CHAPTER 2

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Introduction

The much-celebrated work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, which can be summed up in the proposition “what can be said at all can be said clearly and what we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence” (TLP p. 3), expounds his early philosophy. Logic, language and the world are the three master-issues of the Tractatus. It is an investigation into the essence of language – its structure, which is revealed by logic and its function, that is, to describe the world. He had in mind to trace the limits of language and of thought as well as to investigate the foundations of language, which is the form and essence of language (Pradhan 36). In the Preface of the Tractatus, Wittgenstein brings out the purpose of the book: "to draw a boundary to thought or rather – not to thought, but to the expressions of thought" (TLP p. 3). To draw a boundary means to think about both sides.

The Tractatus is all about what can be said and what cannot be said (Barrett, Wittgenstein on Ethics 3). The earlier part of the work deals with the nature of language and its relation to the world. In the later part of the book, Wittgenstein deals with what is beyond the boundary of language. The purpose of Tractatus is precisely to show the inexpressible by exhibiting the expressible. It is an investigation which traces how far language can picture the facts of the world, and thereby points to a realm that is beyond language and scientific research, a realm
that can be termed "mystical." The prime concern of this chapter is to show Wittgenstein’s view of what is beyond the boundary of language, “the mystical” which ‘manifests’ or ‘shows’ itself by explicating what is within the limits of language. The investigation, therefore, will mainly be focused on the *Tractatus* and *Notebooks* which represent his early philosophy to bring forth the distinction between saying - all that can be described in language and showing - all that cannot be expressed in language.

### 2.1. Language, Thought and Reality

In facing the challenge, exploring the sense of the mystical, one must begin with the analysis of what can be expressed in language. In this attempt, one of the prime concerns of Wittgenstein is to bring out the relationship among language, thought and reality. This relationship is explained by the theory of meaning, which can be seen as the focal point of both phases of Wittgenstein’s philosophy. In his early philosophy, he developed the picture theory of meaning, i.e., the meaning of language is its referent. According to this theory, meaning is not simply a referent but a determinate referent. Certain inferences can be drawn concerning language and the world from the notion of meaning as determinate referent (Hudson, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* 10). The first inference would be that all that is meaningful in language must in the last analysis be reducible to what he called elementary propositions, which consist of names in immediate combination (*TLP* 4.221). The second inference would be that reality in its last analysis consists of simple objects. This necessitates elucidating his understanding of the world and language.
World and Facts

The metaphysical and linguistic concepts in the *Tractatus* are closely and essentially bound together. Wittgenstein, in his early philosophy, is primarily concerned with the logical foundation and the nature of reality. He uses the word ‘world’ as a synonym for reality. “The world is the totality of facts, not of things” (*TLP* 1.1). The world is not a mere collection of various things. From a complete description of all the things in the world, we cannot get an idea of what the world is. Similarly from a complete description of all the parts of a car, we cannot have an idea of what a car is. The world is divided into facts, and facts uniquely determine what the world actually is. Wittgenstein distinguishes between facts and things. Things which we can experience and see are empirical complexes. They can be named and described. When they are named, they function as objects, when they are described; they become facts (*Finch* 1). A fact is a set of state of affairs, and that state of affairs is a combination of objects. It follows that facts also are combinations of objects, but we can distinguish them in the following way. A fact is a combination of objects so that it can be subdivided into other combinations of objects. If these sub-groups are such that none of them can be subdivided into other combinations of objects, then each such sub-group is a state of affairs (*Parkinson* 13).

A fact is not itself some kind of object, but objects combined in a specific way give rise to a ‘fact’ ‘a state of affairs’. It is not simply a collection of objects. "In a state of affairs objects stand in determinate relation to one another. The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure
of the state of affairs” (TLP 2.032). The objects should be capable of being a constituent of a state of affairs (TLP 2.011). The complex facts are composed of less complex facts. On further analysis, we will reach a point which cannot be further divided; that is called atomic fact. Thus, atomic facts constitute the simplest possible fact or state of affairs. The world is a totality of complex facts that is constituted of less complex facts, and this is again constituted of atomic facts, which is a combination of objects. The configuration of simple objects makes up the state of affairs or atomic facts.

Language

It is language that describes the structure of reality in the form of propositions; therefore, to know the structure of language, we have to know the structure of propositions. The Tractatus gives a clear analysis of the structure of propositions. A proposition is essentially an assertion about a fact or state of affairs. It can also be analyzed into its component propositions until we reach a proposition which cannot be further analyzed. This unanalyzable proposition is called the atomic or elementary proposition (Fann 10). The truth of a proposition depends on its agreement and disagreement with possibilities of existence and nonexistence of states of affairs (TLP 4.2). An elementary proposition or atomic proposition is the simplest kind of proposition which asserts the existence of an atomic fact. “An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation, of names” (TLP 4.22). Name is an expression that cannot be analyzed or defined. The only possible way of defining name is ostensive definition, which is used in the case of something observable, that is, to point to something (The word … means this.)
since name is always the name of an object and always refers to something simple – something without parts (Fann 12).

