CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In the contemporary world, the nation-states are experiencing the momentum of globalization from the above and are facing the challenge of ethno-nationalism from the below. Most of the post-colonial states have faced the problem of ethnicity in one form or the other. The wave of ethno-nationalism is so strong that it has forced to redefine the relationships between the state (the whole) and the diverse groups (the parts) that constitute it. In several cases, ethnic assertions have taken violent forms. It has given a setback not only to the efforts of newly independent multiethnic states at various stages of nation-building and state-building, but also to the territorial integrity of the developing countries (Connor, 1973:3).

Some of the significant international political and economic developments such as the spreading of plebiscitary democracy around the world, greater citizen participation in state sponsored activities and programmes in general, and the end of cold war, collapse of Soviet bloc and the inevitable demise of Soviet Union, in particular, have further provided a fillip to the whole process of ethnic upsurge. Indeed, the post cold-war period has been viewed as representing the third wave of nationalism in the 20th century (Hayness, 1996:90). Even the developed countries could not remain unaffected by this phenomenon. Several ethnic groups in Europe and North America such as the Bretons and the Corsicans in France, the Basques and Catalans in Spain, the Scots, Welsh and Irish in United Kingdom, the French in Canada and African-Americans and Spanish in the United States of America have manifested their ethnic assertions in various forms and manifestations. However, the intensity of ethnic consciousness and its assertion is more severe in the newly independent third world countries (Phadnis & Ganguly, 2001:15-16).

The ethno-national upsurge and the formation of ethnic political movements in third world states needs to be examined first in the context of some inbuilt weaknesses of the national liberation movements itself and later on, the state and nations as it created on the one hand, and the policies of nation-building and state-formation on the other. The irrational demarcations of national boundaries ignoring the important factors such as language, culture, religion and popular political aspirations are at the root of the present day ethnic crisis. These boundaries, which turned into ‘hard’
borders in the post-colonial era, defied the historical roles of the communities, which were now torn apart, in their respective regions. Historically, these states were the victims of an exploitative and penetrative colonialism. The different ethnic groups came on a common platform in their struggle to win political freedom and throwing off the colonial rule. However, their feeling of unity or oneness was not expressions of a common political will (Phadnis & Ganguly, 2001:15-16), rather it was a marriage of convenience for a movement against western colonialism (Jahan, 1972:1). Once freedom was attained, various ethnic groups found little common in socio-economic and cultural terms to remain politically together. In the post-colonial set-up their hopes and aspirations for a better deal in terms of opportunities of growth and due share in the development of all or some sections of their communities remained unfulfilled. Though it was largely because of limited resources and inadequate state infrastructure, but the discriminatory policies of politically dominant ruling community vis-à-vis minorities and/or marginalized communities was also responsible for such sorry state of affairs. This socio-cultural and politico-economic marginalization generated frustrations and a sense of insecurity among the ethnic groups, who subsequently mobilized themselves by invoking ethno-cultural and/or religious identities. However, it was not always the socio-economic deprivation that has caused ethnic insurgencies and the contestation of the sovereignty of the post-colonial states, but ‘identity deprivation’ that the minority/marginalized cultural groups experienced in the process of constructing and promoting ‘national identity’ by the state also became instrumental in bringing to the fore deeply penetrated ethnic sentiments among them and their large scale mobilization around them. No doubt, the above conditions reflect the failures and flawed approaches of state-building and nation-building as adopted by the ruling elite. This followed the legitimacy crisis in the post-colonial states which were already trying to gain it by establishing themselves as ‘nation-states’ and were following the twin processes of nation-building and state-building simultaneously, with fast-forwarded speed, for it (Singh, 2002:66-71). In this way a vicious cycle was created, which could have been broken by keeping in mind the diversity of the post-colonial societies and the aspirations of the constituent groups, while formulating objectives and policies for nation-formation and instituting state-structures.

After the independence, the ruling elite of the newly independent countries focused entirely on establishing legitimacy of the states inherited from the colonial
rulers and constructing a viable national identity out of and superior to the parochial identities. This was attempted through various models and different strategies in each country. For example, in case of India, the ruling elite quested to achieve the task on the basis of secularism while accommodating linguistic identities by reorganizing constituent states on the linguistic basis in a federal set-up, but in reality, majoritarian ‘Hindu ideology’ dominated the so called national mainstream. Similarly, a queer mixture of theocratism and liberalism was chosen as a means to get the mission done in Pakistan and Sri Lanka, but failed in both the cases due to the reluctance in recognizing the multi-ethnic fabric of both the societies (Sabhlok, 2002:26-27). It was therefore, a herculean task as to reordering political equations among ethnic groups and to transform these primordial sentiments into civil sentiments (Jahan, 1972:2). In the post colonial states, twin projects of nation-building and state-building were undertaken by subsuing traditional loyalties in favor of new political and cultural identity of the people as a nation. Various symbols, idioms, values and institutions of dominant community emerged on the center stage as ‘national’ symbols and principles, which were used for gaining legitimacy, support and for constructing hypothetical majority. Any resistance to these attempts was labeled as anti-national, unpatriotic or as a threat to national unity and integrity (Singh, 2002:59-60).

As mentioned, the idea of ‘nation-state’ was a derivative discourse in the third world societies. While pursuing this western notion, the ruling elite of the post-colonial world, ignored important segments of European history of nation or state formation, where they took centuries to create national ideology, national elite and strong administrative structures before they proceeded on to the project of nation-building. In a way, it can be said that national as well as state-structures have ‘evolved’ in Western countries, with the former following the latter. But the process that took place in most of the Afro-Asian countries was altogether different. Here, the policies of nation-building and state-building were followed simultaneously in a compressed timeframe and along the lines of state-sponsored and state-planned ideals and strategies, oblivious of the fact that these countries enjoy conditional legitimacy in terms of state infrastructure, governments and even state boundaries (Kothari, 1976:1-2 & also see Jahan, 1972:4-5). But as the ruling elite did not pay any attention to such pre-required attributes of nationhood, they rather engaged in the process of “absorbing, assimilating, and co-opting” the diversities within the projected national mainstream (Dhillon, 2001:228-229). The ruling elite even resorted to the use of
coercive and authoritative methods for welding together the diverse ethnic groups into single coherent framework of nationhood. In a recent example, the Tamil extremist organization, LTTE, was crushed in a brutal battle between the Tamil Tigers and the state. Earlier, in Punjab (India), the Khalistan movement of the Sikhs was also suppressed through military action. In case of Pakistan, there have been frequent attempts on the part of the state to repress Mohajir and Baloch ethnic movements, even when the state has already lost its eastern wing in a bitter civil war in 1971, while resorting to military solutions to absolutely political problems. The intensity and ferocity of army operations and the quantity and quality of the weapons employed in all the above instances indicate the level of hypersensitivity and the intolerance, with which the state deals with dissents as well as digressions to its coveted goal of ‘nation-state’ building. Perhaps, such an approach serves as a double edged sword to subdue and assimilate the ‘erring’ groups on the one hand, and reinforcing the legitimacy of the ruling elite vis-à-vis the dominant – not always majority – community, on the other. Another fact that needs to be pointed out here is that while waging a battle against the state even the belligerent constituent groups have used sophisticated weapons and displayed dexterity and expertise in using modern warfare techniques. All this, in turn, point to some kind of external involvement in these anti-state nationalist movements (Bansal, 2005:259). Anyhow, the ultimate outcome of this process of upholding and promoting state-sponsored nationalism was accumulation of frustration and sense of alienation which further led these deprived groups to engage in political protest, resistance, and opposition. However, the state did not respond to the aspirations and collective sentiments of the indigenous peoples and underestimated the intensity of resentment among them in its zeal to build a homogeneous nation-state. It continued to superimpose its version of national identity. As a result the constituent groups took recourse to violent methods. As violence against the state depicts the crisis of legitimacy amongst its citizens, it becomes clear that the trajectory of nation-building process in the post-colonial states was top-to-bottom rather than bottom-to-top. It also depicts that the sense of community amongst the members of different constituent groups was not only alive but was rather reinforced by the political and ideological structure in the post-colonial period. Hence, sub-nationalism of these groups went simultaneously and in opposition to state-nationalism. As such, the project of nation-building undertaken to unite diverse ethnic
groups into single cohesive nation degenerated into one of nation-destroying (Connor, 1972:336).

