CHAPTER II

LANGUAGE-USE AND THE STATUS OF CORE COMPETENCE
CHAPTER II

2.1 Introduction

In this chapter I set out to bring the two major notions, i.e., 1. code/meaning being variable and in flux (i.e. tentative) and 2. every act of languaging or meaning-making as instantaneous and ever-creative as it keeps augmenting or adding on to the variable and tentative core, nearer to a manageable teaching paradigm as I move from essentially areas in philosophy of language (Merleau-Ponty and Tyler, and the aspect of Saussure that I have seen) towards areas such as Psychology and Applied Linguistics and Language Acquisition among others. Again as I discuss these two ideas the strict demarcating lines between disciplines and genres of disciplines tend to get blurred. I pick and choose from trends of thinking in areas which I consider relevant for language teaching of the kind I envisage (Chapter III).

The notion of 'meaning' as constituted in languaging is not totally given up as having been entirely substantiated. I keep coming back to it implicitly or explicitly when I discuss the one 'core' knowledge, i.e., the language system/core. At the end of the chapter I draw nearer to constructing the paradigm/model for language-teaching that I think is useful for all types of language teaching including
English as a second language. The actual model though is completely constructed in the next chapter.

2.2 Poetic and Referential Functions in Language Communication (Jakobson)

I will open with two notions of Roman Jakobson's viz., the rhetorical figures of metaphor and metonymy. (The references to and discussions of Jakobson's position here are taken mainly from Jakobson and Halle, 1956, Fundamentals of Language and the Section on Jakobson in Hawkes, op.cit.). In his attempt to incorporate a theory of poetics within his stand on (general) linguistics, Jakobson (1956) shows the relationship of these two notions to Saussure's 'horizontal' and 'vertical' constructs - the processes of selection and combination which underlie the act of signification. These two concepts, it has to be noted, are the paradigmatic and syntagmatic 'structure' of the act of signification which also point to the synchronic and diachronic elements of language. These parallels are important; parallels of metaphor, paradigm (super-imposition), selection, verticality and synchronic or of the present; and of metonymy, syntagm (contiguity), combination, horizontality and diachronic, or of the past.

To come back to Jakobson's metaphor and metonymy: both these are concepts of equivalence, i.e., they propose a different entity as having equivalent status to the one that
forms the main subject of the figure. Yet metaphor invokes equivalence through the notion of simultaneity, by superimposition of one entity on the other - while metonymy does it by sequential association. The next point that Jakobson makes is that poetry especially Symbolic and Romantic poetry works more in/by metaphors while 'realistic' prose works with metonymy. Poetry attempts a 'thickening' of language - a deliberate attempt at ambiguity; while (realistic) prose apparently attempts through discourse or narrative and sequential ordering more of a reference to a context. Though sure enough, there isn't this kind of a water-tight division, either, about use of metonymy and metaphor. Any act of language makes use of both super-imposition the selection principle and the contiguity or sequential principle. Thus any poetic use of language draws on both the selective and the combinative modes as a means for the promotion of equivalence.

"... similarity superimposed on contiguity imparts to poetry its thorough going symbolic, multiplex, polysemic essence ... Said more technically, anything sequent is a simile. In poetry where similarity is superinduced upon contiguity, any metonymy is slightly metaphorical and any metaphor has a metonymical tint."

The next important point that Jakobson makes is that the poetic use of language is not in any way confined to poetry, novel-writing or other literary work. It is part of every normal-day use of language. It is only due to other commitments by way of 'functions' that 'normal' use of language is not predominated by this use/function, viz., the poetic function. Let us look more closely at Jakobson's stand on communication itself and the functions of language.

Any communication is a sum total of the six components of addresser, addressee, context, message, code and contact. It is a dialectical balance among these six factors, which is responsible for the total act of communication or meaning conveyance (I prefer meaning-making). Meaning does not lie in any one of these factors. Every act of languaging is a delicate balancing act among the six components with one or the other predominating in any one act of languaging.

The predominating factor depends upon the functions that languaging is meant to fulfil. Thus when the functions of a specific act of languaging is the 'referential' function the component 'context' predominates (with all the other components present yet 'subdued') and when the 'poetic' function predominates the 'message' component is the predominating element.
It is important to remember that for Jakobson every languaging act contains all the functions in their specific quantities or proportions — only at one point in one act of languaging, one function and hence one component of communication predominates. I will take up a discussion of the referential and poetic functions of language since these two are the relevant points for my argument about languaging (see Note 3).

The characteristic of the poetic function of language is that it makes "palpable" the signifier-signified relationships, i.e., it shows up the "fundamental dichotomy between signifier and the object" (Jakobson in Hawkes, 1977:86) (See in this context Saussure's stand on signification discussed in the previous chapter). Thus when language is used 'poetically' it simply does not refer to any object outside of itself — it does not bear towards a context outside language. Language use here becomes highly self-conscious, exploring its own basic non-referentiality. In other words, it refers if at all to itself. (I shall come back to this self-reference of language presently, below.)

Let us look at the referential function of language first. When language is used referentially it gears, itself, as we have noted, towards the context and attempts reference to a 'world' outside language. Now I will add my point to
Jakobson's here: thus though it is the signification process that here also is used, its basic/actual quality of non-essentiality is not *made* "palpable".

2.3 Constructed 'Convergence' in Language Communication: Some Parallels

Let me now recall the parallels that I draw between metonymy, reference (discursive, narrative, sequential/contiguous non-ambiguity etc.), and metaphor, non-reference (super-imposition, simultaneity, ambiguity etc.). When language is used for non-poetic non-aesthetic reasons, for more 'mundane' ones like for instance referential 'objective' passing-on-of-information reasons, a gearing to context takes place, and a resort to discursive sequential ordering (with implicit selection also because we have to remember that all uses involve both the dimensions of selection and ordering) - a statement moving towards disambiguation takes place. This is also more of a tilt towards the diachronic (the past, the 'stored', the given). 4 and 5

For me all these parallel concepts touch very interestingly upon the notion/idea of constructed 'convergence', a move towards a common conceptual core meaning, that I have been exploring all along (and more extensively in the first chapter). This basic factor of 1) structuring need (a need to symbolise or know the world 'at a remove' (Vico) which involves
structuring and which in its turn leads to, 2) a deliberate construction of a shared and shareable world, yet which structuring need also, 3) provides the entry into creativity through the very process of structuring it adopts, has been my theme.

