CHAPTER 3
APPROACHES AND STRATEGIES OF NATIONAL INTEGRATION IN PAKISTAN

Pakistan emerged on the world map in August 1947 as a result of the ‘two-nation theory’. However, to start with the journey towards becoming a nation-state, Pakistan had inherited poor raw material. There were various material and ideological shortcomings that needed to be worked upon for Pakistan to integrate as a nation. But, for the shortsightedness and lust for narrow interests, the ruling elite turned blind eye to these shortfalls. They adopted such approaches and strategies for building nation that rather proved detrimental to their goal. In the present chapter, a detailed description of the Pakistani society, as it historically stood and the features that continued to mark the nature of the social set up since colonial period, is provided. In addition, the approaches and orientations of the ruling elite in the post-independence period are discussed and analysed. In this way, the failures and lacunae on the part of the Pakistani elite in its nation-building and state-building endeavours are highlighted.

The process of nation-building or nation-formation connotes mutual harmony between various social and political institutions and their smooth functioning. It refers to social integration, just and equitable socio-economic formations and processes as well as responsive, responsible and all-inclusive participatory political system. If required, it involves the policy of multiculturalism and recognizing and acknowledging diversity of cultures and customs. This recognition should be reflective structurally and institutionally to be real. However, the post-colonial states which have derived the idea of “nation-state” from the western world, in their endeavour of nation-building focused entirely on unification, uniformity and homogenization of their diverse societies. More so, while doing so, they have adopted top-to-bottom approach and authoritarian methods (Chatterjee, 1993:36). As far as the state of Pakistan is concerned, it failed to create functioning structures that could represent and accommodate the dissenting voices and aspirations of the constituent groups that could make the process of nation-building more representative and reconcile the interests of the state and the constituent groups. On the contrary, the state has been hypersensitive and non-receptive to the views and inclinations of the provinces. The relations of the provinces and the central government are haunted by mutual distrust and fear of disintegration. One can find reasons for this in the historic
conditions, colonial legacy and the political geography of the state of Pakistan. Clearly, the constituent provinces and the ethno-linguistic groups residing in various provinces of Pakistan, have their own glorious pasts that were distorted and ruined by the colonial rulers. In the post-independence period, these groups could not relate themselves with the new state both ideologically and due to their lack of representation in the state apparatus. Thus, they continued to look into their past and aspired for a similar political space in the new political set-up and struggled for it (Singh, 1994:412). The newly emerged states could not forego the colonial orientations of distrust towards the erstwhile ‘subject society’ and continued with the colonial state apparatus to keep the social order intact with coercion and force. Adding to such equations between the ‘state’ and ‘society’ were the state boundaries, which were inherited by the post-colonial states from their colonial masters. These boundaries were more of administrative and political and were drawn without paying any consideration to the ethnic boundaries. This divided the ethnic communities, who could not get over this fact. The state failed to be considerate with the torn communities and treated any of the demands for provincial autonomy or group rights with utter suspicion and reluctance lest it might lead to secessionist tendencies. Besides, to fill in the gap between the state and the society, the interface of ‘civil society’ is almost absent or unable to build and exhort an enlightened citizenry. In this backdrop, an attempt has been made in this chapter to examine various strategies and approaches of the ruling elite in post-colonial Pakistan to build a viable and legitimate ‘nation-state’ (Rashid, 2004: 182).

PAKISTAN: INCONGRUITIES OF A NATION

At the time of emergence of Pakistan as an independent state in 1947, the ruling elite ignored that the territory that came to comprise Pakistan is inhabited by a diverse and heterogeneous population, who are divided along ethnic, linguistic, cultural and sectarian lines. The ethnic consciousness was indeed firmly in place, albeit in the wake of communal riots and communally surcharged environment in the years preceding partition, it remained subdued for some time. Each of the ethnic groups viz., Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, Bengalis and Pashtuns, with their distinct languages, culture, a history and historical association with a specific territory, had a strong respective ethnic consciousness. So much so that the efforts of the Mohajir and Punjabi politico-bureaucratic and military elite, in the post-independent period, to
subdue the ethnic consciousness of the constituent groups permanently, and replace it with the religious consciousness did not succeed. Rather these ethnic groups reacted strongly in the form of ethno-nationalism (For the percentage distribution of the population by ‘principal mother tongue’ or ‘language spoken at home’ see appendix, Census 1998).

As far as religion is concerned, Pakistani society is deeply fragmented on this count also. There are Sunnis, Shias, Wahabis, Barelvis, Deobandis, Sulemanis, Daudi Bohras and other different schools of Ulemas (Kaur, 2003:71). In all there are 72 sects among the Muslims who have their own interpretation of Quran and Sunnah (Afzal, 1993:525). Religious pluralism is also due to the presence of Christians (1.59%), Hindu Jati (1.60%), Scheduled Castes (0.25%), Ahmadis (0.22%), and ‘Others’ (0.07%) (See Appendix). The Muslims constitute 96.28 percent of the population according to the Population Census, 1998. Thus, to construct a monolithic nation out of such a diverse society was nearly impossible. Nevertheless, the ruling elite pursued nation-building by imposing a homogeneous national Islamic identity on these diverse peoples of the country.

**COLONIAL INFLUENCE ON POST-COLONIAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE**

Before embarking upon the study of divergent approaches and strategies of the ruling elite in the post-independent period to unite the heterogeneous society of Pakistan, it is worthwhile to study the colonial legacies that the country inherited. It will be seen that in terms of state boundaries, economic policies and the centralized state structure, the state has continued with the colonial legacies ignoring the fact that the colonial masters while reigning the region, were concerned about their economic and strategic interests. It was not in their scheme of things to unite or bind the colonized society (Rashid, 2004:181). Rather for securing their interests, the colonial rulers have unresistingly, many a times resorted to ‘divide and rule’ policy. But, the post-colonial elite of Pakistan, while pursuing their goals of nation-building and state-building, retained much of the colonial structure and policies, rather sometimes they even added to their strength and pervasiveness. As a result, their endeavor of nation-state building met with failures.

To begin with, legitimating and endorsement of territorial boundaries of the country was problematic since its inception. In fact, hard and frozen legitimate borders are basic characteristics of a nation-state. But, the external appearance
provided to the ‘to be’ nation-state of Pakistan was artificial in terms of its boundaries, which were demarcated according to the whims and interests of the colonial masters. To exhort it as a sacrosanct form of living nation was thus, no more than a misnomer (Singh, 1994:410-412). Hence, if one looks at the western borders of Pakistan, one finds variance between political and ethnic boundaries. For instance, Baloch people, who constitute one of the minorities in Pakistan, have spread across the three countries of Pakistan, Afghanistan and Iran. There was hardly any logic behind such unnatural division of Baloch homeland other than the colonial interests, who viewed United Balochistan as a threat to the British interests in the region. Actually, the British interests in Balochistan grew during 1860s and 1870s, especially, when they perceived that the Russians might extend their territory southward. It is against this background, that the British devised numerous strategies to establish an unhindered control over the Indian frontier besides engaging in the Great Game with Russia that pushed Balochistan into the vortex of power politics (Foreign Policy Centre Paper, 2006: 12). A plan was therefore, embarked upon to demarcate the boundaries of the territory under British control, with Iran in the early 1870’s, and later with Afghanistan between 1893 and 1905. Thus, Goldsmid Line assigned one fourth territory to Iran in the far west in a bid to woo the Iranians away from the Russians, and in the north, a small strip was handed over to Afghanistan under Durand Line with similar intentions. Even inside the British India, the Baloch area was divided into centrally administered territory designated as British Balochistan and remaining area was further divided into a truncated remnant of the Kalat State and three puppet principalities. Of particular note, the British did not pay any attention to the factors like geography, culture, history and the will of the people while reordering the boundaries of Balochistan. Even, the Khan, the then ruler of the Kalat state was not consulted in this regard. Nonetheless, Baloch tribes in the 19th century and in the beginning of 20th century voiced against this unnatural and unjust partition of their homeland by revolting against the British and Persian rule. In 1933, Mir Abdul Aziz Khurd, the prominent national leader of Balochistan showed his displeasure towards the division of Balochistan by publishing the map of Greater Balochistan. Even today, the Baloch people have strong thoughts for uniting the three regions into one and have raised this question at different levels many a times (Baloch I, 1987: 31-32 & Khan, 2003: 283).
Similarly, Pashtuns are divided across the Durand Line that was demarcated by the British on 14 November 1893 (Tinker, 1968:146). Creation of this artificial division, which was carried out at the instance of the British while defending their imperial interests, was lamented by both the then Amir of Afghanistan and the general masses. The line left nearly 6 million Pashtuns in Afghanistan and 5 million in the British controlled territories, east of the Durand Line (Kaur, 2003:114-115,175). The line is believed to be drawn in a hurry, while ignoring the basic features of the group organization viz. ethnic belongingness and linguistic identity (Embree, 1977:24). The Britishers followed the theory of Thomas Holdich, a North West Frontier Province (NWFP) analyst who held that racial, cultural, linguistic and historical divisions are not of primary importance when to draw the national boundaries! Meanwhile, it needs to be acknowledged that despite drawing the Durand Line, the British entered into numerous agreements with the ruler of Afghanistan regarding non-interference in the internal matters of the local tribals (Kaur, 2003: 115). When Pakistan resolution was passed in 1940, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan of NWFP and his Red Shirts did not support the Muslim League’s plan to create Pakistan. He had rather worked closely with Jawaharlal Nehru to preserve an undivided India or to create a separate state of ‘Pakhtunistan’. Khudai Khidmatgar movement had overtones of strong Pashtun identity. In 1928, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan had launched a monthly, The Pakhtoon in Pashto language (Khan, 2005:92). It was only when Pakistan became inevitable that Gaffar Khan joined the new state. At that time, M.A. Jinnah had assured Gaffar Khan that his government would not interfere in any way in the traditional independence of the tribal areas. But, this was not to be so and Pashtuns were continuously and consistently interfered with. This fueled their irredentism, which is based on strong ethnic consciousness (Rahman A, 1982:203). Pashtuns constitute an ethnic majority in the adjacent Afghanistan, whereas in Pakistan, it constitutes of only 14 percent of the total population (Khan, 2005: 85; Census 1998).

As far as the eastern border of the country in question is concerned, it was demarcated by Radcliffe Commission that was set up by the departing British and, is often accused of partiality while recommending and implementing the borders. Thus, it is argued that the Radcliffe award on partition of the Punjab and Bengal was ready by 8th August 1947; however, it was declared on 17th August only. This delay was found to be difficult to explain by the contemporary “record keepers” (Godbole, 2000:393, 395 & 398). Moreover, the changing stand of Mountbatten, the then
Governor General of British India on the Radcliffe award and its disclosure has raised doubts about the impartiality and fairness of the award, as it is alleged that he had influenced and altered the boundaries to favour India (Godbole, 2003:393). Besides, this border can also be termed as artificial if one notes that it was ‘united’ Punjab that had a rich history of social, cultural and economic interactions, which was being divided for ‘political’ interests of essentially a particular section of the people. Thus, the secular-socialist nationalist Congress leaders like Maulana Azad, followers of creed of composite nationalism and religio-cultural plurality like Ajmal Khan and theocratic scholars and Ulemas upholding pan-Islamic universalism, were against the two-nation theory that became responsible for the partition of the historic provinces of Punjab and Bengal (Abbott, 1968: 183-185). According to the supporters of two-nation theory, the Muslims and the Hindus of the Indian subcontinent constitute of two different nations, who are entitled to separate territories for preserving and flourishing themselves. Apart from this, various studies have been undertaken that depict the human sufferings experienced by ordinary people during partition of Punjab and reflect upon its absurdity (see Butalia, 1998 and Jain, 2006). This absurdity of the border, dividing the Punjab is also evident from the vague terms of reference of the boundary commission. Clearly, the entire emphasis was on deciding the exclusion/inclusion of the fourteen disputed districts of Punjab, in Pakistan or India, on the basis of majority of the Muslims or non-Muslims without paying any heed to economic and ‘other factors’ as was demanded by the Sikhs (TOP, Vol.XI:70). This placed Sikhs in an uncomfortable and disadvantaged position, as no consideration was given to their economic stakes, religious shrines as well as the historical role, they played in the region (TOP, Vol.X:629). As a matter of fact, creation of boundaries in terms of sectional/communal interests in place of some natural barrier led to curious frontiers that are not only difficult to defend but have caused many practical difficulties. All the more, the demarcation of the boundary in the Punjab converted the “principal cities into frontier towns” by dividing an area, which was “homogeneous in everything except religion” (TOP, Vol.XI:943).

Similarly, Eastern Wing of Pakistan was carved out of United Bengal of pre-partition era. Till April 1947, leaders of Bengal Provincial Muslim League and Bengal Congress were trying to work out the independence of United Bengal. Their idea of independent united Bengal was based on “territorial nationhood” with shared
language, culture and history (Alavi, 2004:85-101). Nevertheless, when the United
Bengal was divided its boundaries were not only unnatural but “monstrous”. Thus:

In West Bengal, there are more than a hundred villages that are located right up to the zero line. The border runs in the midst of village habitation. In some classic cases, a part of a house is in India and the other in Bangladesh. Agricultural fields are touching each other and often a farmer does not know whether he is cultivating his own field or that of his neighbor who is a ‘foreigner’. Innumerable streams criss-cross the boundary (Godbole, 2000: 519).

Thus, one finds that the quest and the objective of developing countries to build a nation-state out of their heterogeneous societies also involve fixing, sanctifying and hardening of their borders. This has its own set of problems, given the queer history of drawing of the borders of these erstwhile colonies. The post-colonial states that have refused to recognize these borders, as merely colonial legacies do not acknowledge the unnatural, illogical, unfair and unjust division, created by these borders, of communities who are in many respects organically associated with each other. This flawed approach of the developing countries has instead of yielding positive results, led to strong opposition and struggle on the part of the torn communities, whose nationalism has ran in counter with the nation-building efforts of the ruling elite in these states.

The irrationality, illegitimacy, lack of acceptability and consensus in demarcating the territorial boundaries has also provided an external dimension to the challenges of various ethno-nationalisms within the country. Thus in Pakistan, the ruling establishment in the country has remained occupied with Afghanistan as a perceived threat to Pakistan’s national integrity on its western borders. Kabul has never accepted the de jure boundary between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the Durand Line, which they consider as an imperial legacy in blatant violation of the ethnic and cultural identities of the Pashtun people (Razvi, 1979:34). In protest, Afghanistan had voted against the admission of Pakistan into the United Nations in 1948 (UN Official Records of General Assembly, 1947:314). The former has played a direct and proactive role in the Pakhtunistan issue and added to the Pashtuns sense of irredentism (Chopra, 1974:314-5). Further, after the Percham faction of Communist party came to power in Afghanistan in 1979 and Babrak Karmal became the President of the country, the Soviet factor got added into the fears of external involvement in
Balochs and Pashtuns perceived secessionist designs (Bruce, 1986:345). In this regard, China, which had strongly condemned Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and promised every possible help to Pakistan, claimed to have evidence about Moscow’s efforts to change situation in the Balochistan (Bhutto, 1973: 545).

Besides, real or perceptive collaboration of foreign powers with the local cultural groups has generated distrust among the ruling elite vis-à-vis the beleaguered groups. This has led to the rigid postures on the part of the state while dealing with the sub-nationalist groups. Thus, the central government tends to deal with the internal ethnic issues as external security concerns and apply military methods instead of exploring political solutions to the problem. On many occasions while the country was being ruled by the army, external links to the internal dissidence was highlighted to postpone the resumption of democracy and keep away the political demands of various political groups in the country (Rizvi, 2004:123). In this regard Ollapally (2008) has presented an analytical paradigm of geopolitics, while investigating the causes of extremism in religiously and ethnically diverse South Asian region. She contends that due to political expediency and identity needs, the states of South Asia formulate, uphold and promote particular identity structures, and any challenge to the ‘preferred national identity’ that come from ethno-religious assertions of groups at geographical/ political/ national ‘fringes’ is coercively dealt with. Hence, the geographically strategic location, of the groups asserting their political rights influence, if not determine, influence the approach/ response, the state would adopt towards them.

As far as pre-colonial and post-colonial economic structure of the areas, which now constitute of Pakistan is concerned, various provinces were disproportionately developed. Even different sectors of the economy were selectively developed under the British rule. Punjab was the recruitment base of the army, and its agricultural sector was also quite well developed. The province of Punjab continued to provide the largest numbers of official and non-official cadres in post-independence period also (Ali, I A, 2002:34). Punjabis dominate and are over-represented in not only army but even in the bureaucratic structure of the country. Punjabis accounted for over 50 percent of the British Indian Army whereas after partition, 60 percent of the army was Punjabi in terms of its ethnic composition (Cohen, 1984:42). As, agriculture was promoted and patronized by the British, they initiated irrigation schemes and set-up canal colonies. The landed gentry were allotted land in these colonies liberally.
Besides, Punjab Alienation of Lands Act (1901) protected the land rights of the landed class (Talbot, 1999: 98). No doubt, that this class remained socio-economically the most powerful political class in the post-independence period also. As far as Sindh is concerned, it was an administrative part of Bombay Presidency in the colonial period and, was granted the status of province in 1936 only. Though the colonial masters introduced some significant changes in the power and economic structures in the province, but largely they continued to treat it as an outpost of Bombay Presidency. Whatever changes were introduced, were selective and according to the requirements of the colonial rulers. As such, discriminatory policies were adopted that resulted in uneven development and neglect of social services sector (Lari, 2002: 221 & Ali, I A, 2002:32). Moreover, the colonialists started developing the province as an “irrigation province”, like Punjab and set up Public Works Department, canal systems and introduced Sukkur Barrage Scheme (Khan, 2005:130). However, Sindh continued to be an agricultural hinterland, providing “…food grains to the deficit regions of India and raw cotton to the textile mills of Bombay, Ahmedabad as well as in England” (Ahmed, 1984: 156). In the post-independence period, Sindh had to face huge financial losses because Karachi, which was its major commercial and industrial centre, was separated from the province and was elevated to the status of Federal Capital Area. Sindh was compensated frugally for this. When One Unit Scheme was implemented, the developmental projects earmarked for the province, were put on hold and the funds were diverted to the ‘national’ projects. Also, while ignoring the rural development of Sindh, Rs. 330 million was diverted from the province to offset Punjab’s 1 billion rupee deficit. Out of Rs. 2,000 million allocated by Pakistan Industrial Development Corporation for developmental works in the province, only Rs. 200 million were received. Similarly, after construction of Kotri Barrage and Guddu Barrage, majority of the irrigated land was allotted to non-Sindhis (Khan, 2005:143-4). It is due to these reasons that one can say that the post-colonial state continued to adopt the ‘colonial’ economic policies, vis-à-vis Sindh, interests and development of which were sacrificed for the sake of dominant Punjabis.

