in an alleged progress of man's conscience, but in the discovery of new things to which it may apply its unchangeable abilities. (p.444)
Thus Levi-Strauss’ concludes that structure is permanent and the individual subject who creates phenomena in parole is de-centred, as he/she is no longer the source of meaning. On the other hand Eagleton’s conclusion of Structuralism is a closed entity and meaning as constructed. For him structuralism means “it, was much less his or her product than he or she was the product of it.” For him “Meaning was not ‘natural’”. The meaning will be constructed accordingly how “the way you interpreted your world was a function of the languages you had at your disposal, and there was evidently nothing immutable about these.” (p.93).

He summarizes language as a reflection of external world instead of producing reality. For him “reality was a particular way of carving up the world which was deeply dependent on the sign-systems we had at our command, or more precisely which had us at their” (p.94). Since he is a Marxist critic, he objects Structuralism as it rejects the ordinary reader. For Eagleton “Structuralists appeared to constitute a scientific one, equipped with an esoteric knowledge far removed from the ‘ordinary reader” (p.97-98). According to him Structuralists thought language as the origin of everything and they also dissolve the role the reader occupied in traditional humanist criticism as a thinking, perspective and conscious individual.

The individual author or subject is not assigned any initiatives, expressive intentions, or design as the “origin “or produces of a work. Instead the conscious “self” is declared to be a construct that is itself the product of the workings of the linguistic system, and the mind of an author is described as an imputed “space “ with in which the impersonal, “always-already” existing system of literary language, conventions codes and rules of combination gets precipitated into a particular text, Roland Barthes expressed, dramatically, this subversion of the traditional humanistic view, “as institution, the author is dead” (p.301 “The Death of The Author”; in Image Music Text,
Since the 1960s, this way of conceiving an author has been questioned by a number of structural and poststructural theorists, who posit the human “subject” not as an originator and shaper of work, but as a “space” in which conventions, codes, and circulating solutions precipitate into a particular text, or else as a “site” where in their converge, are recorded, the cultural constructs discursive formations and configurations of power prevalent in a given cultural era. The author is said to be the product rather than the producer of a text, and is often redescribed as a figure invented by critical discourse in order to limit the inherent free play of the meanings in reading a literary text.

One precursor of modern cultural studies who insisted on ‘author’, ‘authorship’ space and codes is Roland Barthes. He provides a significant transition from the Structuralist phase of semiotics, language structure and signs to the Post-Structuralist phase of ideology, discourse and culture. He explores the cultural impact on narrative texts. The “Death of the Author” is an extension of the end of the unified subject, and as such, Barthes was expressing the prevailing intellectual stance that was being written and would be expressed among that group of thinkers who were attending the seminars of Jacques Lacan (1901-1981) in Paris.

In his essay The Death of the Author (French: La mort de l'auteur) 1967 Roland Barath argues against traditional literary criticism's practice of incorporating the intentions and biographical context of an author in an interpretation of a text. Instead he observes that writing and creator are unrelated. Barthes states “writing is that neutral, composite, oblique space where our subject slips away, the negative where all identity is lost, starting with the very identity of the body writing.” (P.164-165). Roland Barthes introduces the idea that for a piece of work to be fully appreciated it must be understood in itself, completely separate from when, where and especially by whom it
is created. “Writing is the destruction of every voice, of every point of origin” (p.164). He suggests that the reader should not have any knowledge of the author’s identity, including their history, class, race, religion and political preferences, as these lead to preconceptions about the writing, and the reader may be encouraged to believe there is only one ‘correct’ translation of the text. Barthes observes: “utterly transforms the modern text” and time is also transformed. When the Author is “present,” there is the before and after writing time, when writing begins, the author enters into his/her own death. In order to write, one must utilize language, and language, as Lacan asserted, “Speaks the subject.” The reader or “the scriptor is born at the same time as his text. And every text is written essentially here and now.” (p.166). He also writes, when a reader analyse an author looses his identity “disconnection occurs, the voice loses its origin, the author enters into his own death, writing begins.” (p.165) Therefore “writing” changed from an act of recording or representation to a performance or a speech-act, which Barthes christened as “performative.” The term “scriptor” is then linked to “a pure gesture of inscription” which “traces a field without origin.” Barthes goes on to elaborates thus: the text was “a multidimensional space in which are married and contested several writings, none of which is original: the text is a fabric of quotations, resulting from a thousand sources of culture.” (p.167) Therefore, certain consequences occur: first, the “book itself is but a tissue of signs, endless imitation, infinitely postponed” and it is “futile” to attempt to “decode” a text. (167).

For Barthes to know the author is to know the source of the text and therefore expect a single definitive interpretation: “To give a text an Author is to impose a limit on that text, to furnish it with a final signified, to close the writing” (p.165). The Western mind-set requires clarification of one ultimate and ‘correct’ meaning, for the sake of believability. But without preconceptions on the writing’s birth, the audience is
left to their own devices and imagination to create meaning entirely. For Barthes, the meaning of a work depends on how it is received rather than how it is intended. The view of a text’s unity “lies not in its origin but in its destination” (p.168). This would imply that the reader is in complete control. For instance today’s internet sites such as face book, twitter and email identity which allows the consumer to simultaneously become the user/producer. This site provides the reader with the technical tools to create, edit and broadcast themselves as any character they wish the world to judge them as. In this way the reader/user takes the position of the author, and the two roles become interchangeable. There is little real originality: the reader is simply remediating the substance and structure of previously existing media to craft a new piece of work. As Plato observes, the mere copy of copies similarly Barthes says prophetically, “The text is a tissue of quotations drawn from the innumerable centres of culture” (p.146.) On the web, roles of author and reader, consumer and producer, are not fixed or permanent. User-created sites allow the entire online public (the readers) to access work while the producers (the authors) remain completely anonymous. From this Barthes comes to the conclusion that writing overlaps speech and emphasizes that “the birth of the reader must be at the cost of the death of the author.”(p.168). Barthes proposes writerly text, which requires from readers a self-conscious attempt to read it, and participate actively in understanding the free play of signifiers. It shows the endless play of signification in writerly texts, For him, modern myths are created with a reason.

Roland Barthes look at the ways in which signs can be ideological, and therefore how meanings pertinent to class values can be imposed through certain signifiers. For him Ideology can be defined as the way in which the dominant classes
and powers within a particular society at a particular time can impose their values on the rest of society. Eagleton observations are relevant here, he comments:

’A dominant power may legitimate itself by promoting beliefs and values congenial to it; naturalizing and universalizing such beliefs so as to render them self-evident and apparently inevitable; denigrating ideas which might challenge it; excluding rival forms of thought, perhaps by some unspoken but systematic logic; and obscuring social reality in ways convenient to itself. Such ‘mystification’, as it is commonly known, frequently takes the form of masking or suppressing social conflicts, from which arises the conception of ideology as an imaginary resolution of real contradictions’ (Eagleton, 1991 p5-6).