In Jakobson's theory, the strands that I pick out for my argument are provided in his description of the poetic function (especially as making the signification process palpable) and the referential function and his stand that the former is not the prerogative of literary work; but is present in all language use (see discussion on Widdowson below). This last is what provides me with the strength to argue that in referential use of language what is done is a voluntary agreement on or construction of reference since the referential meaning is also a consequence of the act of signification (which is not palpable) rather than reference to a 'common' world outside.

Though a discussion of Jakobson provides some points about the act of communication, i.e., what is done in languaging (see my second question at the beginning of the chapter) yet, it has only been a derivational point; Jakobson provides insights about the nature of language itself; and since any discussion/model about the nature of language implicitly incorporates the stand on the process of language use or
communication it has been easy to derive ideas about the act of languaging also. To repeat, I claim (suggested obliquely by Jakobson) that in all acts of communication/languaging, are present both a need for reference ('common' construction) and a way for individual message construction (which presence is what makes even the referential use of language potentially a dynamic changing phenomenon).

What has emerged in Jakobson is that there are different kinds of meanings - outcomes - metaphoric, referential etc., depending upon functional orientation given; a concentration on message or a concentration on context. The process accordingly becomes one of 'thickening' or one of disambiguation i.e., one of referring; both, however, being processes of signification, only with the process more palpable in the former.

2.4 Meaning in Intersubjectivity: Jerome Bruner

More light on this concept of a 'need' for common meanings is thrown by Jerome Bruner (1980). Here, (in his Afterword to the collection of essays in his honour edited by David R. Olson under the title The Social Foundations of Language and Thought) he attempts to show the biological roots of socialisation in the human child. The human child is biologically pre-disposed towards "sharing" a world with his/her interlocutors. Quoting experimental data, Bruner says that there
is this biological pre-disposition for the child to 'follow' an object - but only when eye-contact is maintained with the concerned caretaker. Bruner concludes that a world is thus acquired by the child in 'intersubjectivity'.

Two points are made here: 1) the assumption that there is a world outside, 2) and that the world is shared by the others. This 'ostension' is a seed of reference, one of the bases of the child learning language through the establishment of intersubjectivity through interaction with its elders. This, however, is only the starting point for other speculations from Bruner. He goes on to point out that 'language' is the repository of 'culture' (a socially built-up construct which the child learns through interaction with its caretakers) because it is highly sensitive to context - a reference to the speech act theory - a theory of intentionality is a sure pointer here. This sensitivity to context would mean that 'language' is subject to the societal norms, at least to the extent of those norms as revealed in the Gricean maxims (see Grice, 1957). This would mean, to repeat, that 'culture' is 'contained' in language - which makes 'knowledge' itself passed on through language, a cultural construct - highly sensitive to context. And this would logically mean that not only language knowledge but any other kind of knowledge is acquired in intersubjectivity - in interaction - which again means that knowledge is a community 'shared' construct.
(What is contained behind words is a socially distributed -
shared core whose dimensions are learnt only in the (social)
exchange of information, i.e., in interaction.)

The question for Bruner is what are the implications of
this kind of a human being who is socialized into knowledge -
who 'imbibes' as knowledge the pre-suppositions implicit in
the specific community to which he/she belongs. Along with
Popper Bruner wonders about this 'technology-prone' human
being - a human species living by the prostheses of World
Three (see Popper, 1979).

To me this concept of prostheses of World Three echoes
the structurality that rules human meaning-making endeavours.
As Vico (quoted earlier in Chapter I) says, the dominating
human characteristic when coping with meaning is to construct
'structure' and submit to the structures. Thus the shared
knowledge core that Bruner talks about is the human characteris-
tic of constructing structures or simply structuring - i.e.,
reducing the richness (that the act of signification involved
in any symbol use provides, in the innumerable variations of
shifting semantic configurations) in order to find a common
conceptual core meaning, or a striving for objectivity - or
again, finding structures; and the influence of these
structures - the extent of the influence speculated about by
Bruner - is the consequence of the related characteristic of
human beings to submit to structures.

So, we come back to Bruner's question: What happens to
the languaging human being? A human being who acquires
(shared) knowledge by co-operating and in intersubjective
interaction?

2.4.1 Communicative and Analytic Competences: Bruner Continued

To me again, this question of Bruner's emerges in a more
interesting form in one of his earlier papers. There (Bruner,
1975) however, what fascinates Bruner is not the sharedness
of the world of human beings as it comes through in language
acquisition studies, but a human being who exploits (or puts
to its ultimate logical use) the same tool which allows her
this shared world. Let me briefly recount what Bruner argues
for in that paper:

Bruner postulates two kinds of language ability - the
first one he calls the 'species minimum' under which he
assigns linguistic competence, (more or less what Chomsky
means by it) and communicative competence (corresponding to
the pragmatics of language use including the Gricean maxims
of co-operativeness). This 'species minimum' "of course
constitutes an enormous evolutionary step for Homo ..." (Bruner, 1975). But it is the second kind of ability which is more relevant to Bruner's thesis. "It is when one uses language beyond this minimum level that it alters, or indeed transforms the nature of the thought processes in a special way" (ibid.:70). This 'competence' which makes for modes of thought beyond either of the other two competences, Bruner names the 'analytic competence':

"... its principal feature as with Piaget's formal operations ... is that it involves the prolonged operation of thought processes exclusively on linguistic representations, on propositional structures, accompanied by strategies of thought and problem-solving appropriate not to direct experience with objects and events but with ensembles of propositions."

(ibid.:72)

Bruner here, is exploring the idea of a beyond the everyday language-use which facilitates a beyond the every-day conceptualisation, or thinking process (this would be reality-creation for me).

In essence what Bruner is saying is, that at this stage linguistic ensembles themselves constitute concepts or reality and they can as in their conception be operated upon only through the same medium or tool; it is not translatable into any other mode. The tool and the product upon which they act are of the same stuff. A person who uses language to create
thought/reality exists in a reality which is unique, a language-reality, a linguistic reality.

Let us look at some of the characteristic features of language itself according to Bruner which make language such a fitting tool and medium towards this cause. Bruner, in his analysis of the features of language, starts with a questioning of what is involved in learning a language.

"... in learning words or meanings, either to utter or to comprehend them, one must master a set of component procedures relating to their use - what is implied or presupposed, for example, in using the word 'bring' ... it is ... like assembling a set of procedures for a computer program that would, when the sub-routines were put into action, be able to effect bringing. Meaning then becomes the capacity to compile 'the' set or some sub-set of the procedures relating to or pre-supposed in the action of bringing, such as 'hold', 'transport', 'keep in possession' etc."