As far as economic policies of the British in NWFP are concerned, one finds that Britishers initiated certain far-reaching changes in the region. A new land revenue system was introduced, Pashtuns were recruited to the British Army, market economy was set up, modern education was introduced and roads and railway lines were constructed. These changes were introduced in the settled areas of NWFP (Khan,
2005:88). The socio-economic changes that followed in the region were responsible largely in the emergence of Pashtun nationalism, in pre-independence period (Khan, 2005:91). In the post-independence period also, such a selective development of the province continued, with Punjab and some parts of Sindh being promoted as industrial hub and center’s bias for mechanizing Punjab’s agriculture to the neglect of other provinces, including NWFP. Hence the pre-partition economic structure and discrimination continued in the post-partition period also, as like the colonial rulers, post-colonial elite were merely concerned about the strategic significance of the NWFP and focused little on its social and economic sectors. At the same time, it is observed that just like in British army; Pashtuns remain overrepresented in the Pakistani army and are the second largest, after Punjabis to be recruited to Pakistani army (Khan, 2005:100-101). Similarly, as British intervened in the existing economic set up of Balochistan, they pauperized the local peasants and artisans. Balochistan was converted into “…an agrarian appendage of the metropolis” (Gankovsky, 1971:203). The migrants from Punjab and Sindh were imported and promoted, who constituted the new mercantile class and catered to the needs of the British cantonments in the region. In this way, the modern economic structure came to be controlled by the settlers to the exclusion of the local Balochs (Khan, 2005:114). Therefore, Balochistan remained underdeveloped during the colonial rule, a situation which did not change in the post-colonial period also. Also in post-independence period, non-Balochis, particularly Punjabis, were overwhelmingly present in not only the state machinery in the province, but were employed in and were major beneficiaries of the industry and other developmental projects in the province. Balochistan has repeatedly complained about exploitation of its vast untapped natural resources at the hands of ‘outsiders’, particularly Punjabis. The province has indeed remained neglected, backward, underdeveloped and poor despite its vast natural resources. Due to lack of adequate industrialization in the province, Balochis had to migrate outside the province for getting jobs, whereas Punjabi farmers from outside the region are propped up to settle in the arable areas of Balochistan (Rahman A, 1982:201). Not only this, just like the British treated the region as ‘special administrative zone’ without any legislative assembly, as elsewhere in British India, Pakistan’s first Governor-General, Jinnah, kept it under his direct rule through an advisory council, which was not a representative body. A ministry of states and frontier regions was created and kept under his control, which is an unparliamentarily act, to further
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strengthen his hold in the region (Khan, 2005:115). Details of the statistics proving the neglect of the province of Balochistan would be provided in the following chapters of this thesis. Thus, from the above discussion it can be inferred that the development of various regions that constituted Pakistan is marked by inequalities and inequities. It is observed that the uneven development of various regions of British India was part and result of colonial policy. However, this uneven development instead of being rectified was rather accentuated by the post-colonial policies of the state. Moreover, the discussion above indicates that there is a remarkable continuity in the economic policies towards various regions of state of Pakistan in pre- and post-colonial era. For illustration, under the Government of India Act 1935, the authority for allocating financial resources was tipped in favour of central government and the provinces had little autonomy in financial matters. However, in the post-independence period, the Act, according to which interim government of Pakistan was to run, was amended to further add to the financial powers of the centre, on the ground of economic constraints posed by defense expenditure and settlement of the refugees. Thus, sharing of income tax with the provinces was discontinued, control over proceeds from the sales tax and duty on the agricultural land, which had been under the purview of the provinces, was also taken over by the central government (Khan, 2001:271).

The centrally controlled and determined distribution of resources and the economic opportunities, which were also unjust and inequitable, proved to be a major cause of emergence of ethnic consciousness of the constituent groups. The most apt illustration in this regards is the nationalist movement of the Bengalis of East Pakistan. As far as East Bengal is concerned, the economic relations that had come up in the colonial era were that it had reduced to hinterland of Calcutta, where most of its absentee land-owners were settled. The tea gardens in the northern-eastern part of the province around Sylhet were mainly owned by British companies and, Calcutta-based Hindu firms, who continued owning them even in post-independence period. In the post-independence period, the structure of economic relationship remained the same with the Western Wing of Pakistan replacing Calcutta (Jackson, 1978:19). The economic gap between the two wings grew substantially in the initial decade of independence. Thus:
Per capita income increased in West Pakistan from Rs.330 in 1949-50 to Rs. 373 in 1959-60; whereas in East Pakistan it declined from Rs. 305 to Rs. 288. Agriculture’s contribution to regional income dropped in West Pakistan from 50 percent in 1951-52 to 46 percent in 1959-60, and that of industry rose from 8 percent to 15 percent; whereas in East Pakistan agriculture dropped from 68 percent to 65 percent and industry rose from 7 percent to 10 percent. Infrastructure also developed more rapidly in the West. During the period 1947-58, enrollment in primary schools increased by 163 percent in West Pakistan and by 38 percent in the east; enrollment in secondary schools increased by 64 percent in the west but dropped by 6.6 percent in the East; University enrollment increased by 38 percent in West Pakistan and by 11.2 percent in East Pakistan. Similarly, the transport system (measured in road and railway mileage and number of motor vehicles) and communications facilities developed more quickly in the West Wing (Jahan, 1972:30-31).

Meanwhile various subjective, objective, environmental and demographic factors helped in the growth of economy and industry in West Pakistan as compared to East Pakistan. At the same time, the former was deliberately being favoured in terms of development aid and economic planning. During the first decade, the central government allocated about two third of its developmental and non-developmental funds to West Pakistan. Similar difference was seen in terms of allocation of foreign aid. Not only this, the central government through its economic and fiscal policies and control of foreign exchange, import licensing and capital issues, favoured the development of private sector in West Pakistan (Jahan, 1972:34). But, the most regretted aspect of the economic structure of the central government was the transfer of resources from East to West Pakistan. “Through a surplus in international trade and a deficit in interwing trade, a sizeable amount of East Pakistan’s foreign exchange earning was diverted to the West Wing” (Jahan, 1972:35). East Bengal was reduced to a market of the cheap mass-produced industrial goods imported from the Western Wing. The effect of these disparities was tangible and by 1955, the economic disparity became the center of controversy between the center and the East Pakistan relations. So much so that in a pamphlet entitled “Why Autonomy”, the East Pakistan Awami League based its demand for autonomy on economic reasons (Jahan, 1972:37). The decade of 1960s was regarded as decade of development (Waseem, 2003:65). In order to lessen the inter-wing disparities, Ayub Khan increased the public sector allocations to the East Pakistan as compared to the West Pakistan. But
the regime failed in its efforts to revitalize the private sector in the Eastern Wing, whereas it was supporting it in the Western Wing (Jahan, 1972:74). At the same time, it was seen that the allocation of resources to the Eastern Wing in ‘absolute terms’ was lesser than the west one (Jahan, 1972: 76). As a result, the disparity between the economic development of East and West Pakistan could not be removed even by the end of the decade of 60s (Jahan, 1972: 78). Thus:

While East Pakistan’s per capita income rose from Rs. 269 in 1959-60 to Rs. 291.5 in 1968-69, West Pakistan’s per capita income rose from Rs. 355 to Rs. 473.4….East Pakistan’s per capita economic growth rate went from -0.6 percent during 1954-60 to 2.6 percent during 1959-65. West Pakistan’s corresponding increase was from 0.9 percent to 4.4 percent….In 1962-63 the share of manufacturing in overall regional income was 7.4 percent in East Pakistan and 12.7 percent in West Pakistan….From 1959-60 to 1966-67, new roads increased by 1,548 miles in East Pakistan but by 2,824 miles in West Pakistan. During the same period the number of motor vehicles increased by 31,875 in East Pakistan and by 150,167 in West Pakistan. During the period 1959-66, the number of Hospitals increased by 5 in East Pakistan, but by 55 in West Pakistan; the number of hospital beds, by 2,512 in East Pakistan and by 4,642 in West Pakistan. The increase in the number of doctors was 1,929 in East Pakistan and 4,873 in West Pakistan. The corresponding figures for nurses were 243 and 1,272, respectively….Enrollment in primary schools increased by 1,153 in East Pakistan and by 16,412 in West Pakistan. The increase in secondary school, college, and university enrollment was 419,001, 81,103 and 5,065, respectively, for East Pakistan, and by 568,711, 167,820, and 14,616, respectively for West Pakistan….East Pakistan continued to have a surplus in foreign trade and a deficit in interregional trade (Jahan, 1972:79-82).

Hence, it is found that the development was uneven and the social and political divergences between particularly the two wings of the country became more and more acute. East Pakistanis started to blame the ruling establishment with its Head Quarters in West Wing of discrimination and ‘internal colonialism’ (Jackson, 178:19). The Bengalis argued that the central government’s power of economic management had been used to divert East Pakistan’s foreign trade earnings to finance development of West Pakistan, and to compel East Pakistan to purchase goods and services from the West Wing that might be more cheaply obtained elsewhere (Jackson, 1978:19). The overwhelmingly predominance of West Pakistan in the higher ranks of the bureaucracy and the armed services, and in many of the other
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professions was also a source of growing resentment of Bengalis. The sense of cultural discrimination and “paternalism” that they experienced by the ruling elite of Pakistan worked as fuel to the fire of Bangla nationalism (Jahan, 1972:63). In this way, one finds that to the initial regional and linguistic4 contents of Bangla nationalism, economic element was now added as the nationalists demanded for a correction of East Pakistan’s relative economic deprivation (Jackson, 1978:20). It was widely held that lack of political power and the role in the decision-making process was the main reasons for the economic exploitation and cultural deprivation of the province. Hence in 1966, Sheikh Mujib’s Awami league, adopted a six-point manifesto, which was designed to be a charter for the economic and political autonomy of East Bengal. Under the six points, the central government would only be responsible for defence and foreign affairs, and would be refrained from having any effective control over the economy, taxation, trade and aid (Jahan, 1972:67-8). In November 1970, the province suffered from the worst flood and cyclone. The incompetence of the administration and the apathetic attitude of the government officials while dealing with this natural calamity added to the difficulties and resentment of the people of East Pakistan. Hence in the general elections of 1970, people overwhelmingly voted for Sheikh Mujib and his six-point programme. The Awami League also benefited by the withdrawal from the elections of its principal Bengali political rival, Maulana Bhashani’s National Awami Party, as Bhashani boycotted these elections, demanding independent East Pakistan (Jahan, 1972: 189). The political crisis, which followed the election results and the refusal of the West Pakistani leaders and the Army Chief to give in to the popular verdict, led to civil war in the Eastern Wing that subsequently led to its secession. This proves that the economic deprivation and political marginalization of any constituent group, can prove detrimental to the national and territorial integration of the country itself.

Instead of working for the balanced economic growth in the country, the successive governments have nurtured a particular section of landed gentry and commercial groups, which has led to an enormous concentration of economic resources in an oligarchy (Jackson, 1978:21). It is observed that the ruling elite in Pakistan did little to build a unified and equitable economic structure that could accommodate and address the economic needs and interests of various constituent provinces and sections of the country. Building up of a participative national economy could have been a crucial step in ‘nation-building’. Some intermittent but ineffective
developmental policies were adopted and implemented by various regimes with sporadic success in their goals. As a result, the general economic situation of the country remained grim and unsettled. Following the examples of Indonesia and Burma, Ayub Khan embarked upon the project of nation-building with prime focus on economic development and social welfare. The constitution of 1962 provided for ensuring “...that disparities between the provinces...are removed...in the shortest possible time...”. Despite such orientations and provisions, as described earlier, Ayub Khan’s regime ended up in creating more and more interregional disparities that compounded the problems of national integration. His policy of bringing up economic development with the help of private sector led to enormous concentration of wealth in just few hands. So much so, that in 1968, 66 percent of the industrial profits, 97 percent of insurance funds and 80 percent of the banks in the country were controlled by just twenty families (Jahan, 1972: 60). Meanwhile, over emphasis of the regime on the economic development as an integrative tool led to neglect of the ideological aspect, which added to the problems of integration (Jahan, 1972: 65). When Bhutto came to power in 1972, he avowed socialist strategies and policies for achieving national integration. But various contradictions in the socio-economic policies adopted by him led to poor agricultural growth, industrial stagnation, rising inflation and heavy foreign indebtedness (Rahman A, 1982:210). For example, while carrying out land reforms (1972), the landholdings in excess of the ceiling were not compensated. This affected investment in land and agriculture. Also the process of “nationalization” of banks and other thirty-two industries was carried out without proper planning and groundwork, which adversely affected the economy. Corruption and inefficiency crept and reigned in these nationalized sectors (Khan H, 2001: 439). Not only this, even in the education sector indolence and corruption started dominating as a result of the nationalization of about 3,000 educational institutions (Haider, 2003: 107). Nevertheless, Bhutto was successful in mobilizing rural poor behind him on the plank of providing just and equal rights to them (Rahman A, 1982:210). Bhutto based his developmental policies (Phadnis, 1983:68) on the assumption that areas towards west of Indus comprising NWFP and Balochistan are poorly developed and so should be given particular attention. But his “development basis and his political ambitions were poles apart” and “the over assertion of the centre over the two provinces in which his party, the PPP had hardly any base, brought the regions and the centre on collision…” (Phadnis, 1983:67). Actually in
these two provinces, regional Awami National party (NAP) had formed coalition
governments with the support of the Jamiat-ul-Ulama-i-Islam (Phadnis, 1983:67).
Bhutto dismissed these governments, dissolved the respective assemblies and banned
NAP, which invited wrath of the locals. Moreover, he revoked Sardari system in
Balochistan as a result of which, the Sardars got united. Their ouster from power
following dissolution of Assembly and subsequent arrests provided them public
sympathy and support. As a result of all this, on the one hand, the internal divisions in
Balochistan disappeared and, on the other, politico-ideological gap between the centre
and the province increased (Phadnis, 1983:69). In this way, Bhutto’s integrationist’s
economic policies failed on political front.

Zia took over the power in July 1977 by staging a military coup. He took
forward Bhutto’s developmental strategy to promote national integration. But, the
funds allocated for the developmental works in the provinces were integrated under
federal programmes and no separate allocations were made to the provinces.
Nevertheless, government took up developmental works in the underdeveloped
provinces. It started working on long-delayed Chasmai irrigation system in the NWFP
and allocated Rs. 172m for establishing the University of Balochistan and Bolan
Medical College (Gupta, 1983:98-99). Nonetheless, these steps could not prove to be
far-reaching in terms of integration of the peoples of Balochistan and NWFP into the
politico-economic structure of the country, as the basic issue of provincial autonomy
was not addressed adequately.

Major concerns of the state in the years following independence were the
Kashmir issue (1947-48), demise of M.A. Jinnah (1948), annexation of Balochistan
through military action (1948), floods in Sindh, settlement of refugees, assassination
of the then Prime Minister L.A. Khan (1951), language riots in East Pakistan (1948
&1952), anti-Ahmediya riots in Punjab (1953), framing of a constitution in Pakistan
for which, there were wide and deep disagreements and divisions over matters of role
of Islam in the state structure, nature of federalism, national language etc. until
military took over the power in 1958. All these issues indicate that the ruling elite
were facing challenges to nation-building and state-formation since the inception of
Pakistan. However, larger attention was paid to the needs of state’s survival and
security. Hence by 1949, two-thirds of the central revenue was spent on defense
(Noman 1990:19). Moreover, the approach of the ruling elite to deal with these
problems was centralized. The ruling elite tended to ‘impose’ their solutions to these
problems. Meanwhile, at the time of independence, the ruling elite composed of the migrants who were ideologically, culturally, socially, religiously and politically differently disposed of, as compared to the local elite and masses. They had an authoritarian and authoritative style of governance. Hence, the orientation approaches and policy proposals of the Mohajir dominated ruling elite were generally ‘unpopular’ and ‘unacceptable’ to the provincial elite. Though during the initial couple of years, the provincial leadership was willingly cooperating with the central leadership, particularly under the guidance of the Quaid-e-Azam (M.A. Jinnah) and Quaid-e-Millat (L.A. Khan), but after the demise of both these leaders, none of the leaders could garner the same support and respect both at the center and the provinces. Also, the provinces started resenting the centralizing tendencies of the central leadership and started asserting their demands as per the assurances of ‘Lahore Resolution’ (1940), which, when adopted by All India Muslim League on 23 March, 1940 at its Lahore session, stated that:

Resolved that it is the considered view of this session of All India Muslim League that no constitutional plan would be workable in this country or acceptable to Muslims, unless it is designed on the following principle, namely, the geographically contiguous unites are demarcated into regions which should be so constituted, with such territorial readjustments as may be necessary, that the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in a majority as in the North Western and Eastern zones of India, should be grouped to constitute ‘independent states’, in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign (Khan H, 2001:54).

But the political dispensation of the newly independent Pakistan, denied the constituent units, any autonomy, as was assured in the pre-independence period. As their demand for greater political and economic autonomy was turned down, the constituent groups resorted to ethno-nationalism. For instance, in East Pakistan, demands for provincial autonomy from the Bengali elite had started coming up in 1950s, as a response to the centralizing tendencies of the state which did not represent the Bengalis of East Pakistan. So much so that by 1954, autonomy became main issue and United Front swept the Provincial Assembly polls in the same year on this plank in Eastern Wing (Jahan, 1972:29). Similarly, even after Ghaffar Khan took oath of allegiance to Pakistan on 23 February, 1948, he continued to fight for provincial autonomy (Mathur, 1988:39) on the basis of historically, geographically, culturally
and linguistically distinct identity. However, the response that he met was worse than the colonial rulers.