An elementary proposition is a concatenation of such names. Wittgenstein is \textit{a priori} certain that there must be elementary propositions. However, no proposition is true \textit{a priori}. It would either be true or false. Hence, language is a picture of reality, “there are no pictures that are true \textit{a priori}” (\textit{TLP} 2.225). “In order to tell whether a picture is true or false we must compare it with reality” (\textit{TLP} 2.223). This brings us to an important point that all propositions in essence are contingent and not necessary. Since there are no propositions that are \textit{a priori} true, an expression of necessity in language is impossible. This contingent nature of propositions indicates that the truth value of it lies outside the description. The externality of the truth value of propositions leads them to the world of possibilities, not to necessities. In the domain of possibilities, a proposition can be either certainly true or certainly false. “A proposition is in itself neither probable nor improbable. An event occurs or does not occur; there is no middle course” (\textit{TLP} 5.153). It follows that there is no fact in the world that is necessarily the case. All the things in the world are on par with one another without any hierarchy. All propositions describe the same thing, namely the configuration of objects. What is of higher value is not the concern of propositions (Pravesh 9-10). Wittgenstein, in his attempt to analyze language, wants to bring out as clearly as possible the relationship of thought to reality. A proposition is an expression of a thought of reality in words (Parkinson 85).

The relationship among language, thought and reality could be understood in relation to logical forms, which are identical in the case of thought and reality. This
is to say that reality can be thought only in and through language. It is language and thought that confer these forms on reality. Though the reality is prior to language and thought, it depends on language and thought in so far as it is thought and it is represented in language (Pradhan 95). World and reality are tied down to language in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. Language is thought expressed in words about reality. It is reality or the world that makes thought possible, and thereby its expression, language.

The distinction that Wittgenstein makes between names and propositions is very important. A proposition is not meaningless even if it is not true. It depicts a possible state of affairs, but in fact it is not present. However, unlike propositions, names that have no referents are meaningless. To mark this difference, Wittgenstein says that names have referents and propositions have sense (Hudson, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* 16). The meaning of a name depends on the referential object. Therefore, in Wittgenstein’s philosophy there is a close connection between meaning and reference.17

**Picture Theory of Meaning**

Wittgenstein has established the relationship among language, thought and reality through his picture theory of meaning. Reality for him was something objective that could be pictured by language. The basic idea is: the meaning of language is that to which it refers or, in a word, its referent. The picture theory

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17 N. Malla in his article in *Indian Philosophical Quarterly*, contrasts Wittgenstein’s reference bound communicative function of language with Bradley’s reference free communicative system. In his opinion Bradley creates a gap between language, thought and reality whereas Wittgenstein tries to integrate language thought and reality by maintaining a reference bound language. See Malla 58.
exposes the relationship of language to thought and reality. Wittgenstein holds that a proposition is a picture, a logical picture. What a picture represents is its sense. The sense of a proposition is the state of affairs it pictures or represents. A proposition states that something is the case, like “The cat is on the mat.” A proposition is not literally a picture but something like a picture, in the sense that it does what a picture does. “The proposition only says something in so far as it is a picture” (NB 8).

In the preface to *Tractatus*, Wittgenstein demarcates the non-sense from sensible propositions. Sensible propositions, which depict the state of affairs, are within the limits of natural sciences. They are tautologies and contradictions and belong to the realms of logic and mathematics since they are unconditionally true and their negations are contradictions. However, any attempt to express what is beyond the limits of natural sciences is named nonsense. Metaphysical discourses such as ethical, aesthetical and religious talk belong to this category (Mallick 22).

States of affairs are elementary or atomic and correspond to elementary propositions. "Wittgenstein assumes that if we can use language to talk about the world there must be some propositions directly connected with the world, so that their truth or falsity is not determined by other propositions but by the world. He called these propositions elementary propositions" (Fann 8). An elementary proposition is a concatenation of names; a state of affairs is a combination of objects. How are the elementary propositions related to the world? There is a one-to-one correspondence between the names in elementary propositions and the objects that constitute the relevant state of affairs. Language, for Wittgenstein, is purely referential at this level; whatever is expressed in language has its reference. “…that
language at the base consists of pure names and those names only refer and do not describe” (Malla 58). The general result of the theory of the truth function is that the world would get divided into nothing but atomic facts. The elementary propositions are independent of one another. Elementary propositions are constituted of names. To Wittgenstein, it is not a mechanical collection of names but is held together in a certain way to constitute elementary propositions; in a way it can picture facts.

How are the complex propositions related to the elementary propositions? As compound propositions are composed of elementary propositions, they are truth functions of elementary propositions. A compound proposition is truth functional when its truth or falsity is completely determinable from its constituent simple propositions. If we have all the possible elementary propositions, then by constructing all possible compound propositions out of them, we can express all the propositions about the world, all the truth and falsities about the world. If one of the components is not true, then the whole proposition may not be true. Elementary propositions are the logical picture of atomic facts, and complex propositions are the truth functions of the elementary ones (Fann 8).