(ibid.: 65-66)

These pre-suppositions (or sub-set of procedures) though they resemble computer-programming, being components of natural languages, are not analysable and exhaustible like in a computer program. Natural languages are too rich for such precise analysis. "... achieving an atomic level of simple performable operations may turn out to be harder and different and longer and only partially successful and therefore the
Oxford English Dictionary for all its richness does not succeed" (Ibid.). Bruner goes on to argue for a case of learning languages as in the first place learning to execute a set of procedures which are action-related. It is the resemblance between these learnt action-related sets of procedures and language meaning that enables the child to 'discover' meanings in words and sentences which are also action-related. A combination of action-related 'one-word-sentences' and gestures and actions is what eases a child into a language. And scope for such combination are necessary for language acquisition. "It is this requirement of combination that makes appropriate pre-linguistic experience necessary in early language acquisition" (ibid.:67). (See also in this context, Widdowson (1984):

"But recent research in first and second language acquisition represents acquisition as a function of language use, in contexts of interaction, and indicates that a consideration of discourse provides some explanation for the development of first language systems in children." (68)

Widdowson, by making conditions of language acquisition and conditions of language use the same, viz., execution of certain tactical procedures or strategies, is drawing a parallel between meaning-making strategies and action-related gestures, and language learning, similar to the one that Bruner draws.)
Coming back to the main line of thinking, these presuppositions (or procedures) are not only action-related but also context-independent. "The categories of action (have) to be vicariously represented" (Bruner, 1975:68).

Discussing at length the phylogenetic development of language and quoting De Languna, Bruner makes the point that the background to the development of language was the inhibition of action. "... language context comes more and more to take the place of perceptual context" (De Languna, 1927 as quoted by Bruner, op.cit.). Yet that is only the motivation for language growth. What in fact makes (or made) this ability of context independent thinking (in my terminology, reality creation) possible is (or was), apart from the still unexplained ability in human beings to represent events, the characteristic feature of language the tool used itself, viz., "(it) singles out and specifies certain features relevant to the occasion of its use, but the features thus singled out remain in vital connection with what is not specified, but only presumed" (Bruner, 1975:76). This last feature (emphasis mine) Bruner calls the 'entailment of a set of pre-suppositions'. This "provides the basis for a form of meaning that is context independent, not interpretable by reference to an accompanying act of precept" (Ibid.). And these pre-suppositions are the unquantifiable 'procedures' we have already discussed.
In all, the nature of language in itself affords it its unique status of a tool to create and also makes it a medium or the form that this context independent propositional reality itself could take.

The point is, though, according to Bruner,

"... the use of language in ordinary discourse (is) without exploitation of its inherent structure of meaning and organisation ... it is when one uses language beyond this 'minimum' level that it alters or, indeed, transforms the nature of the thought processes in a special way. The most general specification of such language use is its movement toward context-free elaboration."

(Ibid.)

In other words, Bruner seems to imply that thought processes (and hence, thoughts, concepts or reality) before the use of analytic competence are qualitatively different.

2.5 Derivation of Conceptual Parallels: Bruner and Jakobson

At this point I have to recall Jakobson when he says that language when it is used poetically turns upon itself — and becomes self-conscious. Thus language itself becomes the signified, without any reference at all to anything outside of itself. This is in keeping with Bruner's proposition being built upon proposition in the analytic competence stage of language use.
This also recalls Silverman and Torode's attempt at a materialist explanation of the act of languaging (see Chapter I) where they say that discourse rather than having any reference go an outside ('real') world, refers to another discourse. That is, in (even) normal uses of language, the 'product' discourse is built upon other 'verbal' worlds; and not upon 'concrete' (true in the world) objects. And again, Jakobson, it has to be noted, does say that poetic use of language is present albeit not predominatingly in all uses of language. Thus 'poetic' use (where there is no object reference) implicitly underlies even 'referential' use. Again the point I am making is that it is signification with its 'native' characteristic of non-essentiality and potential plurality (i.e., move towards non-convergence if needed) that is at the heart of referential meaning itself.

The connection that I am striving for is the one between referential meaning and Bruner's communicative competence. As referential meaning is sensitive and geared to the context so is communicative competence (and the shared language and knowledge or 'world') sensitive and geared to context; which context foregrounds the 'established' knowledge (language inclusive) in the form of inter-subjectivity and the inter-locutor factor in the interaction between the language
learning child and its caretaker. Hence the 'need' (biological as Bruner points out and, as Vico points out, a feature of humanness) for building up a shared code.

Yet it is a (a) building-up of the shared code (deliberate structuring); with (b) individual configurations eschewed deliberately, or kept at a low profile (this is the inherent poeticality of even predominantly referential languaging), (c) which (b) is also part of the inheritance bestowed by the language tool which can be used (i.e., 'individuality' itself is not the result of a personal apprehension of the actually present world out there but due to an implicit agreement that there is a world out there that is yours and mine. (More of an investigation of this 'individual' meaning later). This makes even language used referentially in the communicative competence stage not qualitatively different but with the same changeableness underlying it.

2.5.1 Non-Automaticity in Communicative Competence: Certain Clarifications

It is here that the question about the child entering the social world of languaging and its influence upon the nature of knowledge not at one particular stage (like e.g., Bruner's analytic competence stage) but in all stages in the development of a human being comes in. The question one would like to ask here is, what is happening to the
child who does use language for communication (an obvious assumption), who is growing in a languaging society (as all societies presumably are)? I have argued that the fact of constructing leads to proliferation of meaning since initially the very act of construction is a result of the presence of proliferation; hence, also the very act of constructing has to be the result of proliferation. This to me is the underlying dynamism of referential (function of common convergent construction) languaging, and (referential meaning, or) communicative competence-core. Thus the child as soon as she enters language—enters a process of creation of meaning.

What is perhaps true though, in Bruner's argument, is, that not all everyday linguistic use seems to be such transactional reality-making efforts. Through sheer automaticity due to use across a long time certain instances of uses of language (apparently) are not negotiated for meaning or the construction of common meaning out of proliferating configuration of possibilities does not apparently happen.

As Sapir (1921) puts it,

"... when I say for instance, 'I had a good breakfast this morning,' it is clear that I am not in the throes of laborious thought, ... It is somewhat as though a dynamo capable of generating enough power to run an elevator were operated exclusively to feed an electric bell."

