CHAPTER III

NEW DIMENSION OF TERRORISM

Acts of terrorism have become common place events at the current juncture. In today's world, the words terrorism and insurgency have become synonymous in meaning and usage. Many claim that the insurgents have, more or less, a political foundation to support and guide their actions. Yet both resort to piracy, snatching of fire-arms, kidnapping for ransom and bargaining, looting of public or private property, and killing to achieve their ends.

The spector of political violence and terrorism has come to acquire a grave significance. In recent years, it has become a popular subject for research and enquiry. There seems to be a difference in opinion with regard to interpretation of the term terrorism by people belonging to developed nations as against those from the developing countries. While the former views the perpetators of poli-
tical violence and terrorism as pathological indi-
viduals driven by irrationality and insanity, the 
latter see them as revolutionaries dedicated to 
achieve national liberation.¹

Perceptual difference also appear more marked 
between the liberal democratic states and the socia-
list world. The socialist world like the developing 
region view insurgent groups as fighters for national 
liberation. On the other hand, the liberal democratic 
states view them as terrorists fighting against 
established order or regimes for achieving political 
or other goals by means of nonconventional and violent 
actions. Most surprisingly, the socialist states 
blame the liberal democratic states for practicing 
'State Terrorism' against insurgent groups contending 
for liberation.

The U.S. Department for Defence, defines 
terrorism as the unlawful use or threatened use 
of force or violence against individuals or property, 
to coerce or intimidate governments or societies; 
often to achieve political, religious or ideological 

objectives. The U.S. Army on the other hand defines terrorism as the calculated use of violence or the threat of violence to attain goals-political, religious or ideological in nature.²

Terrorism or sectarian violence lies at the margin of modern social order. Defined by the norms of the western liberal governments, it appears as a divergence, an extreme form of political pressure that threatens to subvert, the fragile balance of conflicting interests, upon which the stability of politics in a pluralist society exists. In a pathological sense, such acts are viewed by the state as a "Law and order problem and this inevitably means recourse to measures of a repressive nature". Far from evoking a mass outcry or protest, it further creates public pressure for tougher measures.³ On the extreme of the scale, terrorism can be employed to mobilize a hitherto passive populace and to nurture an insurgency. In a multi-racial society, where separatism or national liberation is at stake, this might involve an attempt to polarise racial or
Ethnic groups. Similarly, in an urban setting, communal groups exist in close proximity to society. Minority groups direct indiscriminate violence against the dominant groups, an action, which invites retaliation. Increasing polarization of conflict encourages more recruits to the minority groups. "This strategy was employed with some success in Algiers by the ALN but with a notable lack of success by the PLO in Montreal."  

An armed attack could be defined, as an act of violent political conflict, carried out by an organised group, with the objective of weakening or destroying the power exercised by another organised group. It is characterised by bloodshed, physical struggle and destruction of property. "When an insurgency situation reaches such a proposition, that the government can no longer control it by normal punitive measures, its action as well as those of the insurgents fall within the definition of armed attack".

Refering to Beridn Crozier on counter-terrorism,
Thomas Perry Thornton distinguished two types of terrorism:

"The first is, roughly, the activity of insurgents who wish to disturb the existing order and achieve power; the second is the activity of the incumbents who wish to suppress the challenge to their authority".6

Although they might differ in content, they exhibit a striking similarity that it is a fight for power. There is no denying that this is power struggle.

The main aim of any insurgent group is to weaken the support of the people to the regime in power. It also tries to generate a view amongst the population, that the government is on the verge of downfall. The ability of the insurgents to plan and carry out daring attacks on various targets is primarily intended to denote the importance of the established legal authority to maintain law and order. At times especially in the early phases of an insurgency, the insurgents often in deliberation indulge
in crude acts of terrorism, in order to invite repressive measures from the government. Such acts tend to reinforce the home support to the insurgent group. In a different sense, it increases the recruits to the movement. Such instances are clearly available in the insurgencies in the northeastern region of India.