Language is composed of uttered sounds and written signs, and reality is composed of objects. There is a difference among them. An idea is not a sound or sign or a thing. When a book is on a table, the idea of the book is not on the idea of the table. For something to be a picture of something there should be something in common between the object and the picture. However, words and things have

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18 The independence of elementary proposition points to the fact of a pluralistic approach rather than a monistic approach in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. That is one of our prime concerns in the forth-coming chapter. It is meaning, that constitutes the basis of communication, and it is very much related to reference to reality.
nothing in common. Wittgenstein says it is the logical form that enables the proposition to picture a reality. “What a picture must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it – correctly or incorrectly – in the way it does, it is pictorial form” (TLP 2.17). “A picture has logico-pictorial form in common with what it depicts” (TLP 22.2). An example will clarify this. What is common between a gramophone disc of a certain piece of music, the notes of music and the actual sound of music? The music sheet pictures the sound in the same way that a photograph pictures a man. The photograph of a man does not resemble the man, in the respect that it does not contain skin, bone and blood, but it is his picture which pictures his form. Therefore, logically, what is the groove on the disc, the marks on the music sheet, and series of sounds have in common is form, logical form. It is by virtue of this logical form, the proposition becomes a picture of a certain fact or state of affairs. A logical picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of existence and non-existence of states of affairs (TLP 2.201). A picture agrees with the reality or fails to agree; it is correct or incorrect, true or false (TLP 2.2.21). The logical form can only be shown but cannot be spoken or written.

Therefore, the relation among language, thought and reality is maintained in Wittgenstein’s system of philosophy.19 What we can speak meaningfully and clearly are those propositions which correspond to the facts of the world. A word is meaningfully uttered when it has correspondence in reality. Language articulates only facts of the world, which is its referent. Any attempt to articulate beyond the

19 This understanding of the relation between language, thought and reality is very similar to that of the Nyaya – Vaisesika, which allows the coextensiveness of the real, the knowable and the nameable. ‘Realness,’ ‘knowability,’ and ‘nameability’ are seen as the common characteristics of the padarthas. Whatever is expressible in language is knowable and vice versa, whatever knowable is real and vice versa. See Gokhale 318.
world of facts is to run against the boundary of language, a common human tendency, and a source of metaphysical discourses.

**Limits of the Language**

If we have the totality of propositions, we will have the picture of the world. Since there are an infinite number of propositions, how will we come to the propositions that picture the world? There are propositions which are necessarily true always and under any circumstances, and there are others which are self contradictory, false under all circumstances. There are also other propositions whose truth and falsity depend upon the existence or nonexistence of the state of affairs. Both necessary and contradictory propositions are non-informative. What is informative is the contingent proposition.

Since elementary propositions always picture an observable state of affairs, what about metaphysical statements? Language is that which sets a boundary for the world. The totality of propositions is language that pictures facts. Therefore, we can speak of only facts ‘whatever can be said can be said clearly and whatever cannot be said cannot be said at all.’ Logical positivists, giving emphasis to the verification principle, reject metaphysics, but Wittgenstein consigns metaphysics, theology and ethics to the realm of what cannot be said. When we search for the ground for the non-significance of metaphysical statements in Wittgenstein, we can see two principles: 1) a proposition is meaningful if and only if its negation or denial is meaningful; 2) limits of our language are the limits of our world and *vice versa* (Hudson, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* 23). On the ground of the first principle "to understand a proposition is to know what is the case if it is true" (*TLP* 4.024); to
recognize the case if it is true I must be able to differentiate it from the case if it is
not true. Wittgenstein in *Notebooks* asserts that a proposition to be capable of being
ture it must also be capable of being false (55). Thus, “the positive proposition
necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative proposition and vice versa”
(*TLP* 5.5151). Metaphysical statements are not negatable, and therefore, are not
significant.

Coming to the second principle that language is the limit of the world and
*vice versa*, language is significant only in so far as it pictures reality. It cannot get
beyond reality, for then it would have nothing to picture. We cannot talk about what
cannot be pictured and what is beyond the reality or the world. In accordance with
the picture theory of meaning, we cannot but reject metaphysical assertions. One
thing should be noted that a great deal of the *Tractatus* itself is metaphysical, as it
goes beyond what can significantly be said. Wittgenstein attempted to avoid
metaphysical speculation in the early part of his philosophy; however, he fell prey to
another kind of metaphysics - essentialist metaphysics where meaning is found in
the essential relation between language that pictures and reality that is pictured. The
meaning of a sentence is found in the correspondence to an ontic state of affairs.
This metaphysical thought in *Tractates* can lead one to idealism or to realism. A
metaphysical reading of *Tractates* postulates the ultimate constituents of a possible
world, logical requirement of language that can represent the world, and finally the
adaptation of a mystical attitude towards what is beyond the limits of the boundary
of the language (Reid 98). The preface of *Tractates* was overlooked by the standard
reading until recently. The new interest in the preface brought forth a strong anti-metaphysical stand.

The book will, therefore, draw a limit to thinking (Denken), or rather - not to thinking (Denken), but the expression of thoughts (der Gedanken); for in order to draw a limit to thinking (Denken), we should have to be able to think both sides of this limit (we should therefore have to be able to think what cannot be thought). The limit can therefore, only be drawn in language and what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be nonsense (Unsinn). (TLP p. 3)

The project of Tractatus was to draw a limit to the expressions of thought that is language. Drawing of limits to thinking is considered as absurdity. Limits of expressions of thought and limit of thinking are not the same. Limits of thinking should extend beyond the limits of expression of thought.