(14)
Or to put it into Bruner's own terms, (viz., his computational model of the compilation of pre-suppositions)

"... meaning requires the preliminary compiling of procedures which can then be run off (if needed) in a correct serial order. Like Lashley ... and like McNeill's derivation from Lashley ... Miller postulates that the compiling in advance of speaking or acting need not reflect serial order. Language used in the ordinary way is accompanied by thought processes that simultaneously activate a pool of words that are then put in an appropriate order for speech - and do so steadily and reliably."

(Bruner, 1975:79)

But still in principle this does not mean that, inherently automaticity and ready compilation are not negotiable - automatic use does in no way point to a perfect meaning/reality achievement in any sense. An interesting instance of this can be seen in a child learning a language. In the initial stages of 'learning' there is considerable negotiating for meaning (or learning to eschew its own configurations of semantic space and give in to a common core that the more experienced interlocutor 'demands') between the child and the adult, even in what appears to adult language users as routine linguistic monoevres. Later in her language growth the child stops this overt negotiation and seems to have acquired the 'patterns' - a fund of 'routines' is built up. This 'solidification' of 'meaning' is the result of a kind
of social pressure at conformity - rather than a child getting at the one possible meaning of words/sentences at last. It is during this effort at negotiation, however, - what Widdowson (1984) calls "the results of bricolege, make-shift combinations devised from whatever bits and pieces are available, and cobbled together to cope with immediate contingencies" (248; see also Section on Widdowson below), that the learner might be able to develop the deliberate attention to language which 'presumes' more than it says and which attention is what Bruner's analytic competence demands. And it is this attention, the strategies developed at that time, that leaves the learner with different undercurrents of 'meaning' to the 'comman' meaning she 'learns' (and so makes her meaning and her code different and dynamic).

2.5.2 Meaning Exploration - Unique Meanings and Degrees of Sharedness

To sum up, negotiation of meaning (or the process of signification) which is equivalent for us to the attempts at understanding/creating through and in language, exists potentially at all levels of living - hence at all levels of language growth. And in this negotiation of meaning, while the child is learning the meaning-compilation procedure, she is also inadvertently learning the 'conformity' to rules or the 'automaticity' that Bruner talks about (or better
still the way to operate the doorbell, as Sapir puts it). But, I would like to stress this point once more, what is important is that the child be allowed to learn ways of 'combinations' - what can be 'said' through the 'unsaid', or as Widdowson (1984) puts it, ways of how to flout the rules and create new meanings or, as Bruner would say, to pay attention deliberately to linguistic features and eke a new combination for new worlds (or as Jakobson says to make palpable the act of signification).

I am maintaining that social knowledge (shared divided knowledge) is not imbibed wholesale by the interacting child. There are pockets (voluminous pockets at that if we can help it) of individual 'meanings' (or better still, configurations of semantic space) in the child (as well as the caretaker); which pockets are the potential disruptors of 'received' meanings.

On the one side is the human being who totally depends upon the 'shared' meanings - (it could result, interestingly, in technological mass produced man, an assembly-line human being) and on the other the same tool can produce the human being who exploits the underlying principle of building-up to create with the same structuring instrument. (The same tool which affords 'convergence' a fictional unitariness is
the tool which affords richness of a kind, though that is also fictional.)

2.6 A Summing Up

What have I said so far?

1. I have tried to understand the process of languaging. What is this phenomenon? It is basically a process of creation and the creation itself though apparently seems bound by structuring, it is actually enabled by the same structuring too. The need to create and in create in intersubjectivity asks for a sinking of differences and building up common meanings. As Bruner says, knowledge is built up in intersubjectivity but the same principle affords creation when so willed - a differing to uniqueness rather than commonality.

2. (i) Though there might be different kinds of languaging (I prefer this term to communication) basically all of them involve such creation. As Jakobson says poeticality underlies referentiality, and conversely referentiality underlies poeticality. These being my arguments for saying that Bruner's analytic and communicative competence both involve creation since the latter is only voluntary adherence to a common social meaning. (ii) And this 'voluntary adherence' has to be built up; the concept of negotiation - the process of agreeing is important here.
3. Can this process of creation be described in more detail? I have endeavoured in this context to describe the process of negotiation for referential meaning and, when communicative competence is in evidence; and poetic meaning pursuit and analytic competence, is seen to be associated with exploitation rather than negotiation, where language becomes self-conscious, and indulges in proliferation of the signifieds (more of the processes of negotiation and exploitation in Chapter III).

4. What happens at the end of the process? My thesis has been that the shiftingness - a consequence of voluntary conformity (the way it was done) has to be incorporated to become part of the meaning or knowledge and consequently the language code; and thus confer an inherent dynamism to the code.

2.7 Languaging and the Notion of Capacity - Henry Widdowson

I now turn to support these points with some interesting thoughts in ELT - especially derived from one source - the writings of Widdowson. The development of the notion of capacity (see Widdowson, 1983 and 1984) in his writings throws interesting light on languaging and the concept of system (or competence) in traditional discussions about language.

The idea of capacity emerges initially from his dissatisfaction with the analyst's model of language.
The analyst's model,

"... for the representation of linguistic competence, the knowledge of what has been codified as system ... do not account for the user's capacity for the creative exploitation of knowledge for the making of meaning ... they must presuppose capacity, since it is this which activates the acquisition of competence in the first place."

(Widdowson, 1983:26)

Thus the capacity for creating meanings, is not a consequence of competence; it is the cause of competence. This is the first point.

Next, interestingly, this capacity is not thus the ability to carry out the instructions issued by competence accurately, but creatively and appropriately employ strategies of interpretation. This is the innate pre-disposition or language forming capacity of the child. Which not only produces competence; but does not exhaust itself in that. Again, the point is two-fold: it is not only as though this languaging process does not die down, but it is also not replaced by (the mechanical) skill of implementation of rules (which is another name for the traditional all-powerful competence acquired once and for all in language acquisition). Capacity as a creative and dynamic competence making process remains to create new meanings and augment competence further. The process keeps the 'competence', the 'end' produce itself dynamic.
Two points emerge here: 1. capacity is not rule implementation; the nature of capacity is more creative than that; and 2. rules do not remain static.

Widdowson next shifts the emphasis in languaging from an acquisition of competence and later use (in the sense of an implementation of the 'rules' that competence implies) of the acquired competence, to acquisition of capacity, a process of creation.

Explaining his reason for preferring the term 'capacity' to competence in languaging, Widdowson says,

"... competence seems to imply conformity, either to code (linguistic competence) or to social convention (communicative competence). The assumption seems to be made that language behaviour is rule governed, determined by a knowledge system which has only to be invoked and applied on particular occasions for communication to take place. In other words, language behaviour is a matter of compliance ...."