In “Writing Degree Zero”, Barthes reveals begins his interest in language as a means of understanding current ideology. He discounts the idea of an underlying system of signs, and rather argues that signs and codes are culturally specific, and therefore can be a tool for analysing social change. Due to the nature of ideology, Barthes develops a somewhat Marxist approach to Semiology and the ideology of signs throughout his essays in ‘Mythologies’. He questions the ways in which the ideological connotations of the sign can favour the bourgeoisie by stating the nature of signs as seemingly natural and unquestionable, and thus resistant to social change. Signs take on two meanings, those which are denoted to it, followed by those which are connoted. Later Derrida labels this form of connotation or “significations” as “free play”. Barthes believes that myths are created when the ideological connoted meanings that favour the bourgeoisie become attached to any one sign. These myths then work in the favour of the ruling powers within society by reinforcing the suggestion that society at present is inevitable. Barthes questions the ‘myth’ of red wine. He argue that red wine serves as a
strong example for the twofold nature of the ideology of signs. For Barthes, in its initial layer of understanding, red wine symbolises something that is iconically French. Yet the denotations of red wine, followed by the ideological connotations of virility and status, mask the underlying truth. ‘...the fact that wine is a commodity like any other, produced under a capitalist regime, which has turned into vineyards parts of North Africa that could have been used to produce food, and set the native Muslim population working there, when their religion holds wine in abhorrence’ (Moriarty, 1991 p.21).

Moriarty goes on to explain how in the opinion of Barthes, red wine is ‘doubly alienating’ (Moriarty, 1991 p.21), in the sense that not only does it condone the exploitation of workers under a capitalist mentality, but it also provides ideological connotations which are concealing the true identity of wine as its basiclevel, a commodity. However, what Barthes criticises capitalism. Barthes’ argues that red wine is an ideological concept for the exploitation of workers does make for a strong point against capitalism.

However, he further suggests that due to globalisation and the nature of society today, what can be applied to red wine can also be applied to thousands of other commodities that we regularly consume. He warns that it is also unreasonable to assume that all French people consuming red wine hold the same connotations. For many, wine may simply be an enjoyable drink rather than an attempt to prove status or wealth. Barthes believes that signs are representational of a particular economic time, and are culturally specific. For Barthes every culture would have their own unique language of signs and therefore would find it very difficult to understand one another. As we are able to communicate with people from countries whose class system, culture and values are entirely different to our own, there must be some form of universal understanding. Barthes does attempt to provide a contradiction to his suggestion that
many signs are an indicator of ruling class values, and he accepts that ‘Connotations will be read differently by different individuals and groups, depending on factors such as social class, education, political orientation and so on’ (Leak, 1994 p.22) Individual differences in values allow for different interpretations of a sign to occur.

Sontag, in ‘A Barthes Reader’ explains signs as implying three relations. The first, a ‘symbolic’ relation is one in which the sign symbolises a particular notion. The second and third relations, suggested by Saussure are, Paradigmatic. The paradigmatic relation ‘implies the existence, for each sign, of a reservoir or organised ‘memory’ of forms from which it is distinguished by the smallest difference necessary and sufficient to effect a change of meaning’ (Sontag, 1993 p.211) and Syntagmatic. Which, Saussure suggests as the ‘relationships between items in a linguistic sequence, say words in a sentence’ (Strinati, 2004 p. 93). Barthe says that “it is constructed from a semiological chain which existed before it: it is a second –order semiological system” (114). Thus barthes says that :

I shall represent it in the following way, it being understood, of course, that the spatialization of the pattern is here only a metaphor:

(113)

Barthes ignores the fact that some signs, especially symbolic, can simply be arbitrary. He believes that the linguistic sign, on which he focuses a lot of attention, cannot be arbitrary. Barthes explains this in ‘The Fashion Reader’, by stating that once a word has a meaning placed on it, the meaning cannot be taken away, and therefore
the word can never be arbitrary. Despite the fact that he also states that language as signified is only relevant to its particular social time. However, a sign when only judged on its symbolic relation, with no Paradigmatic or Syntagmatic development, Strinati writes:

Since the meanings of particular linguistic signs are not externally determined but derive from their place in the overall relational structure of language, it follows that the relationship between the signifier and signified is a purely arbitrary one... it is not possible to understand individual linguistic signs in a piecemeal, *ad hoc* or empiricist fashion. They have, rather, to be explained by showing how they fit together as arbitrary signs in an internally coherent system or structure of rules and conventions (Strinati, 2004 p.92).

Barthes explains that when a dog was labelled a dog, there is no reasoning for it. It is simply a random collection of letters to name a particular object. For him once a sign has attached itself to other signs, it can no longer be arbitrary in that context.

We can therefore only analyse the ideology of signs when these signs are placed in relation to one another, and in doing so, we present our own ideologies, due to the subjective nature of interpretation. ‘...the choice of a dominant relation implies a certain ideology; and, on the other hand, one might say that each consciousness of the sign (symbolic, paradigmatic, and syntagmatic) corresponds to a certain moment of reflection, either individual or collective’ (Sontag, 1993 p.212).

Barthes does attempt to provide a contradiction to his suggestion that many signs are an indicator of ruling class values, and he accepts that ‘Connotations will be
read differently by different individuals and groups, depending on factors such as social class, education, political orientation and so on’ (Leak, 1994 p.22) Barthes fails to address the many ways in which Semiology and language can be used to portray personal ideologies, rather than the ideologies of a ruling power. Barthes explains how he believes the lower social classes are repressed, without offering any means for change. He provides evidence that signs and language are used as a means of reinforcing bourgeois values and ensuring that we remain passive.

Barthes recognizes such an ideology in Literature in the realistic mode of writing. Realism believes in the direct representation of objects through words; “I” it sees sign as representational language becomes the transport window that opens onto a world of objects in the real world. Barthes argues against such a view by claiming that sign is a changeable entity and is always determined by roles of a particular sign system which is very much situated in a particular culture. Saussure explores the arbitrary relationship between the signifier and the signified and defines the sign a something that possesses a fixed concept according to conventions. For Barthes, sign is one that can draw attention to its own arbitrariness, instead of passing itself as something fixed or natural. When a sign conveys its meaning, it should convey some sense of its artificial status. Such a view is in correlation with Barthes political attack on the bourgeois society, which tries to project its ideology in a covert fashion: signs are created to suit the ideology and passed on to the masses as ‘natural: innocent, and unchangeable. As Eagleton points out,” ideology seeks to convert culture” and he says, “Nature, and the ‘natural’ sign is one of its weapons…. Ideology, in this sense, is a kind of contemporary mythology, a realm which has purged itself of ambiguity and alternative possibility” (117) whereas the Structuralists view criticism as a form of Metalanguage. Barthes proposes that one man’s criticism can always become the
object of study for another critic, and so on Barthes sees “language as ‘without bottom’ something like a ‘pure ambiguity supported by an ‘empty meaning’ (Eagleton119).

Hence writing does not simply reflect reality, because language partly create and endorses a structure to the world; thereby, language exerts a powerful influence on the way individuals perceive the world around them. By moving away from ‘work’ to ‘text; and by redefining the role of the reader, Barthes begins the Post-Saussurean movement Barthes redefines the concept of ‘sign’ and rediscovers the potentiality of language which had become restricted in the structuralist emphasis on a fixed meaning.

