

Summary of Findings and Conclusion

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“There are very few men—and they are the exception—who are able to think and feel beyond the present moment”

-- Carl Von Clausewitz, (1780-1831)

The concept of security evolved as a conditioned behaviour in humans for survival and existence. It existed in its abstract form in human mental faculty since their advent on earth. Humans were the most inferior form of life in their physical design. Their superiority rested in their continuously developing mental architecture. It was designed, programmed, and upgraded by evolution to devise survival strategies. One of them, seemingly the earliest of all, was to organise themselves into groups. Gradually, in course of civilisation, nation states emerged as the strongest of all human groups. The term “national security” evolved subsequently. Along with nation building, groups based on other features of human interaction and activity also existed, beyond and within the state boundaries. The concept of “group security” was germane to them. **The term “national security” is a distinguished form of group security, applicable to nation states, the most recognised formal group system in the world.**

Though many scholars find the world a human settlement of various civilisations at a given time, there seems to be reasons to believe that the entire humanity was part of a solitary civilisation at diverse stages of development. The

stages present the impression that there is more than one civilisation. The idea of multi-civilisations in a single world at a given time is more acceptable for people when viewed from their own pedestals of security perception. There is belief that highly developed settlements truncated at times for unrecorded reasons (disorder maximisation). In spite of extinction of certain groups even at advanced stages of civilisation, humankind multiplied and developed under powerful life sustaining forces. It gives credibility to human capability to adapt to the laws of life sustaining forces on earth, and to the consequences of their violation. **Within this argument, any clash between the groups in the world is not a clash between civilisations, but a clash within a civilisation.** Civilisation is an entity of human group activity at different stages, and a function of time. It is live and vibrant. A stage will end when disorder within it is maximised. Containing the “disorder within,” is important to retain “group security.”

Today, colonialism is history and nations are free. But domination of the powerful over the less powerful continues. The attempts of domination and the stages of development of humans also give the impression of multi-civilisations. The stages of human development could be the trails of survival. They are long, winding, and continuous. Within these confinements one has to find and maximise security.

Maximising national security within the concept of a nation state is an ideal objective for any government. *Arthasasthra* and similar guidelines of statecraft and war in the days of the kings, deliberate on the duties of the “King”

towards the people of the kingdom (here the word "King" is used without gender bias). The kingdom constituted the nation. It continues to be so even today in many parts of the world. Monarchical heads within a semi democratic system still prevails in various countries. Machiavelli also elaborates about the ruler and his provisions for ruling. Within these statements the concept of a nation is clear. What needs clarification is the concept of national security. It can be argued as the security of a people in an organised group ruled by a government of its own kind. **It is the duty of the government to provide security to its people, irrespective of the form of governance.**

The threshold of security drops as humans advance in life. Demand increases and the scope and elements widen. There is rambling conflict of aspirations and power maximisation that is not easily satisfying. So the government [the King] has the obligation to induce appropriate national security threshold by governance in their people. The national security matrix is simple to understand, but the policies related to them can be complicated. Therefore, there is a need to understand and design policies unambiguously. Errors can cause irreversible policy mishaps. There is no solution to a damage done. This is the principle of chaos theory. Only mitigating measures can be taken subsequently. **A clear understanding of national security concept, its changing profile, and elements, therefore, are vital to any nation.** It is also relative to the character and aspect of each nation. While the concept of power of a nation is relative to the power of another, the concept of national security is relative to its own perception of security that can be different from the perception of another,

unless the assessments are based on the notion of apparent security and not perceived security that more often are not. **National power is not national security.**

National security is defined in many ways according to prevailing perception. This research defines national security as **the measurable state of the capability of a nation to overcome the multidimensional threats to the well-being of its people, and its survival as a nation state, by balancing all instruments of state policy through governance, at any given point of time, that can be indexed by computation, empirically or otherwise, and extendable to global security by variables external to it.** This definition is supported by a mathematical variable: **National Security Index (NSI).** NSI is the state of well-being of the people of a nation based on the aspirations of the ordinary people of that nation. It is a measurable sliding index and being an exploratory hypothesis originated during the research is outside the scope of it, and need further research for calculation and application. This study paves way for it.

Security is against threats aptly perceived. **The threat matrix cube, identified in this research, is recommended for system appreciation of threat analysis that is vital for national security assessment and strategic planning.** The "cube" does not take into consideration the wild cards: unforeseen events in the world that could cause a major discontinuity or fundamental change in national security objective. The wild cards are external to it. Any identified threat can be sited within one of the cube characteristics (type) unless accompanied by a wild card.