A metaphysical reading of the Tractatus puts forward the nature of reality and substantial relation between language and reality enabling language to represent the reality. Metaphysical statements about the reality which try to communicate what cannot be articulated falls into nonsense (McGinn, "Between Metaphysics and Nonsense" 492). That is why Wittgenstein asserts that anyone who understands me eventually recognizes metaphysical assertions as nonsensical when he has used them as steps to climb up beyond them. When one transcends these propositions, he will be enabled to see the world aright (TLP 6.54). Wittgenstein should not be

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20 A Companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, a book from Max Black, one of the influential commentaries on Tractatus conveniently passes over the preface to silence. It is with Cora Diamond and James Conant that the preface gained its important as a new interpretative tool for Tractatus. See Howes 3.
misunderstood as anti-metaphysician. His point was that what is metaphysical cannot be articulated in propositions which constitute language and picture reality. Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysical stand is revealed in the preface of *Tractatus* and concluding remarks (Reid 97). Wittgenstein is careful to consider nonsense as that which cannot be said rather than that which does not exist. In his anti-metaphysical stand, he is concerned with the avoidance of metaphysical talk rather than the content of such a talk. The content of such a talk is what is beyond the limit of language.

### 2.2. Beyond Language

Language is the totality of propositions, which are reducible to elementary propositions and which in turn, picture the world. Therefore, meaningful language is one in which elementary propositions represent the facts of the world, and language is the limit of the world. What, then, is beyond the limits of language? Wittgenstein never rejected what is beyond the world and language, but his point was that what is beyond language cannot be articulated in truth functional propositions. It doesn’t mean that what cannot be said in language has no reality or existence (Thiselton 367). In the preface to *Tractatus* Wittgenstein states that the aim of his book is to draw limits to the expressions of thought, and he suggests that the limit of language shows what cannot be said. In setting limits to what can be thought and presenting clearly what can be said, the realm beyond that will be manifested (Atkinson 18).

As per rule for drawing limits or setting a boundary, one should be able to think about both sides of the boundary. To draw a limit to thinking, one should be

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21 Logical positivists of Vienna circle considered *Tractatus* as the crystallization of their own anti-metaphysical doctrine. They thought that metaphysics is nonsense and is to be eliminated, but Wittgenstein's prime concern was to show that it cannot be articulated in propositions which picture the reality.
able to think about both sides of that limit. One cannot draw a boundary to thinking and think about both sides of the boundary. In this case, the relevance of boundary drawing is nonsense. However, one can draw a limit to the expressions of thought that is the task of *Tractatus* and think about both sides of the boundary of expressions of thought. Thinking about the other side of the limit makes it a real limit. However, the content of thinking cannot be expressed since any attempt to express what is outside the limit of expression is nonsense (Howes 5). Wittgenstein considers some thinking cannot be expressed in language and about this one must remain silent. Any attempt to express what is beyond language through indirect means like metaphors create ambiguity in philosophy. The linguistic categories of sense and nonsense are in the opposite sides of the boundary of language. Any attempt to express what is beyond the linguistic limit is nonsense. Let us see now what Wittgenstein considers outside the boundary of language.

**Transcendental**

The entire enterprise of Wittgenstein's philosophy is about what can be said and what cannot be said. What can be said is identified with the propositions of natural science. The propositions of logic, ethics and metaphysics etc… are nonsensical, since they do not say anything about the world.\(^{22}\) They are attempts to transcend the limits of language in *language*. Though these propositions do not say

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\(^{22}\) Karl Popper, a contemporary evolutionary epistemologist, replaced the verification criteria of meaning proposed by the Logical Positivists with falsifiability as a criterion of demarcation between what is science and what is not science. For Popper falsifiability of statement depends on the empirical content, the more it says about the world – the more informative - the more it is falsifiable. If a statement says nothing about the world it is not falsifiable. He says that metaphysical statements say nothing of the world so it is not falsifiable but its position is outside the boundary of empirical science. It never determines the truth or falsity. See Popper, *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* 18-19. Though Popper has changed this position, he seems to be influenced by Wittgenstein’s idea of metaphysics, which lies outside the boundary of language. It cannot be expressed in propositions but it shows itself.
anything, they *show*. The propositions of logic, for example, say nothing; they show the formal – logical – properties of language and the world (Fann 23). Logic in relation to the world as a reflection is transcendental as it shows itself. Propositions of philosophy are non-sensical since they are attempts to say what cannot be said.

Wittgenstein’s picture theory proposes that meaningful language mirrors ‘what is the case.’ What is beyond ‘what is the case’ is transcendental. Ethics and religion are beyond what is the case, so they cannot be pictured in meaningful language. “If there is any value that does have value it must lie outside the whole sphere of what happens and is the case” (*TLP* 6.41). There is a considerable difference between what is the case and what ought to be the case. What ought to be is the concern of ethics and what is the case is the concern of language; therefore ethics comes outside the boundary of language or it cannot be articulated in meaningful language. Concerning theology, we read in the *Tractatus*: “*How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world*” (*TLP* 6.432). This means that "the world is all that is the case" (*TLP* 1) and God in as much as he is deemed to be transcendent, cannot reveal in the world because a proposition about a God who transcends the world cannot be a picture of what is the case. Hence, logic, ethics and theology all come in the realm of transcendence (Hudson, *Ludwig Wittgenstein* 27).