Interestingly Jacques Derrida’s Of Grammatology adds one more radical definition of sign to Saussure and Barthes views. For Saussure explores the arbitrary relationship between the signifier and the signified and defines the sign as something that possesses a fixed concept according to conventions. For Barthes, sign is one that can draw attention to its own arbitrariness, instead of passing itself as something fixed or natural. As a Post-Structuralist Derrida dislocates the metaphysical concept of ‘presence’ in the sign that Saussure puts forward. Derrida defines two forms, one is differance and the other is dissemination. These are very much related to Saussure and Barthes. Saussure defines signification as a play of binary oppositions, where Derrida writes,

For the signification "sign" has always been comprehended and determined, in its sense, as sign-of, signifier referring to a signified, signifier different from its signified. If one erases the radical difference between signifier and signified, it is the word signifier itself which ought to be abandoned as a metaphysical concept (p.110 structure sign and play).
Barthes describes the same as *infinite semiosis*, where Eagleton presents dissemination in an easy term as he says meaning is scattered along the “whole chain of signifiers: it cannot be easily nailed down, it is never fully present in any one sign alone, but is rather a kind of constant flickering of presence and absence together”(p111)

Jacques Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* is a fundamental work of what has come to be called deconstructionist criticism. “Grammatology” is a term borrowed from Ignace J. Gelb, a linguist and ancient historian who first used it in his *A Study of Writing: The Foundations of Grammatology* (1952). Derrida’s *Of Grammatology* which is translated by Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak in 1997 re-examines and aims to replace traditional Western *logocentrism*. He argues that Language conveys signs, and signs contain two elements: the *signifier* (the physical symbol) and the *signified* (the thought beyond the symbol). The signifier and signified are ever present, and they are always distinct from one another. They may be distinct only to a small degree, or they may have a wide separation. For instance, the coldness of ice cream might make one person think of winter, another person of a summer day at the beach, and a third person of the pain from a sensitive tooth.

“Structure, Sign, and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences”*(French: La structure, le signe et le jeu dans le discours des sciences humaines)* is a lecture delivered at Johns Hopkins University on 21 October 1966 by philosopher Jacques Derrida. The lecture was then published in 1967 as a chapter of *Writing and Difference* *(French: L'écriture et la différence)*. the essay supports in description of a *rupture* and “a redoubling”(107)

In "Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences", Derrida starts by hinting at an "event", a "rupture", that brought about a revolutionary change
in the history of the concept of structure. He later goes on to state that this rupture marks the transition from structuralism to post-structuralism, along with all the ideas and theories that led to it. He shows that the whole history of the concept of structure itself can be seen as functioning within one system, one structure, namely that of metaphysics (part of which is logocentrism). What all those concepts have in common is that they imagine structures as organized around a centre. But since this centre -- be it God, freedom, man, happiness, consciousness, etc. -- cannot be affected by the structure surrounding it, it has to be seen as residing outside of the system, as not actually being in the centre. He writes, “it was probably necessary to begin to think that there was no centre, that the centre could not be thought in the form of a being present, that the centre had no natural locus, that it was not a fixed locus but a function, a sort of non-locus in which an infinite number of sign-substitutions came into play.”(109) Although constituting the axis around which everything revolves, the centre – i.e. the source, goal, and explanation of All – is not part of the system it defines, it is not located in its centre for him.

Thus it has always been thought that the center, which is by definition unique, constituted that very thing within a structure which governs the structure, while escaping structurality. This is why classical thought concerning structure could say that the center is, paradoxically, within the structure and outside it. The center is at the center of the totality, and yet, since the center does not belong to the totality (is not part of the totality), the totality has its center elsewhere. The center is not the center.(108)

At the time "when language invaded the universal problematic" (a recurring hint in Derrida's writing at Sausurre’s theories), it was necessary to begin to think that none of the structures discussed have centers, and it is this moment when, according to Derrida, the "rupture" referred to in the opening paragraph occurs. The simple fact that
signs define themselves by their relationship to other signs implies that there cannot be "a center" – neither within nor without the system (or ‘structure’), since this ultimate sign (the 'transcendental signifier') could not be defined without reference to yet another sign..

This general transition from a belief in structures with centres to a belief in decentred structures has, according to Derrida, relevance in connection with what is generally called "human sciences". Ethnology, he argues, is an academic discipline that could only be born within a metaphysical system (that of ethnocentrism) that had a center (Europe). After "the rupture", of course, these perspectives had to be revised. In giving a more detailed example, Derrida discusses the theoretical work of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who -- surprisingly early -- thought and argued in accordance with much of what Derrida formulated much later, but was clearly positioned within a metaphysical system. Derrida analyses Lévi-Strauss’ treatment of the nature/culture dichotomy, as well as his studies of mythology. At the same time – in good Derridaen fashion – he takes the opportunity to examine Lévi-Strauss’ methods and modes of arguing. This instance is a good example of how Derrida usually treats texts he works with on multiple layers, and how he works his theories into his own text-about-another-text. He writes about Lévi-Strauss that "his discourse [...] reflects on itself and criticizes itself" (113). His understanding of ‘always already there’ influences The concept of play; The open-endedness of interpretation; The making-use of the surplus of meaning and the lack of a center in order to validate new/further meanings, meanings that the text itself might not have been aware of.

2.3 Self : Sub- Coding

In the humanist model, the self is defined as a conscious being that has a power of logic and rationality to discover the truth. Self is portrayed as independent and
reflexive. In Structuralism, structure replaces man as the creator of meaning. It argues meaning as the result of structural relationship among various signs and elements in a system for these theorists, identity of a human being is constructed through the mediation of various structural elements within a system. But Post-structuralism recognises the role played by historical and cultural discourses and the unconscious in the construction of human identity. Hence, in post-structuralism, ‘the subject’ replaces the individual’ of the dominant philosophies originating from Descartes.

In the shifting trends of understanding the concept of sign, meaning has effected a radical change in the conception of self; the term ‘individual’ has been replaced by the term ‘subject’ in describing human beings. The self is sub-coded as various subject like identity, unconscious, decentre, order discourse, ideology and so on. Thinkers such as Benveniste, Foucault, Barthes, Lacan and Derrida deconstruct the notions of individuality and the self and consider them synonymous with consciousness.