As mentioned, a strong centralized government in the country is British colonial legacy and, had a far-reaching effect on the political development of the country. The Government of India Act 1935 provided for a highly centralized authority vested in the office of Governor General. This legacy continued in the post-independent Pakistan, as the country was largely governed in accordance with the Act of 1935, till 1956, with certain modifications. Further, the Indian Independence Act (1947) empowered the Governor-General to amend the interim constitution by an order until 1949 and, thereafter, amendments could be effected by an Act of the Constituent Assembly (Khan H, 2001:77). Hence through various subsequent amendments, the Act, which already had colonial overtones and centralization tendencies, was altered to increase the financial as well as administrative powers of the center. Jinnah added Section 92A to the Government of India Act (1935), which augmented the arbitrary powers of the Governor General vis-à-vis provinces on the grounds of grave emergency (Sayeed, 1968:258). He assumed authority and powers of governor-general, President of the Constituent Assembly and President of Muslim League in him, which not only set on the process of centralization, but also undermined the institutionalized distribution of state powers (Khan, 2005:62). Not only this, Jinnah created an office of Secretary General for one of his associates, Chaudhari Mohammad Ali, for running the government through provincial and central bureaucracy, thereby undermining the political leadership in favor of bureaucracy (Ali, 1973:357). In the following years, central secretariat remained a permanent agency of central policy making (Jahan, 1972:97).

With the help of various constitutional offices and politico-legal devices, the center continued to hegemonise the provinces to an extent of disrupting any healthy center-provincial relationship. Through the office of Governor, federal control was exercised over the provinces. Whereas under a parliamentary system, they were supposed to be nominal heads, from 1947-58, the Governors ruled like effective heads, securing the center’s interest in the respective provinces. It was observed that politically active individuals were appointed as the governors of the provinces (Jahan, 1972:28). ‘Errant’ ministries in the provinces were ousted through the diktat of Governor. For instance, ministries of Dr. Abdul Ghaffar Khan in NWFP and M.A. Khuhro in Sindh were dismissed at the instance of the respective governors in 1948.
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(Kaur, 2003:134 & Salamat, 1992:71). Not only this, Public and Representative Offices--Disqualification Act (PRODA)\(^7\) (1949-54) was used to exert pressure on the provincial politicians. The Act, which provided for debarring a person from public life for a period of ten years, if found guilty of misconduct in any public office or representative capacity or in any matter relating thereto, by an order of Governor-General, was invoked seven times during its term of enforcement. Out of these seven persons, four were former Chief Ministers. Not only this, four former provincial ministers were disqualified under this act. In addition to this, the provincial ministries were dismissed or continued irrespective of their numerical strength in the respective assemblies (Ali, M 1996:133). Besides, the dissidents in Sindh and the NWFP who opposed the One Unit Plan were arbitrarily detained by the central government. Such type of interferences and intimidations on the part of the central government led to the virtual subordination of the provinces to the former and laid the foundations of centralized and authoritarian political structure in the country.

The different heads of state appropriated the real and tangible power and manipulated the divisions amongst political leaders and exploited the weak political party system. For instance, Ghulam Mohammad (1951-55) and Iskander Mirza (1955-58) never allowed Prime Minister to function autonomously and banked upon senior bureaucracy and the military for governing the state. They directly involved themselves in the day-to-day political affairs and dismissed and installed governments at center and the provincial level, at will (Rizvi, 2004:126-128). In an instance of overbearing and high-handed attitude of the head of the state, it was seen that before the Constituent Assembly, which constituted majority of the Bengali members could pass a resolution based on the federal principles as recommended by the Basic Principles Committee (1949), it was dissolved by the then Governor-General Ghulam Mohammad in October 1954 (See ‘Parliamentary History’). Subsequently, in March 1955, the Governor-General declared emergency and imposed “One Unit Scheme” (Khan, 2001: 130). As a consequence, Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan were lumped together in West Wing of the country with its capital in Lahore. Hence, this arrangement virtually led to the setting up of a ‘unitary’ form of government as far as the minority provinces in the Western Wing was concerned. Many prominent provincial leaders like Mujib Rehman, Ghaffar Khan, Wali Khan and Nawab Akbar Bugti were arrested and intimidated as they were protesting the imposition of this scheme and pressing for greater provincial rights. Also as Balochistan was witnessing
increasing unrest, troops were deployed in the province (Alim, 1996:137). On 17 September 1957, the new West Wing Assembly voted for revoking the one unit scheme, which nevertheless continued to prevail (Khan H, 2001:203). In October 1958 General Ayub Khan took over the power and imposed martial law administration and with it, the hopes and possibilities of restoration of the four provinces died down (Waseem, 2003:167). Meanwhile, the martial law administration was similar to the governance of the British India under the company in the nineteenth century (Ahmad, 2004: 111). The constitution of 1962 introduced presidential form of government that concentrated power in the executive vis-à-vis legislature and central government vis-à-vis provinces. It was observed that the administrative relations between the centre and the provinces were largely outlined in a way “…to maintain in essence the strong character of the central government…by vesting the centre with broad policy functions, as opposed to operational or executive functions”, which were made “…the sole responsibility of the provincial government” (Braibanti, 1966: 443-444). The constitution provided for the Basic Democrats System and an indirectly elected National Assembly with a relatively subdued position. In such a system, the elite cadre of the civil services of Pakistan became very powerful and held key and influential positions. Besides, the constitution conferred on the President wide-ranging powers without adequate checks. For illustration, all executive authority of the Republic of Pakistan was vested in the office of the President. Provincial governors were to be appointed directly by the President. He appointed his cabinet members, who were directly responsible to him (See ‘Parliament History’, available at www.na.gov.pk). As far as the constitution of 1973 is concerned, it provides for a parliamentary government. But the approach of the elected Prime Minister and the provincial chief ministers, under the constitution, remained authoritarian (Ahmad, 2004:112). On the one hand, the constitution of 1973 provided residuary powers to the provinces (Article 142 (c), p.58) as well as setting up of institutions for equitable sharing/distribution of the resources, but on the other hand, it strengthened the executive in relation to other institutions of governance, thereby endorsing the centralizing tendencies. Thus, Prime Minister was empowered to countersign the orders of the National Assembly (Ali M, 1996:132) and its power of moving vote of no confidence against the Prime Minister was limited (See Article 95, p.42). Bhutto went a step ahead and passed various amendments to consolidate and augment his powers. For instance, he passed amendments for continuation of emergency, retention
of the Defence of Pakistan Rule and other ordinances that tantamount to curb the civil liberties and also gave him the power to dissolve the political parties (Ali, 1996:132). He tended to build a strong center also to implement his economic reforms programme smoothly. He continued the political tradition of dismissing the defiant provincial ministries. Thus he sacked the NAP- JUI government in Balochistan in February 1973 alleging the involvement of the ‘errant’ ministry in ‘subversive’ activities (Burki, 1980:93).

To conclude the discussion, it can be said that since its inception, inadequate efforts were made by the ruling circles to develop multiple centers of authority in the Pakistani state and to set-up and institutionalize a truly democratic and federal system. On the contrary, it was witnessed that in the initial years all the power came to be concentrated in the Muslim League dominated cabinet, followed by power appropriation by the elitist civil servants led by Governor-General/President, and then by the Chief Marshal Law Administrator. In this way, one finds little difference in the attitudes and style of governance between the colonial and post-colonial states.

In the last leg of anti-colonial movement, Pakistan was demanded by the Muslim League on the basis of Lahore Resolution (1940) that described the two-nation theory on religious grounds. In the following paragraphs, the concerns and interests of the Muslim majority-provinces in the pre-independence period will be described and, it will be seen that how far, creation of Pakistan, fulfilled their political aspirations that they had. At the outset, it is found that Balochistan like the NWFP was unwilling to join Pakistan at the time of independence. Under the British rule, the province was under the control of the Chief Commissioner and was provided enough space for autonomy to the local sardars. The Khan of Kalat, one of the rulers of Balochistan, had declared independence of his state during partition. As a result, Pakistan used military force to take over Kalat in 1948 (Khan M.A., 1983:178). Since then, relationship of the province of Balochistan with the state of Pakistan has remained in the rough weather. Similarly, as mentioned earlier also, Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan of NWFP and his Red Shirts did not support the Muslim League’s plan to create Pakistan. They were rather keen to either preserve an undivided India or to create a separate state of ‘Pakhtunistan’. It was only when Pakistan became inevitable that Gaffar Khan joined the new state. At that time, M.A. Jinanh had assured Gaffar Khan that his government would not interfere in any way in the traditional independence of the tribal areas (Rahman A, 1982:203). But this was not to be so and
Pashtuns were continuously and consistently interfered with. This fueled their irredentism, which is based on language and race (Rittenberg, 1998: 74).

Further, the Bangla leader Fazlul Haq, who proposed ‘Pakistan resolution’ at the March 1940 Lahore session of the League and, endorsed Muslim League's emerging all India policy did so in return for the support to his coalition government in the province, which he was heading from 1937 until 1941 (Jackson, 1978:11). During the Round Table Conference (1930-32) the Muslim representatives of Punjab and Bengal displayed their interest in securing a further decentralized political set-up (Jaffrelot, 2002:11). In 1944, the President of the Bengal Muslim League, Abdul Mansur Ahmed had held:

Religion and the culture are not the same thing. Religion transgresses the geographical boundary but tamaddun (culture) cannot go beyond the geographical boundary...for this reason the people of purab (Eastern) Pakistan are a different nation from the people of the other provinces of India and from the “religious brother” of Pakistan....( Talbot, 1999:90).

After the failure of the Cabinet Mission in July 1946, when it became clear that sovereign Pakistan would be created, which in turn will lead to the partition of the historic provinces of Bengal and Punjab, some Hindu and Muslim Bengali leaders, including Suhrawardy tried to work out a proposal for the creation of sovereign united Bengal, independent of both India and Pakistan. Though Jinnah had supported this proposal, but in absence of any backing from Congress, it died down (Jackson, 1978:13). No doubt that in the post-independence period the vernacular elite started pressing for provincial autonomy by as soon as 1950, following their feeling of cultural, linguistic, political and economic discrimination and deprivation, in the new political set-up.

The regional Sindh Ittehad Party (SIP) (1936) of Sindh was fashioned on the lines of Punjab Unionist Party. Its objective was to protect the interests of Sindhi rural elite irrespective of their religion. During the 1937 elections, the SIP won the largest number of seats in the Provincial Assembly. At that time the Muslim League could not even win a single seat in the province (Syed, 1995:18-19). Even the provincial Muslim League in the province aimed at preserving the Sindhi culture. G.M. Syed who is a renowned Sindhi nationalist was the mentor of this party. Earlier he had championed the cause of regional self-determination before the Cabinet Mission in
1946. In the pre-independence period, Sindhi elite had desired to have an autonomous status and hence the Muslim League members in the Sindh Assembly adopted the Lahore Resolution that provided for ‘independent national states’ (Khan, 2005:135-6). The party has throughout remained infused with the Sindhi nationalist ideas. Thus, it becomes clear that the constituent provinces and the states were Muslim majority and experienced no threat to their religion as such, and hence, charted their own political course, until the last couple of years before independence, when religious frenzy swayed even the majority provinces⁹. The Pakistan movement was silent or at best vague in terms of future political set up and the provinces relied on the Lahore Resolution that proposed autonomy for them in the state of Pakistan, which was enough to lure the majority provinces. But, as these constituent groups found themselves to be marginalized and unrepresented in the new state of Pakistan, they started distancing themselves from the state ideology of religious unity and Islamic nationhood.

The ruling elite in post-independent period indeed, ignored the fact that the provinces that constitute the territory of Pakistan are traditional homelands of the respective ethnic communities in the country. These ethnic communities were tied to their respective territories even before the idea of Pakistan came into existence. They had their own political history and experiences of autonomy. As these ethno-cultural groups found themselves to be unrepresented in the new political dispensation, which was almost entirely dominated by the migrants and the Punjabis, their regional political aspirations got flared up. Their political aspirations were rooted in irredentism and historically evolved cultural bonds. It was miscalculation on the part of state of Pakistan to undermine the extent and strength of these historical bonds and experiences and impose upon them a naïve and centralized idea of Pakistan. In such a notion of Pakistan, there was no place for cultural diversities, because the elite promoted the ideal of Islamic brotherhood that does not recognise cultural diversities (Khan, 1999:173). Meanwhile, it is often alleged that the symbolic or rhetoric strength of the culture or ethnicity is merely used as a garb or instrument to further politico-economic interests of a section of the people¹⁰.

But, the very fact that the ethnic rhetoric works more than any other socio-economic factors indicate the potency of ethnic bonds. Hence, the ethnic aspirations in the existing post-independent set-up cannot be termed merely as narrow ‘provincialism’ (Rahman, 2004:2). These ethnic aspirations have sometimes spiraled
out of control and proved to be a virtual threat for the territorial integration of the state itself.

**COLONIAL APPROACH TO THE POST-COLONIAL CHALLENGES**

Apart from the colonial past, the post-independent development of politico-economic structure in the country also created fragmentations and inconsistencies in the society and polity that proved detrimental to the evolution of nationhood. Pakistan failed to evolve a democratic polity that could help in building a civic nation, where citizens of the country enjoy certain constitutional rights and exercise their civic right of electing their government on the basis of universal franchise. The issue of democratic institutionalization in Pakistan cannot be separated from the political orientation of the post-independent elite of the state that primarily constituted of the migrants. As they were in minority in terms of numbers, they discouraged the functioning of democratic structures lest they might get marginalized (Waseem, 2003:60). Besides, it was seen that the democratic culture and structure in the areas that constitute Pakistan was very weak since the pre-partition period except the provinces of Punjab and Bengal, which were relatively better exposed to the democratic political process (Binder, 1987:264). Sindh got provision for its Provincial Assembly in 1936 only, whereas large tribal areas of NWFP and Balochistan had Sardari system intact. Provincial Assembly in NWFP was provided for settled areas only (Phadnis, 1983:64). Even in the post-independence period, there was no deference and recognition for the democratic institutions, procedures and practices. During the first 11 years of independence, Pakistani cabinet and provincial assemblies were installed and dismissed indiscriminately and whimsically. Moreover in this period, the country witnessed coming to power and exit of seven Prime Ministers without going to polls. Thus, some of the Prime Ministers and/or Chief Ministers were unconstitutionally, undemocratically and arbitrarily appointed. Governor General Ghulam Mohammad dismissed Prime Minister Nazimuddin from his office despite the fact that he commanded majority in the central legislature. Not only this, the Governor General appointed Mohammad Ali Bogra as the new Prime Minister, who was country ’ s ambassador to USA and was called back for appointment as Prime Minister. Bogra was neither the leader of majority party nor its nominee (Salamat, 1992:38). After chief minister Ayub Khuuro and his cabinet that enjoyed majority support in Sindh Assembly were dismissed in 1948, because of their opposition to the
centre’s decision of separating Karachi from Sindh, Pir Illahi Bux, who was an unelected politician, was appointed as the chief minister of the province (Lari, 2002:301). Again in 1954, Governor of Sindh replaced A.S. Pirzada and installed Khuhrro as Chief Minister of the province, who at that time was not even member of the Sindh Assembly (Lari, 1002:8). In 1948, NWFP ministry led by Ghaffar Khan was dismissed and a minority government led by Muslim League was installed (Kaur, 2003:134). Similarly, duly elected United Front government in East Pakistan and its chief minister Fazlul Haq was sacked within six weeks of coming to power 1954, on the ground that it was bringing about disintegration of the country (Jahan, 1972:47). During 1956-58, Ataur Rehman ministry in East Pakistan was sacked; A.H. Sarkar ministry in East Pakistan and Dr. Khan Sahibs’ ministry in West Pakistan were retained disregarding the wishes of the respective Provincial Assembly members (Ali M, 1996:133). In 1956, a constitution was adopted by the second Constituent Assembly. As mentioned earlier, first Constituent Assembly was dissolved by the Governor-General Ghulam Muhammad on 24 October 1954. The second Constituent Assembly was summoned by the Governor-General, by proclamation on 10 May, 1955. The sixty members ‘constituent convention’ was to be elected from the existing provincial assemblies (Khan H, 2001: 154). The first general elections under this constitution were to be held in October 1958, when General Mohammad Ayub Khan in connivance with the then President, Major General (retired) Iskander Mirza abrogated the constitution and imposed the martial law in the country (Khan H, 2001:210). He introduced a new constitution in 1962, which provided for a presidential form of government and system of basic democracies, whereby central legislature was elected indirectly. It was only in 1970 that general elections for the first time could be held in Pakistan.

Moreover, no written basic law in the form of constitution was available in the first nine years after independence to the country that could govern and determine the power relations in such an ethnically fragmented and politically fragile society. As mentioned, the country was faced with imminent threats to its survival from within and outside the state boundaries as there was problem of settling the refugees, and war with India on the Kashmir issue. This diverted the attention of the state elite from focusing on constitution-making. Moreover, the difficult history of Pakistan’s constitutional evolution which is described in the following pages expose absence of any rock foundation or bond upon which a common identity and/or civic-politico
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institutions could be based and evolved in Pakistan. Apart from this, the constitutional and legal institutions, methods and approaches of the elite of Pakistan to accommodate and represent the aspirations of the people, are viewed in the following section. This will help to understand that how serious efforts have been made by the powers that be to represent, respond and accommodate the fragmented and diverse society of the country.