**The Inexpressible**

An analytic method can be applied to propositions; however, this method is not applicable to what lies beyond the limits of language, i.e. what cannot be said. What can be said, as we have seen are propositions corresponding to atomic facts.
What is beyond the propositional language is not subjected to the analytic method. The sole concern of *Tractatus* is drawing limits to establish what can be expressed in language. Thus, this limit of thought or expressions of thought shows what cannot be said. However, the last sentence from *Tractatus*, “What we cannot talk about we must pass over in silence” (*TLP* 7) is not meant to bring a simple distinction. In a 1919 letter to Ludwig von Ficker, Wittgenstein writes:

> My work consists of two parts: one presented here and all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book draws limits to the sphere of the ethical form the inside as it were, and I am convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short, I believe that where *many* others today are just gassing, I have managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it. (qtd. in Goodman, *Wittgenstein and William James* 2)

What cannot be said is signified in setting limits to what can be thought and expressions of thought in language. In the early writings of Wittgenstein, he claims that objects, solipsistic self, reality and the mystical cannot be put into words and they are beyond an analytic approach.

As we have seen in the earlier part of this chapter, Wittgenstein believes that facts are composed of atomic facts which cannot be further analyzed. However, the atomic facts can be further broken down into its constituents such as objects. Unlike Russell who claimed that these objects are self subsistent and independent, Wittgenstein claims that objects that stand in determinate relation cannot be isolated
or put into words. Objects “make up the substance of the world” (TLP 2.021). Substance is independent of what is the case – totality of facts. “One cannot say, for example, there are objects as one might say there are books” (TLP 4.1272). Wittgenstein also makes the claim that objects cannot be put into words. However, objects can be named and names are representative of objects. Wittgenstein is not concerned about any existential claim of objects. We cannot know anything about objects as objects; what we know is only the names, and names can be known only in the context of the state of affairs. The dependent nature of objects in the state of affairs brings forth the different possibilities of objects. Objects in the state of affairs contain all possible combinations of relationship. The configuration of objects in its determinate relationship makes up the state of affairs and in the state of affairs objects lack independence and self subsistence. The form of objects can be represented by names; however, the content of objects cannot be put into words. An object in its form and content is reality which is limited by objects. The objects that are not named cannot be put into words. The objects that are not named are the form of the object or the possibility of occurring in the state of affairs. In other words, objects in an unalterable form cannot be expressed in propositions and cannot be the subject of analysis (Atkinson 20-21).

The form of objects can be represented by names. However, the content of objects cannot be put into words. The form and content of objects make up reality (TLP 5.5561). Reality is limited by objects. Solipsistic self is part of reality and also cannot be put into words. Solipsistic self which is co-ordinated with reality is without extension (TLP 5.64). It is not a human being in terms of body and soul
It cannot be said but can show itself as my world. My soul is the limit of world soul. In *Notebooks* 49 Wittgenstein recognizes one world soul which is not part of the world. My soul which also is not part of the world is the limit of the world soul. My world is the reality with which the solipsistic self is coordinated. Reality here is the empirical reality that we experience as my world. Propositions, which correspond to the reality, do not tell us that the reality is, but only how the world is. Proposition reports an experience but later is an experience itself. The latter cannot be put into words (Atkinson 27).

**The Mystical**

The term, “the mystical,” is used mysteriously by Wittgenstein in his philosophy. The adjectival use of the term “mystical” indicates the inexpressible. The term appears four times in his published works, three times in the *Tractatus* and once in *Notebooks*. Now let us see the *Tractatus* version of mystical. “It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists,” “Feeling the world as a limited whole – it is this that is mystical,” “There are indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical.”

In what sense is the term mystical used? Though there are various meanings attributed to this, let us consider two prominent ones. The first one is the traditional spiritual one as being in union with God or the Ultimate Reality; the second one is wider, mysterious and awe-inspiring. It seems that Wittgenstein uses the term mystical in the second sense. The *Notebooks* confirms this. “Aesthetically, the

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mystery is that the world exists. That what exists does exist’ (86). It is an experience of amazement and astonishment; it is a feeling of wonder. In the Tractatus this experience that the world exists is called ‘mystical’ and in Notebooks it is called a ‘marvel’ or as Anscombe translates a ‘miracle.’ In both cases what is meant is the same.

The experience of the world as a bounded whole is mystical. To regard the world as a whole, totality of facts transcends the individual facts and cannot be expressed in propositions. To view the world as a bounded whole and contemplate the world from outside temporality is mystical. This view of the world as a whole and contemplating it from outside is mutually dependent. ‘World exists is mystical.’ World is not the name of a simple element, and therefore cannot refer to or signify any fact. Since ‘world’ does not signify anything, we fail to give meaning to ‘world’ in the statement ‘the world exists.’ Existence is predicable only of those signs that express the possibility of becoming the constituent of proposition. All that we can say about mystical is that it consists in seeing the world as a bounded whole and marveling and wondering that anything at all exists. As the picture theory suggests, what is expressed in statements (propositions) are the pictures of facts. Statements of the mystical are not statements of facts; therefore, they cannot be expressed in words. It is beyond the boundary of language, and therefore, it is inexpressible. The mystical is the same as that which cannot be subsumed under the concept of a proposition (Roy, "The Mystical" 267-269). To understand the world as a limited whole and there is a realm beyond the limited world is ‘the mystical’ which cannot be articulated in words.
Understanding the logic of language is mystical. Understanding the logical structure that represents the structure of reality – what can and what cannot be the case – is the mystical (Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics* 75). They are mystical in the sense that they are inexpressible and show themselves. It is concerned with the “thatness,” not “howness” of the facts that constitute the world. Propositions can represent the whole reality, but they cannot represent what they must have in common with reality - logical form - in order to be able to picture it. The form itself cannot be represented but must be grasped intuitively, and that is mystical.