The concept of national security was believed to be military security based on crude military might. This is a serious contradiction within the national security concept. Human beings are designed to survive using their mental faculty, not “claws, jaws, and immunity busting techniques” of other life forms. Using the more powerful mental faculty to overcome biological inferiority is, therefore, logical and natural. **This argument undermines to a great extent drawing on violence by war or terror for perceived security and survival.** Military might is essential as an instrument of national (global) security within the scaffold of national policy. This is achievable by transforming “crude military might” into “**intelligent military might.**” It covers the broader spectrum of national security. The world, at a very slow pace, is turning into that direction. Wars will continue; intelligent military might will make it result-oriented and appropriate for survival. (The concept is not new. The mythological wars depicted in *Mahabharatha* and *Ramayana* are examples. Close to reality, the Afghan War of 2001 is a step in this direction for the first time in recorded military history. This is researcher’s perception. The statement needs closer examination.) Research indicators show that the Indian establishment is capable of developing “intelligent military might” towards the wider objective of national security by focused planning. **This capability is a buffer to the security of India, if exploited effectively.**

Transcending to self-actualisation level, where the well-being is experienced, is a mental activity. It is not practical when perceived security outgrows apparent security. The gap is filled by spirituality and belief systems in human vanity for

existence and survival. The constituent elements of national security concept were examined within these precincts. They are visible through the fog of misconception after the Cold War. This research identified 15 elements: **military security, economic security, environment security, resource security, demographic security, health security, disaster security, border security, energy security, ethnic security, food security, geostrategic security, and information security** as the constituent elements and, **cyber security and genome security** as evolving elements. They were identified from acceptable parameters by disregarding those that were conditional. The elements are mutually inclusive and complementary to each other. They are pervasive to terrain specific environments since terrains highly influence human life. **The research identified land, ocean, airspace, and outer space as separate geographical terrains, and cyber space, human mind, and the genomic matrix of life as nongeographical terrains for the interplay of national security elements.**

The ocean terrain highly influenced human life, and contributed to their well-being and thereby security. Majority of the world population are either along the coast or near to it today. But the apathy of land-based humans to the oceans was evident throughout history, barring some exceptions. It still continues to a great extent. Principles of maritime security did not receive the desired attention of governments. Maritime security is defined in this research as the **all-encompassing complementary faction of national security of a maritime nation from an ocean specific terrain assessment applicable to that nation.** Maritime nations for this

purpose are all nations, whether land-locked or geographically disadvantaged, that can enhance their security by exploiting the oceans. The factors of maritime security were identified under the concept of "geoproperty" as "**ocean property**" and not as "ocean wealth," evinced earlier in the definition of the research problem. "Ocean property" is considered to be a more appropriate term with wider connotations than "ocean wealth." It is introduced for a wholesome approach to ocean benefits of a maritime state and for the convenience of mathematical modelling. Such modelling will be required for calculating the national security index. It was a finding of the research. **Ocean property** comprises **ocean resources, ocean terrain advantage, maritime environment, and islands in the ocean**. It is historically and existentially proved. The key to maritime security lies in understanding the threat to its ocean property. **Maximising the returns from the ocean property and minimising damage to it will be the underpinning objective of maritime security policy towards maximising national security of a maritime nation.**

The maritime border security is different from the contemporary belief system of land based border management. Borderlines cannot be barricaded on water. The ocean terrain is different from the land terrain. It has varying "widths" on the borders. They are perimetric and authority bounded within the national and international legal structure. **Therefore, maritime border management is not akin to land border management.** If it has to be compared with land based boundary management (fencing, for example) then the border concept is to be seen from the outer side of maritime zones with special reference to the flanks on the coastal interface with

neighbouring countries in the geostrategic context. A hypothetical diagram of the land-border principle, if applied to the sea, is given at **Appendix M**. There are also areas outside this extension, like blocks allocated for deep-sea mining. They also include in ocean property and maritime boundaries. The model for maritime strategy and integrating maritime security with national security, therefore, has to be designed accordingly. The attempt of the researcher for such a model is only a beginning.

Futuristic perception of maritime scenario is excitingly different from the land-based approaches, as the ocean variety is yet to catch up with the developments over the land. An example is terrorism. Currently, maritime terrorism is restricted to piracy, occasional stowaways who turn hostile at sea, insurgency related attacks, providing support to land based terrorism by transporting explosive materials and crude devices, and an odd suicide attack in a harbour. Ocean based violence is probably limited because terrain specific expertise is not easy to come by. Also, the perpetrators may not get the desired propaganda since the media access is restricted by nature of the ocean terrain. But maritime forces cannot be complacent. Though the ocean is not a comfortable place to hang out, terrorists are bound to enter the maritime sphere more violently, if the “illegal mariners” who deal with piracy and other transnational maritime crimes play into the hands of militants. White-collar terrorists who threaten biogenetic modifications from the silence of the oceans on special vessels or platforms in international waters can be a different threat. Futuristic maritime strategic assessment will depend upon all these and more, linked with

military and nonmilitary elements encompassed by the ocean property paradigm and maritime border area management concept.