Descartes’s *Discourse on Method* contributes the term ‘individual’ which dominated the philosophical systems from the Renaissance to the twentieth century. The terms “individuals”, “consciousness,” and “qualities,” suggest that, man is an autonomous and stable entity. Individuality attributes free intellectual status to man and suggests that man is an autonomous and stable entity. Individuality attributes free intellectual status to man and suggests that man’s thinking processes are not mediated through material and cultural world. In other words, “I” in Descartes philosophy, refers to a fully conscious and knowable self. For Descartes man is a creator of the meaning and remains outside the symbolic form. Thus Silverman concludes, “They confer identity not only on things external to man, but on man himself” (128).
The French linguist Emile Benveniste outlines the need to make a distinction between what he calls the subject of the énoncé and subject of the énunciation. In two influential arguments, Benveniste focuses on the role and implications of the ubiquitous first person pronoun (and its reciprocal second person), used at least implicitly in every language known to the humans. In Problems in General Linguistics he argues that pronoun and verbs acquire the signifying status only in specific discursive situation. In “On the Nature of Pronouns” he notes that the first person, “I,” operates in a way quite unlike other pronouns because it is essentially linked to the exercise of language. In other words, the sign I reflects Saussure’s two dimensions of language, the collective intelligence of langue and the ephemeral individual acts of parole: “It is this property that establishes the basis for individual discourse, in which each speaker takes over all the resources of language for his own behalf” (220). In fact the I not only links the otherwise heterogeneous dimensions of langue and parole but also keeps its speakers unaware of this profound difference. Emile Benveniste observes:

There is no concept “I” that incorporates all the I’s that are uttered at every moment in the mouths of all speakers, in the sense that there is a concept “tree” to which all the individual uses of tree refer….I refers to the art of individual discourse in which it is pronounced, and by this it designates the speaks…. The reality to which it refers is the reality of the discourse…. And so it is literary true that the basis of subjectivity is in the exercise of language (226)

He argues what is peculiar about the signs I and you and goes on to state that they are essentially without any meaning except when they are being employed or used. For him, the reality to which I or you refers is solely a reality of discourse. They
refer to nothing but the fact that someone is speaking or has spoken (and nothing changes when we consider fictional or reported dialogue). Benveniste states the precise definition for I as follows: “I is the individual who utters the present instance of discourse containing the linguistic instance I” (218). By taking the always implicit and often explicit situation of “address” into account, one has the symmetrical definition for you: “The individual spoken to in the present instance of discourse containing the instance you.” According to Saussure know that all signs are intrinsically empty of meaning, which is determined only in the repetitions of institutions, systems and events. However, I and you are instances of signs that lack even the possibility of material reference. These signs cannot be misused because they “do not assert anything, they are not subject to the condition of truth and escape all denial” (220). The implications are far reaching. Language is not something the human subject uses (as René Descartes and the traditions of modernity that follow his lead had always asserted), but rather, the human subject is something only made possible by language. In his 1958 article, “Subjectivity in Language,” Benveniste underlines this point:

We are always inclined to that naïve concept of a primordial period in which a complete man discovered another one, equally complete, and between the two of them language was worked out little by little. This is pure fiction. We can never get back to man separated by language and we shall never see him inventing it … It is a speaking man whom we find in the world, a man speaking to another man, and language provides the very definition of man. (224).

Benveniste says that language provides the very definition of man, we mustn’t assume, with theoretical linguistics that we know what language is. At this stage, language provides us with the definition of man only because of the peculiarity of
personal pronouns. The foundation of “subjectivity” is determined, according to him, by the linguistic status of the person:

Consciousness of self is only possible if it is experienced by contrast. I use I only when I am speaking to someone who will be a you in my address. It is this condition of dialogue that is constitutive of person, for it implies that reciprocally I becomes you in the address of the one who in his turn designates himself as I” (224-225).

Hence the basis of subjectivity, if we take language as a model, would not be those aspects that constitute either its lexical content (meaning) or its formal and grammatical rules, but it would only be discoverable in the exercise of language.

Benveniste’s distinction as the signifiers “I” and “you” always imply a speaker and a listener respectively and in discursive situations these roles are reversible just as the signifiers. Other distinction the linguistic sign, the subject too, depends upon another term with in the same paradigm, which is activated through discourse. Thus an individual forms his or her cultural identity only within a concrete discourse through the signifiers (pronouns) “I” and “you”. There is no stable “identity”, as it is in the constant process of being constructed through various discursive instance plays a decisive role in the work of Jacques Lacan, Roland Barthes, Julia Kristeva and Michel Foucault, who are some of the “names” I associate with the category of critical theory called poststructuralism.

On the other hand, for Lacan, a most Freudian since the subject comes into being through language he does so through the exercise of signifying articulation—the act of enunciation. As soon as he comes into being he finds himself not as he is (what Lacan would call the truth of his being) but as he imagines himself to be—that is, as a
representation (at the level of the statement). In order to discover the subject of the unconscious, the analyst must focus on the level of enunciation (performance, expression)—in order to recognize the truth of the subject in the articulation of language—its enunciation. Lacan observes: “In order to be situated in the locus of the Other, the presence of the unconscious is to be sought in any discourse in its enunciation” (Ecrits 834). So the relation between statement and enunciation (the said and the saying) actualizes the divided structure of the psychoanalytic subject and helps us further to grasp the difference between the imaginary (fixed and complete image of person) and the symbolic (the constitutive function of language). In order to explain identity of an individual one has to read through small units.

Freud paves a way to understand the psychology of human mind through its units. His study of the “self” merely systematises a version of the “self” that has been accumulating for some time. He gives a scientific form and an idea of the “split subject”. Two crucial version of Freud’s model of subject serves as fine exemplars. They are, conscious and unconscious which gives important insight into its meaning. The appearance of Freud’s writing at the very end of the nineteenth century and in the first few decades of the twentieth merely systematises a version of the “self” that had been accumulating for some time. In 1915, Freud expanded that statement into a more ambitious metapsychological paper, entitled "The Unconscious". In both these papers, when Freud tried to distinguish between his conception of the unconscious and those that predated psychoanalysis, he found it in his postulation of ideas that are simultaneously latent and operative. He believes that the majority of what we experience day-to-day (the emotions, beliefs and impulses) takes place in the unconscious and is not viewable to us in the conscious mind. In particular, he uses the concept of repression to demonstrate that although an individual may not remember
something traumatic happening to them, this memory is locked away in the unconscious. Yet importantly, these memories remain active in the unconscious and can reappear in consciousness under certain circumstances and can cause problems for us even in the unconscious. Our conscious mind, however, according to Freud, makes up a very small amount of our personality – as we are only aware of the small tip of the iceberg of what is actually going on in our minds. Freud has also added a third level to our psyche known as the preconscious or subconscious mind. This part of the mind is the one that although we are not consciously aware of what is in it at all the times, we can retrieve information and memories from it if prompted. This is one of the most important Freudian contributions. The existence of ideas on the border of consciousness is hardly a radical idea. Freud, however, was puzzled over the variety and the enigmatic nature of this experience. In the “Interpretation of Dreams” (1904), Nick observes that Freud saw in the dreams the existence of not only of a part of the mind in the shadow of conscious awareness, but one that was radically different, even opposed to consciousness. That is “dream however, were not the only place that such unconscious investments reappeared. Slips of the tongue- still referred to in common speech as Freudian slips, especially when they have some sexual ambiguity and jokes are common daily occasions when surprising or incongruous material surface unexpectedly and without easy explanation in the conscious mind “(p.28)