The undue emphasis on urbanization, industrialization, and social mobilization or in sum the factors of social change broadly associated with the process of modernization further complicated the exercise of creating viable states in third world countries (Jahan, 1972:3). The leaders of these countries went all out for economic development undermining the need to solve political problems of nation and state-building, in order to catch up with developed countries. They felt that with the coming of modernity, ethnicity would either decline or disappear. In addition, it would enhance the capabilities of modern states in making inroads into the matters, which hitherto were regarded as internal by ethnic groups (Singh, 2002:62). Karl Deutsch was the most vocal supporter of this school of thought. Nevertheless, in the wake of ethnic uprisings since the late 1960’s and early 1970’s throughout the world, scholars like Anthony D. Smith and Walker Connor found this viewpoint wanting. They held the view that process of modernization rather worked more as a catalyst to ethnic consciousness as well as ethnic mobility (Amin, 1988:22-26).

In case of South Asia, the problem of ethnic conflicts seems to be more sensitive and entrenched. The entire subcontinent is world’s most complex region that constitutes a plurality of different communities and races with each having its identity attached to separate region, history, language and pursuit of social practices. Almost all the countries have faced ethnic assertions in various forms and manifestations with demands varying from the basic socio-economic and political rights to regional autonomy to outright secession and sometimes even-independence (Phadnis & Ganguly, 2001:17-18). Intrinsically, the zeal of nationalism which was used as an ideology for uniting the diverse ethnic groups against the colonial rulers seems to have dissipated soon after the independence and, group consciousness of people began to center around smaller groups based on religious, cultural and linguistic identity in these countries. This move in turn, has hampered the development process in general and national integration, in particular (Sabhlok, 2002:25-26). But the ruling elite of these countries despite knowing the ground realities made inadequate efforts to adopt multiculturalism or pluralism as guiding principles of governance. They instead engaged in both homogenizing and assimilating the diverse ethnic populations into dominant community’s version of nation-state. It led to widespread rejection, resistance, unrest and violence against the state as the ethnic groups viewed these
strategies inimical to their interests and designed to dilute their identities (Sabhlok, 2002:35-37). As such they felt alienated and viewed state to be an ‘alien’ state. They felt persecuted. On this plea, the aggrieved communities have often sought moral and/or material support from the international community or regional allies. This further intensified the bitterness in the relations between state and its constituent erring units. Clearly, the geopolitics that refers to political environment, relations with the neighbors, regional and international environment, strategic considerations and the identity needs of the state elite, determines the approach and methods of dealing with ‘erring geopolitical fringes’. The end result of this scenario is widening gap between the state and the indigenous peoples and their respective ideologies. As a result, the ‘evolution’ of nation-ness seems a distant proposition.

Thus the ethnic ties across the borders and the role of ethnic kin-state in the secessionist conflict of adjoining states involving their co-nationals is another factor responsible for the present day ethnic turbulence in South Asian countries. In such a situation, ethno-secessionists appeal for support, recognition and publicity particularly from ethnic kin-states. But the country witnessing ethno-national assertions sees all these cross border ties through the prism of suspicion and keep strict vigil over these affinities. As far as the ethnic-kin states are concerned, they support the ethno-nationalism in the neighbouring country on the pretext that outbreak of the conflict is difficult to ignore because of cross-border ethnic ties with the belligerent community in the neighbouring country. Meanwhile, ethnic-kin states also help the national government of the neighbouring country fearing that ethnic assertions in the adjacent state might not arouse ethnic aspirations and assertions of its own people of similar ethnic origin. For instance, Pashtun movement in Pakistan had the material support of Afghanistan, majority of whose population is ethnically Pashtun. On the contrary, Iran assisted Pakistan, militarily and economically, during military operation to suppress the Baloch movement in that country in 1973, suspecting arousal and incitement of ethnic sentiments and political aspirations of its own Baloch population. Meanwhile, the opportunistic intervention and support, in terms of material or moral, by the external powers with vested interests have further provided a fillip to the already existing strife in these countries. Consequently, the disputes that are often internal political matters become internationalized, and become increasingly harder to resolve (Singh, 1994:417-18).
The state of Pakistan is no exception to the above said generalizations. It has a bitter experience of ethnic violence since its very inception. The state has itself been carved out of British India on the basis of the Two-Nation Theory for safeguarding the all-inclusive interests of the Muslims of the Indian subcontinent (Khan, 1999:168). The driving force behind the creation of this new state was the better-educated Muslims of the provinces in British India where they were in minority and entertained the fear of marginalization from the numerical majority and economically, politically and culturally predominant Hindu community. Urdu-speaking migrants from these Muslim-minority provinces of British India subsequently constituted of the ruling elite in the post-independent Pakistan. However, they lacked both support and popularity in the proposed Muslim dominated areas of Pakistan. Hence they mobilized the diverse ethno-linguistic groups on the sole bases of Islamic identity. They portrayed the Congress as a Hindu party and ‘Hindu India’ as an enemy of Islam and Pakistan. Actually, religion proves to be a binding force only in face of threat from ‘other’ religion. Meanwhile, attempt was made on the part of the power-wielders to impose a ‘national’ identity moulded in rational-modernist Islamic traditions of Muslims of minority-provinces. Ironically, the ‘nation’ that was supposed to embody this new identity had remained rather elusive to the idea of Pakistan that originated in the minority-provinces, even during the Pakistan movement. The Muslim majority areas like the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), Balochistan, Punjab, Sindh and Bengal were less enthusiastic or even skeptical to the idea of Pakistan (Jaffrelot, 2002:8-15). However, as the communal riots in several parts of British India on the eve of independence aroused passions on communal lines, which swept across the Muslim dominated provinces as well, the Muslim League made a dent in this communally surcharged environment, and managed to enlist the support of the masses and leaders of Muslim-majority provinces behind the demand for Pakistan. Nevertheless, it failed to mobilize them in favour of religion based nation-building agenda in the post-independence period. As a result, the religious passions which were spontaneous initially, gave in to the ethnic factors which divided the Muslims of the Indian sub-continent with much deeper schisms.