A maritime model should be flexible for integration with national security concept. It has to be doctrinal policy based and terrain specific; it should not be land-based. For example, the concept of boundary and joint tasking are specific to land terrain. In the ocean parlance, it is the area within the perimeter that needs attention besides recognition of elements of ocean property. The maritime model suggested in this research is based on the idea incorporating the aforesaid flexibility. It is subject to modifications as and when the “ocean blindness” and “maritime strategic ignorance” dissolve into more coherent appreciation. In the proposed model, the suggestion is to identify the ocean as a separate entity and terrain with its property elements and advantages to link up with national security. It, therefore, has to be under a separate scheme of affairs at the highest level. The “forces” available to the government are the maritime component of India. They should be unified and controlled at the national level for maritime security without mixing up or reversal of roles. The research model proposes governance of ocean terrain through a separate advisor on maritime security. Identity within jointness is important for efficiency. Each force or agency has specified roles to perform as deemed fit under a national command order without duplicating efforts. It is to be established jointly. **Merging military security by asymmetrical alliance of forces and agencies at indeterminate times with other elements of security can be costly and damaging.** That will defeat the very advantage of jointness and, therefore, should be avoided.

Importance of the oceans to national security of India was indisputably established. **India is one of the highly advantaged maritime countries in the world** strategically located midway between two choke points in the Indian Ocean that is very volatile and active. India has about 2.01 million square kilometers of exploitable maritime zones. With the delimitation of legal continental shelf, it is expected to expand by another million square kilometers by the Year 2005. It is as big as the land area with exclusive resources and advantages. In spite of this, the concept of maritime security has not taken shape in India. It has a soft maritime tradition that continues today. Organised and dedicated focus is amiss. **India lacks firm and focused maritime security policy, doctrine, strategic thinking, institutions, and practical leadership in maritime aspects. It lacks exclusivity and pragmatism in strategic maritime thinking.** While they were practically naught before independence, there were some stray thoughts of vision in post independent India. Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister of India, understood the importance of the Indian Ocean to India. But, there wasn't any serious effort to create a national maritime security policy designed towards national security. India's Ocean Policy Statement of 1982 stands in isolation within the confines of science and technology development.

India has a modern but untested navy and an evolving, well charted, but ill equipped and staffed coast guard. The rest of the maritime agencies are highly constrained. Maritime thinking is still vague and continues to be land based even within the maritime community. This is confusing. The basic ambiguity is in understanding and accepting the ocean as a separate terrain with profiles peculiar to

it. This weakness is attributed to “ocean blindness” or “strategic ignorance.” The attempt made by the government for the first time to examine India’s security concerns through the Kargil Committee Report and the recommendations of the task force that culminated in the Report of the Group of Ministers provide a beginning to national security thinking in India. But it is still military security specific and land based. National security is a wider theme. **Neglect of or militarising nonmilitary aspects of national security can spell disaster to a nation in its search for national security.** There is a long way to go for firming up the concept, especially in maritime affairs.

While there is an urgent need to understand the magnitude of the maritime advantage of India to maximise maritime security, diagnostic appreciation of parameters was not favourable for preparing a finer model. An organisational structure and interactive model, for immediate execution as a step towards it, is suggested in this research.

At the end, it is the cohesive **amalgamation of national strategic maritime community: forces, agencies, cartographers, scientists, and technologists under an effective maritime doctrine with role definition that is important for vitality in maritime security.** Defending and maximising national security of India, and to that extent any nation, involves much more than protecting it against a nuclear, biological, or chemical attack, or fighting terrorism and other forces of disintegration. Maintaining an “intelligent military might,” and establishing compact terrain specific

doctrines on each domain of national security involving strategies, policy directives, and procedures, supported by smart training and equipment under an effective all encompassing national command and control, are essential. **Ultimately it is the strength of the nonmilitary elements of national security that will enhance military security efforts.** They have the power to develop and sustain the most needed intelligent military might of a nation state. The oceans are vital to India's interests and strategy in this regard.

The research culminates with the findings that the **first three hypotheses are true and the third, partially true.** National security is an evolutionary concept and vital to a State and includes maritime security for a maritime nation like India. National security is not military security alone; it envisages a broader concept including nonmilitary elements also, towards the well-being of the people of a nation. Oceans are very important to a maritime nation and therefore need greater concern from the national security perspective. **The diagnostic parameters of India show that it is not ripe for preparing a model for "total maritime security" and its integration into the national security spectrum for maximising national security.**

The research finds that maritime India is disorganised in the absence of an articulated National Maritime Security Policy Statement, and cohesive amalgamation, integration, and role definition of its strategic maritime community. If this weakness is straightened, and priorities are defined and understood by the strategic maritime community, then **total maritime security is an achievable goal for India.**