(ibid.:25-26)

He points out that "a strict conformity to rule" seems to be abnormal. "Indeed, if language users were strict conformists, their language would presumably lose its capacity for adaption and gradually fossilise" (1979:142). "... capacity (is) the ability to exploit the resources for meaning in language which have only been partially codified as competence and are only partially describable therefore in grammars" (1983:26).
2.7.1 Language System – Widdowson Continued

To understand the nature of capacity, developed on the lines of its creative procedurality better, we have to take a look at the concept of a competence or code itself in Widdowson. 'System' for Widdowson is not simply the linguist's rules. The rules are certainly there. But only as abstractions. For Widdowson the system consists of such abstractions allright, but they do not have an 'executive role' in languaging:

"... there is a contextual level within the knowledge (or competence, emphasis and this addition mine), of language itself, a level of preparedness for use, and it is at this level that (what he calls) schemata have their being. So in this view, knowledge of language embraces two levels: the level of system, where we can call it linguistic competence and the level of schema, where we can call it communicative competence."

(ibid:38)

I schematise it as follows:

The System and the Schema - Fig. 1

Systemic (linguistic competence)  Schematic (communicative-competence)

Competence (The System)
Henceforward when I refer to competence-core it includes both linguistic competence (the systemic side of competence) and communicative competence (the schematic side); also I sometimes refer to this competence as System (with a capital S). Note, this is different from the systemic side of competence, in that it includes that and the schematic side of competence and is a replacement word for 'competence-core'.

How are these schemata acquired, is the next question. They are the result of the process of capacity mobilised, or procedures of interpretation employed. As such, they bear the traces of their acquisition, or 'contain' or retain their situational provenance. But when it comes to languaging even these schemata themselves are not implemented, i.e., 'put into' new contexts of languaging wholesale. A new set of procedures have to be employed, (i.e., capacity is to be mobilised). These procedures employed seek a fit - the best possible in the circumstances - for the already formed schemata, to the new set of (execution) circumstances. Because of this purpose their nature is 'negotiative', an adjustment between what is already there, and what a situation demands, a move towards an agreement is what is intended. 9

Thus the schemata part of the core itself is not a script but only a prompt. (The abstracted systemic part or linguistic rules anyway do not have direct executive function.) Widdowson thus clarifies the status of the accumulated core - as the consequent of capacity - and later only as a reference point.
2.7.2 'Capacity' in Relation to a Language 'Core' - Dynamic Movement in Language Use

Let us come back once again, to a description of Widdowson's capacity, and this time it is clear from the description of the system we have seen, that Widdowson means it to be a dynamic, of-the-moment process and not a describable core. This capacity to employ interpretative procedures cannot be systematised through the listing of actual procedures employed in a particular situation of meaning-making. If and when this happens they become part of the System, and the System, if we recall is only a prompt - and other strategies for the (current) moment of languaging have to be looked for. Languaging, cannot

"... simply be a matter of correlation; we do not just identify instances of use as manifesting the rules we already know. We draw upon our knowledge of pre-existing rules, we create discourse and commonly bring new rules into existence by so doing. All competence is transitional in this sense."

(Widdowson, 1979:142)

"Thus if a particular sequence of procedures becomes so favoured by custom as to become common conventional practice, then it takes on the character of a schema and becomes part of competence. ... Consider the case of a particularly inventive use of procedures which yields a metaphorical expression. This, we will suppose, is communicatively effective in that it establishes a particular frame of reference in an entirely appropriate way. Now, if that expression becomes permanently attached to that frame of reference, then it will, of course, become conventionalised as part of an established schema. The metaphor then
becomes part of semantic structure, and its procedural history is recorded in an etymological dictionary. So procedures not only serve to project existing schemata so that they come into focus, but they also create new ones. Sometimes, these creations will be fugitive affairs which last only as long as the discourse in which they appear; but sometimes they will be retained by custom, become conventionalised and placed in schematic store for future use."

(Widdowson, 1983:41-42)

The important development here is Widdowson's implication that all uses of language being creative are metaphors coined for the 'new' situation. The meaning encoded in the schemata pre-existent and the 'meaning' at the end of the application of negotiation procedures are not identical. A change is wrought - by immediate employment of procedures of negotiation. As such it is this ability of evoking suitable procedures which is crucial to languaging; the schemata before is only a starting point; and meanings at every stage are metaphoric and not logical. The two facts of approximativeness about the agreed and 'established' meanings, and there being no implementational 'truthness' or 'rightness' about them contribute to this.

"... metaphor and ambiguity are not aberrant features of language use, although they are commonly represented as such in language analysis. It is a normal and essential quality of natural language that it should allow for metaphor for a creative use of its total resources; otherwise it would not have the flexibility it has to have to adapt to changing communicative purposes. But metaphors cannot be reduced to rule
because once they are, they cease to be metaphors and become incorporated into the semantic system. The point about metaphors is that they depend on a disparity between the established rules of the code and the extempore exploitation on a particular occasion of potential resources for meaning which are not reduced to rule."

(Widdowson, 1984:13; emphasis mine)

Obviously, Widdowson's user's model depends mainly on his notion of capacity. Language acquisition is not a 'core' collection but the refinement of capacity - the employment of (negotiative) strategies or procedures of meaning-making. And in that employment are collected personal schemas, which by themselves are static and not yet capacity but have underlying them the traces of the circumstances; which traces of acquisition enable further use of similar strategies for meaning-making in every instance that demands it. This, incidentally, is what I have called pockets of configuration of semantic space (see page 70 above).

And finally, Widdowson does seem to see the need for a collection of such pockets of personal, differential, and varied configuration of semantic space (to revert to my terminology).

"Indeed in the very process of learning (the codes of conduct, linguistic and otherwise - my expansion here), we discover ways of evading them or turning them to our own individual advantage. And so it is with rules of language. In the process of acquiring
them, as a social convenience we learn how to exploit them and how to escape from their confinement in order to express individual experience."

(Widdowson, 1984:242)

"The learner (is) a kind of inventive handyman ... a bricoleur of make-shift utterances..." 10

(ibid.:247)

2.8 Widdowson - A Summing Up

How do all these fit into my scheme?

The whole idea of capacity I would like to point out is very much the kind of pre-disposition to structure or built-up meanings (the pre-disposition at signification) that I have been talking about - the process of building-up to a common meaning (employment of interpretative procedures) resulting in competence (a common agreed core). Yet the same process continues to function and hence re-building a situational common core, employment of procedures again, this time to adjust pre-existing core to the specific situation and the consequent different (by degrees) core from the initial core, meanings.