Wittgenstein’s two further accounts of the mystical are the feeling of being absolutely safe and the experience of feeling guilty. The feeling of absolute safety is mystical in the sense that no matter what happens to us our equilibrium is not disturbed. Whatever happens can have no effect on our life. We accept it as accidents of life; it neither surprises nor hurts us. To be indifferent to facts, to live without fear or hope, involves a feeling of being safe, no matter what happens (*NB 74*). It can be seen as a further step of the experience of wonder that what is, is. It is a move from an experience of wonder to a total acceptance (Barrett, *Wittgenstein on Ethics* 81). Another experience is that of guilt. If one feels insignificant, looking at the world as whole with wonder is mystical. Cyril Barrett is of the opinion that “Feeling of absolute guilt is the reverse of the feeling of wonder” (*Wittgenstein on Ethics* 75).

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24 There are typically two types of knowledge named cognition and intuition. Cognition is knowledge through symbolism whereas intuition is a direct and un-symbolic awareness of, or insight into reality. Cognition can be expressed and communicated, while intuition is inexpressible and incommunicable. Schopenhauer, who distinguished direct and indirect apprehension of reality, might have influenced Wittgenstein in this regard. Alexander Maslow in commenting on the *Tractatus* says that “What is grasped by intuition is a case of what Wittgenstein calls the mystical.” Ses Maslow 56.

Wittgenstein seems to view that all religious terms as similes or allegories. When we speak of God who sees everything and we kneel before him, it allegorically expresses our feeling of being absolutely safe in the hands of God (LE 10).

The mystical, as opposed to the scientific, has no questions and answers; it is an experience of wonder at the existence of reality. Wittgenstein distinguishes between what is scientific and what is mystical. What is scientific is the facts of the world which can be articulated in propositions, and what is mystical is an experience of wonder at the existence of reality that is beyond the reach of language and cannot be articulated in propositions. “I believe the tendency of all men who ever tried to write or talk Ethics or Religion was to run against the boundaries of language” (LE 11-12).

The mystical in Wittgenstein’s philosophy can be understood as an attitude of mind which realizes the meaning of life. The mystic may find the sense of life or sense of the world becomes clear to him; this is the case of the happy man for whom life is no more problematic, that is to say he is in agreement with the world. Another possibility is that he may remain a prey to doubt as to whether life has any sense (McGuinness, “The Mysticism” 316). According to Wittgenstein, “the world of a happy man is a different one from that of an unhappy man” (TLP 6.43, NB 78e). The happy man is more harmonious with whatever happens in the world. In this context, it is proper to mention his view of will as an attitude to the world. I have no control over whatever happens, whatever happens, happens accidentally. It may or may not coincide with my wishes. What is in my control is to make my wishes coincide with
whatever possibly happens. In that case, I am accepting the world. The *Notebooks* makes clear that both the realization that the world is my world, the identification is with the world as a whole and the ability to live in the present are essential parts of happiness (74-75). The essential feature of a harmonious or a happy life is transcedent one which can only be shown (Choudhary 70).

Though it is possible to explain the “mystical” in the *Tractatus* without making any necessary connection with religion, we can trace a connection. For Wittgenstein "it is not how things are in the world that is mystical but that it exists" (*TLP* 6.44). He had an indifferent attitude to how things are in the world. That is very clear from a conversation with Waismann on religious language. "For me the facts are unimportant. But what men mean when they say, “The world is there,” lies close to my heart" (Waismann, “Notes on Talks with Wittgenstein” 12). It is reasonable to conclude that there is a close relation between what is stated in the *Tractatus* as ‘the Mystical’ and religion (Keightley 27). However, it is not necessarily related to theistic mystical experience, as it is traditionally understood.

**God, Meaning of life and Prayer**

Wittgenstein makes a remarkable distinction between two godheads including the world and the independent I (*NB* 74). What can be said includes the world, facts, and propositions of science and understanding of world in terms of *how it is*? What cannot be said consists of my independent I including the expressions of thought and the world in terms of *that it is*. God and meaning of life belong to the second godhead that is my independent I. The knowledge of God and the knowledge
of meaning of life are made possible from the knowledge that the world exists (Atkinson 127).