As the state of Pakistan came into being, it constituted a mosaic of ethnic and linguistic groups, which had little in common in terms of social structures, values, cultures etc., except Islam. Even the socio-cultural outlook of the Muslim population which migrated from the Muslim minority provinces of British India, like Bihar,
Delhi, Utter Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Hyderabad, had very little similitude with the Muslims in Punjab, the NWFP, Balochistan and Sindh. Prominent ethnic and linguistic groups in Pakistan were Punjabis, Pashtuns, Sindhis, Balochs and Bengalis. All these groups differed/differ greatly in terms of their size, resources, and level of social development, proximity to power, language and culture (Singh, S.K., 2000:28-30). The ruling elite, mainly constituted of Punjabis and Mohajirs, hoped, however, that religious bond would be enough to control and melt different ethnic divisions into the newly formed state. As such, they did not pay adequate attention to the factors such as separate history, traditions, culture, language or local customs, which constituted the core of the respective ethnic identities, and did not provide any outlet to these ethnic sentiments. However, soon it became clear that only religious mantra would not create firm ties of oneness among various ethnic groups. The disintegration of Pakistan and emergence of Bangladesh as an independent country in 1971, proved beyond doubt the inability of religion in uniting different ethnic groups (Alam & Tahir, 1999:74).

In fact, the religious solidarity, in the absence of serious attempts to implement the principles of Islamic justice, paved the way for a paradoxical situation in Pakistan. Whereas on the one hand, the ruling elite consisting mainly of Punjabis and Mohajirs engaged in the process of consolidating itself in the state machinery, on the other hand, they followed highly centralized policies and even resorted to authoritarian or dictatorial rule to achieve their own version of national integration. In the name of Islamic brotherhood, they tried to suppress the regional, ethnic and ‘parochial’ sentiments of the local people, while maintaining the ‘ethnic character’ of the state establishment in their favour. As such, the Islamic creed, Islamic ideology and Islamic identity, as promoted by the ‘ethnicized’ state did not appeal to the indigenous peoples, who practiced their own syncretic version of Islam in their daily lives. Anyhow, whosoever was not part of the ruling combination or not willing to be co-opted as a junior partner was viewed as a potential threat to the country (Khan, 1999:169). Since the major challenge before Pakistan was to integrate the ethnically, culturally and historically diverse communities into a thread of political unity, as such the twin projects of nation and state-building were undertaken simultaneously. This task was virtually very tough as the distinct ethno-national communities like Baloch, Pashtuns, Sindhis and Bengalis refused to accept the dominance of politico-military ruling elite – Punjabis and Mohajirs – as they were culturally alien to them (Engineer,
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1989:26). Also political unity could not be brought about due to the unresponsive, unrepresentative and non-participative nature of the political system.

In the years following independence, a dichotomy within the ruling establishment was visible where on the one hand, the executive branch of central government including civil-politico administration of the country was dominated by the migrant and military establishment by Punjabi-Pashtun elite, on the other hand, there was the legislative branch dominated by the local elite who were elected indirectly before independence by the legislative assemblies of the provinces which later on constituted Pakistan. Thus many a times, migrant led executive sought to bypass the legislature and also attempted to shape country’s politics on the non-representative norms, as they were aware of the fact that due to their lesser numbers, elections would lead to their exit from the power. Here it may be mentioned that significance of the legislature in the political set-up of the country also got eroded due to deep and irreconcilable ideological differences regarding the future political as well as constitutional structure of the country, particularly, regarding role of Islam in the polity, mode of elections, federal structure, etc., between the members of the constituent assembly. These differences and undue delay and reluctance on the part of the leaders to resolve and overcome these differences, deprived the country of ‘Basic Law’ for its governance, for its initial crucial nine years, during which, executive, both political and permanent, reined the country in an authoritative and authoritarian manner. In this way, democratic institutions and processes could not take roots in the new country, as soon after, the political power was overtaken by the military. The coup de’ tat of 1958, by General Ayub Khan, was in fact, a watershed event in the evolution of a democratic society and civic nation. Thus, ensued a non-representative politics in Pakistan in which sub-national groups were denied their due place in the national mainstream which, in turn, hindered a sense of united national identity and national integration (Wasseem, 2000:4532).

Even after the secession of Bangladesh in 1971, the ruling elite in Pakistan did not go in for a reappraisal of the existing mindset and policies aimed at nation-building and state-building. They continued to rely on the quasi-colonial style of governance and coercive politico-bureaucratic apparatus under which the pace and direction of change was dictated from above. Both Islam and anti-India sentiments were often raked up as a political rite, performed to grant periodical legitimization for those who were in power or aspiring to be in power and in controlling or quelling the
dissent at the center and in the provinces (Rahman, 1982:206-207). In spite of the simmering discontent among various ethnic groups, the ruling elite now primarily consisting of Punjabis, made no serious effort to accommodate and co-opt them. Instead, their legitimate grievances were labeled as anti-national or threat to national unity or integrity. This led to the feeling of insecurity among the ethno-national groups such as Baloch, Sindhis, Pashtuns and even Mohajirs. The most recent in jumping the ethnic bandwagon were the Seraikis. They perceived these policies with suspicion and viewed nation-building as nation-destroying, development as exploitation and controlled democracy as internal colonialism (Amin, 1988:105).

Such views and opinions were reflective of the asymmetrical growth of these groups in terms of their socio-economic, cultural and political development. Subsequently, these groups felt excluded from the Pakistani state and took cudgels against its arbitrary policies. The Baloch insurgency of the 1970’s, growing ethnic polarization in the province of Sindh, and its violent manifestations, particularly, in urban areas of the province can be cited as examples of assertion of frustrated ethnic groups and failure of the constitution of 1973 to address the deeply entrenched sense of alienation among the constituent ethnic groups. Secession of East Pakistan in 1971 and emergence of Mohajir ethno-nationalism have particular negative bearing on the nation-building agenda of the Pakistani elite. These phenomena have proved to be major setbacks to the ideological tool of the state. Clearly, if religion was sufficient to evolve and hold a ‘united’ nation, how come the regional, ethnic and linguistic Bangla identity surpassed the Islamic one and led to secession of East Pakistan? Rationale can be found in their politico-economic as well as cultural and linguistic subversion by the Pakistani state. The fallacy of religion as basis of nationhood and highly ethnicized nature of polity and society is depicted by the emergence of Mohajir ethno-nationalism also. The community was in the vanguard of ‘Pakistan movement’, and demanded separate state for Indian Muslims, who were regarded as a single nation. In post-independence period, Mohajirs constituted of the state elite and were a progressive community. However, gradually they were getting marginalized in the state-structure. Moreover, as both society and state got highly ethnically conditioned in the decade of 1970s and as the territorial and ethnic identities started contesting for superiority of the religious identity even in public discourse, Mohajirs recharted their identity discourse and took to ethnicity, as other constituent groups had been doing (Pattanaik, 1999:471).
Therefore, it became clear that the state in Pakistan is a complex mosaic composed of five major and distinct ethno-national groups namely Baloch, Mohajirs, Pashtoons, Punjabis, Sairakis, Sindhis and the minor groups in northern areas. Though, these groups have been identified with a specific region but the exact demarcation of territories as homeland of each of the ethnic groups, both within the existing provinces and outside Pakistan is a matter of dispute that still continues. However, we shall focus here only on the Baloch ethno-national upsurge in Pakistan.

