A Historical Perspective

1. Introduction

It is perhaps well-known that several categories of English have been influenced by the classical tradition of Greek and Latin grammars to a considerable extent (Charleston, 1941, pp. 202). Even the categories of Latin have, to some extent, been influenced by those of Greek; for example, Greek has a formally marked distinct optative mood, while Latin has none. Yet some Latin grammarians call such subjunctive forms as are usually preceded by utanam optative, just because they express wishes. Such meaning-equivalence has misled grammarians of many other languages as well. The traditional formulation of the case system, or even of the mood system, in English is a very good illustration of this. The basic question that has always worried grammarians is whether grammatical categories should be determined by means of notional or formal criteria. It has worried even theoretical linguists. Lyons thinks that at some point the categories of logic, epistemology and syntax are in correspondence with one another. He argues at length for a notional theory of parts of speech and tries to show that the distinction between nouns and verbs rests in the nuclear instances upon the
distinction between things and properties in the perceptual world (Lyons, 1966:232). This only proves that there is a deeper relationship between notional and formal categories, but Lyons rejects notional definitions as they involve circularity. Clarifying the issue he says: "The criticism of circularity loses its force as soon as we take into account the distinction between 'formal' and 'notional' definitions, and the possibility that the notional definitions of the parts of speech may be used to determine the names, though not the membership, of the major syntactic classes of English and other languages." (Lyons, 1974:318) English grammarians have had no less a share of worry regarding criteria. As regards mood the worry has been still greater on account of a lot of uncertainty, as Kennedy (1935:464) points out: "There has always been more uncertainty among scholars regarding the nature and definition of (grammatical) mood than about any other of the so-called (verb) properties." The grammarians have had to struggle hard in search of proper criteria to determine different categories of English. This will be quite evident if we have a brief look at the history of mood in English.

2. XVI, XVII & XVIII Centuries

Although mood is defined as a psychological concept in ancient Latin grammars - 'Modi Sunt diversae inclinationos amini various sins affectus demonstrantes' (Priscian VIII:63) -
grammarians mostly followed formal-semantic criteria to determine moods (Vorlat, 1975:328). Most Latin grammars recognize the following moods: indicativus (pronuntiativus or definitivus), imperativus, optativus, conjunctivus (or subjunctivus) and infinitivus (or infinitus). Donatus mentions one more, namely, impersonalis (e.g. legitur) (Vorlat, 1975:329-30).

Linacre (1556) adds a 'potentialis' to the five moods of Latin grammar, and thus distinguishes six. Lily also distinguishes six moods, which are defined as follows:

"The indicative mood sheweth a reason true or false ... or else asketh a question ... The imperative biddeth or commandeth ... the optative wisheth or desireth, with these signs 'would God', 'I pray God', or 'God graunt': as utenam amen, 'I pray God I love', and hath evermore an Adverbe of wishing joyned with him ... The potentiall mode is knowen by these signs, 'may', 'can', 'might', 'would', 'should', or 'ought' ... without an adverbe joyned with him ... the subjunctive mode hath evermore some conjunction joyned with him ... and it is called the subjunctive mode, because it dependeth on another verbe in the same sentence, either going above, or coming after ... the infinitive signifieth to do, to suffer, or to be, and hath neither number nor person; nor nominative case before him and is known commonly by the sign To: (B-II, V)." (Quoted by Vorlat, 1975:330)
Another Renaissance grammarian, Ramus (1572), follows a different line. He rejects mood as a verbal category and distrusts the definitions of the various moods given by other grammarians on account of cross-references between moods like the indicative and the subjunctive, on the one hand, and the imperative and the optative on the other. Ramus concludes that modal meanings are expressed not by verbs but by adverbs. He even goes to the extent of saying that the whole sentence, rather than the verb, expresses modal meanings. Ramus influences Greaves and Jonson greatly, but Hume (1612) disagrees with him. If Hume believes that mood expresses facts or volition, occurring in a main clause, or depends upon the requirements of a conjunction, if occurring in the sub-clause (pp. 16-17). This shows that he has both notional and formal criteria in mind. Mood is basically a semantic concept to him. He treats verbal inflexion as only a consequence of the 'differentia in rebus' which the mood express. A speaker makes use of a certain verbal form, just because he wants to denote a difference in the things themselves (Vorlat, 1975:344). In his English Grammar (1612:30), Hume defines mood as "an affection of the verb serving the varieties of utterance".