In 1947, the 450-membered Constituent Assembly, which was elected on the basis of limited franchise in 1946 on the entire British India basis, was divided into two bodies for the dominions of India and Pakistan. But a very few of the Constituent Assembly members opted for Pakistan. Therefore, many of the members were added through arbitrary selection/cooption (Maluka, 2002:123). In this way, the final strength of the Constituent Assembly rose to 79 (Choudhary, 1969:19). There were only two main parties in the Assembly, namely Muslim League, which was the largest party with its 59 members and the Congress party. All the Muslim members in the Constituent Assembly belonged to the former whereas the Hindu members belonged to the latter. East Bengal enjoyed majority in the Constituent Assembly. As far as the class background of the members of the Assembly is concerned, those belonging to the East Pakistan primarily had a middle class background, whereas those from the West Pakistan included some of the big landlords in the country. Ideological position of the Muslim members ranged from leftists like Iftikharuddin to the rightist religious critics like Maulana Shabbir Ahmad Osmani. Abdul Ghaffar Khan and A.K. Fazlul Haq were the only Muslim non-leaguers in the Constituent Assembly. The members of the Assembly held different opinions regarding the division of power between the center and the provinces, issue of Islamic state vs. Muslim/secular state, reconciling the competing interests of landlords, religious leaders, businessmen and industrialists, the issue of Urdu vs. Bengali as national language, the parity formula which involved dissolution of the federating units in the west to balance the linguistically homogeneous and more populous East Pakistan and the question of joint or separate electorate system, which also had an ideological overtone (Khan H, 2001:78-79). Thus, the adoption of system of separate electorate that connotes Islamic exclusiveness of pre-partition era by placing Hindus of East Bengal on separate electoral roll would have deprived the Bengalis a natural Bengali majority in the country, which was not acceptable to the Bengali leaders. On the other hand, if joint
electorate system would be adopted, it would call for an Islamic question as well as bring to the fore the issue of regional nationalism (Jackson, 1978: 16).

Anyhow, the first draft constitution, as prepared by the Basic Principles Committee, was presented to the country by Liaquat Ali Khan in 1950 (Khan H, 2001: 107). It, however, evoked wide opposition from East Pakistan due to the lesser quantum of representation in the proposed central legislature, as in the upper house of the bicameral central legislature all the units of the federation were given equal representation. East Bengal opposed this because such a system reduced its representation, which otherwise constituted majority of the total population to one fifth. This objection of East Pakistan assumed significance in the light of the fact that both the houses of the central legislature enjoyed equal rights and powers. East Pakistanis also opposed the adoption of Urdu as the sole national language. As a consequence of widespread agitation in East Pakistan, the Constituent Assembly had to postpone its deliberations (Khan H, 2001: 108-109). After going through the objections to the first draft and seeking proposals and suggestions from the public by January 1951, the second draft was presented to the Constituent Assembly by the then Prime Minister Nazimuddin on December 22, 1952 (Khan H, 2001: 112). Salient features of this draft included the provision that the head of the state be a ‘Muslim’. The upper house of the bicameral central legislature was to be elected on the basis of proportional representation by single transferable vote by their respective provincial legislatures. However, the lower house was to be elected directly and enjoy the real powers. The principle of parity between the east and the West Wing was adopted (Khan H, 2001:113-114). But this time, the opposition came from the province of Punjab. The critics pointed out the treatment of East Bengal at par with the other constituent units of West Wing as a whole, as against the federal principles. Also lesser powers provided for the upper house was also criticized. In this way, due to opposition of the draft in the Punjab, the deliberations of Constituent Assembly were postponed for an indefinite period (Khan H, 2001:116).

In order to remove the constitutional deadlock and achieve a compromise on the issue of representation of East and West Pakistan in the federal legislature, Prime Minister Muhammad Ali Bogra put forward a ‘formula’, known as “Muhammad Ali Formula” in Constituent Assembly on 7th October 1953, which was subsequently adopted on 6th October 1954. According to this formula, the upper house of the federal legislature would be indirectly elected by the legislatures of the constituent
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units. Equal powers were to be given to both the houses of the federal legislature. Though the decisions in the two houses were to be made on the basis of simple majority, but it was provided that this majority should include at least 30 percent of the members from each zone, i.e. East and West Pakistan. Actually, this formula was devised keeping in mind the geographical and demographical facts. Thus, as the Western Wing constituted major part of the territory of the country, it was given a clear majority in the upper house, whereas because the Eastern Wing housed the majority of the population of the country, it got clear majority in the lower house of the legislature. At the same time by providing for a minimum vote of 30 percent for each zone at the joint session, the formula sought to provide not only parity but also the interdependence of the two. Thus it can be said that a genuine attempt was made on the part of the Prime Minister to give the country a working constitution while trying to allay the fears of the East Pakistanis of being dominated by the Western Wing. However, once again the constitutional differences came up, as it was criticized that the constitution instead of suppressing the provincial and regional feelings is actually giving in to them. Also giving upper house equal powers as given to the lower house was regarded as undemocratic as the former was to be indirectly elected (Khan H, 2001:122-124). As far as the language issue is concerned, it was provided that the national language of the Islamic republic of Pakistan would be Urdu and Bengali and such other languages as might be declared to be such by the head of the state on the recommendation of the provincial legislatures concerned (Khan, H, 2001:128). However, on 24th October, 1954, the Governor-General, Ghulam Muhammad dissolved the Constituent Assembly and announced an end to what he described as “parliamentary bickering” (Wilcox, 1963:179). In April 1955, by a proclamation, he summoned a sixty-member ‘Constituent Convention’, who were elected from the existing provincial assemblies. On 29 February, 1956, a draft constitution was adopted by the Constituent Convention (Khan H, 2001: 163).

But elections were never held under the 1956 arrangements. As the intrigues in the cabinet at the center intensified, in October 1958, in connivance with President Iskander Mirza, the Commander-in-Chief General Ayub Khan staged a successful coup (Khan H, 2001: 210). In this way the country was introduced to the Army rule. As the politicians failed to devise a viable political mechanism for transferring the sovereignty enjoyed by the King in Parliament of England in the pre-independence period to the people of Pakistan, that power was now appropriated by the strongest
force, the army, within the state. In 1962 Ayub Khan promulgated a new constitution, which proclaimed that sovereignty belonged to Allah, thereby setting aside the principle of the popular sovereignty in Pakistan on another basis (Jackson, 1978:18). However, the principle of parity was continued through the system of Basic Democrats, as there was provision for total 80,000 basic democrats, which included 40,000 from each East and West Wings of the country (Khan H, 2001: 257). The national and the provincial assemblies were reduced to a minor legislative role and were subordinated to the executive (See Khan H, 2001:268-269). The constitutional structure and political system established by Ayub was characterized by the existence of autocratic elements as well as the military and aristocratic Islamic traditions of the Urdu-speaking North Indian Muslims (Jackson, 1978:18).

In 1970, President Yahya Khan declared elections for a new Constituent Assembly. These elections were to be based on the universal suffrage and joint electorate system thereby enabling East Pakistan to enjoy the majority once again. At the same time, the ‘one-unit’ in the west was to be reconstituted into four constituent provinces, which was in consonance with the aspirations and demands of regional minorities of West Pakistan (White Paper, 5 August 1971:1). While expressing concerns for the “ideology and integrity of Pakistan” (White Paper, 5 August 1971: 2), President laid down in the Legal Framework Order of 28 March, 1970 that:

All powers including legislative, administrative and financial, shall be so distributed between the federal government and provinces that provinces shall have maximum autonomy, and financial powers….(White Paper, 5 August 1971: 3).

To ensure that the constitution was governed by these principles and others that were stated in Legal Framework Order, it was also provided that the constitution be submitted to the President for the authentication (White Paper, 5 August 1971: 3). Even the constitution of 1973, in its preamble vows that:

The units (of the federation of Pakistan) will be autonomous with such boundaries and limitations on their power and authority as may be described (Preamble: 1).

Notwithstanding, these stated positions, the rulers of Pakistan have displayed utterly authoritarian mindsets. Thus, the Hamoodur Rahman Commission of Inquiry, which was appointed by the President of Pakistan in December 1971, for enquiring the incidents leading to secession of East Pakistan in July 1972 held that:
General Yahya Khan, on 25 March 1969, imposed second martial law, not in order merely to restore normal conditions and reintroduced the democratic process. He did so with a view to obtaining personal power (also it concluded that) military actions could not have been a substitute for a political settlement most favorable time for (which) was between the months of May and September 1971, during which a reasonable amount of normalcy (in the troubled province of East Pakistan) had been restored (Hamoodur Rahman Commission of Inquiry Report, 1972: 56).

General Yahya Khan did not take any initiative role to start a political dialogue with elected representatives of the East Pakistan to resolve the crisis in the province. Similarly, as stated constitution of 1973 provides for a federal government and autonomy to federal units. But one finds that there is difference between theory and practice, as far as implementation of the provisions of the constitution is concerned. For example, the constitution provides for a Council of Common Interests and National Economic Council with due provincial representation in these councils, for formulating and regulating subjects like railways, water, electricity, oil and natural gas and industrial development and other matters relating to provincial concerns and welfare, in consultation with the provincial representatives. But it was observed that either these bodies were not constituted at all or if constituted were not summoned regularly and frequently. So much so, that the provincial government of Punjab had to seek judicial intervention for directing the federal government to call a meeting of the council of common interests for discussing provincial matters in 1989 (Khan, H, 2001:887-889).

An interesting fact, which comes out of the whole constitutional mess in the country since its inception is, that the divergence of opinions and viewpoints regarding underlining principles of the constitution, are actually on religious (Muslim vs Hindu population of the state) and regional lines. But, the problem throughout has been, that the basic law of the land, which generally reflects the ideology of the state, could not accommodate and represent different sections and constituent groups. This failure of the constitution to accommodate and represent the dissenting voices in the population, can be ascribed to the fact that the ideology of the state is based on Islamic unity of the Muslim population of the country, which does not recognizes and represents the linguistic, cultural and regional diversities.
As far as constitutional, legal and institutional apparatus in Pakistan is concerned, it has depicted reluctance in recognizing and conferring rights upon the ethnic and linguistic minorities in the country. Thus, whereas at the first place the founding fathers were at fault in conceptualizing the diverse ethnic and linguistic groups as a single category of Muslims, the post-colonial state structure which was based on this notion failed to recognize and represent this diversity (Ali and Rehman, 2001:9). To start with, despite frequent use of the word ‘minority’ in the constitution, the meaning or context of the word has not been defined explicitly anywhere. Hence, by clearly defining its peoples in terms of minorities and/or indigenous peoples state of Pakistan can make their politico-legal status clear and the populations of country can justly get their rights. Meanwhile, one finds that the term ‘minority’ as generally mentioned and understood in the constitution of the country, connotes ‘religious’ minority (Ali and Rehman, 2001:14). As far as the ethnic and linguistic groups are concerned, each of the constitutions of the country has accorded vague and inexplicit recognition to them. Thus, the 1956 and 1962 constitutions despite being federal in nature divided the country “administratively”, not ethnically or provincially. The West Wing of the country lumped together the Sindhis, Punjabis, Balochs, Pashtuns and peoples from Northern Areas, under the ‘One Unit Scheme’. This scheme was bitterly opposed by the constituent groups and abolition of it became one of the major issues in the run up for the first general elections in the country on the basis of universal adult franchise. Meanwhile, the constitution of 1973 moved a step ahead and provided for the four provinces as the units of the federation of Pakistan. But even this constitution failed to address the basics of the issues of minorities. Its preamble states that:

Adequate provisions shall be made for the minorities to freely profess and practice their religions and develop their cultures, (and that) fundamental rights, including equality of status, of opportunity and before law, social, economic and political justice, and freedom of thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and association, subject to law and public morality (shall be accorded to all citizens) (The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1).

On a closer look one finds that there is general unwillingness reflected in the constitution to recognize the rights of the ethnic minorities and the ‘cultural’ rights are not provided independent of the religious rights. Such an interpretation is
strengthened by the benefits provided to only the religious minorities, like reservations in the national parliament viz. Article 51 (24) and in the provincial assemblies viz. Article 106, freedom to profess religion and manage religious establishments, safeguards against taxation for purposes of any particular religion, etc. Similarly, the article 36 of the constitution directs the state to protect the “legitimate rights and interests (of the ‘minorities’, particularly at the provincial level) including due representation in federal and provincial services”.

Meanwhile, the chapter on fundamental rights that give justiciable rights to the citizens of the country as well as minorities can prove to be source of ethnic and cultural rights. For instance, Article 28, which is a fundamental right, is perhaps the sole article which confers on various linguistic communities ‘right to preserve their distinct language, script or culture’. However, at the same time, the provision of this article is subjected to Article 251, which elevates Urdu to the status of national language. If one takes a look of the chapter of the constitution of 1973, dealing with the Principles of Policy, one finds that there are provisions which may prove detrimental to the interests of the ethno-cultural and indigenous groups. Thus, Article 33 directs the state to discourage the “parochial, racial, tribal, sectarian and provincial” tendencies and beliefs among the citizens of the country. But again, there are provisions like Article 37 that provides for the promotion of “social and economic well being” of the citizens of the country, which can be invoked for securing socio-economic rights by the constituent groups. Articles 33-38 however fall under non-justiciable rights and are in the form of intents and directives to the state. But it can safely be inferred that though out of political expediency, particularly after the dismemberment of the East Pakistan, the constitution framers found it prudent to provide some recognition and solace to the ethnic minorities, but there is a general lack of commitment on their part to adopt and implement such a state policy. Hence, the provisions relating to the rights of these groups are found to be conspicuously vague, ambiguous and silent. Not only this, rights given are not unconditional and come invariably with a rider, which is in contrast to the spirit of recognizing the group rights.

Meanwhile, the Article 153 of the constitution of Pakistan provides for a Council of Common Interests (CCI), as a platform wherefrom provinces could air their grievances towards each other and the federal government. This forum is also entrusted with the function of overseeing just and equitable distribution of the
resources among the federating units. For instance, revenues received from the vast natural gas deposits from Sui area in Balochistan and hydro-electric power in the NWFP. Similarly, the National Economic Council (NEC) as provided by Article 156 has been entrusted to look into the economic development and interests of the country. Apart from these constitutional arrangements, various institutional arrangements are made to protect and promote the interests of the minorities and the indigenous peoples. Interestingly, though various provisions of the constitution have tended to address the problems of the religious minorities only, but over the years the country has developed paraphernalia of institutions that are responsible for the betterment of the ethnic minorities also. Some of these institutions are controlled by the federal government whereas others are working under the patronage of the provincial governments. Hence there is a Ministry of Religious Affairs and Minority Affairs at the federal level that has been established since 1970. After the coup of October 1999, this ministry is combined with that of the Ministry of Culture and Sports (Ali and Rehman, 2001:33). Ministry for States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON) administers tribal areas of the provinces of NWFP and Balochistan (Ali and Rehman, 2001:32). Federal Advisory Council for Minority Affairs is entrusted to make detailed recommendations to the government on the matters relating to the minorities. However, the ultimate decision on the execution of these recommendations is the sole prerogative of the federal government (Ali and Rehman, 2001:33). National Commission for Minorities was set up in 1993 in order to promote the well-being of religious, social and cultural rights of the minorities. Among others, the committee is supposed to ensure that the churches, shrines, temples, gurdwaras and other places of worship are preserved and maintained in a functional condition. In 1974, Raja Tridiv Roy, was the federal minister for Minority Affairs. Under his leadership and influence, the term ‘minorities’ implied a wider meaning, by including the ‘ethnic’ minorities in its ambit. There is National Committee on the Kalash People, which consists of members of the National Assembly belonging to that region, representatives of the ministries and provincial government of NWFP. The Committee aims at protecting and preserving the Kalash people and their culture (Ali and Rehman, 2001:35). The Ministry of States and Frontier Regions (SAFRON), which is an old established division of the federal government undertakes the supervision of the administration in the tribal areas and the contingents (Ali and Rehman, 2001:35). Similarly, the FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas)
Development Corporation that was established in 1972, was established to undertake developmental tasks in the Tribal Areas. But it was seen that the functioning of SAFRON and FATA Development Corporation was typical of any other government departments and ministries and reveal a general lack of commitment in carrying out their due responsibilities that defeated the very purpose of establishing these institutions. It was also observed that the employees of, particularly FATA Development Corporation, were themselves the tribals, but now as they were better placed, they did not relate as much with the problems of the locals (Ali and Rehman, 2001:42). Khidmat (Service) Committees, which are 427 in numbers and are spread across the country, were established in 1998. However, since their inception, these committees were opposed by the locals for their constitution and mandate as well as lack of sincerity of the federal government for their successful functioning. Following the October 1999 coup, these committees ceased to be operational. In August 1999, the federal government constituted a Ministerial Committee for Human Rights. It is entitled to recommend the measures for genuine protection of the rights of members of ethnic and religious minorities and of the women (Ali and Rehman, 2001:38). District Minority Committees are organized by the provincial governments. In these committees, which function at the district level, seats are reserved for minorities where the minority groups elect their own representatives who in turn look after their interests in various spheres like schools, dispensaries, local roads, minor irrigation, etc (Ali and Rehman, 2001:35). Besides the Senate Commission of Inquiry for women was established in 1994 to “review all existing laws which are discriminatory to women or affect their rights to (equality) and to recommend amendments to bring laws and rules into accordance with the injunctions of Islam as enshrined in the Holy Quran and Sunnah, as well as, other remedial measures.” Meanwhile, the purview of the recommendations of this Commission is regarded significant for particularly the women belonging to the indigenous communities and ethnic religious minorities (Ali and Rehman, 2001:38).

From the above description of the institutions of Pakistan, certain generalizations can be derived. It is found that the most of the institutions meant for the minorities are under the federal control. Besides, in the absence of any clear terms of reference regarding the ambit of these institutions as well as rights of the ethnic and indigenous peoples, these institutions have tended to function in accordance with the inclinations and beliefs of their respective leaders or ministers. In addition, due to
unstable governments and frequent changes in the regimes and their policies, these organizations have been rendered as redundant (Ali and Rehman, 2001:42). Also as mentioned earlier, most often the needs and requirements of the religious minorities is sought to be addressed rather than the indigenous peoples. However, it needs to be admitted that these institutions provide a platform for tackling the problems of the indigenous minorities. The efficiency of these bodies in doing so is nevertheless questionable due to lack of commitment on the part of the powers that be. Moreover, it is found that functions and jurisdiction of these institutions overlap with each other, which in the absence of mutual cooperation give rise to friction, shrouding responsibilities and malaise against each other. All these conditions coupled with the “active desire to deprive minorities of their lawful rights” have led to the failure on the part of these institutions to fulfill their respective obligations (Ali and Rehman, 2001:42).