The province of Balochistan came into existence in July 1970, when the administrative divisions of Quetta and Kalat were merged, after the abolition of One Unit Scheme (Ahmed, 1975:6). In terms of landmass, it is the largest province of Pakistan covering 43 percent of country’s total area. The population of the province is ethnically and linguistically most diverse in character as compared to the other provinces of Pakistan (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2006:2). Baloch is the largest ethnic group in the province, and their number is closely followed by a substantial number of Pashtuns, Sindhis and Punjabis. Another interesting feature of the population is that majority of the Balochs live outside the province, most conspicuously in Karachi and western districts of Sindh. The Baloch people are completely entrenched in their tribal values and honor (Bokhari, 2003:868-70). Pastoral nomadism is an important means of subsistence for the Balochs, besides small-scale agriculture. Moreover, Baloch society is extremely conservative and beset with both horizontal and vertical cleavages (Titus, 1998: 669-670). However, the province is rich in terms of its natural resources. Here it needs mention that this has been a major cause of erring relations between the state of Pakistan and the local Balochs. Clearly, the state of Pakistan which is predominantly Punjabi and Pashtun as far as its ethnic character is concerned, has been controlling and exploiting these natural resources for the benefit of the people of other provinces, particularly, the Punjab, without taking the local people or the leaders into confidence. The people of Balochistan perceive this as ‘colonial’ exploitation of their natural resources by an ‘alien’ state with whom they cannot identify culturally and even politically as they are hardly represented in the state structure (Grare, 2006:4 & also see Breseeg, 2004:97). The Baloch people have demonstrated many a times against such control and misuse of their resources by the ‘outsiders’. Not only this, they have opposed any developmental project in their province, as they uphold that ultimately it is the Punjabis and other ethnic groups who will benefit in terms of goods, services, employment or any other output and outcome.
of these developmental projects, be it building dams, roads, ports, etc (Grare, 2006:5).

Before the colonial rule, there was no such concept like state authority in highly fragmented, tribal and localized Baloch society (Khan, 2003:282). It was only in the 18th century that 6th Khan of Kalat; Nasir Khan became successful in establishing a unified Baloch army of some 25000 men and 1000 camels. He built up a centralized bureaucratic system covering all of Balochistan (Harrison, 1981:16). However, the relations of the Khan with the local tribes remained tense. These already existing tensions between the Khan and the local tribes were aggravated when the British annexed Balochistan. It is this outside intervention by the colonial state that ignited the Baloch consciousness to fight against intrusion (Khan, 2003: 282). The first such assertion can be traced to successful campaign launched against the state recruitment in 1929 that resulted into an armed mutiny. In the following years, Baloch nationalists formed different political organizations such as the Kalat State National Party (1935) with the objective of achieving independence (Khan, 2003:285 & Harrison, 1981: 22-23).

As British withdrawal from India became certain, Baloch nationalists intensified their activities to support the notion of greater Balochistan as an independent country. Though Balochistan was inhabited mostly by Muslim population, neither Khan nor the Baloch nationalists had any intention to join Pakistan (Khan, 2003: 282). The Baloch reluctance to merge with Pakistan was not only historically factored, but even physically Balochistan is a part of Central Asian plateau rather than a part of Indo-Pak subcontinent (Baloch I, 1987:21). Meanwhile, the Khan of the Kalat state declared that the legal status of Kalat and Nepal is different from other princely states in Indian subcontinent as both have direct treaty relations with Whitehall unlike the native states, which dealt with the British Indian Government in New Delhi. He proclaimed that the British should respect the sovereignty of Kalat as they have committed, under the treaty of 1876. The British though listened the Baloch demands but did nothing concrete in this regard (Harrison, 1981:23). It is worth mentioning here that the British initially had the idea of making Balochistan as an independent country but due to the intelligence reports that endorsed Pakistan as a better option to serve the British interests in the region as compared to Balochistan, the British decision that favoured independence of Balochistan was changed (Foreign Policy Centre Paper, 2006: 22). On the other hand,
Pakistan intensified its activities to ensure the merger of Balochistan with it and, the Khan of the Kalat was informed to facilitate this process. Amidst these circumstances, the Khan declared independence of the Kalat state a day after the creation of Pakistan on 15th August 1947 and offered to negotiate special relationships with Pakistan in the fields of defence, foreign affairs and communications (Baloch I, 1987: 178). Nevertheless, Pakistan rejected this declaration while blaming that it lacked popular support and after nine months of diplomatic tug of war, Kalat was forcibly annexed by the Pakistan Army. A month after the Khan signed the instrument of accession, Abdul Karim Khan, younger brother of the Khan crossed over to Afghanistan against this decision and challenged the Pakistan state thereafter (Harrison, 1981: 26).

In the post-independence era, Baloch ethnic ambitions continued to haunt the state of Pakistan in terms of its territorial unity and integrity. Thus, as part of a larger project of nation-building and state consolidation, the dominant ruling elite mostly Punjabis and Mohajirs made several attempts to dilute and dissolve the distinct Baloch identity within the Pakistan’s identity. The service personnel in the civil administration as well as security forces that were deployed in the province of Balochistan were recruited from the other provinces to tighten the grip over the province and check the Baloch nationalist’s activities. Otherwise also, the Baloch representation in either provincial or national services is negligible (Jetly, 2004: 11-12 & also see Bokhari, 2003:871). The One unit scheme introduced in 1955 further infuriated the already deprived Baloch people. Hence, they along with other minorities in the country mounted pressure on Islamabad to dissolve the scheme. Thus many political parties/alliances emerged to oppose One Unit Scheme which was crafted by the ruling elite of Pakistan (Punjabis/Mohajirs), who feared that three minority provinces of West Pakistan could combine with Bengalis against them (Titus & Swidler, 2000:52). Meanwhile, the Balochs demanded a unified province. When the unrest increased in Balochistan, Pakistan army moved into Kalat on October 6, 1958 and arrested Khan along with other leaders on the charges of negotiating secretly with Afghanistan for the support to wage a war against Pakistan. Consequently, an armed conflict broke out and Baloch insurgents were heavily gunned down (Harrison, 1981:28). Ultimately, following strong protests and opposition in Pakistan as a whole and the Baloch province in particular, the One Unit Plan was revoked and subsequently, Balochistan was accorded the status of province in July 1970 (Amin, 1988:115).
In the same year when Balochistan was accorded the status of a province, General Elections were held in Pakistan where the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Z.A. Bhutto swept the national assembly elections of West Pakistan as well as of Punjab and Sindh provincial assembly elections. The People’s Party however, was virtually nonstarter in both Balochistan and the North Western Frontier Province (NWFP) as it could win only one seat from the Frontier and none in Balochistan. Ultimately, in 1972, the National Awami Party (NAP) in alliance with the Jamiat Ulema Islam (JUI), formed the first ever-elected Baloch government in the province under the Chief Ministership of Attaullah Mengal and Ghous Bux Bizenjo as a Governor (Khan, 2003:286-287).

It is worth mentioning here, Islamabad was not comfortable with the installation of Baloch government. Hence, the leadership at the center exploited the already existing ethnic divisions between the Baloch and the Pashtuns while patronizing Abdul Samad Khan Achackzai, a leader of splinter faction of the NAP, who was striving for Pashtuns’ rights in Balochistan (Shah, 1997:102). Even the armed forces in Pakistan did not relish the installation of these local governments, especially in Balochistan. Moreover, given its Punjabi ethnic composition, the Pakistan Army desired the political balance in favour of Punjab vis-à-vis other provinces and to do away with the possibility of its retired servicemen and bureaucratic settlers being displaced from Balochistan. Subsequently, the survival of Baloch government was further jeopardized when Shah of Iran strongly opposed the step of granting autonomy to the Balochs because he feared that his own Baloch subjects may demand similar arrangements. Acting on these fears, the Shah of Iran built up enormous pressure on Islamabad to suppress even the slightest expression of Baloch identity. This ultimately resulted in the elimination of Baloch rule later on. The other key factor that escalated the worries of Pakistan government was the overthrow of Afghan monarchy in early 1973 and the entry of Sardar Daud Khan as a President of Afghanistan who showed his keen interest to support the Baloch secessionists (Shah, 1997:98-99).