"Violence and terroristic acts are typically undertaken by specialist conspirators and paramilitary organs within the revolutionary movement." Being a group phenomenon, it has an ethos, an ideology and a program to achieve its ends. Most terrorist actions in the 1960s were carried out by clandestine political groups. The percentage of identification is more clearly defined with reference to European states than in others, with regard to the responsible group identified with such acts. Legitimate organizations quite often provide the context and cover for violent action for some segment of its numbers. In the European context as well as in the case with regard to the USA and Canada, communal groups were
quite often the implicated party in terrorist activities. On the other hand, communal groups in the developing and under developed regions were rarely involved in political terrorism. Separatist movements in Africa and Asia were more likely to inspire civil wars than purely terrorist campaigns.\(^8\)

More recently, it has been reflected that terrorism and insurgency are of the same brand. But there are two schools of thought:

(i) one claiming that insurgency is altogether different from terrorism or revolutionary movements.

(ii) the other believing that terrorism and insurgency have become co-terminous terms.

Perhaps a review of existing literatures on terrorism and insurgency will indicate the extent of parameters of the two as well as difference between the two. Various authors and observers have put opinions in differing way.

Roger Perkinson\(^9\) states that "revolutionary
insurgency warfare is concerned with creating an entirely different state of affairs than what presently exists. In this sense, an insurgency is based on an offensive aim.

It can be stressed that the aim of an insurgency activity will have an offensive aim. But in the preliminary stage (when the insurgent group was still in a starting stage), it had to be in a defensive side. Because firstly, insurgency is a fight by irregulars against an organized regular force. Therefore, logically, the insurgent group would have to keep in mind that it may be suicidal for them to strike without assessing its own stage of development, strength etc., in relation to the opponent's capability. Secondly, an insurgency activity has to depend upon the population. Without popular support, it will be impossible for an insurgency activity to become a mass movement. Hence, in the first stage of starting the activity, insurgents have to do some work to convince the population. Such a work cannot be done overnight. Hence,
while carrying out such a stage if the insurgents try to take up offensive actions, they may be in a very unfavourable position or in other words, their activity may be crushed at the beginning.

But it cannot be denied that an insurgency is based on an offensive aim. What we mean here is that such an aim may be damaged if there has to be wrong tactical directions like offensive in the preliminary stage of the movement.

Despite the above facts, not surprisingly, a phenomenon has emerged in the modern days that insurgents often take up offensive actions in the earlier stages to achieve certain tactical gains.

Emphasizing upon the other aims of the insurgent, Roger Perkinson further says that "another aim or need for insurgents is the acquisition of as much as wide an appeal as possible in order to gain maximum support from the population: with this, the insurgents have the advantage of being able to promise more than they actually intend to give".
Here, it implies the need for a popular support of the population to the insurgents. To enable to get this, the insurgents have to provide a charm and confidence to the population about the cause and result which they intend to get. In the process, the insurgents are often bound to project certain ideas (either taking from other cases which have already been successful or by creating their own). Then, they create a situation that the population would come to support or sympathise their idea. And again, to challenge an already existing regime or system is not a small matter. Thus, the insurgents try to let the people feel about an altogether new regime/system which can present a promising future to the population. Accordingly, to enable to get such an advantage, the insurgent, many a times declare promises, intentionally not knowing their actual capabilities in a particular phase of the movement.

Marx and Engels\(^{11}\) have their own view as they declare that "first, never play with insurrection
unless you are fully prepared to face the consequences of your actions. Insurrection is a calculus within very indefinite magnitude and the value of which may change every day, the forces opposed to you have all the advantage of organisation, discipline and habitual authority unless you bring strong odds against them, you are defeated and ruined. Secondly, insurgency once entered into must act with great determination and be on the offensive. Being on the defensive could lead to defeat even before it has measured itself with its enemies.

Here, Marx and Engels not only emphasised the complicated and fragile nature of an insurgency but also they feel the creation of firm determination which the insurgents have to possess. Marx and Engles demonstrate that an insurgency war is not a "half hearted game" and its nature is not static. There cannot be any sort of underestimation about the opponent as the opponent is an organized, discipline and also in the status of being an authority. Marx
and Engels again mention that defensive could be disastrous for the insurgents.

As V.K. Anand\textsuperscript{12} has pointed out that "In this age of sophisticated techniques, insurgency has acquired a modern approach. Yet in another sense, it can be regarded as the same old guerrilla warfare in the struggle between man and man".