Wittgenstein’s introduction of the relationship between the eye and the visual field in *Notebooks* gives an important clue to understanding the relationship between God and the world or in a way what can be said and what cannot be said. The eye is not in the field of sight; thus the eye cannot be made into the object of sight. The existence of the eye is understood from the necessary relationship between the eye and the visual field. Same relationship exists between what can be said and what cannot be said. However, it is necessary to examine the relationship between God and world. Understanding the proposition "God does not reveal himself in the world" (*TLP* 6.432) in this context needs further explanation of “in.” In the case of the eye, it does not reveal itself in the object of sight, or as in the case where thinker cannot be turned into the object of thought. In the above cases, the word "in" indicates a demarcating point between the opposites. In the case of thinker and thought, the eye and object of sight there exists a mutually exclusive and dependent relationship. There is no separation between the two in each case. The same type of relationship exists between God and world. However the world is not my world. It is the world of facts. The proposition, God does not reveal himself in the world draws the distinction between God and how things are in the world. It means God cannot reveal himself in the world of facts. Thus God lies outside not inside the world of facts or of what can be said. There exist a co-dependent relationship between God and the world (Atkinson 128-29).
To talk about God is something self-contradictory in Wittgenstein’s early philosophy, since it goes against the boundaries of language. Here let us try to articulate what he has tried to say, what cannot be said in his earlier works especially in *Tractatus* and *Notebooks*. There are certain references in the *Tractatus* regarding God. God cannot create anything contrary to the laws of logic. He cannot create a world in which two contradictory propositions are true (*TLP* 5.123). Wittgenstein puts a logical prohibition to God’s entry into the world. If God is conceived as the creator, He cannot be part of the created world. If he is part of the created world, He is not a genuine creator.

The philosophical point, that the concept of the higher, to which values like ethics, aesthetics and religious beliefs belong, is strengthened by another proposition of the *Tractatus*. “How things are in the world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world” (*TLP* 6.432). This proposition seems to go against those religious traditions of the world which believe in a God who has revealed himself in the world in one way or other. It prohibits all theories of incarnation and re-incarnation of God which serves as the foundation of many world religions. Re-incarnation makes no sense unless the incarnation theory is accepted. If the incarnation theory is accepted once, the re-incarnation theory cannot be rejected (Maudgil 73). When we consider this proposition in the context of the whole philosophy of Wittgenstein, we can see that it is impossible for God to reveal himself in the world. Since what we have in the world are only facts or states of affairs, God cannot reveal himself as a fact or state of affairs which constitute the world (Tripathy 15). He cannot be a part of the world, or one among the facts. “God
is not factuality” (Roy, "The Mystical" 272). It is in the realm of higher where values are. The transcendental status of God is emphasized.

Wittgenstein has made some remarkable entries in the celebrated Notebooks, supporting the proposition of the Tractatus that “the world and life are one” (TLP 5.621). The meaning of life and the sense of the world are synonymously used in Notebooks. The meaning of life is not understood in its traditional sense of purposiveness. The meaning of life for him is simply the sense of the world, that which makes it intelligible. The facts in the world happen to be there and are not intelligible in themselves. The sense of the world lies outside the world of facts. What is outside the world is the value that gives sense to the world. “The meaning of life, i.e., the meaning of the world, we can call God” (NB 73). We can call this higher that gives sense to the world, God. Cyril Barrett interprets this proposition in the following way: “It could mean that God is not a being, but the name we give to explanations of facts at a higher level. ‘God’ is a composite or portmanteau word for ethical, aesthetic and other values with which we grace the world” (Wittgenstein on Ethics 98). Another entry regarding God in Notebooks is the simile of father. However, this notion of God as father is not like the Biblical God who is considered a compassionate and loving father. What Wittgenstein has in mind, commentators say, is God as fate or reason for everything that happens. The meaning of the world or meaning of life is God, and meaning is not a being. The relationship between God and meaning of life is that to believe in God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. To believe means to understand that there is more than facts. One can know about God is that this world exists. The world exists is not a fact, but
a feeling that the world is a limited whole (TLP 6.4). This belief is not to be considered as normal usage. To believe means to understand the question about the meaning of life, that is to recognize that all possible questions are put into words and answered. The question of the problem of life remains untouched; to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter referring to the fact that the answer to the problem of life lies outside the language; to see that life has meaning referring to a feeling of dependency on what lies outside the language – God (provisional name) (Atkinson 132).

Wittgenstein also mentions human powerlessness and dependence on something that is independent of our will, that we may call God or Fate. The givenness of the world and powerlessness to steer the happenings of the world are related. We are masters of our own destiny to a very limited extent. “I cannot steer happenings of the world according to my will, but am entirely powerless. I can make myself independent of the world and then in a certain sense master it only in so far as I renounce any influence on its happenings. The world is given to me i.e., my will enters the world entirely from outside as into something already there” (NB 73).

The concept of God and belief in God in early Wittgenstein are closely connected to the world as it is and the meaning of life and the sense of the world. God is the one who is transcendent and in a way outside the boundary of language; any attempt to give an account is to run against the boundary of the language. The meaning of life is ethical in that Wittgenstein believes a person who follows the good life is one who lives as the willing subject in the present. Living in the present
means to view the world as *sub specie aeternitatis*. This means to view the world as a limited whole and contemplate this world in this way is mystical (Atkinson 89).