Meanwhile, the major task before the NAP government was to find out solution of Baloch problems, including the correction of the socio-economic and political imbalances prevailing in the province. Meanwhile, the government decided to extend the writ of state over the entire province in order to implement its reform agenda properly, besides indigenizing the provincial administration. But it resulted into
widespread unrest due to the clash of tribal interests with the government, as many tribal areas in the province were beyond the reach of state authority. When the situation turned critical, the provincial government approached the center for help. The irony was that the central government took the side of tribal chiefs who were threatening the state authority and later on resorted to usual methods of blaming the NAP as anti-Pakistan rather than of applauding the provincial government’s efforts to enlarge the state authority (Khan, 2003:289-290). So much so, the central government gave the Baloch problem an international and conspiratorial dimensions by alleging that both Mengal and Bizenjo are hands in glove with Iraq and the Soviet Union as part of a larger strategic plan to dismember both Pakistan and Iran. As a result, in response to a plenty of domestic and international pressure, the first ever-elected government of Baloch people was dismissed and both Mengal and Bizenjo were accused for anti-national activities (Harrison, 1981:35).

Nonetheless, all these measures of central government were seen in Balochistan as an assault both on the provincial autonomy and on the distinct identity of Baloch people. In resistance, Baloch nationalists waged a powerful revolt against the center that soon turned into a bloody civil war. There were around 55000 Baloch insurgents including 11500 organized combatants who gave a tough fight to the Pakistan Army. It was estimated that more than 5300 insurgents and 3300 troops were killed in this war. The fight went on till December 1977 when military regime of General Zia-ul-Haq ordered the withdrawal of the army and temporary truce was effected along with the release of Baloch nationalists. It is worth-mentioning here that Zia though extended amnesty to Baloch leaders, but his reign was also by no means less authoritarian to his predecessors’ and, hence he failed to address the real issues like the autonomy to the province. Rather the ethnic identities during his rule were politicized to the maximum because he created and nurtured divisions between various ethnic groups and sectarian groups within the provinces and the country as a whole to consolidate his rule and weaken his opponents (Harrison, 1981:36 & Khan, 2003:290).

In 1979, the fortunes also favored Zia as the Soviet forces entered Afghanistan. This made Balochistan the attention of international community, including for the western media and among the scholarly circles. This was primarily because of the possible Soviet and Afghan support to Baloch secessionists and the fear of super-power confrontation over this issue. In any case, Zia exploited the
situation cleverly by convincing the west that the Soviets may use Baloch card to increase its foothold over the strategically important region as part of their larger strategy to make inroads into the Gulf (Shah, 1997:100). Consequently, billions of dollars were poured by the west into the region as aid through Islamabad. Not only this, Zia also encouraged the Afghan refugees who crossed over to Pakistan in the wake of Marxist coup in Afghanistan to settle into Balochistan. It is estimate that out of 5,000,00 Afghan refugees who crossed over to Pakistan following the Marxist coup in Afghanistan, nearly 50,000 were settled in Balochistan, which undermined not only the ability of Baloch people to control the political destiny of their province but also made them a minority in their own homeland (Bokhari, 2003:869).

In the following two decades, the Baloch movement got diminished largely. This was largely because of the split first in the NAP along the ethnic lines and later on, among the Baloch nationalists themselves. Many of the Baloch leaders went into self exile; some in seclusion, some jumped into mainstream politics and some even came to power. The other factor that eclipsed the Baloch national movement was the losses incurred during the previous insurgencies, in terms of both life and property (Khan, 2003: 292). Even during the decade of democracy in the country that refers to the period following the Zia rule, the political situation in the province remained volatile and fragile, as the central leadership failed to take up the real issues of provincial autonomy that remained to be an irritant factor between the central and provincial leadership and hindered smooth running of administration and carrying out development of the province. Thus, the deliberate strategies of successive central governments of both civil-democratic and military junta led to the exploitation of the situation and proved to be decisive in both exhausting and dividing the Baloch leadership (Baid, 2002:10).

However, this is not to say that there were no voices of dissidence and opposition against the suppressive and oppressive Pakistani regime. As the minority groups found that no single ethnic group or political party was in a position to influence and/or force the centre towards conceding their demands on their own, they strategically formed an alliance to protest/agitate and make the state fall in line with the ethnic demands. The Pakistan’s Oppressed Nationalities Movement (PONM) is an apt illustration in this regard. It played a cardinal job in mobilizing the public support against Punjabi domination in all walks of public life (Baid, 2002:10). The coup of 1999 has further aggravated the situation in the province. The military regime made
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no sincere efforts in order to solve the Baloch problem; rather it has radicalized Baloch people by putting maximum emphasis on the exploitation of their natural resources for managing Pakistan's economy. As a consequence, the Baloch nationalists rejected the military’s electoral, political and constitutional manipulations and reverted back to militant and violent methods since 2000 that led to a full fledged insurgency in 2005. The insurgents frequently targeted the gas pipelines, electricity grids, railway tracks, government installations and personnel in almost all the Baloch majority areas. Not only this, the insurgency spilled over to the Baloch-majority areas of the provinces of Sindh and Punjab also. On 26 August 2006, military launched an operation in which the Jamhoori Watan Party’s (JWP) leader, Nawab Akbar Khan Bugti was killed. As a result more and more young Balochs, not only from Balochistan but also from the Baloch dominated areas of the Punjab and Sindh joined the militant ranks (Crisis Group Asia Report, 2006:8-9). It is worth mentioning here, killing Bugti was symbolic of the fact that the Pakistan government was interested in solving the problem militarily.

After the general elections of 2008 in the country, the newly set up democratic government took several conciliatory initiatives towards the province. Thus in February the PPP government offered a public apology to the people of Balochistan by acknowledging “the atrocities and injustices committed” against the province. In response the Baloch nationalist organizations, including Balochistan Liberation Army and the Balochistan Republican Army decided to suspend their armed struggle indefinitely (The Tribune, 4 September 2008). Meanwhile, some Baloch nationalist groups have rejected this package outrightly. However, it should be noted that until and unless the mindset of the ruling elite, which is shrouded by doubts, distrust and apprehensions towards the demands and aspirations of the constituent groups as well as their approach, which more often addresses the superficial symptoms and manifestations instead of routing the root causes of the conflicts involving provincial and central leadership, is rectified no real solution to the Baloch as well as grievances of other ethnic groups can be attained.