National political integration is largely dependent on the institutionalization of political participation (See Huntington, 1968: Chapter 7). This actually is a decisive factor in shaping attitudes of the people towards the state and the government and effects the process of integration. According to Karl Deutsch (1977:24) political integration will have achieved when “…within a given territory, people will have attained a sense of community, institutions and practice strong enough and widespread enough to assure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change among its population”. In democratic systems, it is the faith and participation of the citizens in the election process that determines and shows the orientation and levels of integration of the people in the political system. Elections in Pakistan have been fraught with many shortcomings and corrupt practices. These appear to be more of a façade than a genuine democratic exercise. Thus regarding the elections held from 1970 onwards, those of 1977, 1985, 1990 and 1997 are widely believed to be a farcical exercise due to the employment of various unfair means, whereas the elections of 1970, 1988 and 1993 were rated as relatively fair and free by the media and the foreign observers (Kennedy, 1993:19-20 and Khan H, 2001:900). As far as the elections of 2002 and 2008 are concerned, on the basis of the respective results (See Appendix) and prevalent political environment of the country, it can be stated that the former was biased toward the alliance of the religious parties, namely Muttahida Majlis Amal (MMA), where as the latter were relatively free and fair. As far as the basic law of the country is concerned, Articles 213 to 226 (Part VIII and
Chapter I & II) of the 1973 constitution deal with the election commission, electoral laws and conduct of elections. Interestingly, until 2002 there was no provision of a permanent Election Commission (Article 218 and footnote number 1, p.94). As far as the implementation of the electoral laws and provisions is concerned, it has generally been observed that various laws and provisions pertaining to the election process are often subject to abrupt changes at the whims and particular “requirements” of the powers that be. Through the institutions of the bureaucracy, police and military, the election process is manipulated for attaining pre-determined results (Maluka, 2002:126). Meanwhile, the “off and on policy” have been adopted by different regimes for various issues like enhancing/ reducing the voter’s age limit from 18 to 21 years and the issue of joint electorates vs. separate electorates. This has caused inconvenience and confusion to the Election commission and the electorate alike. The latter issue, which has a religious connotation had delayed constitution making in the 1950s, and was also used by Zia regime to create wedge between the Muslims and non-Muslims in the country (Maluka, 2002:127). At present, the system of joint electorates is in vogue since 2002 (See Article-52 (4) (a)). The Provisional Constitutional Order of 2002 also reserves the seats for women by inserting Article 51(1A) and Article 224(6). But in practice there is strong prejudice against women as they are kept away from casting their votes through agreements/jirgas and to add to it, there is deliberate neglect on the part of Election Commission, which is well aware of these facts, to take recourse to the legal action against the perpetrators of such acts (Maluka, 2002:130). Thus in the absence of set institutions, practices, procedures and proper implementation of laws, various sections of the populace of the country feel left out of the electoral participation process, which is against integrating tendencies.

Meanwhile, a weak and fragile political party system in the country could also not play its due role in educating and informing the masses about its duties and roles in the new political system. The Muslim League that had led the Pakistan Movement from the front and took it to the logical conclusion could not hold the fervor for long in the post-independent period. The party, which was founded in 1906, could not establish itself among the masses until 1939-40. It was only in the last 7-8 years before partition that the party became popular. Hence it could not generate and train lower rung of leaders in internal organization and mutual coordination, nor could it develop and establish a mechanism to tackle with internal dissidence and indiscipline. As a result, the party had remained dominated by M.A. Jinnah and L.A. Khan, and
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after their death, the party could not find able leaders of second line (Rizvi, 2004:125). Besides whatever mass support Muslim League, that led the Pakistan movement from the minority provinces of British India, and its programmes received in the areas constituting Pakistan was based on regional and/or feudal affiliations (Report of SAARC-NGO Observers, 1995:2). Widespread intrigues, personality clashes and divergence of narrow self-interests of the leaders within the party led to factionalism. This was generally true in case of other parties also (For details see Callard, 1957: Chapter II). The parties could not develop discipline and democratic culture even within. They failed to offer any sound programme to the masses to organize around. Meanwhile, the political culture of the country has been characterized by extremism, polarization and violence. Even the political leaders are reluctant to cooperate with and accommodate the opposition’s viewpoint. The country lacks the culture of political bargaining and constitutionalism (Ahmad, 2004:113). In this way, one finds that there were political, historical and structural problems that came in the way of political integration of the country. Moreover, there was incongruity in the social as well as the emerging political structure in the country. Clearly, the society was heterogeneous and federal whereas the political paraphernalia that was sought to establish was homogeneous and unitary. There was problem of mindset and orientation of the ruling elite also. As they were composed of the migrants of the minority provinces and the dominant Punjabis, who were carriers of liberal and puritan Islam and were well-versed with Urdu, they regarded other ethnic groups, who practiced and lived with their cultural Islam, as pervert Muslims and tended to reform them. Politically, they were reluctant and displayed distrust towards other provinces while power-sharing and displayed a colonial mindset, as earlier discussed in this chapter.

CIVIL AND MILITARY BUREAUCRACY VS. DEMOCRATIC AND CIVIC NATION

Along with a weak political democracy, the state had inherited a strong bureaucratic structure. But the authoritarian orientation and features of the functioning bureaucracy, which was a hangover from the colonial past, posed a formidable challenge to the nascent democracy of the new state in the initial years (Salamat, 1992:159). Contrarily, this bureaucracy was supposed to be subservient to the political masters for facilitating the growth of the democratic culture in a state that
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had recently emerged out of an authoritarian colonial rule. It was also supposed to act as a countervailing force against emergence of any undemocratic challenge in the new set up. But the bureaucracy failed on both these counts in Pakistan and itself blocked the growth of democratic processes and institutions (Ahmed, 2004:116). It rather assumed unassailable power at the behest of Governor-General/President of the country, which preferred to rule through a centralized bureaucratic structure rather than responsive and responsible democracy. Particularly Governor General Ghulam Mohammad and Iskandaar Mirza had contemptuous attitude towards politicians, and tended to conduct the state business through bureaucracy, while bypassing and impinging upon the authority of legislatures (Salamat, 1992: 154-155). After 1951, power of bureaucracy and centralization of authority continued unabated. Hence, on the recommendation of the then Secretary General, Chaudhri Mohammad Ali, Governor General Ghulam Mohammad (1951-1956) amalgamated provincial cadre of civil services into the unified civil services of Pakistan, a decision taken to keep at bay provincial loyalties of the provincial service officers (Salamat, 1992: 147). This added to the alienation of the peoples of various provinces, who did not have adequate representation in the civil services, and viewed the Punjabi-Mohajir dominated administrative machinery of their respective provinces as ‘alien’ (Khan A., 1999: 172). Meanwhile, adoption of a presidential form of government by constitution of 1962 further reinforced the supremacy of elite cadre in power hierarchy. For pursuing his goal of economic development, Ayub Khan relied on bureaucracy as a prime instrument of socio-economic change (Jackson, 1972:93). For this, he reformed and restructured the organization, as per the recommendations of the Administrative Reorganization Committee. Thus he decentralized the administration and delegated the powers to the middle rung of the bureaucratic structure. Also, through the system of the Basic Democrats, the gap between the administration and the people was sought to be reduced (Jackson, 1972:94). However, the net outcome of these moves of the regime was that instead of becoming an agent of change and development, bureaucracy became a venue of political struggle and conflict between regional elite (Jahan, 1972: 95). Bureaucracy could not perform its “integrative” role properly because of its narrow social base. It did not represent various socio-economic and ethnic groups adequately (Jahan, 1972:106). But In 1973 administrative reforms were introduced. The administrative reforms of 1973 introduced by Z.A. Bhutto weakened the position of the civil services. These reforms removed the constitutional safeguards
attached with the service of the civil servants. Further, lateral entry scheme for talented individuals from private sector was started. Thus the bureaucracy now became more compliant to their political masters. Ironically, this led to more repressive administration, as the political leaders worked in an autocratic manner and used a weakened bureaucracy for furthering their political interests. It is held that though the administrative reforms introduced by Bhutto modified the colonial structure of the bureaucracy, but did not bring any substantial change in it. As such, bureaucracy could not be made “public oriented” (Khan, H, 2001: 82 & for detailed account of impacts of Bhutto’s administrative reforms see Kennedy, 1987: Chapter 4). The civil services in Pakistan have retained its colonial character in terms of structures, class composition, style as well as attitude, despite recommendations from various commissions like the Pay and Services Commission (1948), Rowland Edgar (1953), Bernard Cladieus (1955), Paul Becket (1957) and the Report of Pay and Services Commission (1956-62), no steps were taken by the successive governments to reform the “obsolete” administrative system in the country (Salamat, 1992:160).

As Zia succeeded Bhutto, he reverted the changes introduced by the latter, and bureaucracy regained its colonial character (Kennedy, 1987: 14), which was not transformed even by the democratic governments of Benazir Bhutto (1988 to 1990 and 1993 to 1996) and Nawaz Sharif (1992 to 1993 and 1997 to 1999). In 2001, in order to end the British legacy of paternalistic district administration, a Devolution Plan was introduced. Under this plan, a system of elected councils at the level of districts and lower administrative units was introduced. Thus, the elected leaders i.e. Nazims who are in a way elected Deputy Commissioners carry out the administrations of the districts and the lower rungs of administration (Ahmed, 2004: 112). Nevertheless, bureaucracy has retained its authoritarian tenor.

There was no attempt at rectifying this malady in the state structure. As mentioned, it was in the interest of the migrants to keep democracy at bay and establish rule by officials. According to Max Webber ‘rule by official’ is direct outcome of inherent tendency of the bureaucracy to accumulate power (Albrow, 1970:48). In fact, it has been a major concern of Weber to check such possibilities for preventing the parent organization (or state) from itself becoming subservient to bureaucracy, which in actual is supposed to serve the former. In this regard, he posed his trust on the system of “representation” as that would not only provide opportunity to various interest and political groups to put and carry forward their interests and
opinions but most importantly would act as a “proving ground” for able national political leaders. Hence, according to Weber in the ultimate analysis, the representative system determines national achievement and greatness (Albrow, 1970:48), which was absent in the Pakistani polity. Meanwhile, in case of Pakistan, the structural circumstances were also adverse. Thus intensely competent, imaginative and dedicated leaders were required to set up and institutionalize democratic ideals in the society and polity. On the contrary, it was found that in pursuit of narrow selfish interests, even elected leaders have indulged in various authoritarian and corrupt practices, injurious to the cause of democracy in the country (Inayatullah, 1995:101).

To begin with, after the death of Jinnah in 1948 and assassination of Liaqat Ali Khan in 1951, no leader of such stature and charisma appeared in the national political scene. Mujib-ur-Rehman was a regional leader and bound by the popularity and support of the Bengalis for securing their best interests.

Bhutto had got charismatic appeal and when he appeared on the national scene, he attempted to curtail the power of the bureaucracy. He had tremendous charisma on the basis of which he could earn international recognition not only for himself but, even Pakistan was able to earn respect in the international community (Haider, 2003:109). However, he had an authoritative style of governance. He curtailed individual freedom and freedom of press. He banned political rallies and was averse to any kind of criticism or opposition. As a result, his charisma started fading by the end of 1976. He could not reconcile different sections of interests and could not fulfill the promises to the extent that he roused the ambitions of the masses during his pre-poll campaigns. His opponents collaborated with military to pull him down (Haider, 2003:110). Nawaz Sharif and Benazir have had their share of charisma, but ill fate of Pakistan is that military has acquired prominence and stake in civil matters and governance, which was institutionalized during Zia regime (Waseem, 2003:63).

Hence, these leaders could not work independent of the will and wishes of the army. When Ms Bhutto came to power in 1988, she made three major concessions towards the military: support for a five year term for acting President Ishaq Khan, who was a known Zia loyalist and had military backing; retention of Lt. Gen. Yaqub Ali Khan, who was foreign minister in Zia’s government, in her cabinet for continuity in Afghanistan policy; and a commitment to not to take unilateral decisions regarding defence expenditure and the service conditions of the army. However, her government developed differences with the army over issues of transfers, appointments and
retirements of army officers and other internal matters of the organization, handling of law and order situation in Sindh in 1989-1990 and her confrontation with the provincial government of the Punjab. As a result, the President, who was on the side of the army, sacked her government in August 1990 (Http://www.defencejournal.com/july 1998/civil military2.hpm). Similarly, it was only when Nawaz Sharif soured his relations with the army during his second term of his government, that coup was staged against his government by the then Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf in October 1999 (Cohen,2005: 150-151). Once its interference got institutionalized since days of General Ayub Khan, it has played Kingmaker’s role in the country. Hence, no leader has the courage to antagonize the military top brass (Khan, M A., 1983:172).

As the army ‘intruded’ into the power circle and displaced and dismissed the civilian instruments and institutions of state power for the first time in 1958, an era of undemocratic, authoritarian and unresponsive rule was ushered in, which was a major stumbling block for the evolution of a participative civil society and civic nation. As the military took over ostensibly to save Islam, nation and the people from the clutches of corrupt politicians, it started to displace and replace the political and civil masters in the power structure of the country (Cohen, 2005:110-111,127). Henceforth, military became the epicenter of the power circle of the country, wherein all the power structures, be it elected or non-elected, legal or extra-legal, revolved around the army. Every time the military takes over the political reins in its hands, it claims to do so in the best interests of democracy, national integrity and above all, for the sake of Islam. Thus, Ayub Khan cited “national disintegration” as his reason for the coup in 1958 (Jahan, 1972: 62). After Zia assumed power in July 1977, he proclaimed the beginning of an Islamic era in Pakistan. He justified the postponement of the elections, which were scheduled to be held in November 1979, saying that his government would hold elections only after he was convinced that the future elected government would safeguard national integrity and enforce the Islamic system. In August 1983, General Zia, in order to get re-elected as President held referendum on the only question that:

Whether the people will support the Islamisation of all laws in accordance with Holy Quran and Sunnah (Haider, 2003:112).
Weirdly, this implied that by supporting Islamisation, the people would like to see Zia as the President of the country. Zia amended the constitution drastically and provided constitutional rule for the army in name of Islam (Khan, 2005:75). In July 2002, the military government of General Pervez Musharraf announced a constitutional package for the sake of “political stability” and “checks and balances in the power structure” of the country (Maluka, 2002:129). Various provisions in this constitutional package gave the President many constitutional and executive authority of the Prime Minister as well as confer discretionary powers on him, thereby making the office of President as most powerful in the corridors of power. Not to mention that these legal artifacts were in reality devised to maintain the hold of military in the leadership of President Musharraf. Anyhow, the most damaging impact of ascendancy of military was on the evolution and growth of democratic set up and institutions.

Army, in fact has risen gradually in the power echelon. As Pakistan came into existence, the country became concerned with its internal and external security, particularly as it had to fight a war against India in Kashmir. Besides, the country had to confront the irredentist claims of Balochs and Pashtuns, latter were also supported by Afghanistan. Hence to tackle the internal and external threats to the country’s territorial integrity, army was provided a major role in decision-making regarding security issues, its internal organization and budget allocations. Pakistan’s decision to join the US sponsored defence pacts in the mid-fifties was made at the behest of General Ayub Khan, Commander-in-Chief of the army (Lari, 2002:306). During internal disturbances, like anti-Ahmedis riots, and natural calamities, like floods, civilian authorities used to take help from the Army. This enhanced its status in the eyes of the masses and exposed the lacunae and weaknesses of the civilian authorities to the people (Khan, MA, 1983:4). Meanwhile, as discussed above the civilian authorities, institutions and political leadership were facing steep decline in terms of legality, purposefulness, efficiency and popularity. Thus the prevailing political instability, weak and divided leadership, lack of a clear socio-economic programme, the absence of a written constitution and set political mechanisms and processes to resolve political problems and waning of influence of Muslim League provided ample room for military to intrude in the civilian matters (Rizvi, 2004:128). With constant modernization, acquisition of resources and improvised training of the army top brass, particularly in the wake of joining of US security blocks, army got instilled with confidence. In these circumstances, the traditional imbalance of poorly developed...
political structure and cohesively developed army was further reinforced. Thus the ascendance of the military in the power structure was sealed by the peaceful coup of General Ayub Khan in October 1958 and imposition of Martial Law Administration. Here, it is interesting to note that every time military has taken over the reins in its hands, it has received overt or covert support from one or the other sections in political circles in the country along with the tired and sick masses. In political circles, it is observed that support to the military rule has invariably come from the religious political and interest groups, among others. For illustration, in 1977 for removing PPP, the opposition alliance of PNA sought the support of military, whose attitudes and perceptions were apparently in tune with the dominant Islamic parties of the PNA. Zia is believed to intervene, due to the apprehensions that, given a fresh mandate, Bhutto might pursue policies detrimental to the interests of the army as an institution and to the ideology of Islam (Rahman A, 1982:206-207). Here it needs mention that dedication to the cause of state nationalism, symbols and Islamic ideology is part of the training programme of servicemen in the army (Rizvi, 2004:122).

Once army acquired political power, it started distributing benefits to the army personnel. Thus the military rulers inducted retired and serving personnel to various civilian, government and semi-government institutions. A large numbers of military officers were appointed as ambassadors to foreign countries (Gupta, 1983:93). When General Ayub Khan rose to power, he distributed such material benefits to his officers. General Zia ul Haq did this in more systematic and institutional manner. Employment and jobs were offered to serving and retired army officers, they were sent to Gulf states for various assignments, agricultural lands were allotted to them, residential plots at cheaper rates were also allotted in prime urban centers and cantonment areas, also easier bank loans were made available to them. Finer describes this situation as “military colonization of other institutions” (Finer, 1978:84). In addition, a ten percent reservation in civil jobs was made for the military personnel and a system of their regular induction in the elite groups of the central superior services was introduced. This practice of inducting military personnel in civil jobs was further expanded by General Pervez Musharraf during his tenure. Thus as the army penetrated in almost all the spheres of civil administration, it developed its own stake and interest in the politics and administration of the country. So much so that the army is no longer regarded as a neutral arbiter among the contending political groups.
in the country, but is viewed as an active player and stakeholder in the political circles (Rizvi, 2004:130). Meanwhile, the ethnic composition of the army in Pakistan is homogeneous enough to constitute single entity with single ethnic causes and interests. Thus majority of the officers in the army come from a Punjabi background, followed by Pashtuns. Punjabis and Pashtuns compose over 95 percent of the military. Punjabis constitute of 60-65 percent of the Pakistan’s army and Pashtuns constitute of 30-35 percent (Sayeed, 1968:276 & Kennedy, 1991:946). Besides, the civil bureaucracy is also characterized by a similar ethnic composition. Hence the two major organizations find it easier to build close ties while administrating the country (Rizvi, 2004:128).