Freud later developed his therapeutic technique of free association and was no longer practicing hypnosis. Then this he went on to explore the influence of unconscious thought processes on various aspects of human behaviour and felt that amongst these forces the most powerful were the sexual desires in childhood which were repressed from the conscious mind. That repressed become the “symbolic substitutions”.
Nick Mansfield explains the most common objections to Freud’s work on the “unconscious” is that it takes the accidental and trivial and turns it into the significant, dramatic, and even tragic. For Freud, all psychological (and by corollary, cultural) material is “over determined”. This means that even the most trivial behaviours biting our nails, disgust at the skin on the surface of warm milk, anger and impatience in traffic are the focus and expression of the most plural and deep psychological complexity. Nick opines that, “for Freud, subjectivity is not of only simple presences and absences, but also of potentially violent energies and conflicts where negative feelings do not merely lapse from the conscious mind, but where they are kept in place by a force against which they constantly struggle in their endeavour to enter the conscious and mind and gain expression and fulfilment, unconscious ideas meet the barriers of repression.” (p.30). Nick Mansfield proceeds further thus he says “Freudian version of the subject topographically, we have an interior life split between the socially and culturally integrated processes of the conscious mind”, dreams, in fact, usually function as what Freud called “wish fulfilment”, allowing repressed material an adequate enough expression so that it need not interpret the subject’s daily practices. In nightmares, the repressed materials have proven too strong for the subject.

Freud introduces the idea of the human self/ subject, as radically split, divided between the two realms of consciousness and unconsciousness. For Freud, actions, thoughts, beliefs, and the idea of the self are primarily determined by the unconscious. Jacques Lacan, French psychoanalyst in the Freudian school, and famous as “the French Freud” reinterprets Freud in the light of Structuralist and Poststructuralist theories and he turns psychoanalysis theory into a Poststructuralist one and into an essentially humanist philosophy. “Lacan always presented his project as a return to freud’ saying that he was merely drawing out ideas already present in the earlier
theorist’s own writings” (Nick 40.) he develops the semiotic version of Freud, and converts the basic concepts of psychoanalysis into formulations derived from the linguistics theory of Ferdinand de Saussure, and applying these concepts not to human individuals, but to the operations of the process of signification. In humanistic view, “self” is stable and has “free will”, Freudian “unconscious” destabilize and deconstruct, the humanist idea of the self. Freud puts rational mind out of the centre and replaces it with the unconscious. Freud’s goal is to strengthen the ‘ego’ the ‘I’/self. For Freud, the conscious rational identity is the ultimate and powerful, and able to control, the unconscious. For Lacan, this projection of ego at the centre as an unconscious is illegible, for Lacan the “Ego” or ‘I’ self is only an illusion, a product of the unconscious itself. In Lacanian view, the unconscious is the ground of all being. Freud is interested in investigating how the child forms an unconscious and super ego and becomes a civilized adult. Lacan describes how the infant forms an illusion of an ego, of a unified conscious self-identified by the signifier “I”.

Lacan tracks the structure of language, following the ideas of Saussure, but modifies them a bit, when Saussure talks about the relations between “signifier” and “signified”, who form a “sign” and insisted that the structure of language is the negative relation of values among signs (one sign is what is because it is not another sign). Lacan’s focus is exclusively on relations between signifiers alone. For him, elements in the unconscious wishes, desires, images are all signifiers, and they are usually expressed in verbal terms, these signifiers from a ‘signifying chain’ one signifier has meanings only because it is not some other signifiers, for Lacan there is no signified, there is nothing a signifier ultimately refers. Lacan argues that, the chain of signifiers for instance, x=y=f=h=c=q=%=&=? =#=s=k=c- is constantly sliding and...
shifting and circulating. There is no anchor, no centre. For him, nothing that ultimately gives meaning or stability to any single signifier or to the whole chain of signifiers.

Lacan’s essay “The Instance of the Letter in the Unconscious or Reason since Freud.” 1957 introduces the formula of the signifier. Lacan argues that the subconscious is structured like language, through chains of signification. Lacan begins his essay by stating that he uses the term “letter” quite literally and means by it “that material support that concrete discourse borrows from language” (448). He goes on to remind us of the structure of language and lays out an algorithm which he says is at the foundation of linguistics: “S/s which is read as: as the signifier over the signified” (448). He claims that this algorithm is appropriate because, “in so far as it is itself only pure function of the signifier, the algorithm can reveal only the structure of a signifier in transfer” (450). It is because the signifier and signified are separate “that no signification can be sustained other than by reference to another signification” (Lacan 448). Lacan uses an example of two children on a train who believe, because of their relative positions, that they have reached either a stop called “Ladies” or one called “Gentlemen.”:

A train arrives at a station. a little boy and a girl, brother and sister, are seated in a compartment face to face next to the window through which the buildings along the station platform can be seen passing as the train pulls to a stop, ‘look’, says the brother, ‘we’ re at ladies!,’ ‘idiot,’ replies his sister, ‘can’t you see we’re at gentlemen.’ (450)

Lacan explains that this example shows how “the signifier sends forth…incomplete significations” (450). In this example, each child sees a sign over a public restroom. While what is represented by each sign is merely a specific type of restroom,
the signification of the signs for the children is something else altogether. In this way the signifier (restroom sign) gives not incorrect, but incomplete signification.

Lacan brings together the ideas of S/s and signifiers’ incomplete significations to form a chain of signifiers where one signifier merely slides along and signifies other signifiers. Because of this he claims we must, “accept the notion of an incessant sliding of the signified under the signifier” (451). Lacan notes that Saussure began to articulate this action but stopped short because his analysis took place only linearly. Lacan argues that to fully understand the chain of signifiers, one must recall a number of contexts that operate simultaneously. He claims that for a signifier to fully operate, it must have “passed over to the level of the signified” (452). This “passing over” “discloses the possibility…[of] us[ing] it in order to signify something quite other than what it says” (452). This discovery underscores the importance of metaphor and metonymy because they function precisely by signifying something other than they claim: part of a whole for Metonymy and substitution of unlike things for metaphor. Metaphor and Metonymy are at the heart of the structure of language and their functioning depends not on equality but on difference and word-to-word relations.

Lacan says that the process of becoming an adult, a self; is the process of trying to fix, to stabilize to stop the circulation of the chain of signifiers so that stable meaning including and represented by, the meaning of the word ‘I’ becomes possible. Saussure on the other hand says that, “I” was a signification because the signifier ‘I’ is linked to a concept the signified which is identity or self-hood of an individual. But the signified for ‘I’ shifts every time and someone uses it in various forms. The chain of signifiers is constantly in play. Whereas in Derridian concept, there’s no way to stop sliding from one signifier to the other, signifier plays endlessly. For Lacan language
existed before any of us was born, and we must locate ourselves in the field of language in order to take up a place in the human world.

In a similar fashion, Foucault (in *The Order of Things*) insists that man is the product of certain historically and culturally determined discourses. In his view, ethnology and psychoanalysis are most important discourse, as they focus on human reality, which is shaped by culture and the unconscious. In *Subjectivity* theories of the self from Freud to Haraway Nick Mansfield observes that, “both the Lacannian and Foucauldian points of view dispute the model of the subject as a “free and autonomous individual”(52).