The following collation should go a long way in stating my scheme with all that has been said till now incorporated:
**Fig. 1:** 'Competence', 'Capacity' and 'The New Circumstances of Use'

**COMPETENCE (Linguistic and Communicative)**

### Schemas
(1) negotiative or exploitative procedures employed at the specific time when specific mobilisation of capacity took place, and associated situations of use.

2. 'traces' left by the unique acquisition process which form clues to pockets of 'semantic configurations'.

### Linguistic (Systemic) Abstractions/rules
- *No direct 'executive' role*

### New Circumstances of Use
('new' meaning demanded)

(tensions between:

- a. my current meaning from a shifted configuration (see No. 2 above; the influence of the element of the 'personal' in the 'Given').
- b. the 'Given'/"my" System/Competence (No. 1 above; the element of the 'public'; the 'pull' of 'competence' as reference-point (degrees of influence)
- c. (a) and (b) of the 'other' interlocutor.)

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**Exploitation procedures** employed for 'new' meaning.

**Negotiative procedures** employed for 'new' meaning.
2.9 A Few Relevant Trends in ELT

I shall now look at all I have said about languaging from a different perspective. This is to show trends in areas connected to language teaching which indirectly are useful for the model of languaging I am more or less ready to articulate fully.

I, however, do not propose to discuss in any detail at all such trends. I shall just mention the relevant areas very briefly, with details just about sufficient to draw a clear picture of the support that they lend my model, and at the end suggest a slight addition which my model as against the work I will be quoting makes, and which is crucial to the kind of language teaching that I envisage. I intend picking this up later in Chapters IV and VI.

2.9.1 Studies in Interlanguage and Second Language/Acquisition

Firstly, when discussing languaging as mobilisation of capacity, my concentration is entirely on the process of languaging. Such a concentration on process is reflected in current research in second language acquisition in the area of Interlanguage (see Pit Corder, 1981).

A look at the processes of learning without pointing out 'errors' and devising ways of checking them; but regarding them as indicative of the functioning of creative capacity,
seems to be evincing the right attitude and acknowledging the evidence that works such as for instance Richards (1974), Hatch (1978), and Corder (1981) offer. Intersubjectivity or interaction as the appropriate source for (independent) system-creating is reiterated in the above and other second language acquisition research pervasively. Evelyn Hatch (quoted above) for instance maintains that "language is learnt in discourse". She sets up a discourse-model of SL learning. The native speaker, she maintains, when trying to carry on a conversation with a SL learner with limited language resources, due to the pressures created by this communicative situation, searches for words and sentences to make meaning. These make for valuable input for the SL learner for his/her own system creation. This model gives equal importance to the native speaker as input source and to the learner as the regulator of that input, and looks very similar to the mother-child interactions of Gordon Wells (1981, 1982; see below) and other analyses of caretaker-child interaction in first language acquisition studies.  

2.9.2 Studies in First Language Acquisition: Gordon Wells

Gordon Wells in his several books to do with the first language acquisition research conducted at Bristol refers to two kinds of mother-caretaker. Producing data (see Wells,
1982 especially) from two different mother-child interactions he points out two different qualities to these interactions.

In one interaction (from now on interaction T).

"Almost every utterance (of the mother) is on falling tone, the intonation for making independent assertions. It is as if the mother has to put her stamp of approval on everything that (the child) says before it is admitted into the conversation ... it is the mother who is responsible for the introduction of almost all the topical material into the conversation. One gets the impression that this mother is trying to teach her child ... about the world and about truth. But it is truth according to her view of things that matters and until the child comes around to her way of thinking, then what he says doesn't count."

(Wells, 1982:10)

The mother here, seems to be "much more demanding and didactic in her approach" while the other mother (in what is to be called Interaction M) seems to provide a good example of supporting and extending her child's choice. Elsewhere in his discussion of this "supporting and extending" role played by this second mother, Wells shows how the mother is willing to follow the child's lead,

"... in spite of the fact that he rejects her original, and probably accurate, response to his opening question. She might easily have cut the conversation short by rejecting his suggestion with 'Don't be silly, darling, I've already told you ...' or words to that effect. Instead, (perhaps respecting the child's inclination to fantasise) she first checks that she correctly understood (the child's) version ... and then helps him to develop a fantasised account ..."
in which he himself takes over the role of principal actor."

(Wells, 1981:106 - parenthesis mine)

This kind of treatment by the mother, Wells suggests, leads to the second child's remarkable progress in language use.

Not only, then, in the adherence to the topic chosen, but also in the acceptance of the meaning pursued within the topic, the caretaker's non-interference is seen as valuable. Meanings have to be negotiated and not unilaterally imposed. In this encouragement to pursue personal meanings lies an encouragement of creativity.

Wells sees the value to the learners, of such individual meaning pursuits for creating "images of themselves as learners, and of their abilities to recognise and solve problems for themselves. These self images, are, I believe, of very considerable consequence, not only for their learning in school, but also for the quality of their life after they leave school, and for the sort of contribution that they are able to make to the wider society of which they are growing to be members" (1982:205). Wells, here, is obviously, talking about the role of the process of language acquisition in promoting creativity in education.
Some Additional Implications

Thus what seems important is that a) there be interaction where strategies for languaging are employed by both interlocutors; b) in that interaction the learner be given the deciding role as to choice of strategies, choice of experience and focus of experience and so on.

The latter though, emerges more clearly in first language acquisition studies. Additionally, by inference, I would say that interaction is not just a means, it significantly makes for independent system creation and a dynamic system-creation by becoming part of the learnt system.

Employment of strategies - making of errors or the demonstration of creative capacity at work, I maintain, leaves its mark on the system learnt; and since the capacity does not disappear once the learner has 'grown up' it keeps leaving its mark. In Wells' recommendation of the attitude of the mother in Interaction M above, as valuable for language learning and later life, and in Widdowson's suggestions to let learners flout rules and create, right from the initial stages of learning, such interaction is given more importance than just a means to an end.
"... recent research in first and second language acquisition represents acquisition as a function of language use in contexts of interaction, and indicates that a consideration of discourse provides some explanation for the development of first language system in children ... If this is so, it would seem reasonable to suppose that an investigation into the procedures that language users employ in the discourse process should provide us with a description of activities to be incorporated into course design: activities which while creating conditions for acquisition simultaneously develop the necessary ability for language use.