From the above discourse, it is evident that the disproportionate development of various organs of the state has led to imbalanced and uneven power structure in the country. Once civil and military bureaucracy ascended to the apex it became a class in itself that looked after its interests and attempted to secure and maintain its hegemony, which implied the dominance of Mohajirs (Urdu speaking immigrants) and the Punjabis, later on Pashtuns also became junior partners of Punjabis during Ayub Khan regime. Ascendancy of unrepresentative and irresponsible bureaucracy and military went parallel to the weakening of democratic institutions and stunted the growth of civil society in the country. This in turn dampened the growth of civic nationalism that corresponds to the process of bottom-to-top nation-formation (Ali, IA, 2002:37). It is also seen that as the process of nation building in Pakistan did not follow modernization, industrialization, and development of political communication, evolution of a national culture was dampened. The growth of institutions and the processes that are characteristic to the concept of a nation-state and as developed in the western world was hindered. Whatever development was taking place was unplanned and uneven. If one traces the evolution of Pakistani society since the colonial period, one finds that as part of their colonial policy, Britishers came in the way of even development of different social forces as they favoured the growth of one against the other. In the territory that was to constitute Pakistan, the only sector that Britishers promoted was the agriculture that in turn strengthened the conservative feudal class. Thus the landed gentry were allotted land in the canal colonies. This land was available for commercial groups at much higher rates at the auctions. The Punjab Alienation of Lands Act (1901) ensured that non-agriculturalists would not obtain land owned by agricultural ‘castes’. This policy not only retarded the process of
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transition to agricultural capitalism but also further empowered the bureaucracy that controlled the system of land settlement and the canal irrigation network (Talbot, 1999:98). The condition of industry in this part of the colony was equally dismal. For instance, East Bengal, which is world’s one of the largest raw jute producers did not have a single mill and all its jute was sent to Calcutta for processing, from where it was exported to other parts of the world (Ali I, 2001:103). At the time of partition, Pakistan had only 8 towns that according to the 1941 census had a population of more than 100,000 each (Rashid, 2004:181). This explains the weak trade union movement in the country that could have proved to be instrumental in the growth of civil society. This also explains the lack of a vibrant middle class. Hence, historically, there has been a culture of dependence on the state that has nurtured a relationship of subjects with the state and prevented the growth of a participative and enlightened citizenry.

Hence it is clear that the coercive state institutions of military and bureaucracy that were set up in the colonial state to maintain law and order and execute the state policies and secure colonial interests continued to function in a similar unchecked manner even in the post-independence period also. The civil society and its institutions were not developed enough to counter the state structure. There was an utter lack of mobilization of the populace in the country. Pakistan movement was very short and could not make any long-lasting impact in the Muslim majority provinces. Moreover the party, which was in the vanguard of the movement hardly, had any organizational presence in these areas. It itself depended upon the native feudal dominated parties and/or leaders for establishing its roots in these areas. Thus Pakistan was historically disadvantaged as far as political context of development of its civil society is concerned. Once the euphoria of independence was over and grand leaders M.A. Jinnah and Liaquat Ali Khan expired, the party could not fulfill its organizational and mobilizational obligations. Also Pakistani society could not develop a large, dynamic and vibrant middle class due to structural reasons. As a result, the social institutions like trade unions, press, political parties and other mechanisms that are crucial for social integration, remained dwarfed in comparison to the ‘over-developed’ state institutions and former found it hard to counter the authoritarianism of the latter which proved detrimental to the growth of a democratic and participative society and civic nation.

One can thus, conclude that the ground realities of the state of Pakistan as it came into existence and the way it developed and materialized was in contrast to the
idea as it was visualized by its ideologues. In this regard, Stephen Cohen (2005) states that the “idea of Pakistan” which is traced to Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Mohammad Iqbal and Jinnah, was to build a “liberal, democratic and just state” that would be imbibed by the ethos of “Indo-Muslim civilization”. But in practice, the state of Pakistan emerged as a potential “pariah” of the Asian continent. The state structure was dominated by civil-military bureaucracy in the first decade following independence; however, later on military took over the reins which proved to be a watershed in the evolution of democratic set-up and ethos in the country. Similarly, the political undercurrents of the regionalist and separatist movements in the country were not properly grasped by the rulers. Instead of providing just and equitable share to the provinces in the state structure, the powers that be, have tried to deal with the ethnic upsurges by applying economic or military solutions. Hence, the state has met failures on various counts, though it can rectify its approaches and policies by taking cue from the ‘idea’ of Pakistan. The discussion in the above-given paragraphs also indicate that the country remained overshadowed by the colonial legacies, policies, institutions, practices and above all orientations, which had bearing on the post-colonial set-up. The ruling elite did not adapt themselves in terms of mindset, attitudes and institutions, keeping in view the new ground realities. In the wake of visible and tangible diversities, which posed grave problems for building a nation-state warranted for integration process based on “unity-in-diversity” or centrifugal approach. According to Schermerhorn “…a centripetal tendency refers to a group’s cultural and structural trends towards common society-wide life styles and the institutional participation, while centrifugal tendency would manifest in a group’s attempt to retain and preserve unique cultural attributes, as well as to seek greater autonomy politically an economically” (Schermerhorn, 1970:14). If both the ruling elite and the subordinate ethnic elite agree upon either centrifugal or centripetal strategy the process of integration can be followed through consensus, but if there are disagreements regarding this, both the parties adopt conflictual path. Thus, in case of Pakistan it is found that as per the convenience and interests of the ruling elite, assimilationist approach was adopted, whereby attempts were made to purge the unique cultural features of the minorities and submerge them into larger national culture moulded by that of the dominant group (Kazi, 1994:31). This antagonized the ethnic elite who then proceeded on a confrontist course.
Meanwhile, even the idea of Pakistan was regarded by the natives as rather an ‘alien’ concept. For at the first place, demand for Pakistan in the name of Islam never came from the majority provinces, which constituted Pakistan (Alavi, 1998:3). Moreover, the idea and ideology of the state was to be based on the rationalist and modernist Islam, which was in contrast to their composite, syncretic and cultural Islam, which they practice and live with. Similarly, Urdu was an important part of the ideology of Pakistan, which was spoken by a minority and was upheld merely to fulfill the need of a national language for a nation. As such, “…the idea of a nation based on ideological Islam and the Urdu language…(was) more of a fiction than reality” (Khan A., 2005:70). However, irrespective of the anomalies and incongruities which are uncharacteristic of any nation, the rulers embarked upon their course of nation-building by upholding and promoting a national identity and a nationalist ideology, which rather turned to be divisive.

STRATEGIES AND INSTRUMENTS OF NATION-BUILDING

In Pakistan there were three basic elements that constituted the ‘national identity’ of the newly born state, viz., Pakistan, Islam and Urdu. The Objectives Resolution (1949) stated explicitly that as Pakistan was created on the Islamic plank, it “…should be the corner-stone of the state …(and) the state will have to play a positive part (for this).” After going through the Objective Resolution and the ensuing debate in the Constituent Assembly, it becomes clear that though the framers of the constitution did not intend to build a theocratic state but ‘Islam’ as an ideology entered into the political and public life and debate. No doubt that Pakistan was created on the basis of religious identity and as a homeland for the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent, but with the introduction of visa regime between India and Pakistan in 1952, Islamic identity gave way to the ‘Pakistani’ identity. Thus in a way territorial aspect of the ‘national’ identity acquired significance. Henceforth, nation-building in Pakistan was to be territorially and religiously exclusive. During the debate on the Objectives Resolution in the first Constituent Assembly, the non-Muslim members were skeptical of adopting Islam, *Quran* and *Sunnah* as the guiding principles of the state. Though they were assured that the citizens of Pakistan will be treated as equals irrespective of their religion and creed, and will enjoy all kinds of freedoms including the religious freedom, but invoking Islam as the basis of national ideology, outrightly excluded non-Muslims from the process of nation-formation.
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(Gaborieau, 2002:47). This is evident from the division of votes along communal lines in the Constituent Assembly, where Muslim members voted in favour and non-Muslim members voted against the Objectives Resolution (Khan H, 2001:105).

Meanwhile, no unanimity over the extent and role of Islam in politics of the country as also about which version of Islam should be applied and employed could ever be created. Hence in the Constituent Assembly (1949) references regarding adoption of Islam as merely source of high ideals and broad principles of governance on the one hand and as a complete system of governance as “…practiced 1,350 years ago….” can be found (Khan H, 2001:101). The members of the justice Munir Commission, who were given the task of reporting on the anti-Ahmediya riots in 1953, in Punjab, concluded:

…neither Shia nor Sunnis nor Deobandis nor Ahl-i-Hadith nor Barelvis are Muslims (according to the followers of different sects) and any change from one view to the other must be accomplished in an Islamic state with the penalty of death if the government of the state is in the hands of the party which considers the other party to be kafirs. And it does not require much imagination to judge of the consequences of this doctrine when it is remembered that no two ulema have agreed before us as to the definition of a Muslim.

Governor General Ghulam Mohammad declared that “Pakistan is a secular, democratic and not a theocratic state” (Noman, 1990:8). Similarly, Iskander Mirza, who was his interior minister and later on became the first President of Pakistan, held that religion and politics should be kept separate for better (Noman, 1990:8). So much so that in 1956, the Prime Minister, H.S. Suhrawardy, even declared that the two-nation theory, on the basis of which Pakistan was created, had “ceased to be valid as soon as Pakistan was established” and so oft-repeated notion of Islamic unity of the two wings is futile (Sayeed, 1987:171).

But at the same time, it needs to be remembered that except for the religion the constituent units of the country are diverse in every other respect. Moreover, as the country was created in the name of Islam, none of the governments could dare to be known as un-Islamic. Thus, Islam was used as a major source of legitimacy. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the process of Islamisation was carried forward by authoritarian regimes or non-Islamic parties of the country, as none of the religious parties of the country could ever garner the numerical majority in the
legislatures. In the constitution of 1973, for the first time Islam was declared to be the official religion of the state. According to it the freedom of speech and the press were made subject to, among other things, considerations of national security and the ‘glory of Islam’ (Article- 2). Besides the head of the state and the government were required to have “a belief in the unity of God, the finality of Muhammad’s prophet hood, the Quran as the last of the holy books, and the day of judgment”, and to “strive to preserve the Islamic ideology which is the basis for the creation of Pakistan (Article 42, 3rd Schedule). Also it directed the government:

…to enable the Muslims of Pakistan, individually and collectively, to order their lives in accordance with the fundamental principles and basic concepts of Islam and to provide facilities whereby they may be enabled to understand the meaning of life according to the Holy Quran and Sunnah (Article 31,1).

Besides, it was for the first time that in the Bhutto’s cabinet the post of minister for religious affairs was created. High-class hotels were directed to keep a copy of Quran in the rooms. It was Bhutto who declared the Ahmedi sect of Islam to be non-Muslim. He shut down the nightclubs and banned gambling and liquor for Muslims. He made Friday, which is the Muslim prayer day, as the weekly holiday instead of Sunday (Khan, 2005:74) General Zia introduced an amendment to the Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) in the 1980s, which was validated by the 8th Amendment to the constitution, which introduced status laws that discriminate between citizens according to religion, sect and gender. This body of laws made Sunni orthodoxy the dominant state ideology, and undercut the basic structure of the constitution (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 22). Anyhow, it is settled that this is not to deny that Islam has been a fundamental and essential theme of public discourse and identity in the country. But implementation of Islamic precepts in political realm and practicing Islam in day-to-day community life has different connotations (Alavi, 1988:20). Hence upholding and applying Islam for outlining and defining a crystal clear national identity is not worth of an approach for building a nation. There are perplexing diversities within Islam at the level of practice. At one end of the broad spectrum lies “nominal” Islam, which involves expressions of abiding loyalty and sporadic participation in rituals (Islam, 1989:9). Richard M. Eaton has described folk Islam as “Theatre Islam”, with its characteristic features of tawiz, futhuh (offering), urs, langar, qawwali, dastarbandi (coronation) and bahishti darwaza (symbolic entry into
heaven). Precisely, such a version of Islam is mixed with pre-Islamic local social structures, religious and cultural influences. Islam of the indigenous peoples is impregnated by Sufi traditions. In fact Islam was brought to this region of South Asia by the mystic Sufis known as pirs. The whole paraphernalia of the activities and rituals of this mystic Islam was centered on the living saints or the tombs of dead pirs. But the Islam that is at the core of state ideology put down this form of Islam as ‘perverted’. The ideological Islam of the state emphasizes formal education and poses trust in individual will and growth by it (Hussain, 2000:147). In fact, various governments have tried to promote formal education and set up modern healthcare facilities in the vicinity of the tombs of pirs. The state adopted patronizing modernist attitude towards the local people, whom they regarded as idle, unclean, apathetic, and backward (Verkaak, 2004:24). Such an approach towards the indigenous peoples rather proved to be divisive. Hence, this was one of the major factors in Sindh that created and widened the wedge between the locals and the migrants. As a result, the province had to pay dearly due to confrontation of these two communities in the following decades. In East Pakistan even more hostile stereotypes were prevalent. Actually the East Pakistani Muslims have historically, geographically and culturally intermingled with their Hindu counterparts, particularly in matters of language and dress, as well as have more affiliation with the peoples of South East Asia, where practice of Islam in day-to-day life has its own local form. As a result the West Pakistani Muslim leaders, who had proximity with the puritan Islam of the Arab world, looked down upon the East Pakistanis. The hostility towards them was displayed in its most crude form during the army action for suppressing the civil war in the province. Some of the military personnel have reportedly admitted that the slaughtering of the East Pakistani Muslims, who according to them mixed with Hindus, was “almost a religious duty for them” (Islam, 1989:17).

Gellner (1983:57) has held that nationalism involves reviving or inventing a local high culture in place of alien high culture. In case of Pakistan “high culture” was derived from the migrants’ pure Islam and/or rational ideological orientations based on the ideas of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan and Mohammad Iqbal. In order to make good Muslims out of the indigenous peoples, the ruling elite tended to impose their version of Islam on them and denounced and suppressed the practiced diversities and parochial popular Islam (Alavi, 1988:22-23). For foisting its set of ideologies and concept of national identity, ruling elite had adopted a top to bottom approach but the
idea of Pakistan could not percolate down to the masses. For, there was a natural resistance towards such a hegemonic act by perceptively an ‘alien’ state; alien because the state elite was primarily composed of the migrants (Waseem, 2003:76). The latter were pressing upon their version of Islam in utter disregard of the practices and faith of the locals. In the later years even when the Punjabis replaced the migrants, the ideology of the state remained the same, i.e. imbued by the migrant ethos of pure Islam, with Urdu being its linguistic vehicle. Pakistan leadership did not realize that they inherited a federal society and that underlying Islamic unity was not incongruent with the manifested and practiced diversity. Even the Munir Report (1954) had suggested that “every sect was entitled to its own interpretation of Islam”. Students should be trained along these ideas (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 23).

Meanwhile, there is another set of orthodox creed of Islam as followed by ulemmas and other religious people. It is closer to the ritualistic Islam as practiced in the Arab world. However, one finds diversities and various sects even within this orthodox form of Islam also. As mentioned earlier, there are Shias, Sunnis, Ahmediyas, Ismailis who believe their worldview to be the only true one and have strong feelings against all the other creeds and forms.

Besides, Islam, which underlies Pakistan’s nationhood, was distorted and altered depending upon the inclinations and orientations of the section of the power elite aspiring for attaining and maintaining legitimacy as rulers of Pakistan. It was off and on invoked to suppress domestic dissent or to whip up public sentiments against India (Waseem, 2003: 164 & Khan A, 1999: 175-176). In the process, Islam as propagated by the state lost much of its meaning and significance for the majority of political leaders and masses alike. Thus whereas the modernized and liberal version of Islam propagated by President Ayub was aimed at strengthening the state apparatus to continue an unjust and inequitable socio-economic order in Pakistan, Bhutto’s espousal of ‘Islamic Socialism’ was aimed at using Islam to pacify the religious people of Pakistan and to silence the criticism of his opponents that he was ‘anti-Islamic’, while simultaneously pursuing socialist policies (Khan A, 1999:181). Similarly, Zia announced his scheme of an Islamic order in Pakistan to legitimize and prolong his military rule as well as to defuse political tensions and dissent within the country, and to divert the focus of the ongoing political debate in the country (Ayub, 1979:539). Here it may be mentioned that it was during the Zia regime that for the first time in Pakistan’s history some ‘fundamental and far-reaching measures’ were
introduced for Islamising Pakistani society. He introduced Islamic institutions in various walks of public life. Shariat Benches were inducted in the Supreme Court and all High Courts for deciding and applying Shariat Laws. Besides Islamic penal codes called as Hudood Ordinance was introduced and Qazi courts were established in addition to the present ones. He patronized religious madrassas to promote religious education. He officially assigned 100000 Mullahs to propagate Islamic and Quranic laws (Gupta, 1983: 97). For establishing an Islamic economy, interests on all capital and financial transactions were abolished and, Zakat and Ushr were introduced (Rahman A, 1982: 207). But these efforts on the part of the Zia regime to define and carry out Islamisation of the Pakistani society following a particular Sunni-Hanafi ideological framework led to exclusion of the people who did not follow or practice Islam according to the definitions and injunctions of the state (Gupta, 1983:97). Also as he tended to project a particular ideal type of image of women, which was antithetical to the popular and prevalent sentiments, he actually ended up excluding a large section of women. Actually his notions and ideology were in contrast to the prevalent notions of Islam, according to which though people were “personally” religious but did not necessarily displayed their faith “publicly” (Islam, 1989:17).