The similarity between the two groups goes on to psychoanalysis; the Foucauldian tradition omits a fully-fledged definition of the nature of the self/subject. To know the individuality of the systems it is evident to understand the theories of eminent scholars who have contributed to this field of ideological discourse. Whereas, in their hands concepts like individuality /system/self and subject takes the position of ideology and materialistic views.

Foucault’s theory of “power” was not the first political theory. Marxist philosopher Louis Althusser (1918-90) has developed a definition of the Subject place under Capitalism in the late 1960’s. His “Ideology And Ideological State Apparatuses” written in 1969, focuses on how the structure of capitalist society reproduces itself like, army, police and prison system. For him, the institutions that reproduce the values, meanings and logic of the capitalist system- what are called ideological state-apparatuses. Like the church, family and especially the school, these institutions endlessly reinforce capitalist values. Meanwhile we/ individual /I/self-become the subject under these dominant orders. The “I” functions like the listener and subordinator, which is useful for a dominant order.
Thus, capitalism succeeds by creating subjects. Nick Mansfield demands that “ideology needs subjectivity.” (53. Subjectivity). Since capitalism constitutes one as subjects by “interpellating” (53). Althusser emphasis in his most famous example that, “the hailed individual will turn round. By this mere one- hundred- and – eighty- degree physical conversion, he becomes a subject” (Althusser (1971, p.163). Ideology as structure gets us to become subjects, and not to recognize our subject positions within any particular ideological formation, through interpellation. According to Althusser a particular ideology says in effect, ‘hey-you!’- And we respond, me? You mean me?’ and the ideology says, I mean you; so that we think these ideas are individually addressed to us and hence are true. He says that ideology, as structure, requires not only subject but also subjects. In using the capital’s’, he invokes an idea similar to that of Lacan, small ‘s’ subject, the individual person, and a capital ‘S’ subject which is the structural possibility of subject hood which individuals fill. The idea of subject and subject also suggests the duality of being a subject, where one is both the subject of language or ideology, as in being the subject of sentence and subject to ideology, having to obey its rules and laws and behave as that ideology dictates. His comparison of a reader to a policeman and his way of calling out some one in the street, by calling out to him the policeman creates a certain type of subjects’, one answerable to the law and to the state and system behind it. Texts creates subject positions for readers whether that construction of subject positions is obvious or not like the text says ‘dear reader; as many pre-twentieth- century novels frequently does and Nick concludes, “subject does not develop according to its own wants, talents and desires, but exists for the system that needs it.”(53). Thus subjectivity, is a type of being. Capitalist state requires us not only to behave in certain ways, but to be certain types of people.
Althusser’s influence has steadily declined since the late 1970’s when Nietzsche, Bakhtin and Foucault talk about materialism further. Friedrich Nietzsche, one of the key forerunners of Foucault’s work, also claims that he is influenced by the Nazis. His argument is opposite to the material subjects put forward by Althusser. His emphasis is *On The Genealogy of Morals* (1887), Nietzsche argues that logic is an illusion, and it is quite wrong to assume that behind every effect there is a human ‘subject’ intending it, and therefore answerable. For instance, his example of lightning which in his analogy is not something that exists permanently, he writes:

>a quantum of force is equivalent to a quantum of drive, will, effect more, it is nothing other than precisely this very driving, willing, effecting, and only owing to the seduction of language (and of the fundamental errors of reason petrified in it) which conceives and misconceives all effects as conditioned by a ‘subject; can it appear otherwise. For just as the popular mind separates the lightning from its flash and takes the latter for an action, for the operation of a subject called lighting, so popular morality also separates strength from expressions of strength, as if there were a neutral substratum behind the strong man, which was free to express strength or not to do so. But there is no such a substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is merely a fiction added to the deed- the deed is everything. (1989,p-45)(56).

Here he argues that things exist in the world; they act on the world the effects that they give rise to be a result of that inner nature. For him, it is language that gives the illusion that something called lightning exists separate from the fact of its flash, grammar gives the impression that lightning is a thing and flashing merely something that it may or may not sometimes do. Nick observes in Nietzsche that for him, “a
seduction of language to think that subjects exist who can choose or not choose to act in certain ways and morality, and its instrument language, are not universal systems of absolute truth’s and values, but weapons in a power game, where one group in the human world tries to constrain another”(p.56). Mikhail Bakhtin adds “dialogue” to the material discourse. Bakhtin was not exactly a Marxist but a theorist writing in the Soviet Union in the 1920’s. From 1940 to 1950 He was associated with the Russian formalism. His works were ‘not translated into English until 1970’s. Bakhtin shares with Marxist theorists an interest in the formation of the subject and an interest in language as the means in which ideologies get articulated. For Bakhtin, as for Althusser, language itself both structurally and in terms of content, is always ideological. Language, for Bakhtin, is also always material, he argues against Saussure and Structuralists and insists to examine the use of language, which for him is a material practice and which is always constituted by and through subjects. Bakhtin’s theories focus primarily on the concept of dialogue and on the notion that language in any form of speech or writing is always dialogic. It consists of three elements: a speaker, a listener/respondent, and a relation between the two languages and what one says in language are always thus the product of the interactions between (at least) two people. Bakhtin contrasts that notion of dialogue with the idea of the Monologue, which are utterances by a single person or entity.

Both Althusser and Bakhtin are interested in examining how Ideology, and Literature as a specialized subset of Ideology, which makes subjects to obey the law, and never they resist the centralized authority. Michel Foucault( Paul-Michel Foucault) (1926 – 1984) was a French philosopher, historian of ideas, social theorist, philologist and literary critic. His theories addressed the relationship between power and knowledge, and how they are used as a form of social control through societal
institutions. Though often cited as a post-structuralist and postmodernist, Foucault rejected these labels, preferring to present his thought as a critical history of modernity. His thought has been highly influential for both academic and activist groups. Foucault is also interested in exploring the mechanisms that create and enforce our obedience to authoritative rule. Although he does not belong to any of the “ist” and developed his own way of criticism. He is primarily interested in examining how discourse creates relationships of power/ knowledge which then become the framework within which human thought and action are possible. For him, the simplest sense “discourse” is conversation, or information. For Michel Foucault it is through discourse (through knowledge) that we are created. He says in an isolated family, a child's knowledge depends upon just a few people. In a sense, those few people create the child's identity. The child cannot know anything but what is communicated by them. While, Foucault notes the "increasing vulnerability to criticism of things, institutions, practices, discourses" (p.80), he is wary of "global, totalitarian theories" (p.80) which have in fact proved a hindrance to research. Hence, his sense that social criticism over the last few years has been local and less theoretical than reality-oriented. In addition, Foucault argues that we have been witness to the "insurrection of subjugated knowledges" (p.81), that is, of the "historical contents that have been buried and disguised in a functional coherence or formal systematisation" (p.81). By ‘subjugated knowledge,’ Foucault means those "naive knowledge, located low down on the hierarchy, beneath the required levels of cognition and scientificity" (p.82).