Not ignoring the influence and advantage of the technologically advanced world upon the approach and activities of the insurgents of the day, the observer signifies that the inner core of such a game called insurgency is still not changed as the same guerrilla oriented man to man fighting is still there. But it can also be mentioned that such a phenomenon of group engagement, even though, has been existing since time immemorial has now been drastically changed from the angle of causes, organisation, goal and perspectives etc. Despite these facts, we cannot ignore that the old same guerrilla warfare between man and man is still the core of the general theme of the changing parameters of insurgency.
According to Captain Steven E. Daskal, it says that "insurgents are motivated by a variety of factors, but probably the strongest is idealism... true believers. They aim to eliminate the system that seeks to eliminate their very own system".

This professional observer says that even though there are variety of factors for the origin of an insurgency, the strongest factor is idealism. It emphasizes about the degree of conviction by a group for a cause. And it also shows the responsibility and the size of the goal by indicating that it is not merely an expression of a group protest but it has to destroy an existing system with a hope to replace the system by another one.

Stressing upon the same idea which has noted above, the same observer (Captain Steven E. Daskal) further brings out that "while poverty is a factor influencing an insurgency, it cannot be stated to be the main factor. On the other hand, material wealth does not prevent an insurgency. In the contemporary world, developed countries such as Germany, Italy,
Britain and Holland are rocked with terrorism. Even the middle range countries like Argentina and Lebanon are effected by acts of terrorism.

Infact, it can be claimed that only the economic factor cannot be treated as the sole basis for an insurgency. There may be some elements which can be contributing factors for an insurgency. The observer, here again projects a synonymity of such a group violence like insurgency and terrorism by not putting a demarcation between the two by referring the two worlds of developed and developing nations.

In the light of the contemporary historical trend, success for the insurgents may be determined by two qualifying factors: (a) popular support and (b) support from foreign governments. To obtain the first, they must make their presence felt. For the second, neighbouring hostile states offer the opportunities in order to create political problems in periphærial for the established authority.

Terrorism has started to act as a definite weapon in the hands of an insurgent. Yet its advan-
tages and limitations must be evaluated in a proper perspective. It could lead to the effective use of terror to achieve one's ends. Foremost among its advantages is the economy of effort required. In quasi-mathematical terms this would mean: Less input = enhanced output. It is a weapon that promises returns for out of proportions to the amount of time, energy and materials the insurgent invest in. It leads to the projection of an image larger than the actual perspective.

The central aim of an insurgent group is its need to fracture the relationship between the legitimate authority and the mass. In order to do so, the insurgent hopes to disturb the tie that binds the ruler and the ruled within the society. In a logical sense, removal of structural supports in the society could lead to the (a) undermining the strength of the society and (b) creation of critical problem for the mass. Such a process of calculated disorientation is a characteristic of effects of terror.

In the same background, Thomas Perry Thornton^{15}
states that "since terror is a weapon having political implications it should be considered in the light of its relationship to the entire spectrum of political agitation. The insurgent's aim of political victory through the military defeat of the authorities is difficult to oppose. Their cause is pre-emptive. Their strong points of appeal of the grassroot level, local support and intelligence cannot be easily eliminated. Their self-reliance, mobility, flexibility and attraction for disgruntled youth are difficult to dismantle. Superior propaganda and supervision are of little help to the authorities".

It may be rightly said that terror tactics have started to get political touch, therefore, its relationship with political agitation or group violence cannot be ignored. When a situation has become an insurgency situation of a comparatively developed stage, it is very difficult for the authority to suppress it. Therefore, the developing stage of an internal security problem (may be a group protest or violence) has to be paid immediate attention.

Here, it will be interesting to note what
Lawrence Freedman has said. As he pointed out that "as a strategy, terrorism must be purposive". The purposes are not always easy to say distinct because of the nature of terrorism - and terrorist - but it must be distinguished from pathological violence. So for example, the assassin of a political leader may have a severe personality disorder, a grudge against the leader as an individual, a fantasy about acquiring a place in the history books, or a belief that as a result of this assassination important political changes will take place. It is only the last factor that would give the act of strategic quality. It may of course be bad strategy, not only in ethical terms but in terms of achieving the desired results, and the inadequacy of the underlying analysis. It may be verging on the irrational, in that there is only the most tenuous relationship between the means employed and the desired ends. It may be self-consciously an act of desperation. Nonetheless, this would be strategic as opposed to pathological terrorism. There is a long but by no means distinguished history of political strategies -
varieties of anarchism, such as nihilism and Blanquism based on such dubious judgments yet adopted by otherwise intelligent people. More recent versions are the Angry Bridge in Britain, the Weathermen in the United States and the Baader-Minhof gang in Germany, which grew out of the student protest movement of the late 1960s and represent a combination of extreme ideology with political immaturity.