National language constitutes an important feature of a national identity (Ziring, 1995:91). For a multi-lingual state of Pakistan to choose and adopt a national language was an imminently difficult task. But as the “high culture” of the migrants of North India was to compose the national identity in the new state, their language “Urdu” became an obvious choice for the national language of the country. Moreover, during various linguistic and religio-cultural reformist movements in the eighteenth and the nineteenth century, Urdu came to be related to ‘pure Islam’. Hence, in a state that was created in the name of Islam, Urdu was to be a natural choice for national language. Besides, the language had served a significant symbolic purpose during the communal politics of the twentieth century in constructing a distinct “Muslim” identity in the undivided north India, in contrast to the Hindi-speaking “Hindus” (Tariq Rahman, 1996: Chapter 5). So much so that now Urdu is organically associated with Islam and the Muslim identity in both India and Pakistan (Jafferlot, 2002:16).

Thus on 21 March, 1948, on his visit to East Bengal, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, the first Governor-General of Pakistan declared:
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But let me make it very clear to you that the state language of Pakistan is going to be Urdu and no other language. Anyone who tries to mislead you is really the enemy of Pakistan. Without one state language, no nation can remain tied up solidly together and function. Look at the history of other countries. Therefore, so far as the state language is concerned, Pakistan’s language shall be Urdu (See Speeches and Quotes, Quaid-e-Azam, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, at www.pakistan.gov.pk).

However, there were many practical difficulties in the way the move of adopting and applying Urdu as a national language. At the time of independence, Urdu was spoken by merely 3.8 percent of the population of the country. In order to promote the national language, the state doubled the budget of the Anjuman-e-taraqqi-e-Urdu between 1948-9 and 1950-1 and the courts and provincial assemblies were requested to use it (Jafferlot, 2002:16). But adoption of Urdu as national language as well as efforts of the state to promote it, did not go down well with the indigenous peoples. Notwithstanding their displeasure, the state continued with its agenda. Hence, the songs of the Bengali poet Rabindranath Tagore were banned on Radio Pakistan. In Sindh, the Sindhi language was replaced by Urdu as the medium of instruction and was exorcised from the Karachi Municipal Corporation. Still worst, the language was banished from the University of Karachi and the road signs, signboards, voter’s lists etc. were re-written in Urdu. Not to forget that Sindhi has been the medium of instructions in the province since 1851. Not only this, the language has to its credit largest number of publications as compared to any other indigenous languages in the country. Also Sindhis were five times more literate in their mother tongue than Punjabis, Pashtuns and Balochs. No doubt that Sindhi language and literature has been at the center of the Sindhi nationalism. Also, not only the Sindhi-Urdu controversy (1972) has been instrumental in triggering the inter-ethnic violence between Mohajirs and Sindhis in the province of Sindh, but it gave momentum to the respective nationalisms of both the linguistic communities also (Waseem, 2003:73). However, Bengalis were the first to register their resentment and resistance. Actually majority of the Bengalis take pride and identify themselves with the rich literary heritage of their mother tongue. Their resistance to imposition of Urdu as the sole lingua franca of the Muslim nation of the Indian subcontinent dates back to 1937. At that time the resolution recommending “Urdu” as the official
language of the Muslim League in the Lukhnow session of the All India Muslim League (AIML) was opposed by the Bengali Muslims who argued that most of the Bengalis did not understand Urdu. As a result, the resolution was amended and it now held that all possible efforts would be made to make Urdu the *lingua franca* of the Muslim League. As Urdu was being imposed on the peoples of Pakistan in the post-independence period, Bengalis launched a movement in 1948 and 1951 as a consequence of which, Bangla was elevated to the position of *lingua franca* at par with Urdu in the constitutions of 1956 and 1962 (Khan, 2005:66). In East Pakistan opposition to the elevation of Urdu as the sole national language became instrumental in constitution of the major opposition party of the Muslim League in the province and the country namely, Awami League. It led an alliance ‘United Front’, in the province on the language issue and the demand for provincial autonomy that virtually wiped out the Muslim League from the province (Ali & Rehman: 2001:25). During Zia regime, Urdu was made the medium of instructions in government schools and the language was aggressively promoted via television, radio and the education system. Though Urdu continues to be the national language of Pakistan, Article 251(3) of the present constitution provides that “without prejudice to the status of the national language, a Provincial Assembly may by law prescribe measures for the teaching, promotion and use of a provincial language in addition to the national language.” Notwithstanding this provision the linguistic and ethnic minorities of Pakistan have over the years bemoaned the neglect of their linguistic rights. They particularly resent the undue edge that the Urdu-speakers, despite being minority, enjoy over the local indigenous peoples in terms of ease and confidence in communicating in Urdu language (Jackson, 1978:26).

Here, it needs mention that language has been an essential ingredient or symbol of the ethnic groups in the country. All the ethnic groups have their own respective languages of which they inherit a rich literary heritage. No doubt that the seven main linguistic groups in the country are actually the seven ethnic groups, namely Bengalis (in pre-1971 era), Punjabis, Sindhis, Balochs, Pashtuns, Mohajirs (in post-1971 era), and Seraikis who have recently joined the ethnic bandwagon. Language has indeed been instrumental in preserving and propagating ethnic feelings amongst the ethnic groups besides serving symbolic purpose. But when the national language was forced from the above with utmost lack of concern towards the sentiments of the constituent groups, it rather fuelled the fire of ethnic nationalism.
that ran in counter with the larger nation-building process in the country. In this way, both Islam and Urdu ended up creating schisms in the society and instead of forging a homogenous national identity further crystallized the respective ethnic identities.

Meanwhile, national education system was adopted as another means of achieving national integration in the process of nation-building. Scholars have highlighted the effectiveness of education in inducting young ones as members in the social and political system, which supports and sustains a nation-state (Wriggins, 1962:8). Not only this, national education system can also prove instrumental in preserving and reinforcing national identity and promoting national integration (Kazi, 1994:26). However, it is also argued that when the political decision-making and participation process is non-representative and biased it affects national educational policies and curricula. In such a case in place of spreading sense of nationalism education gets linked to the forces of national disintegration. Education system in Pakistan has also failed to be integrative and representative and remained a luxury for a privileged few. In this regard Aftab A Kazi (1994) has undertaken a detailed study. In his study he has taken national social sciences curricula as a tool of analysis for analyzing the process of nation-building in Pakistan, as organic relation is found between the two. According to him, prevalence of relative deprivation in various provinces of the country has led to widespread political instability which in turn has caused lack of legitimacy for the ‘to be’ nation-state. As a result, use of force and violence on the part of the state becomes inevitable. Consequently, the people of deprived area become unwilling to develop their human resources by receiving education, until they get due share in the process of decision-making at political level. Hence education gets limited to particular ethnic groups (Kazi, 1994:30). Besides the relative deprivation in the allocation of resources in national budgets have also hindered equitable educational development in the country. It is also found that most of educational infrastructure has benefited the students of urban areas, while students of the rural areas remain semi-literate for lack of facilities (Rehman, 2004:147). In addition, it is found that the curriculum,

...only represents the values of the dominant elite and the indigenous cultures and values have been either ignored or, in most cases, distorted. Thus the students of the indigenous ethnic groups feel alienated in the sense that what they learn at home is different from that what is being taught at the schools....(Coleman, 1972:99-105).
Therefore, sense of alienation and frustration gets stronger amongst the younger generation. Thus the national educational system failed to forge a nation and rather ended up creating and reinforcing divisions in the country (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2004:5). At the same time, there is religious education system in the country, which is taken by a majority of poor and religious people (Rahman, 2004: 147). These madrassas are regarded as the breeding ground of extremism and militancy in the country as it is the principal source of recruitment of teenaged males, who respond to the calls of jihad and martyrdom. Moreover, these Seminaries are known meeting places and sanctuaries for militants, and sources of funds for regional jihad. Hence the governments have tried to regulate and oversee the functioning of the madrassas. In this regard, Musharraf regime had introduced Madrassa Reform Project, which did not prove much effective. Recently the PPP-led government has made an announcement to set up a Madrassa Regulatory Authority for this purpose (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009:18). Hence for building a participative nation, a strong public education system is required. The government should not only reform the education sector in terms of its capacity, but the content of the curricula should also be reformed. In 1980s, Zia had emphasized the Islamisation of education that included references to jihad also. Though the Musharraf government promised to remove these contents but subsequently gave in to the opposition of the hardliners. Hence such references as well as the sectarian bias in the textbooks should be removed. Even the Munir Report (1954) had suggested that “…every sect was entitled to its own interpretation of Islam”. Students should be trained along these ideas (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 23).

To conclude, it can be said that Pakistan when created was an uneasy and volatile conglomerate of various cultural nationalities, who had their own sense of shared history, common descent, common language, historical association with a territory. The uneven economic and political growth of various constituent geographical and popular units, which were inherited from, the colonial past was continued, rather reinforced in the post-independence period. As the immediate and imminent concern of the ruling elite in post-independence period was survival and security of the incipient state, little attention was paid on reforming and rectifying the imbalances in politico-economic structure. Moreover, such demands of the constituent peoples were suppressed and/or rubbished in the name of national security. Hence
there were no attempts towards building a civic-participative nation. Various measures of imposing nationalist ideology, single national language and implementing non-representative national educational curriculum for nation-formation failed due to inherently wrong and incommensurate (with the ground realities) approaches and strategies of the ruling elite. Thus as the constituent cultural groups could not relate themselves with the state sponsored and superimposed national identity and were left out in the power circles as well as did not find any share in the economic pie of the country, they started asserting themselves. In the process respective ethnic identities as well as language came to be handy in mobilizing the masses (Khan, 2005:189). Various studies analyzing ethnic movements in Pakistan support the view that the ethnic uprisings in the country are related more to the politico-economic causes rather than identity-related issues, as it seems. It is held that the “…culture, history and language have been part of the symbolic and rhetorical armoury of these movements but not of their actual political agendas” (Khan, 2005:189). This is further illustrated by the occasional rise and dormancy of Pashtoon, Sindhis, Baloch and even the Mohajir ethno-nationalism. Thus as the once excluded Pashtuns started getting representation in the state structure, their political stand changed from separation to integration, though the turbulence and disorder in neighboring Pashtoon-dominated Afghanistan can also be counted as a reason for dying down of their nationalists secessionist stand. Similarly, as Mohajirs got marginalized in the state structure they turned to ethnicity, where as in the initial decades of the post-independence period of the country they were in the dominant position and were ardent supporters of the state sponsored anti-ethnic nationalism. At the same time, Sindhis and Balochis, who have found themselves consistently at a distance from the state structures, have constantly followed their anti-state ethnic nationalism (Khan, 2005:189). It is also argued that the modern state in general and Pakistani state in particular is the main target of the ethnic nationalism within its territorial boundaries for two major reasons: that it is the prime authority of allocation of goods and resources and that it is the propounder and promoter of a single national identity. In this way distribution of goods is associated with a particular form of national identity and constituent groups who do not conform to it, are left out. They in turn devise their own sub-nationalism or ethnic nationalism while demanding their due share of goods and resources.
The fact of the matter is that in the absence of any consensus-building democratic structure and power-sharing mechanism in the polity, any policy or project, be it ideological or material, imposed from above was doomed to be failed (Ahmad B, 1983:34). However, the ruling elite seeking solely military solution to these essentially political problems attended to suppress the ethnic assertions of the constituent groups with a heavy hand. This in turn has added fuel to the fire of various ethno-nationalisms in the country. Secession of Bangladesh was culmination and an apt illustration of the whole cyclic process. In the post-1971 scenario there was a mix response to the ethnic issues of the country. Hence though ruling elite realized the importance of recognizing the aspiration of the constituent groups, but at the same time had to face the challenges of nation-building in the form of ideological crisis (Waseem, 2003:69). Till 1971, religious nationalism was undisputed state ideology. However, as East Pakistan seceded, the myth of Islamic unity was exploded and the superior strength of ethnicity vis-à-vis religion was demonstrated. Hence Pakistan lost rationale for its birth, as it was created on the religion based two-nation theory. The 1973 constitution fully represented this trend by providing for an upper house of the parliament. It was maintained that Punjab’s populist majority in the National Assembly needed to be balanced by providing for increased representation of the smaller provinces in the upper house. During the following decades, the senate emerged as a territorial chamber of the federation of Pakistan, which gave equal representation to the four provinces at 19 seats each, including Balochistan at one extreme with 3.5% of the population and Punjab at the other with 58% etc. (Waseem, 2003:168-9).

To tackle with the crisis of legitimacy of the nation of Pakistan, Bhutto started emphasizing territoriality of the nation and embarked upon the task of territorial and administrative consolidation of the state. Consequently, in the post 1971 era, the Indus Valley overtook the Indo-Muslim civilization as a source of cultural symbols. Bhutto, adopted various policies to ensure effective administration and to end feudalism. In this direction steps were taken to revoke the special status accorded to the northern territories of Pakistan and abolition of the Frontier Crimes Regulation as well as Jirga System (of tribal elders). The latter was rather replaced by the jurisdiction of High Court and Supreme Court. New roads, schools and hospitals were constructed in the borderlands of the NWFP and Balochistan in order to strengthen the communication and economic aspects of a nation. To this end, generous development funds were
distributed by the regime. He adopted favorable policies towards common people particularly tenants, sharecroppers, industrial workers etc. His government also devised a system of wage-price packages for industrial labour. In addition, prices of commodities like wheat were subsidized. In fact, 60 percent of the government’s subsidies were devoted to keeping down prices of commodities used by the industrial labour (Raman A, 1982: 208). Bhutto’s ‘forward policy’, however, as mentioned earlier also, aroused sharp resistance from Balochistan and the NWFP. The Balochs and Pashtuns were apprehensive of further tightening and consolidation of central grip in their areas through these administrative and socio-economic measures adopted by the Bhutto government. The ‘forward policy’ of the Bhutto regime rather revived the demand for ‘Pakhtunistan’. Particularly, the Baloch tribes, Marris and Mengal, who had been up in arms during the Ayub regime were wary of Bhutto’s policies. Besides, the tribesmen of the border region felt threatened from these measures of effective governance that would end the lucrative contraband trade across the border of Afghanistan and Pakistan (Rahman A, 1982:199).

Apart from this, in his endeavour of nation-building and dealing with the challenges to it, Bhutto adopted a ‘carrot and stick’ policy towards the provinces. Hence on the one hand, after restoration of the provinces to their pre-1955 (One Unit) status, popular leaders like Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo and Arbab Sikander were appointed as governors of Balochistan and NWFP, respectively. On the other hand, though, while describing the ethnic nationalists as threats to the integrity of the state, Bhutto used ruthless force to suppress civil disorders and internal violence in these provinces. For this purpose High Treason Act of 1973 and the Private Military Organisation (the Abolition, Prohibition and Prevention of Anti-national Activities) Ordinance were adopted. But the arbitrary disposition of the central leadership towards the elected state government of Balochistan precipitated a major political crisis in the province. In 1973, the provincial government tended to resist political and economic interventions in the matters of the province by the central government as a result of which, Bhutto dismissed the popular governor Ghaus Baksh Bizenjo and the state cabinet. Prominent leaders like the President of the National Awami Party, Khair Baksh Marri were arrested on the charges of subversion. As such central rule was imposed in Balochistan and more than 70,000 troops were deployed in the province. An essentially political problem was thus turned into a military problem and a situation of civil war was created. Even the Governor of NWFP resigned from his
post in protest against Central government’s high-handedness towards provinces. But Bhutto continued with his domineering approach towards the provinces. In 1975, he abolished the National Awami Party led by Wali Khan, a staunch supporter of provincial autonomy, through a legal order. He detained him and other NAP leaders on the charges of treason that ended in a prolonged trial. These developments led to a strong resentment in the NWFP.

The beginning of another spell of military rule in the country rang death knells for democracy. Still worse, Zia institutionalized the involvement and influence of the military in the country. Meanwhile Zia did not show any commitment towards democratization of government in Pakistan. In a speech in October 1980, he ruled out general elections as a risk to national unity and solidarity (Jackson, 1978:208). Zia expanded his federal cabinet and created a Federal Advisory Council (Majlis-I-Shoora) comprising 250 to 300 members drawn from ten selected professions who though might not be elected representatives of people but according to him are ‘true Pakistanis and Momin’s. Zia generally was averse to politics and political parties. He continued with the ban on political activities that was imposed under Martial law order I of 1977 and worked towards atomization of political forces in the country. No doubt that his federal cabinet was composed of some old guard Muslim League leaders, representatives from the law, industry, commerce and the bureaucracy who were technically competent and politically neutral.

As far as his approach towards ethnic nationalists is concerned, Zia attempted to pacify the Baloch nationalists, revoked Hyderabad Tribunal and released political leaders like Wali Khan. He expressed his intentions for “letting by-gones be by-gones in the larger interest of the country”. As part of his “normalisation” efforts, he extended financial assistance to those who lost their lives and suffered injuries during 1973-77, worked for rehabilitation of people adversely affected by the Baloch insurgency, particularly students and government servants who abandoned their education or careers; and emphasized acceleration of development projects under federal government allocations. In a further, move he included Mr. Monyuddin Baloch in the federal cabinet as minister for communications. But the militant Baloch leaders refused any negotiations before the withdrawal of the Army. Also Zia did not include key issue of provincial autonomy in his ‘normalisation’ efforts. Thus Balochs, particularly youth, did not find any solace in these efforts. Moreover, this led to
polarization between moderates and hardliners in the province of Balochistan. A similar polarization was also seen in the Pashtuns areas (Harrison, 1979: 152).

Though while negotiating with these nationalist leaders Zia had assured of conducting general elections and setting up of civilian rule in the country and granting real administrative and financial autonomy to the provinces in accordance with the 1973 constitution, but instead of taking recourse to political equality and equity, he adopted the method of political cooption of Muslim League leaders and technocrats from the NWFP as federal ministers. More so he started invoking the Islamic ideals for obscuring people’s participation and their ‘materialistic’ needs as espoused by the PPP’s slogan of providing “Roti, Kapra aur Makaan”. Instead, he held that “…sovereignty belongs to Allah and we are all His servants” (Ismani, 1979:1). He stressed that Pakistan would be an Islamic and ideological state.