Foucault wrote extensively about historical reconfigurations of knowledge in what would now be called the human sciences. During the 1970s, however, he argued most notably in *Discipline and Punish* and the first volume of *The History of Sexuality* that these reorganizations of knowledge were also intertwined with new forms of
power and domination. Foucault's works from this period have often yielded contradictory responses from readers. His detailed historical remarks on the emergence of disciplinary and regulatory bio power have been widely influential. Yet these detailed studies are connected to a more general conception of power, and of the epistemic and political positioning of the criticism of power, which many critics have found less satisfactory. Foucault's discussions of the relation between truth and power have similarly provoked concerns about their reflexive implications for his own analysis. Foucault had been writing about the history of knowledge in the human sciences long before he ever explicitly raised questions about power. What had interested Foucault was not the specific bodies of knowledge compiled through disciplined investigation at various times. Instead, Foucault had written about the epistemic context within which those bodies of knowledge became intelligible and authoritative.

*The Archaeology of Knowledge* called "discursive formations" also included the objects under discussion. Foucault was thus committed to a strong nominalism in the human sciences: the types of objects in their domains were not already demarcated, but came into existence only contemporaneous with the discursive formations that made it possible to talk about them. Foucault's earlier studies were in fact directed toward significant changes in the" discursive formations" that governed the serious possibilities for talking about things. He proposed that there were important shifts in what counted as serious discussion of madness, disease, wealth, language, or life, shifts that were evident in the historical archives. His aim was not to explain those shifts, but rather to display the structural differences they embody, and to some extent to document the parallels between contemporary shifts in several discursive formations. Foucault was especially concerned to demonstrate the parallel shifts in several
discursive fields in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, through which the modern sciences of "man" replaced the classical tables of representation that displayed the order of things.

Nick Mansfield observes in Foucault’s views of self as compromised by the world, yet that is recoverable “beneath the detritus and in authenticity of day to day life”, and still self has a powerful attraction. According to Foucault. The modern era has been saturated by the dream that social life is a place of compromise and debasement and it also teaches to “be yourself,”(54) but that somewhere- your true self remains hidden free and available if we can find the right social group, language or personal style. Nick says for Foucault “the individual is self-contained and complete and society presses in on it from the outside, frustrating its dreams and restricting its ability to express itself” (54) Foucault individuality in:

the individual is not to be conceived as a sort of elementary nucleus, a primitive atom, a multiple and inert material on which power comes to fasten or against which it happens to strike and in so doing subdues or crushes individuals. In fact, it is already one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-a-vis of power; it is, I believe, one of its prime effects the individual is an effect of power, and at the same time, or precisely to the extent to which it is that effect, it is the element of its articulation. The individual which power has constituted is at the same time its vehicle.(Foucault 1980 b p 98)

2.4 Recoding The self

Foucault is the ambassador of recoding the “self” by retrieving the self through orders, power and refiguring history to know our “self”. He gathers the scattered facts
to regain the oneness, particularly through historiography. He also serves as a bridge between poststructuralist and the postmodernist thinkers. In postmodern discourse self is displaced as a central presence in experience and appropriated as yet another signifier. Postmodernists are less concerned with the conditions of social organization, conveying instead the liquid, imaged self of electronic media and consumerism. In the context of postmodern, the idea of the self as a central presence dissolves and is replaced by the radicalization of what Derrida calls the “word play”. Hence, Derrida shows the self as polysemic, that is attached to, and articulated with, multiple systems of signs. Supporters of this view see new possibilities for the expression of their experience. Postmodernism applies to a variety of contemporary views. The version that is characterized in this chapter is gleaned largely from the influential work of Jean Baudrillard, Jean-Francois Lyotard, and Linda Huttcheon. Postmodernism posits the module of no fixities and finite patterns but multiple possibilities. However, it is not a critical formula or a set of rules but it is an alternative discourse which problematizes the other discourse and questions all pre-exists or what Lyotard calls the “metta narratives” (26). Jean-François Lyotard (1924-1998) was a French philosopher, sociologist, and literary theorist. He is best known for his articulation of postmodernism after the late 1970s and the analysis of the impact of postmodernity on the human condition.

He views on what is postmodern condition in *The Postmodern Condition: a report on knowledge* (1984) is that it is not only a leading statement of postmodern consciousness, but also offers a basis for grounding the ostensibly groundless. Lyotard is a skeptic for modern cultural thought. The impact of the postmodern condition was to provoke skepticism about universalizing theories. Lyotard argues that we have outgrown our needs for grand narratives due to the advancement of techniques and
technologies since world war II. He argues against the possibility of justifying the narratives that bring together disciplines and social practices, such as Science and Culture. For Lyotard the narratives we justify as a single set of laws and stakes are inherently unjust. He argues that A loss of faith in meta-narratives has an effect on how we view Science, Art, and Literature. Little narratives have now become the appropriate way for explaining social transformations and political problems. Lyotard argues that this is the driving force behind postmodern science. As metanarratives fade, science suffers a loss of faith in its search for truth, and therefore must find other ways of legitimizing its efforts. Connected to this scientific legitimacy is the growing dominance for information machines. Lyotard argues that one day, in order for knowledge to be considered useful, it will have to be converted into computerized data. He illustrates the world where technology has taken over. Lyotard introduces the postmodern “self” as a condition of knowledge in highly developed societies, “where we can no longer simply speak, write, or refer to objects in the way we had before the late nineteenth century” (p.xxiii). He considers the hallmark of postmodernity to be a “breaking up” (p.15) of these epistemological or grand bases of the disciplines. He writes “I define postmodern as incredulity toward metanarratives” (26.1) with respect to the social and behavioural science as narratives of the self, postmodernism shows that theories of the self can no longer be accepted as principally about the thing they represent. However, Lyotard argues:

A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by pre-established rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgement by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work.
Those rules and categories are what the work of art is looking for. (lyotard.81)

Lyotard suggests that a “self” is necessarily referenced in quotation marks because the nature of our knowledge of the “self” is markedly changed from its substantial modern form of the self which is no longer simply refers an entity. For Lyotard to speak of the postmodern is to set a discursive and experiential stage, as it were, upon which further references, exchanges, repairs, and resistances are played out. In other words self centrally represents experience. For Lyotard postmodern “self” does not amount to much” (1984,p15). Thus he says “We have become alert to difference, diversity, the incompatibility of our aspirations, beliefs and desires, and for that reason postmodernity is characterised by an abundance of micro narratives.”

Jean Baudrillard (1929 – 6 March 2007) is was a well-known French Sociologist Philosopher and cultural theorist. His work is frequently associated with postmodernism and specifically post-structuralism. Baudrillard is best known for his analyses of the modes of mediation and technological communication and concerned with the way how technological progress affects social change. In Simulacres et Simulation translated by Sheila Glaser, Baudrillard locates the postmodern condition in what he aptly terms “hyperreality” – "the blurring of distinctions between the real in the unreal in which the prefix ‘hyper’ signifies more real than real whereby the real is predicted according to a model" (1991, p. 119). This “hyperreal” is the "end result of a historical simulation process in which the natural world and all its referents have been gradually replaced with technology and self-referential signs" (1997, p. 101). He argues: No longer is there an underlying reality which has an existence apart from the simulations and simulacra. Rather, what we consider to be social reality is indefinitely reproducible and extendable, with the copy indistinguishable from the original, or
perhaps seeming more real than the original. Video games become more real than other forms of interaction, theme parks which are simulacra become more desirable than the originals. For instance he gives such example like Las Vegas, Disneyworld, and even nature becomes better viewed through national parks and reconstructions.