So far as the external involvement in Balochistan is concerned, the Pakistan government has been ceaselessly blaming and claiming India’s involvement and support to the Baloch insurgency. The ruling establishments both at the centre and provincial level in Pakistan have accused Research and Analysis Wing – the Indian intelligence agency – for providing funds to Baloch secessionists through Indian
consulates in *Herat* and *Kandhar* (Grare, October 2006:12). Not only this, Islamabad has intermittently accused Russia and Afghanistan also for their alleged involvement in Balochistan. Meanwhile, political analysts and strategists have also been exploring the external dimension of the Baloch insurgency and agree that due to the kind of weaponry and skills used in the guerilla warfare by the Baloch ultra-nationalists, particularly the recent insurgency in 2004, some foreign hand cannot be ruled out (Bansal, 2005:259). At the same time, they have explored the interests and feasibility of the involvement of various countries that Islamabad has been alleging. In this regard, references can be found of involvement of Afghanistan, India, Russia, Iran and even the US. Still others point to some business groups in the Gulf as they fear that operationalisation of Gawadar port may threaten their interests in the region (Sarafraz, 2004:2). However, no concrete evidence has been found till date linking the acts of violence in the province with any foreign power.

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

The literature on nation-building and state-formation, in general, is unlimited, but there is dearth of it in the context of peculiar socio-political conditions in the third world and with reference to Pakistan. Though there are number of studies pertaining to the strategic importance of Pakistan to the developing world, but the studies on ethnic developments in Pakistan within the context of limitations and failures of the mindset and the approaches of the ruling elite are very limited, indeed. There is lack of comprehensive literature on Baloch ethnic upsurgences in this context. However, following studies are worth mentioning:

The present study (Smith, 1986) regards history and ethnicity as the most important factors in building nations and nationalism. According to the author, history of a group is so significant that the nations that have no past tend to reinvent it. He discusses the role/potential of other socio-cultural and politico-economic factors also, in fanning the ethnic sentiments, but submits that these can just sharpen the already existing ethnic divide. However, he draws references primarily from the European experience. In another study, Smith (1981) has interpreted the ethnic revival as a modern day universal phenomenon. Further he has discussed various reasons causing ethnic strife in multi-ethnic societies. On certain occasions he tends to uphold the liberal view that with the onslaught of modernity, ethnic ties and consciousness would fade away.
The authors provide some thought provoking themes in this edited work (Hutchinson and Smith, 1994). The focus of the study remains on defining the concept of ethnicity. Various theoretical approaches that attempt to explain the process of nation-building and its decay both in the developed and developing world are analyzed. But the vexed problem of integration in plural South Asian societies cannot be comprehended employing these Euro-centric models and approaches. Nevertheless, the study provides knowledge of basic ideas and concepts.

Stefan Wolff (2006), in his book has discussed the underlying factors of ethnic conflicts and violence across the globe. While upholding that ethnic ties still hold grip on the everyday politics around the world, author rules out the ethnic identities as a cause of conflict and violence, in itself. Citing specific cases from around the world the author illustrates that the power and material gain equally work as motivational factors for followers to choose violence over negotiation. Thus various actors and factors involved in the conflict and the approach of the state to deal with these conflicts need to be taken into consideration before reaching any conclusion. But the study skips any analysis of the success of the European model of nationalism and nation-formation in the countries of Afro-Asia. It also fails to suggest the possible conflict management techniques or other measures that could be adopted for resolving the ethnic conflicts world over.

In this work (Phadnis and Gangualy, 2001), the authors present a comparative study of the dynamics of ethnic identities and movements in South Asia. An in-depth analysis of theoretical concerns and issues as well as problems of their application in the region is taken up. Though the emphasis has been given to the primordial loyalties as the basis of ethnic resurgence but at the same time, the authors have not negated the instrumentalist aspects of the problem. This work will endure as an important study for any one interested in the ethnic premises of South Asian politics.

In the article (Dhillon, 2001) under review, the author has tackled the issue of nation-building and state-formation in South Asia. The post-colonial states were riddled with colonial processes and institutions and the demarcation of boundaries were irrational. Thus the twin tasks of nation-building and state-formation were inevitable. However, due to lack of multidimensional approach and continued colonial legacy, these two got blurred and worked at cross purposes. The article presents a comprehensive theoretical perspective on the twin processes and advocate
accommodation rather than homogenization, as solution to the challenges in the face of nation and state-building.

In the present work (Ollapally, 2008), while exploring the causes of extremism in religiously and ethnically diverse and heterogeneous South Asian region, the author has provided a conceptual context of ‘geopolitics’. It is contended that states in South Asia have been proactive in formulating, upholding and promoting particular identity structures in the respective societies. ‘Geopolitics’ of these preferred identities has provided ample space for the extremist groups to function. According to the author, the geopolitical identity constitute of ‘preferred state identities’ which are politically expedient and geographically have international and regional dimensions. She has illustrated this phenomenon by citing examples of conflict and crisis in Afghanistan, ethnic and religious extremism in Pakistan, which was created in the name of Islam, Kashmir issue, ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka and Islamic resurgence in Bangladesh, which is vascillating between Bengali and Islamic identities to define and justify Bangladeshi identity. Further, it is argued that geopolitics of the identities also determine the state response to various ethno-religious assertions on the fringes. Though the work has focused on extremism and terrorist methods of extremists, but provides an analytical tool that explains the role of states in constructing ‘national identities’ in the region and their approach while dealing with the dissenting constituent groups.

In the present work, the author (Cohen, 2005) has attempted to distinguish between the ‘idea’ and the tangible ‘state’ of Pakistan. According to him the idea of Pakistan corresponds to the vision of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, Mohammad Iqbal and Jinnah who upheld the notion of a “liberal, democratic and just state” and imbibed by the ethos of ‘Indo-Muslim civilisation’. But in practice the state of Pakistan has emerged as a potential “pariah” of the Asian continent that has failed to perform in the political, economic and civil arenas. Domination of military in the political organization of the state has sealed the fate of democracy. According to the author, the state could not grasp the political nature of the problems of ethno nationalisms in the country and attempted to solve them economically and/or militarily. Author has also analysed the ideological orientations, perspectives, influences, organization, political inclinations and policy proposals of major and potential key players in the socio-political life of the country. The author ends in an optimistic note and does not
rule out the resurgence of the ‘idea’ of Pakistan. The study is more factual and less analytical.

Adeel Khan (2005) has skillful analyzed the phenomenon of ethnic conflicts and its genesis in the post-colonial states and especially, in case of Pakistan. While citing the way nationalism emerged in the post-colonial countries, including India and Pakistan, Khan finds that the emergence of nationalist sentiments in these societies was due to the excessive intervention of the state and not because of the socio-economic and politico-cultural transformations in these societies, as in case of Europe. Author applies this analysis for explaining the ethnic sub-nationalist movements in the Pakistani society. Though he accepts the primordial ties as a potent force in mobilizing the people but in case of Pakistan, he contends that the ethnic turmoil in the country is propelled by the competition for resources or the lust for proximity to state structure. Neither the ruling elite has ever crafted the policy accommodating the dissidents nor the sub-ethnic groups thought short of holding power and, hence ‘politicization of ethnicity’ in Pakistan caused havoc in the country, the author argues.

Tahir Amin (1988) in his study has argued that the explanation for the rise and decline of various ethnic movements can be found in the domestic and international political context of the ethnic groups. According to the author the public policy of Pakistan state led to an increasing power sharing with Pashtun elite, which has led to the decline of Pashtun movement, but the exclusion of Sindhi and Baloch elite in power sharing has led to an upsurge of Sindh and Baloch movement. Another line of argument is that for a deeper understanding of the perceptions, attitudes, actions and reactions of the ruling elite as well as analyzing the public policies the ideology of the state should be taken into consideration.