Hence, it can safely be said that with kind of mindset and approach the nation-building process was pursued in Pakistan, it could not lead to build an inclusive nation. Whole of the process of nation-building was exclusive, particularly as the country was, of and on, ruled by military dictators, they either depended on the policy of coercion or appeasement of one or the other exclusive religious and ethnic group (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 21). In this way, they nurtured a particular section of society that led to strengthening of fundamentalism and extremism. The identity and legitimacy needs of the military dictators provided ample scope to the intolerant extremist elements in the society to operate (Ollapally, 2008:7). The best illustration of this is found in the regions of FATA and NWFP of the country along its western borders with Afghanistan, where the writ of the state is completely displaced by the writ of the Pakistani Taliban. The Pakistani Taliban comprises of various militant groups united under the Deobandi Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). This group has support from Sunni extremist organizations that were nurtured by the army during 1980s to serve its strategic interests in Afghanistan and India (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: i). On 16 February 2009, NWFP’s Awami National Party (ANP)-led government entered into an agreement with the Swat-based Sunni extremist Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), according to which the government would impose Sharia in the Malakand region of NWFP, and all the cases after 16 February 2009 would be decided by the religious courts. Also all security checkpoints would be dismantled and any military movement would require prior approval of TNSM. Not only this, it was also agreed that all the detained militants, even with charges of
heinous crimes like public executions and rape, would be set free in return of an undertaking by them that they would give up their armed struggle. Similar deals were signed between the militants and the erstwhile military regime also, though this one is regarded as more pervading (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: ii). Not to mention that this deal is in contradiction to the verdict of the electorate of the region who had voted out the religious right-wing parties in February 2008, elections. The whole process of strengthening the grip of the sectarian and extremist forces started during Zia regime (Zahab, 2002:79). At that time, the radical Jihadi groups were supported by the state, for furthering US-sponsored anti-Soviet Jihad in Afghanistan and for promoting Sunni orthodoxy within the Pakistani state while advancing the state ideology, which was based on orthodox Sunni-Hanafi interpretations of Islam. However, this policy continued in the ‘decade of democracy’ also for continuing support to Taliban in Afghanistan and jihadi militants in Kashmir, in India. But as these elements grew stronger and became the prime reason of terrorism even within Pakistan, the Bhutto government (1995) and Nawaz Sharif government (1997-98) decided to act strictly against them. Particularly, the government took steps against Deobandi militant groups like SSP and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LJ). With the coup of 1999, these steps were not taken forward. Though after 9/11, Musharraf gave in to the international pressure, but he was selective in crackdown on the extremists groups (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 4 & 18). As a result, the Islamists got their sphere of influence in the tribal areas and some settled districts of NWFP, including Swat, to operate and prevail. Here it needs mention that the extremist militant organizations, particularly Sunni Deobandi militant networks, work mainly from the heartland of Punjab (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 5).

Meanwhile, if violence is taken as an indication of contesting state sovereignty and legitimacy, the authority of the state is questionable. According to the Pakistan Institute for Peace Studies, there were 2,148 terrorist, insurgent and sectarian attacks in 2008, which indicate a steep rise in the incidents of violence as compared to the killing of 2,267 people, and injuring roughly 4, 500, in 2005. Meanwhile, in FATA’s Kurram Agency and the border areas, inter-tribe sectarian clashes took a toll of 1,336 deaths (See Pakistan Security Report 2008:3). With the 20 September, 2008, attack on the Marriott Hotel, it becomes clear that the organized violence has reached the federal capital of Islamabad also. On 6 October 2008, in a suicide bombing that took place at the home of Shia PML-N parliamentarian Rashid Akbar Niwani in Punjab’s
Bhakkar district, close to Dera Ismail Khan in NWFP, 25 were killed and 60 wounded including the PML-N leader. In another suicide bomb attack in Dera Ghazi Khan of Punjab in a procession at a Shia mosque, on 5 February 2009, more than 30 people were killed. In another daring attack, gunmen attacked the Sri Lankan cricket team during its visit to Lahore on 3 March 2009 that injured several of the players and killed five security personnel (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 6). Similarly, many Taliban-Deobandi madrassas and mosques are propping up in Karachi also. Moreover, there is rise in crime rates in Karachi also, as radical Sunni groups, are working for raising funds and acquiring weapons for the FATA-based Pakistani Taliban, through robberies, kidnapping for ransom, and snatching weapons from police, guards and even the paramilitary Rangers force (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009:10).

An interesting fact that has come up is that the militant jihadi groups are increasingly attacking the state institutions and authorities. Not only this, militant organizations like SSP have even taken extreme stands against the state and its ideology. Thus at a rally of SSP, former Pakistani general Zaheerul Islam Abbasi, declared:

> The concept of nation state is an obstacle in the way of the establishment of Khilafat. We will start the establishment of Khilafat in Pakistan and then will do so across the world (Crisis Group Asia Report: 2009: 11).

From the above discussion, one can infer that the kind of national identity, the state and successive governments, both military and civilian, have formulated, nurtured and promoted has created irreconcilable divisions and differences in the society as well as helped growing extremists in the country. Specifically, decades of military rule can be held responsible for weakening civilian, moderate and secular structures of the society and strengthening of hardliners and right-wingers. Moreover, the religious extremism in the country has exposed the nature of the Pakistani state and its nation-building approach. At the same time, it may be noted that the regional and international environment has also played its due role in the emergence of extremist militant/jihadi movement in the country.
STATE RESPONSE TO THE ETHNO-NATIONALISMS

As it is clear that since its independence, the Pakistani elite have overtly displayed an inclination towards a strong center and, have resisted any demand for greater provincial autonomy. In a public address (See Speeches and Quotes of Quaid-e-Azam, Mohammad Ali Jinnah at www.pakistan.gov.pk) in Quetta Municipality (15th June, 1948), while expressing his views on Provincialism, Jinnah said:

Local attachments have their value but what is the value and strength of a “part” except within the “whole”….It naturally pains me to find the curse of provincialism holding sway over any section of Pakistan. Pakistan must be rid of this evil. It is relic of the old administration when you could clung to provincial autonomy and local liberty of action to avoid control—which meant –British control. But with your own central government and its power, is a folly to continue to think in the same terms, especially at a time when your state is so new and faces such tremendous problems internal and external. At this juncture any subordination of the larger interest of the state to the provincial or local or personal interest would be suicidal….We are now all Pakistanis—not Baluchis, Pathans, Sindhis, Bengalis, Punjabis and so on—and as Pakistanis we must feel behave and act, and we should be proud to be known as Pakistanis and nothing else (emphasis added).

From the above statement, the level of opposition to the idea of Pakistan becomes clear. Hence Jinnah seems to convey that the state of Pakistan should be government in a ‘unitary’ manner as the government of Pakistan belongs to all the Muslims of the state. Further, in terms of defining and promoting a national identity, it is solely the Pakistani identity that will be upheld by the state and no other local or parochial identity would be recognized or tolerated. It was with this disposition that the state elite pursued their agendas of state and nation-building, which is reflected in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. However, after success of Bengali nationalism in 1971, the state seemed to give in to the ethnic realities and political aspirations of the ethnic groups. As it has been mentioned, that at least theoretically, certain half-hearted provisions were made in the constitution of 1973. But practically the elite have never conceded to provincial demands in terms of proper power sharing as they have been skeptical and do not want to give in to parochial regional sentiments as they regard it to be a threat to the existence of the state (Cohen, 2004:206). Bhutto
emphasized that regionalism or provincialism have narrow and parochial connotation, which is detrimental to the interests of the nation and its territorial integrity (Phadnis, 1983:60). Pakistani state, in order to suppress the regional demands has unhesitatingly resorted to violence. It is described as a “fierce” state that has sought to carry out its writ over un-obliging sections of its population through violence (Khan, 2005:78). Meanwhile, resort to frequent violence point towards a lack of legitimacy on the part of the state as well as its ideological shortcomings (Khan, 2005:78). Anyhow, employing military measures against the ethno-nationalist groups further fanned their nationalism and aspirations as well as helped them in building and widening, support and legitimacy amongst the relatively neutral or complacent members of their respective communities. This ran counter to the process of nation-building in the country, as the sense of alienation, discrimination, deprivation and persecution which widened the gap between the state and its citizens.

The state has adopted the policy of armed repression against all the minority and marginalized ethnic groups in the country, at some or the other point of history of the country. To begin with, when Bengalis protest against making Urdu, sole national language of the country and held demonstrations opposing this governmental move, the state resorted to police action that incurred heavy casualties. This event was commemorated every year by Bengali nationalists. To add to the injuries, the central government dismissed coalition government led by Fazlul Haq in 1954 on the grounds that the latter has made separatist declarations to India. Hence the nationalist sentiments among the Bengalis got strengthened, who kept complaining of the unjust treatment meted out to their province by the center and pressed for more political and economic autonomy. In this regard Sheikh Mujib-ur Rehman, who was a renowned nationalist, formulated the six-point programme (1966) that advocated democracy and a loose federation. Subsequently, Ayub Khan arrested him on the charges that he is receiving arms from India for sabotage and other disruptive activities. This in turn infuriated the Bengali people, who rallied behind Mujib-ur Rehman and his party. In the general elections of 1970, people of East Pakistan voted the Awami League to majority in the National Assembly. Similarly, in 1970s, the state of Pakistan that have had experienced secessionism of its Eastern Wing due to its flawed military approach to the simmering political problems in that region, was yet again geared for another confrontationist nationalism in the province of Balochistan. As most of the Baloch leaders in that province were put behind bars on the charges of ‘treason’, the
nationalist movement was taken over by the students who launched a guerilla war having Marxist overtones. The magnitude of the upsurge that followed can be estimated from the fact that the Pakistani army had to deploy over 80,000 soldiers in the province for dealing with the rebellious situation. During the years of insurgency (1973 to 1977) about 5,300 Balochis and 3,300 soldiers were reportedly killed (See for details Khan, 2003:290 & Harrison, 1981:38) Balochis also felt the same sense of deprivation, discrimination and alienation as Bangladeshis (Harrison, 1987:276-7). They aggrieved that their rich natural resources, especially the gas, was being exploited by the people from other provinces, particularly, Punjab, without giving any due share in the royalty and even the natural produce, to the people of Balochistan. Balochistan indeed is the most undeveloped regions of Pakistan. However, it was during the years of insurgency that most of the Baloch people, including those who had been long accustomed to the prevalent exploitative situation, were affected and politicized (Jafferlot, 2002: 18-29). Further, it was found that the internal factionalism among the Baloch leaders also gave way to unity, as these leaders found common interests in getting rid of an exploitative system and an oppressive state (Harrison, 1987:275).

From the above illustrations it can be inferred that authoritarian rule and the coercive-repressive measures to contain the aspirations and grievances of the ethno-regional groups can only prove to be counter-productive. Such approaches and methods can even provoke a dormant and apathetic ethnic group or its sections to adopt confrontationist path. For instance, when General Zia after taking over the power, staged execution of Z.A. Bhutto in 1979, latter’s co-ethnics took it as an assault to their national pride and to protest against the regime, they participated overwhelmingly in the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (1983). Though this movement was launched by various political parties all over the country, but it especially became popular in Sindh. Following its policy of repression, the center deployed army in the province. For six months, 45,000 soldiers were deployed in Sindh and according to an estimate about 300 Sindhi protesters were killed in this period. Consequently, nationalist sentiments grew so stronger in the province that in the underground literature, the demand for a “Sindhu Desh” often figured. Mumtaz Bhutto articulated a programme on the lines of Mujibur Rahman’s Six Points (Harrison, 1987:283). Again in Sindh, to curb the ethno-nationalism of the Mohajirs, army operations were launched twice. In these operations the members of the
community were indiscriminately arrested and annihilated. Army carried out its operations in a high-handed manner (Waseem, 2003:75). As a result, the community felt persecuted and alienated. Mohajirs, who are in many respects internally diverse, got united behind their own ethnic party, Mohajir Qaumi Movement and its leader Altaf Hussain.

To conclude, the chapter, it can be said that Pakistan lacked features like, rational-participative political culture, representative, responsive and responsible political institutions, adequately modernized and progressive economy, vibrant civil society, unpolicised army, inclusive and accommodative ideology, and constitutional and institutional framework for implementing it in practice, which could integrate different sections and groups of the country. More importantly, the country lacked a committed and far-sighted leadership to attempt to rectify these deficiencies of a nation. On the contrary, it seems that there is a ‘political will’ to not to correct these weaknesses. The state machinery is dominated by army and bureaucrats, who have emerged as class in itself which seems to be more concerned to preserve their own interests. Besides, their attitudes and orientations are conservative and colonial. Contrarily, it can also be argued that in the fragile polity of Pakistan, it is the bureaucracy that has kept the society organized and unified. But in any case in the absence of any proper sense of direction from the society and its representatives, it is bound to become authoritarian and hegemonic in outlook, which can frustrate and alienate the minority ethnic groups, which have little representation in it. Political leadership is weak, divided and devoid of any farsightedness. Ethnically Punjabis constitute the dominant group, and the state is identified as ‘Punjabi state’. Thus, the minority ethnic groups feel alienated from the state. They feel colonized by this alien state. Even Islamic ideology has failed to integrate them in the political system, who often raise their demands for their due rights. Clearly, by depriving the ethnic groups of their social, economic, political and cultural rights, the ruling elite cannot win over them in the name of Islam. Moreover, as this state ideology is abstract and exclusive rather than tangible and tolerant, people do not always identify themselves with it. Such a state ideology and national identity has only bred extremism, intolerance and sectarian violence in the society.
ENDNOTES

1. For Example, soon after independence Governor General of Pakistan made amendments to the interim constitution based on Government of India Act 1935 and, increased his executive and emergency powers. This point will be taken up in detail in the forthcoming pages.

2. Here it needs mention that the two-nation theory continued to cast its shadows on the Indo-Pak relations and their respective nation-building processes, particularly Pakistan, in post-independence period also. Vigilance, security arrangements and “thick” nature of Indo-Pak borders actually reflect the exclusionary nation-building process in both the countries.

3. For Details regarding Role of Afghanistan and External Powers in Pashtoon Movement See, Rupinder Kaur, Chapter V. Balochs will be dealt in a later chapter.

4. In 1948 and 1952, language riots broke out in East Pakistan, when Urdu was declared to be the sole national language. The Bengali students had been in the forefront of the movement that left indelible marks on the psyche of the Bangla people (Jahan, 1972:43).

5. Governor General Ghulam Muhammad and President Iskander Mirza, who were migrants, were particularly known for their contempt for political democracy. They preferred to function through bureaucracy (Khan H, 2001:881).

6. For details see, Khan, 2005:98.

7. It is believed that the act was devised to give the Governor General / Governor the arbitrary powers, which would not require him to even, consult his ministers, to disqualify, through “highly abnormal operations”, those politicians who “incurred the displeasure of the central government” (Callard, 1957: 81,102-103).

8. These include Council of Common Interests (Article 153), National Economic Council (Article 156) and National Finance Commission (Article 160), pp.61, 63, 65.

9. Another fact that comes up in this context is that the regional elite of those provinces primarily belonged to feud class. As withdrawal of the British was
becoming imminent, this class started supporting and joining the Muslim League and its demand for Pakistan, which suited their interests as the Congress was known for its commitment to land reforms, which was detrimental for their class interests (see for details, Alavi 1988).

10. This is the line of argument various ‘instrumentalists’ have adopted for explaining the phenomenon of ethno-nationalism Brass, 1991.

11. As mentioned, general elections in Pakistan were held for the first time in 1970. Nevertheless, the country witnessed coming to power and their exist of seven primeninsiter namely, Liaquat Ali Khan (947-51), Khwaja Nazimuddin ( 1951-53), Muhammad Ali Bogra ( 1953-55), Chaudhry Muhammad Ali (1955-56), H.S. Suhrwardy (September 1956 to 1957), I.I. Chundrigar (October/December 1957) and Feroz Khan Noon (December 1957 to October 1958). During these eleven years elections for Provincial Assembly of East Pakistan were held in 1954.

12. Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989, apply on indigenous peoples defined as “...peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations, which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and… irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions”, whereas the word “minorities” is defined by the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, in terms of nation, ethnicity, religion and language, and provides for their rights to “…enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, and to use their own language , in private and in public, freely and without interference or any form of discrimination” and the “…right to participate effectively in decisions on the national and, where appropriate, regional level concerning the minority to which they belong or the regions in which they live, in a manner not incompatible with national legislation”, (Article, 2). If one compares the two categories described by two different international legal devices, it becomes clear that though the local population of Pakistan can better be fitted in the former category, but categorizing them as indigenous peoples, gives them wider political rights as they can “retain some or all of their …political
institutions”. However, the framers of the constitution have throughout eluded this proposition as it can cause problems for power distribution as well as homogeneous nation-building. Besides, the definitions of “indigenous peoples” and “minorities” make the predicament of the smaller groups and communities within the main provincial ethnic groups, peculiar. For example, there are Kalash people in NWFP who are entirely different and distinct from the Pashtuns, but are generally clubbed with the latter (For details on the plight of the Kalash people see, Ali and Rehman, 2001: Chapter IV). Similarly, there are Gurjars who are nomads and are spread across the country, but who are believed originally to be the “indigenous” peoples but are devoid of any specific recognition and rights (Ali and Rehman, 2001:20).

13. This aspect of the approaches towards nation-building will be taken up in details, in the following sections of this chapter.

14. In Punjab the Muslim league signed an accord with Sikander Hayat Khan of Unionist Party that enabled it to enter into the politics of the province. In 1937 elections, the former could hardly win any seat.

15. Lecture on Manifestations of Islam in South Asia: History, Politics and Culture by Professor Surinder Singh, Department of History, Panjab University, Chandigarh, at Baba Budhhaji Bhawan, GND University, on 3 February, 2009.

16. There were four suicide bombings in and near Islamabad in 2008, claiming 85 lives. These included the suicide bombing of the Danish embassy compound on 2 June 2008, later claimed by al-Qaeda; the HQ of the Anti-Terrorism Squad in Islamabad, killing eleven people, on 9 October; attack on an ordinance factory some forty miles outside Islamabad in August 2008, which claimed more than 60 lives (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2009: 11).
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