Postmodernism reliant on models and maps that we have lost all contact with the real world that preceded the map. Reality itself has begun merely to imitate the model, which now precedes and determines the real world: "The territory no longer precedes the map, nor does it survive it. It is nevertheless the map that precedes the territory—precession of simulacra—that engenders the territory" (The Precession of Simulacra.p.1). To Jean Baudrillard postmodern to postmodern simulation and simulacra, “is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is a question of substituting the signs of the real, for the real” (The Precession of Simulacra. p.2). Baudrillard is not merely suggesting that postmodern culture is artificial, because the concept of artificiality still requires some sense of reality against which to recognize the artifice. His point, rather, is that we have lost all ability to make sense of the distinction between nature and artifice. To clarify his point, he argues that there are three "orders of simulacra". He attempts to absorb simulation by interpreting it as a false representation, he writes;

simulation envelops the whole edifice of representation itself as a simulacrum.

Such would be the successive phases of the image:

it is the reflection of a profound reality;

it masks and denatures a profound reality;

it masks the absence of a profound reality;

it has no relation to any reality whatsoever;

it is its own pure simulacrum.
In the first case, the image is a good appearance - representation is of the sacramental order. In the second, it is an evil appearance - it is of the order of maleficence. In the third, it plays at being an appearance - it is of the order of sorcery. In the fourth, it is no longer of the order of appearances, but of simulation. (p. 4)

He further explains:

The transition from signs that dissimulate something to signs that dissimulate that there is nothing marks a decisive turning point. The first reflects a theology of truth and secrecy (to which the notion of ideology still belongs). The second inaugurates the era of simulacra and of simulation, in which there is no longer a God to recognize his own, no longer a Last Judgment to separate the false from the true, the real from its artificial resurrection, as everything is already dead and resurrected in advance. ("The Precession of Simulacra".p. 4)

Simulations are processes whereby events or situations in the past are replaced with virtual, electronic, or digitized images and signs. While a drama may simulate real life, we generally think of this as representation of some part of the social world – institutions, relationships, and interactions that idealize or characterize aspects of the social world. Television has carried this much further, so that the images simulate many different and hypothetical aspects of social life. Simulacra denote representations of the real but where the essence of the real may be missing. What Baudrillard argues is that these simulacra "are so omnipresent that it is henceforth impossible to distinguish the real from simulacra" (1997, p. 101). That is, we live in a society of simulacra so that it no long makes sense to distinguish some underlying reality from the simulacra. Baudrillard points to a number of phenomena to explain this loss of distinctions between "reality" and the simulacrum. He points out that to media culture,
exchange-value, multinational capitalism, urbanisation and language and ideology as fine examples. Any representation of reality is always already ideological, always already constructed by simulacra. Mark poster criticises Baudrillard’s for using media and lists some additional criticism, even while he later appreciates Baudrillard’s contributions to our understandings of the impact of electronic media on society:

Baudrillard’s writing style is hyperbolic and declarative, often lacking sustained, systematic analysis when it is appropriate; he totalizes his insights, refusing to qualify or delimit his claims. He writes about particular experiences, television images, as if nothing else in society mattered, extrapolating a bleak view of the world from that limited base (p.7).

In his view, Baudrillard fails to bring in other things which matter in the society seriously. He also criticises that he is blind using age class system and gender difference. Thus “self” in Baudrillard’s hand free and it is nowhere and everywhere at the same time.

The ideologies of a postmodernist is criticised by Fredric Jameson where he distinguishes through Marxist viewpoint but differently from Karl Marx. As Fredric Jameson ideology is beyond subjectivity. It is apt here to distinguish and build a bridge between postmodernity and postmodernism. Linda Hutcheon, (1947) a Canadian academic working in the fields of literary theory and criticism, opera, and Canadian Studies, is very careful to distinguish between postmodernity and postmodernism. In her The Politics of Postmodernism, (1989) and The Poetics of Postmodernism(1988). The former she understands to mean "the designation of a social and philosophical period or 'condition'" (Politics 23), specifically the period or "condition" in which we now live. The latter she associates with cultural expressions of various sorts, including "architecture, literature, photography, film, painting, video,
dance, music” (Politics 1) and so on. Indeed, Hutcheon diagnoses as one reason why critics have been led to such disparate opinions about the "postmodern" is because of the conflation of these two disparate if associated domains (socio-historical on the one hand, aesthetic on the other hand). By distinguishing between the two domains, Hutcheon offers a critique of Fredric Jameson's influential attack against the postmodern: "The slippage from postmodernity to postmodernism is constant and deliberate in Jameson's work: for him postmodernism is the 'cultural logic of late capitalism’” (Politics 25). Jameson thus sees postmodern art and theory as merely reinforcing the many things he finds distressing in postmodern culture, particularly the conditions of multinational late-capitalism.

Hutcheon does not deny that postmodernity and postmodernism are "inextricably related" (Politics 26); however, she wants to maintain the possibility that postmodernism's cultural works could be successful in achieving a critical distance from the problems of our contemporary age. On the whole, she agrees with other critics regarding the elements that make up the postmodern condition: a world dominated by the logic of capitalism, Hutcheon departs from the critics of postmodernity in by underscoring the ways that postmodern cultural works engage in effective political critiques of the postmodern world around us:

critique is as important as complicity in the response of cultural postmodernism to the philosophical and socio-economic realities of postmodernity: postmodernism here is not so much what Jameson sees as a systemic form of capitalism as the name given to cultural practices which acknowledge their inevitable implication in capitalism, without relinquishing the power or will to intervene critically in it (Politics 27).
In The Politics of Postmodernism, she gives postmodern photography as a perfect example, since it "moves out of the hermeticism and narcissism that is always possible in self-referentiality and into the cultural and social world, a world bombarded daily with photographic images" (Politics 29).

Hutcheon further characterises the modern and postmodern by coining the term historiographic metafiction, to describe those literary texts that assert an interpretation of the past but are also intensely self-reflexive (i.e. critical of their own version of the truth as being partial, biased, incomplete, etc.) (Poetics, 122-123). Historiographic metafiction, therefore, allows us to speak constructively about the past in a way that acknowledges the falsity and violence of the "objective" historian’s past without leaving us in a totally bewildered and isolated present (as Jameson has it).

In this chapter an attempt has been made to answer a number of questions, among cultural subjectivity like what are the respective roles of the author and the reader? To what degree, if at all, should an author’s life or the historical moment in which a literary work was written be a relevant variable in the analysis and exegesis of the work? What characteristics of a text should be considered most salient in arriving at an interpretation of its meaning? What literary techniques and resources are used to establish the text, its action, and the ways in which it can be read? and so forth.