The position taken in this paper, then, and its claim to pedagogic relevance is that the conditions for language learning and the conditions for the effective communicative use of language are the same and need to be incorporated into a definition of what is to be learnt as learning objectives and not simply converted into pedagogic techniques as teaching aids. There is, I believe, a crucial distinction here ..."

(Widdowson, 1984:98)

As I said earlier, though, I shall pick up this point about means and end later in Chapters IV and VI for more extensive argumentation.

Just one more point here: If we consider a flouting of rules as an indication of learner autonomy, learner's eagerness to invest her/his subjectivity, which in turn leads to more attention being paid to strategies and more innovation therein, then it becomes important that there are opportunities for learners to do this. One way of creating opportunities is to let the learner be (the lead-from-behind policy recommended by Wells above).
2.9.3 **The Mathetic Language Acquirer and the Pragmatic Language Acquirer - Ann Peters**

Another way is indicated by research in a different aspect of first language acquisition by Ann Peters (1983).

Though the whole research there is highly interesting I shall just look at what is relevant here for one particular point about the learning atmosphere at home and by extension at school, in a SL learning situation.

Working on the child's extractions of 'linguistic chunks' from adult language use and the role of such extracted chunks in acquisition of structure, Ann Peters, poses this question:

What factors in the child's language learning situation may be responsible for the observed variations in the size of the units they first extract?

"Two strategies of early language productions that I have labelled Analytic and Gestalt seem to be fostered differentially by the need to use language mathetically ... and the need to use (it) pragmatically ... An Analytic utterance is the nice neat one-word utterance that over time slowly increases in closeness to the adult target; in Gestalt utterances the segmental fidelity is poor, although the combination of number of syllables, stress, intonation and such segments as can be distinguished combine to give a very good impression of sentencehood."

(Ann Peters, 1983:22)

When children start to learn how the language system works they may begin by focussing more on one function than on
another. The predominantly mathetic child is usually more cautious and when he/she uses language it is more 'accurate' and nearer adult language. Whereas the expressive child is more 'adventurous' and uses formulaic expressions without really having analysed them, in order to interact. They need just tokens to establish social contact and they rely on the immediate context to help them along. The former type of use evinces an interest towards the structure of language to talk about things while in the latter kind of use social interaction is the motive and hence any 'bits and pieces' are the focus, the immediate medium.\textsuperscript{12}

As Nelson (as pointed out by Peters) says, some children decide their primary need for language is for talking about things (the mathetic function of language), whereas other children decide that language is primarily useful for social interaction (the pragmatic function); hence some children grow up with more practice at using various strategies to get their meanings across (since they follow individualistic divergent meanings) than others (since these others are more keen on social convergence in meanings, rather than the pursuit of individualistic meaning).

Though of course there are not purely mathetic children and purely pragmatic children, the kinds of meaning that a child pays attention to more often can be influenced by environmental encouragement which could be in the form of
the demands and expectations created unconsciously by the mother. Thus as Ann Peters (op.cit) points out, in the discussion of a study done by Lieven of two mothers:

"... Kate's mother was observed to make more efforts to communicate with her daughter than Beth's mother: she responded to Kate's comprehensible utterances 81 percent of the time (as opposed to 46 percent for Beth's mother); she was more likely to interrupt an ongoing conversation with an adult in order to make such responses; and her responses tended to be geared to extending the communicative interaction rather than simply acknowledging her daughter's utterance. The relevant underlying assumptions here involve the child's role as a legitimate conversational partner and the acceptability of the child's utterances as real speech. It is noteworthy that the children's language was observed to differ markedly: Kate was much like Nelson's (Mathetic) children, whereas Beth was more (Pragmatic). And they appeared to be using language for different ends. Kate talked slowly and coherently about things happening around her and objects in her environment while Beth devoted more time using her speech to try and engage her mother's interest ... Thus it seems likely that these mothers' differing expectations about their daughters' language influenced the children's strategies for breaking into the language system." 

(30)

Considering the fact mentioned earlier that potentially though both pragmatic and mathetic meaning pursuit involve use of strategies, due to social pressures at conformity, the former might require comparatively fewer instances of strategy-employment, giving salience to the pragmatic or the mathetic in terms of experiences could influence the language as well
as the reality that is built by the child, an individual world of divergence or a social world of cooperative convergence.

2.9.4 A Summing Up

Let me briefly sum up this part. Language and languaging then is learnt in discourse, but this without implying that one 'correct' language 'core' is imbibed. The dynamic creative languaging capacity (or employment of strategies) of meaning-making which is the acquisition process is also the process of use and objective of the language acquisition.

When the learner is engaged in the process of strategy-employment the attitude of the caretaker is crucial - in the form of a lead-from-behind policy, plus a certain amount of care about creating opportunities for mathetic meaning pursuits, thus maximising possibilities of extensive strategy employment (Chapter III discusses this aspect of 'teaching'.) This leaves a definite mark on the quality of languaging in later life and my point is that the mark is in the motivation (apart from the expertise) in the exploitation of the inherent dynamism of languaging.
2.10 Conclusion and Looking Forward

I shall now sum up what has gone into this entire chapter. I set out from the basic premise that all languaging is, basically a building up or ascribing of meanings; a premise that was argued for in Chapter I. The initial point I made from here, was, that languaging is motivated by different functions. I chose to concentrate on two main functions, i.e., the referential, and the poetic. And every act of languaging though is categorised under one or the other, in fact, it is a mixture of all the functions, with the one into which it is categorised, pre-dominating.

Depending upon the pre-dominating function, the question of the path to the end meaning differs, from a willingness to go towards a common meaning ascription deferring to the context (and the other interlocutor(s) in the context) and an urge to pursue a message for its own sake.

Whatever be the function, the building-up is done afresh at every instance of languaging since even in the first is present also poeticality and hence an urge to give in to a different individualistic message of the moment and the end meaning, that much different, from the one in the beginning.
These basic arguments were used with reference to different trends of thinking about language. E.g. the distinction between communicative competence and analytic competence that Bruner sets up was questioned, and they were shown not to be different but basically the same act of creation, and the progressive augmentation of a 'moving core'. Widdowson's dynamic capacity as against the static System, the analyst's model against the user's model and his conclusions after a discussion of these, that all language use is metaphoric, was also evoked to elaborate and support the argument about the process of languaging as creative in every instance and this process as the most relevant as against a product core which anyway is static and ever vulnerable to change; and which supports rather than causes the process.

Thinking and research in language (first and second) acquisition studies were also briefly looked into to show the lasting effect that the traces of acquisition, a result of the degree of encouragement to use language poetically, or use analytic competence or foreground the metaphoricity of language use, could have in a child's later life.