Prayer is conceived as thought about the meaning of life and the sense of the world. This prayer is not the prayer of petition, but philosophical contemplation in which we think about the sense or meaning of the world which lies outside the world of facts. “To pray is to think about the meaning of life” (*NB* 73). Thought itself is prayer. In other words thinking is praying, thinking how the world is ‘that it is’, is prayer.

“To believe in God is to understand the question of the meaning of life, to see that life has meaning.’ Wittgenstein says further in the *Notebooks*, “To believe in a God means to understand the question about the meaning of life. To believe in a God means to see that the facts of the world are not the end of the matter. To believe in God means to see that life has meaning” (*NB* 74).

**Word and Silence**

“What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence” (*TLP* 7). The whole of the *Tractatus* is expressed in this concluding proposition. This is the climax of what was elucidated in the *Tractatus*. Commenting on this proposition, McDonough calls this Wittgenstein’s “doctrine of silence” (McDonough 236). What is uttered is word or language, and it is meaningful only when it pictures the reality – the facts or states of affairs. What we can speak is all about the facts in the world.

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26 Martin Heidegger insists that thinking is thanking. “As we give thought to what is most thought-provoking, we give thanks.” The thanking man wonders at all ‘that is’. He wonders at the splendor of Being. Man’s privileged relationship to being is more tangibly exercised in his thanking-thinking that ‘shepherds’, ‘houses’ and listening to Being. See Heidegger, *What is Called Thinking* 146.

27 This is taken from the title of a book by Raymond Gawronski, *Word and Silence, Hans Urs von Balthasar and the Spiritual Encounter between East and West*.
Language sets a boundary. Boundary always presupposes two sides: one-side, words and the other side silence; word and silence (Gawronski 1). Wittgenstein has never said and would never have said that metaphysics is nonsense. What he said is that the attempt to say anything at all (in the sense of stating propositions) about what is beyond the world will result in nonsense. Wittgenstein's anti-metaphysical stand is manifested in the preface of Tractatus and he criticized the traditional metaphysicians who presented their theses in propositions (Fann 26).

Metaphysics, ethics, and religion belong to the realm of the transcendental, which cannot be said but only shown. The whole enterprise of the Tractatus is to show what is inexpressible by expressing clearly what can be expressed. Language is used to show the realm where language fails, or word is uttered to show the realm which word cannot represent but only show. What is beyond the boundary of language cannot be articulated in words and so needs to be passed over in silence. It is the mystical that shows itself. This is very close to the treatment of the mystical in the Eastern religious traditions like Hinduism and Buddhism where the negative way of articulating the ultimate Reality is widely prevalent. Though Wittgenstein was in favor of a religion without speech, he didn’t rule out the occurrence of speech, which for him is an important religious behavior, not a theory (Creegan 78). He was highly critical about the conceptualization and dogmatization of religious

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28 With regard to saying and showing we could make a comparison with Heidegger. Wittgenstein’s notion of what can be shown closely parallels what Heidegger puts under the primal Saying. It is of a letting-be-seen, always in its ‘presenceing.’ We are listeners to the primal Saying. Both these thinkers express their wonder at existence.

29 The negative description the Ultimate Reality (neti, neti) is very well known in India. Moreover Wittgenstein’s approach to religion as thoughtless and speechless (mystical) comes very close to the Indian classical approaches. For example, yoga system speaks of citta virti niroda - cessation of all mental fluctuations.
experience. Metaphysics and religion are beyond language, and they show themselves. Man wonders that anything exists. That is beyond words, only silence.\textsuperscript{30}

\textit{Tractatus} ends not with statement about silence but really in silence. The purpose of the book as stated in the preface is to make clear what can be said, and what cannot be said is to be passed over in silence. At the end of the book after making the clear distinction between what can be said and what cannot be said, one transcends the level of language, that is silence, a subject that cannot be predicted.

\section*{Conclusion}

Early Wittgenstein was very much misunderstood as anti-metaphysical. He was considered one of the leading figures of Logical Positivism, which rejected metaphysics out rightly as meaningless since Positivists were very much concerned about empirical verification for the meaningfulness of statements. Wittgenstein advocated the correspondence theory of meaning in his early philosophy, but he never rejected metaphysics. His point was that metaphysical statements could not be articulated in propositions, which is the right language for him. The metaphysical statements are not in the category of science. They are outside the boundary of empirical science. He was against the conceptualization and dogmatization of religious beliefs and looking for proofs for the existence of God. For him, all these are outside the boundary of scientific scrutiny. He explicated what is beyond language by the analysis of the relationship among language, thought and reality. What is beyond language is ‘the mystical,’ which cannot be articulated in words;

\textsuperscript{30} Word represents the world, and silence represents what is beyond, the mystical. Words are articulation of thoughts about reality. This is an eastern mystical approach where we can see that there is no thinking about reality that it is an experience of simply ‘to be.’
religion comes in this realm. What he advocates in his early philosophy is a religion of speechless faith. Wittgenstein does not rule out religious language completely. Speech occurs in religion, but it is a part of religious behavior not as a theory. Wittgenstein would have thought that something ineffably shows itself through religious language; religious language speaks for itself. There is something unutterably contained in what is uttered in religious language. Therefore, the proper language – propositional – cannot be applied to religion. What cannot be said can be seen, since it shows itself? Such is religious language in Wittgenstein's early philosophy.