The article (Rahman, 1982) deals with the question of crisis of creation of national identity that could defy various regional and linguistic pulls and pressures. The author laments that even the crisis of 1971 could not set a precedent for the establishment, to prioritize this issue. He underlined frequent military coups and ensuing instability as the main cause of instability in Pakistan. However, the author fails to provide any solution to the problem.

In the article (Alavi, 2002) author has exposed the fallacy of ideological nationhood and suggested territorial nation-building as the most feasible alternative. Blaming Salariat class for indulging in religious and/or ethnic nationalism for their
narrow self interests, he argues that it is the class character of the educated middle class professionals to divide on ethnic lines while competing for scarce government jobs. Author accuses feudal class also who are in control of the state machinery for not adopting far farsighted developmental policies while pursuing their self interests. However, author fails to take notice of the interests of the cartel of military and religious leadership who have appropriated authority through extra-constitutional and illegitimate methods and have brow beat the Islamic ideology for gaining legitimacy. He overlooked the role of the Mohajirs who were at the helms of power in the initial years in undermining territorality as that would be detrimental to their interests. Migrants never got assimilated in the host society as is contended

In this article (Iftekharuzzaman, 1998), the writer studies ethnicity and constitutional reforms, in the context of Pakistan. He starts first with giving a brief account of ethnicity and its role in South Asia and later on, analyses the impact of ethnic commotions on the political set-up of Pakistan. He pronounced Pakistan as a multi-racial, multi-cultural but unnatural country as it lacks an effective common bond. Though he finds constitutional reforms as more durable and long lasting solution for ethnicity based assertions, but at the same time, he also laments the failure of successive central regimes for not providing and implementing constitutional safeguards for the minority groups. The ethnic problem in the urban Sindh especially in Karachi has been discussed in some detail, but there is no such deep discussion on the Baloch problem.

In the present work (Rahman, 2004), emphasis is on studying education as linked with the socio-economic and political ground realities. The book traces the history of the development of educational institutions in British India and describes how the schools and universities are socially structured in the contemporary Pakistan. Through this, the divergences in Pakistani society along socio-economic lines and its impact on the socio-political views and perceptions of individuals at various educational levels are studied. Entire range of educational institutions, including Urdu medium schools, English medium schools, madrassas as institutions of higher education are analyzed. The study points to the nature of the pubic distribution system, as it is found that money is spent in more quantum and frequency on the education of elite rather than the masses. So much so that the poor people who live away from the urban centres often go without any formal education at all. It is also found that the state which legitimizes itself in the name of Islam does minimum for
the madrassas, where maximum of poor and religious people go for education. In this way hypocritical nature of Pakistani state and imbalanced and flawed approach of the state elite towards nation-building is depicted. The author himself admits to the limitations of the work as it skips the study and survey of rural areas and small towns and focuses on the province of Punjab only. In another study (Kazi, 1994) pertaining to education system, the author has attempted to study the problem of ethnicity in the process of nation-building in Pakistan. For this, national social sciences curriculum is taken as a tool of analysis. Periods from 1947-55, 1955-68, 1968-77, 1977-89 and after are studied and a direct correlation between the nation-building approaches and educational policies are found. It is generally observed that in the social sciences curricula culture and facts about ethnic minorities are underrepresented and/or misrepresented. Much of the emphasis is on Islamic tenets and Urdu language. Besides, the educational infrastructure is not available equitably and uniformly to all the ethnic groups and regions in the country as the political and economic relative deprivation of underdeveloped regions and communities is reflected and visible in terms of educational facilities also. Such lopsided educational policies have generated frustration and disillusionment among young ones of the ethnic minorities. Hence, it is argued that fallacy of educational policies is reflective and symptomatic of shortcomings of larger nation-building perspectives of the ruling elite in Pakistan. Contrarily, a representative and judicious education system could have been instrumental in inculcating sense of nationhood among the young recruits to the social system.

Taking the issues of East Bengali ethno-nationalist upsurge and disintegration of Pakistan, the author in her study (Jahan, 1972) makes an attempt to analyse the diverse signs, symbols, idioms and institutions which were evolved by the ruling elite of Pakistan especially during Ayub Khan era and how these unnatural variables failed in the process of nation-building on empirical grounds. Author argues that efforts of Ayub Khan to integrate East Pakistan by catering to the economic needs of Bengali people failed, as it could not satisfy their ethnic aspirations, resulting in the disintegration of Pakistan and emergence of a new state, Bangladesh.

The literature on the history of Baloch race is limited. This work (Baluch, 1955) is an attempt to fill the void. The author feels that the historians have neglected the Balochs while many volumes are written on insignificant tribes. He attributes the lack of literature to the fact that the Baloch race is more at home in the war zone than
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at the scholarly desk. The existing theories regarding the origin of Baloch race are negated and the author has given a comprehensive analysis of the origin, history, race, customs, culture and clans of Baloch.

The present work (Scholz, 2002) analyses social structures of Balochistan in a historical perspective. These structures which are colonial legacies determine the political, social and economic processes even in the present time. The structures and changes that were introduced in these arrangements have inturn contributed in changing the nomadic norms of the people of the province. With the help of case studies, the author has tried to prove that the causes of changes in these structures lie in the conflict situation both at the national and tribal level.

The book (Kunda, 1994) presents an analytical description of various socio-cultural, political, economic and administrative aspects of the Balochistan. According to the study, the norms of tribalism and Sardari system are entrenched in Balochistan and mould the orientation of people towards the administrative, political, and economic development of the province. Study also describes the geo-strategic significance with its potential resources and points out that optimum realization of these potential resources can improve the socio-economic conditions of the entire society of the province.

In this work (Titus, 1998), author has analyzed Baloch and Pashtun history, tradition, customs, social relationships and organization. According to the author, one should have a sufficient knowledge of these aspects in order to understand their social and political activities properly. The first part of the article deals with the brief account of British colonial rule. Second part throws light on the common stereotype of the groups and the personal qualities of the member of groups. Subsequent part discusses the structural, ecological and historical factors responsible for the inception of these strategies. The final part examines the continuities and transformations in various characteristics of Baloch and Pashtun societies in the context of contemporary political economy of the region.

This book (Bakhsh and Baloch, 1974) is an attempt by the author to track down the origin, customs, languages and history of Baloch people. The author pursues the origin of Baloch race and its history, which is replete with wars and conquests, in detail. To the present crisis in the region, the author has devoted very little space. Nevertheless, he affirms the existence of the discrimination against the region and advocates an equal approach for all the regions.
This edited volume (Titus, 1996) articulates the discursive linguistic and ritualistic parameters of Baloch ethnicity. Some papers of the volume attempt to analyze the dynamics of ethnicity in Balochistan in terms of competitive power relations as well as competition for natural resources and economic development. The study concludes that though Baloch ethnicity has historical and cultural contents but it is also reflexive in nature particularly in the context of larger national and international order. The study further explains that conflict exists not only between competing ethnic groups but also within the Baloch consciousness itself as there is ambivalence between seeking benefits of modernization and economic development by integrating with national polity and nostalgia of a separate cultural identity.