Paul Wilkinson has a broader view about the role of terrorism as a part of insurgency in the recent years. As he assessed that "the weakness of both the international community and particular states in responding to terrorism also contributed to its increase. But since 1972, certain West European States have begun to take a firmer line; and there has been a widespread growth of elite units of special forces designed for hostage rescue, a development inspired by the success of the Entebbe, (1976), and Mogadishu (1977) rescues. But since the TWA hijack to Beirut in 1985, and the disastrous
loss of life in hijack to Malta in the same year, it has become clear that such rescue forces are not a panacca and do not necessarily restrain potential hijackers of the more fanatical type. The observer further expressed that "the shift of revolutionary theory in the Third World away from the rural guerilla concept towards the idea of urban struggle is an important feature of contemporary terrorism. European revolutionaries in the 19th century and early 20th centuries had been through a similar process. The hunger for publicity - the propaganda of atrocity - tends to drive the modern revolutionary to the cities". As one of the Leaders of the Algerian Front de Liberation National (FLN) put it, "it was more effective propaganda to shoot a couple of French business men in the middle of Algiera than to shoot a hundred or so soldiers in a lonely gully." Terrorism may even be contagious in that communications and cause a bandwagon effect. Other factors precipitating the move to cities are technological opportunity and the vulnerability of
of industrial societies and cities to terrorist techniques. There is also the growth of ideologies and subcultures supportive of terrorism in some Western cities in the countries that had the highest number of terrorist attacks in the last decade. Finally, maverick states have been active in giving sanctuary to terrorists.

Cols. Trinquir and Lachery of the French War College have defined insurgency, "as a movement against government in which the rebels have the active support of the populace.

Coror Crese O'briand has got a different view. He does not intend to mix up terrorism with insurgency. He argues that "the forces used by a democratic state against terrorist is legitimate and terrorist groups claim to be liberation movement are attempts to inject terrorist groups with legitimacy that most contemporary terrorist movements lack".

On the other hand, Laquer argues that
definition of the word terrorism has been greatly changed over the last century. "For him terrorism is now an insurrectional strategy that can be used by people of different political conventions". The observer thus deny that terrorism is no more a proposeless activity as it has got a strategic implication. Not only this, but also terrorism has got political implications and it will be difficult to isolate terrorism from political violence or insurgency activity in the light of the changing nature of terrorism.

Another observer has put up a more broader outlook on the issue. He projects that terrorism has become a kind of a systematic activity. Its frame has now been enlarged to a more extent. As he describes that "the factor of dependence upon weaponry, combined with the reliance of many terrorist movements and agencies upon a military organisational structure and style underline the close relationship between terrorism and war. Indeed many American and French scholars have been so impressed by this affinity that have tended to study terror
exclusively in the context of 'internal war' and 'problem of counter-insurgency'".

The observer further pointed out that the "basic thesis" of the social revolutionaries envisaged systematic political terror as a crucial part of a concentrated programme of worker and peasant action, demonstration, and uprising. Their terrorism is not only to help disorganize the regime but also to serve as a means of propaganda and agitation which will display itself before the eyes of the whole people, which will undermine the prestige of the governmental power. Finally, all the secret revolutionary party find terror a means of defence and of protecting the organization against espionage and treason.

Jenkins takes "terrorism as a kind of a threat of violence designed primarily to instill fear". He feels that terrorism is aimed at people and fear is the intended effect. Thus Jenkins isolates terrorism as a violence against the people without much of a political significance.
Regis Debray\textsuperscript{25} also has got an independent stand. He is against taking terrorism related to revolutionary or insurgency movement. As he says that "terrorism is to be taken as individual action. It is not related to the development and objectives of a revolutionary movement, it is independent to the historical and subjective aspiration of the masses". The observer wants to imply that terrorism does not have implication for mass movement. It is violence for individual gains.