Later, Wilkins (1668) makes a distinction between primary and secondary moods. According to him moods are indicated either by 'distinct words' (the modal auxiliaries)
or by the inflexions of the verb. Defining moods as linguistic expressions of feelings, emotions etc., he contrasts as analytic and a synthetic way of denoting them. He thinks that moods are primary or secondary, according to the way in which grammatical subject is linked to its copula. The primary moods like the indicative, the imperative etc., simply link the subject and the verb, while the secondary ones express at the same time the notions of possibility, liberty, necessity etc. (Wilkins, 1668:315-16)

Port-Royal grammarians draw a distinction between the moods of simple affirmation and the moods of volition. They think that moods only express by means of inflexions simple affirmation and various modes of man's will. Moods of simple affirmation are two, namely, the indicative, which simply states a fact, and the subjunctive, which states it in a modified and conditional form. Moods of volition are, on the other hand, three, namely, the optative, which denoted wish, the potential, which denotes that the speaker grants something against his inner conviction, and the imperative, which denotes the speaker's will as a desire addressed to someone.

Mood is not recognized as a verbal category by all the grammarians in the above-mentioned three centuries. Of the 258 old grammars of English examined by Michael (1970) nineteen say that there are no moods in English, and another
thirty do not mention the category at all. Grammarians like Greaves (1594), Jonson (1640), Wallis (1653), Greenwood (1711) Loughton (1734) and Collyer (1735) refuse to recognize mood as a verbal accident (Vorlat, 1975:334). But many other grammarians still accept mood as a verbal category under the influence of Latin grammarians, and, more or less, follow their classification of mood. Besides the influence of Latin grammarians, other influences like that of the port-royal grammarians, etc., were also at work in this matter.

Aickin (1693) mentions 5 moods, indicative, imperative, subjunctive, optative and infinitive. Stirling (1735) mentions only four, leaving out the optative. Pool (1646) and Entick (1728) recognize six moods like Lily. These are defined partly in notional, and partly in formal terms. These moods are indicative, imperative, optative, potential, subjunctive and infinitive. Bullokar (1586) leaves out the potential, but he does not clearly point out formal distinctions in his definitions, as is evident from his comments on the subjunctive: "the subjunctive mood is declined as the indicative everywhere having always a conjunctive before his nominative case; excepting that after conjunctions, conditionals, exceptives, and adversatives, it is declined everywhere in the voice of the optative mood." (p.28) The question is: why identify the subjunctive as a separate formal category, if it is identical
in form with the indicative at one place and with the optative at another? Turner (1710) also distinguishes five moods: indicative, imperative, subjunctive, potential and infinitive. He throws out the optative and brings in the potential.

The definitions are, again, part formal and part notional. Newton (1669) and Miege (1688) distinguish four moods. They are indicative, imperative, potential and infinitive for Newton, and indicative, imperative, subjunctive and infinitive for Miege. The definitions are, again, part notional and part formal, as one can see from the following: "the indicative indicates, the imperative commands, the subjunctive speaks of things without conjunctions before it and the infinitive without either number or person." (Miege, 1688:50) For the subjunctive the formal criteria do not seem to work, as is evident from the following statement: "The subjunctive is much the same in English with the indicative, but that it is used with conjunctions before it, from whence it has got the name of subjunctive. 'This also called optative, because in it we make wishes; and likewise potential, for that the verb 'may' and 'might' are used in this mood." (p.54)

Like the above grammarians there are others such as Gill (1619), Butler (1633) and Wharton (1654) who also, to some extent, follow the Latin system. The only originality they show is that in place of six they distinguish only four moods:
indicative, imperative, potential and infinitives, but the definitions are like those of Lily. Duncan (1731) defines moods formally and specifies their semantic functions. He says: "moods are different ways of conjugating verbs agreeably to circumstances and to our thoughts or affections of the mind. These are five of them, the indicative, the imperative, the subjunctive, the infinitive and the participles." (p.19)

Maittaire (1712) has significant views on mood. He first distinguishes three finite and one infinite moods on the basis of the kind of notion that the verb denotes. His finite moods are indicative, imperative and potential, and the infinite mood is infinitive. Later he rejects this classification, based on notional grounds, and accepts only two moods for English. They are the indicative and the subjunctive. He first claims that this classification is based on the verbal ending, but later gives a general definition of the two moods, such as the following: "I would, in my opinion, reduce the sense and notion of the mood to two; the one absolute and independent and properly indicative, the other relative and dependent and properly subjunctive; the one is the main verb of every sentence, the other is the verb of such clauses as are joined to and attending upon the main one, whether expressed or understood." (p.138)
Maittaire first rejects both imperative and infinitive but later includes them under some compulsion of desire to follow the Latin and Greek scheme as closely as possible. He says: "However (notwithstanding this) I have thought to distinguish the English moods so that they may, as near as can be, answer to the Latin and the Greek; and therefore was forced to make the imperative a distinct mood, and give the infinitive its place among them." (p.138)