The author in this work (Baloch, 1987) has tried to explore and analyze the problem of nation-building in the newly independent Afro-Asian states which lack a cohesive basis of nationalism and face severe problems of ethnic conflict among their nationalities with particular reference to Pakistan. However, the main emphasis of the study is on the historical background of the Baloch national movement and its demand for the right of self-determination until 1948. He has described Balochs as a separate nationality, having its own history, culture and traditions. Though Balochs embraced Islam but they regard religion as an individual’s private affair, according to the author. The strategic location and British political consideration together with internal cleavages in Baloch leadership were obstacles in the way to convert their dream of an independent Balochistan into reality. Nonetheless, impact of this great game was felt in Balochistan from time to time, which has increased political awareness and consciousness in the society.

The author in this work (Khan, 2003) has interpreted the emergence of Baloch ethnic nationalism as a response to the imposition of the centralized modern nation system, first by the British colonialists and then by the state of Pakistan. According to author, nationalism always arises out of the quest of a group for either getting share in the existing state power structure, or if that is not possible, then creating its own state.

The book (Ahmed, 1975) is a collection of articles published in the journal Pakistan Forum. It deals with the problems of Balochistan and the nationality question. The book rues the fact that even after disintegration of Pakistan no reappraisals of the policies towards the linguistic and nationalistic issues were made in Pakistan. Rather the problem was dealt with brutal and naked use of force.
This book (Harrison, 1981) is an attempt to present the volatility of the Baloch against the backdrop of worsening struggle in neighboring Afghanistan and ever increasing US involvement in Pakistan and Persian Gulf War. This book is significant as it essays the role and influence of the two superpowers in the area. It deals with Baloch problem and the involvement of foreign powers like Afghanistan, Iran, along with superpowers in the region. The author could have described involvement or non-involvement of India, which he had missed.

**RESEARCH QUESTIONS**

The study is an attempt to find answers to the following questions:

1. There is near unanimity among the scholars of sociology and political science that an ethnic phenomenon is universal one and all the states irrespective of their level of development or nature of their regimes are afflicted with this problem. Why this problem has produced conflict and violence on an unprecedented scale in developing states in general and Pakistan in particular?

2. Pakistan was created on the basis of ‘Two Nation Theory’ with Islam as the foundation, but soon after formation, why the viability of Islam to build and sustain the national identity came to be challenged by the ethnically fragmented society of Pakistan?

3. The territory that came to constitute of Pakistan in the post-independent period was virtually inhabited and divided by different ethno-linguistic groups. Even then the ruling elite continued to harp on “nation-ness of Muslims of Indian sub-continent”. With this approach, what other policies and methods did the ruling elite adopt to obviate or accommodate the ethnic differences and aspirations? Why did/did not the state structure that came into existence and other legal and constitutional provisions succeed in addressing the diverse realities and aspirations of the indigenous peoples?

4. In the post-independence era army in Pakistan not only has an edge over country’s decision-making process but has also emerged as powerful institution. It has increasingly acquired an ethnic character. What interests and role it has played in managing ethnic assertions in nation-building projects of political establishments?

5. Though the Baloch constitute the largest ethnic group in the province of Balochistan, followed by the Pashtuns, but in the wake of exodus of Afghan refugees to Pakistan during the Soviet interference in Afghanistan in 1979, the
number of Baloch has been reduced to a minority status. The situation in the province is that both the groups are in competition and conflict with one another in politico-economic and other spheres, which is the main cause of tensions and violence in the province. How far and in what manner the state in Pakistan has attempted to resolve or manipulate the same in the larger context of its nation-building project?

6. Soon after the independence, the ruling elite of Pakistan, who were mostly Punjabis and Mohajirs, imposed a centralized and hegemonic style of governance and adopted the policies of homogenization and assimilation under the rubric of nation-building and state-formation for constructing a viable national identity. What reactions and responses did this approach invite from different ethnic groups in general and Baloch in particular?

7. Federal Parliamentary Constitution was introduced in Pakistan in 1973 and for the first time duly elected governments both at the centre and in the provinces were formed. But the Baloch provincial government was dismissed on the pretext that both the Chief-Minister and Governor were planning to revolt against the centre in collaboration with the external forces. How far and in what manner this development affected the Baloch ethnic politics and its reaction against the central government?

8. As the Baloch people are dispersed across the three countries, due to the effective linkages, the Baloch uprisings in Pakistan have important spillover effects over Iran and Afghanistan. Also due to its strategic importance, certain other external forces have also played keen interest in the region. In this context what role the external factors/powers have played in ethnic politics of Balochistan?

9. The demand for Pakistan lacked support in Muslim majority provinces of British India. To what extent did Pakistan grant autonomy to these provinces in general and Balochistan, in particular? Was the autonomy able to satisfy the demands of Baloch nationalists?

10. As the state of Pakistan established a highly centralized state apparatus, where the communities were denied equal participation rather, ruthless force has been used for suppressing their ethno-national aspirations. At present since, no ethnic group is in a position to challenge the state authority; their assertions are coming out in the form of regional political organizations. In this context, what role has the organization like PONM has played in the expression of their demands?
These and related questions are the foci of this study. However, as the study proceeds some of these questions may acquire new dimensions and certain other questions may prop-up. An attempt is made to seek answers to all these problems.

**IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY**

The study attempts a detailed analysis of the problem of ethno-nationalism and nation-building in Pakistan. It provides an in-depth description of the power of ethnicity to overcome the bonds of common religion, on the basis of which Pakistan was created. The undertaken study analyses ethnic politics of Baloch people, who provide a glaring instance of an ethnic group seeking to break the shackles of centralized state and trying to regain its traditional autonomy. In this endeavor what role can external forces play, with particular reference to the strategic significance of the region, shall also be the focus of the study. Hence the study is significant as it explores the strategic, geopolitical, internal and external dimensions of the ethnic conflict in volatile, diverse and strategically significant South Asian region in general, and the province of Balochistan in Pakistan, in particular.

**CHAPTERISATION**

**Chapter 2  Dynamics of Nation-Building in Third World Countries: Theoretical Analysis**

In this chapter, the process of nation-building and state-formation in the third world countries is studied. The thrust of the chapter is to analyse the diverse models, approaches and structures pursued by the ruling elite to accomplish the task of nation-building and state-formation with compressed time framework.

**Chapter 3  Approaches and Strategies of National Integration in Pakistan**

The chapter throws light on various bases and approaches undertaken by the ruling elite in Pakistan to unite the diverse population into a single cohesive nation-state on the one hand and to construct a viable national identity, on the other. It also examines the general nature and the level of participation of different ethnic groups in the policies of nation-building.
Chapter 4  Evolution of Baloch Ethno-Nationalism in Pakistan
This chapter focuses on the historical background of social and political organization of Baloch people. The chapter further deals with autonomy/independence, which the Baloch people enjoyed before and even during colonial rule and denial of the same by the state of Pakistan. Economic grievances of the Baloch community, particularly their control over the natural resources, which are found abundantly in the province, are also taken up in detail.

Chapter 5  Baloch Nationalism and the Pakistan State
The chapter describes the resentment and festering of irredentism among the Balochs and failure of the Pakistan state to politically manage the same. The external involvement in Balochistan is also studied in this chapter. Particularly the role of USA, Russia, Iran, Afghanistan, India and China is studied in detail.

Chapter 6  Concluding Observations
In this chapter the findings of the study are summarized.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The study is based on the primary and secondary resources. The primary sources include the official documents released by the government of Pakistan and the provincial government of Balochistan. The pamphlets published and resolutions adopted by the Baloch exiled leadership are also studied. The secondary sources also include various books, journals and magazines published. The depends on the newspaper clippings to study the problem in Balochistan.
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