But Paul Wilkinson\textsuperscript{26} (with reference to terrorism's global links) takes terrorism as a weapon for a revolutionary warfare. He has his own opinion as such that "terrorism has become one of the most ubiquitous and typical weapon in the most characteristic form of warfare in the modern world-revolutionary warfare. It can be briefly defined as: systematic murder, maiming, and destruction, or threat of same inorder to create elimate of terror and coerce a target into concending to the terro-rist's demands".
Here, terrorism is being perceived as a useful tactic in the process of a movement of revolutionary nature. Hence, it is not to be taken as a purposeless destruction. Terrorism and its relationship with a revolutionary or insurgency activity is now demonstrated as it (terrorism) has taken a systematic role in the process of attaining a political goal.

Quite reverse to the above idea, Benjamin Netanyahu has in his mind that "terrorism blurs the distinction between combatants and non-combatants, thus broke the central tenet of the law of war". The writer observes that not only the terrorist breaks down this standard, but also people begin to accept this standard.

The same author, again, views that "terrorist declares total war on society he attacks." For the terrorist, as the author changed that everyone is legitimate target. He expresses his feelings with regard to the unpredictable targets of the terrorist. As he puts that "a baby is a fair game
(for the terrorist); he may after all grow up to be a soldier - so the baby's mother, she gave birth to this future soldier. No one is spared ordinary citizens and leaders alike."

The observer's view goes towards an emotional direction rather than the analytical aspects. But it cannot be neglected from the point of view of the effects of terrorism on the population. What is more important here is the role of such an act (terrorism) and its possible goal for some kind of a political end (if not political gain).

Joining the same voice, another observer declares that "terrorist's strategy is premised on the ability to deliver blows, no matter what".

The U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan says that "terrorism denies the distinction between State and Society, public and private, government and individual, the distinction that has in the heart of human belief. For the terrorist, there are no innocent by standard no private citizens. Terrorism denies that
there is any private sphere, the individuals also have any right or beyond politics. There are thus no standards according to which individual citizens or society can attempt to term with the totalitarian terrorist. There is no way to satisfy his demands.

The Senator expressed the extent of the area that the activities of terrorist extends in the society. It also gives the implication that terrorism does not put criteria for selection of target. It is also true that the victim of the terrorist may not be related to the actual act or acts. But what can be traced here is the motive behind the action. It may be for a certain demand or pressure or otherwise for certain objectives. If a particular terrorist act is to be taken as such without being given a thought about the probable connections with the act and the other hidden objectives, then it can be taken as a mere crime in our day to day life which does not have much of a significance in the society or on the other hand, if we are able to
see the problem with reference to other probable connections, it may come out to be a part of a bigger game. Here, comes the possibility of the relationship between terrorism and political violence or insurgency etc., This is how terrorism becomes an important issue in the contemporary world.

Author Paul Johnson\textsuperscript{31} has his own words as "for the terrorist, there can be no hiding places. The terrorist must never be allowed to feel safe anywhere in the world". Such idea is based on the question of public support and says about the distinction between terrorism and insurgency with a logic that insurgency obtain support from the population whereas terrorism does not have such support from the population and therefore terrorist acts are to be not related to the mass.

But on the other hand, a distinguished observer\textsuperscript{32} believes that "terrorism aims at deliberate and systematic murder, maiming and menacing of innocent; violence towards political enemies and private citizens; and the destruction of public and private
property to instill fear—in order to gain political ends”. Sharing the view that the target of terrorism does not cut any demarcation, the observer does not underestimate the effects of terror tactic and its effectiveness to get political gains for an ultimate end.

A group of Indian workers\textsuperscript{33} on terrorism throws out their comment that "terrorism is not random, un-directed, purposeless violence". It is not purposeless violence unleashed by an earthquake or hurricane, both act of nature before which we are helpless. Terrorist and those support them, have definite goals and they use violence as a means to attain goals. Terrorist acts are projected in many ways from lone individual who plants a handmade explosive in a shopping centre or at a bus stop to the small clandestine group that plants kidnappings and assassinations of public figures to well equipped and well organised that use force to terrorise the entire population. The stated objectives range from separatist causes to revenge for ethnic grievances and
political ambitions.

Therefore, from the above review about insurgency and terrorism, the following assessment may be drawn:

Firstly, the claims and feelings of many insurgent groups that terrorism is not at all to be mixed up with insurgency has no valid point as terrorism in the modern age has become widely used tool for the persuasion of insurgency activity particularly in the initial stage of an insurgency movement.