It was also shown how language acquisition studies again indicate that creativity and innovation in later life can be affected if languaging is not encouraged as a process of meaning-making and the resulting core is not treated as
changeable and thus end in a foreclosing of options of use of strategies in and for immediate situations. This might result in abjectly conforming individuals, while the nature of the tool, i.e., language with its invitation to innovate, does not justify this. 13

Throughout all these discussions (especially in the case of Bruner's two papers above) is implied reality-construction in and through the symbolic tool and language as the symbolic tool in question, of constitution rather than reflection. The implication justifies the importance given to an encouragement of languaging rather than accumulation of a language core, since ultimately this act is an act of reality-construction itself.

From the next chapter onwards, I shall be concerned with issues and questions to do mainly with teaching. The perspective from which communication and reality-construction has been viewed till now changes, naturally, to suit pedagogic contexts and model-making for such purposes.

...
1. I am aware that the first question implies the second. Yet I make this kind of separation for conceptual clarity on issues these questions eventually raise.

2. An example of this is the writings of Widdowson and Allwright. Though both generally belong to the field of ELT the former's writings are more speculative.

3. Thus when the communication inclines towards the contact, then the phatic function predominates, when it inclines towards the code, the metalingual function is the dominating one and so on. See Jakobson (1956) for more details. At this point of the argument an expansion of this is not necessary. Yet in a later section when I postulate my cline of the communicative act, I will briefly recall this extended model of Jakobson's in the use of the term 'phatic function' in my model.

4. This does not mean that there is no verticality (selection) involved in discursive use of language or that there is no horizontality (combination) in non-discursive use of language. Any use of language involves both these dimensions. Yet discursive or normal day-to-day use of prose disambiguates by striving for one image (monoselection) and an appositional structuring of the selected. Yet the same disambiguation can be exploited to 'over' disambiguate and that is the use through exploitation of the dimensions of language that logic employs. To me the kind of propositional thinking which forms the basis of what is called 'analytic competence' in language use that Bruner, discussed more extensively below, talks about, could more or less appropriate to
this logical use of language. The logician and the literary writer however, both exploit the languageness of language, thus the logician can be said to use language poetically and the literary writer to use language analytically or if a difference is to be made, both are 'abstract' thinkers (in using language's languageness) yet one a poetic thinker the other an 'analytic competence' thinker.

5. Which is in contrast to an emphasis at ambiguating - not conveying - trying to retain the 'richness' of meaning intended, as against bare conceptualisation and exploiting the moment dependance (the present and the 'new') of the act of creation through the same tool of languaging - the signification process and attempt at not structuring, yet the attempt is through the dimensions involved in structuring.

6. The fact that there is also the 'subjective' part of the caretaker, i.e., the 'unstructured' 'residue' of the interacting adult-caretaker is also a fact to be considered; this line of argument is developed later in Chapter III.

7. Vygotsky (1962) discussing the relationship between thought and language poses the same problem in a slightly different way. "If we compare the early development of speech and of intellect - which ... develop along separate lines both in animals and in very young children - with the development of inner speech and of verbal thought, we must conclude that the later stage is not a simple continuation of the earlier. The nature of the development itself changes, from biological
to sociohistorical ... The problem of thought and language thus extends beyond the limits of natural science and becomes the focal problem of historical human psychology, i.e., of social psychology." (51).

8. The uniqueness though is made possible only in and through symbolicty once again. Individuality itself is created by structuring or languaging. So uniqueness itself is a relative term. Uniqueness or individuality of meaning is language - social commonality - inspired meaning. (See Chapter I - Tyler: self itself is created in language; Also see Not here.) Individuality here only means that in poetic languaging, at that moment at least, the urge to defer to the common/given which arises at that instant - is kept to a minimum. More of this in Chapter III.

9. Widdowson also claims with the ethnomethodologists that meaning results of such negotiations are only 'approximate' to the meaning intentions spawned by the moment, and this is inevitable. This supports my stand about the voluntariness - the agree to agree feature of languaging and meaning-making and the constant flux in which meaning is kept.

10. Widdowson, in advocating such 'adventurousness' for the learner as the most creative way to languaging acquisition, also refutes the risk here of the language-user-meaning-seeker-learner striking out totally on her own refusing to conform. "Of course there will always be some people who will openly flout authority and assert the primacy of self by denying the social contract to conform: drop-outs and other disaffected elements."
But then they risk losing the benefits that the system provides for those who subscribe to it, and the consequences of challenging the established order can be serious. There are, thus, very strong pressures on people to accept the constraint of social convention and they will in general seek some scope for individual initiative within it rather than try to break it down at the barriers" (1984:243). Again, he points out later in the same place, "... This is all very well, you may say, but what if the learners never arrive at the standard structures and so remain incompetent, content with the makeshift bricolage of their own contrivance. I do not think it is very probable that learners will persist in the use of linguistic forms which manifestly do not work in preference to those that do. Like the rest of us, they are likely to take the line of least resistance, and incline to orthodoxy because it is convenient" (ibid.:250-251). See also Note 13.

11. Other work in SL research which come close to first language acquisition studies and reflect an interest in learner contribution through interaction to acquisition, are studies in learner inter-language, already mentioned above and studies in learner communicative strategies. Also see Lily Wong-Fillmore (1979). For a more detailed survey of the field and its contribution towards learner initiative, see Rama Devi (1985).

12. Ultimately in both function types, however, potentially the need for negotiation, which is an evidence of the creativity of language is present.
13. I would like to continue the line of thinking that I started with the Widdowson quotation in Note 10. My argument in languaging is for an extreme (if it could be called that) form of differential meaning system. This is to highlight the possibility of creation that is inherent in languaging, since to me it seems 'conforming' has reached its extreme form in learning a set of rules or principles in any field of knowledge, more so in language learning. And the kind of work done in communicative language teaching also seemed to be not trying to change the paradigm of rule implementation, a priori competence, which is the starting point for what I call the extreme form of conformism, but working within the paradigm, only patching up and working face-lifts, for the 'old' grammar translation and structural approaches. Yet I would agree with Widdowson that such an insistence on the creative non-conformism potentiality of languaging and meaning-making need not necessarily endanger social stability. My own model of languaging, is built upon the human urge to structure (see Chapter I), to build in intersubjectivity (see discussion of Bruner in this chapter). I talk about this once again, in Chapter V in Note 16 there when briefly touching upon teaching the four skills of language (p. 350, Chapter V).