Secondly, sabotage is one of the invaluable weapons of the guerrilla warfare. Both the terrorists and insurgents resorted to this technique. Hence they are of the same category.

Thirdly, both insurgents and terrorists apply the method of guerrilla warfare. Guerrilla warfare is practiced by smaller number of people against a bigger number. It is the type of a tactic for maximum gain by minimum investment. There is no rule as such
that insurgents should have a large number of personels. Therefore, determination of difference between the insurgents and terrorists in terms of size and number carries no validity. Both are of the same class.

Fourthly, in many of the cases of modern terrorist trends, some sort of a political motive for a political gain could be found. Therefore, terrorism and political violence or insurgency activity etc., become inseperable.

Hence, there is no assurance that terrorist acts would not become a part of insurgency activity and an insurgency. On the other hand, become terrorist activity. Both are reversible to each other as there is no clear dividing line between them. Thus, they belong to the same class.

As a noted scholar of International Law says the following points:

Insurgency is a war of citizens against the state for the purposes of obtaining power in whole
or part, it always implies a sustained armed struggle by a group of citizens against an established order. Thus when any group of citizens (big or small) resort to violence against an established order for the purposes of even partial political demand can be termed as insurgents. Hence, the logic of defining terrorism with the size of the demand has not to be a valid argument as terrorism is being practical by a group of people for certain kind of demand, and in the modern days - political demands, for the group itself or in support of the demands of a group or groups.

It is not surprising that the function of terror tactic was visible in French-Revolution. Terror with reference to specific ideology developed in a historical process serve as a justification for terror and can link up with existing impulses to social change - as well as with religious and racial hatred. The ideology of the French-Revolution aimed in particular at achieving a moral effect: Psychological trauma, i.e. terror, was supposed to evoke civic virtue.
Terror in the French-Revolution 'La Terreur' is the name of the period in the French-Revolution during which the revolutionary tribunal under Danton and later Robespierre held sway (from the spring of 1793 until July, 27, 1794). These historical events and their ideological or political interpretation gave the wide-spread process known by.

Karl Marx interpreted the phase of show-trials in the French Revolution as an application of a proletarian sense of power. He saw at work in this procedure the driving force of the revolution rather than it stagnation or loss of moral credit. According to Marxist-Leninist theory, the use of force is characteristics of some phase of the revolution. The violent of view a procedure legitimized by its conformity with the over all goals of world history. At the same time the terror thus legitimized is described by Marx as the historically final form of the use of force. With this the history of terror ends. Lenin demanded (and set up) a combat organization of the revolutionaries whose task was to include the antithesis, economism, within their
revolutionary action unit and to complete it by agitation and propaganda. 36

The assessment of the historical relevance of a terror system, i.e. in evaluating whether it was necessary for a detrimental to the achievement of political aims and whether it was contributed to a progressive historical development by helping to humanize the human condition, is dependent on the political standpoint of the assessor. All ideologies of terror, of no matter what historical epoch, claim to want to destroy an evil (as the group concerned perceived) at its root by neutralizing and destroying all potential carries of the evil. This goal might not be achieved because real individuals cannot be identified with the ideological image of the enemy, i.e. because opinions and conditions cannot be equated with persons. But the basic premises of a terror system blind it to this failure. On this basis the image of the enemy i.e. the ideology of terrorism legitimizes every terroristic act. 37 Thus it has become a fact that "terrorism was, and more
vividly in the modern days, has become a part of insurgency activity, and therefore terrorists and insurgents came out to be of the same category".

In the Indian case, such type of violence go toward secessionist activity. It can be confidently claimed that many of the major violent groups in the country like in the North-Eastern India and also in the Punjab are to be known as secessionist as the activities are aimed at creating a separate country.
FOOT NOTES


10. Ibid., p. 152.


16. Lawrence Freedman, "Trends in International Terrorism and the American response" in Lawrence

17. Lawrence Freedman, "Terrorism and Strategy" in Ibid., p. 42.

18. Ibid., p. 42.


21. Ibid., p.2.


23. Ibid., p. 64.


28. Ibid., p. 41.

29. Ibid., p. 41.

30. Ibid., p. 42.

31. Ibid., p. 43.

32. Ibid., p. 43.


36. Ibid., p. 130.

37. Ibid., p. 126.