Unlike Maittaire, Wallis (1674) recognizes only formal criteria, and shows how the meanings expressed by the Latin moods are expressed in English by omitting verbal endings, or by prefixing 'to'. Greenwood (1711) supports him by subscribing to formal criteria. He says: "Moods are the different Endings of the Verb that are made use of to express the Manners or Forms of its signifying the Being, Doing or Suffering of a Thing." (p.118)

It is claimed that even though English can express all those meanings that are expressed by the Latin moods it has no moods, since it does not have any verbal endings to express them. Those meanings are said to be expressed mostly by means of modal auxiliaries (pp.62-63; p.119). Loughton (1734) also subscribes to this point of view. Cooper (1685) also believes that moods are indicated by means of either endings or auxiliaries. Brightland (1712) treats mood as a semantic concept which is realized in English by
means of auxiliaries. But there has been some controversy about the status of auxiliaries. Several grammarians think that forms with *may* and *can* are not in the indicative mood. They treat *may* and *can* as signs of the potential mood (Michael, 1970:425). If the clauses in which they are used are preceded by a conjunction, they are considered to be a special case of the potential, and are called subjunctive or conjunctive. The roles of the potential and the subjunctive are later reversed. In 1671 Lye treated the subjunctive the dominant mood, which he called optative when preceded by 'may', 'might' and 'can'. For a long time it remains quite controversial as to which is the dominant mood, the potential or the subjunctive. Along with this controversy the controversy about criteria continues. While many grammarians follow notional criteria and easily set up categories like potential, optative etc. by applying them, there are others like Lynch (1796:39) who says: "No more moods should be admitted in a language than there are different inflexions of the verb expressing the various manners of mental affirmation". On the basis of this many grammarians like Greenwood emphatically say that there are no moods in English, because the verb has no diversity of endings. (Greenwood, 1711:119) But about the same time Gildon and Brightland (1712:102) mention three moods, the first two of
which correspond to the indicative and the imperative, and the third seems to be realized by 'may', 'can', 'ought' and 'should'. Later, Dyche (1776) distinguishes four moods. He starts with formal criteria, but later reverses his position by saying that moods can be denominated as variously, and be as numerous as the particular circumstances require. The pull of the notional criteria is perhaps so great that Harris (1751) uses only these criteria for his classification of moods. He distinguishes two powers of soul; perception and volition. By the power of perception he means the senses and the intellect, and by the power of volition, not only the will but several passions and appetites, in short, all that moves to action, whether rational or irrational. He believes that all sentences in a language are related to one or the other of these powers, and are thus of different kinds. He says: "The species of moods in great measure depend on the species of sentences". (1751:144) With this criterion in hand he proposes four moods, which he defines as below:

"The indicative or declarative, to assert what we think certain; the potential, for the purposes of whatever we think contingent; the interrogative, when we are doubtful to procure us information; and the requisitive, to assist us in the gratifications of our volitions. The requisitive too appears
under two distinct species, either as it is imperative to inferiors, or preceptive to superiors. (Harris, 1751:144)

But Harris does not remain quite consistent in his approach. He regards the infinitive as a mood, but also says at the same time that moods in English are expressed entirely by auxiliary verbs. Harris's notional line is followed by Buchanan (1762) who gets terribly angry with those who deny moods in English, and asks whether one can believe that "the wisest and most respectable body of people upon the Face of the Globe own a language which is incapable of ascertaining their ideas, or of exhibiting the soul, and its various affections." (Buchanan, 1762:105) He seems to think that moods alone can exhibit the soul and its various affections. He does not realize that a language can use devices other than moods for this particular function.

As Buchanan is upset by the statements of those who said that English had no moods, White (1761) also finds them unpalatable. He proposes a scheme of ten moods, partly on formal, and partly on notional grounds. They are indicative, subjunctive, imperative, infinitive, participle, and five other moods according to the association of the auxiliary verbs, such as potential (can), determinative (would), obligatory (should), elective (may) and compulsive (must).
About the same time Lowth (1762) emphasizes formal criteria, and rejects the potential and optative moods. He distinguishes only five moods: indicative, imperative, subjunctive, infinitive and participle. (Lowth, 1762:46) But he later draws a distinction between 'primary moods' and 'secondary modes'. The moods mentioned above he treats as 'primary modes', as they depend on the modifications of the verb itself. The secondary modes are said to be represented by auxiliaries like 'can', 'may', 'should', etc. It should be noticed here that Lowth uses the scheme of his contemporary, James White, but he seems to be clearer, and much more confident about his criteria than White. In the second edition of his grammar, he re-emphasizes formal criteria by saying: "As far as Grammar is concerned, there are no more modes in any language, than there are forms of the verb appropriated to the denoting of such different manners of representation ... whatever other Metaphysical modes there may be in the theory of Universal Grammar, there are in English no other Grammatical Modes than those above described." (Lowth, 2nd ed., 1763:48-50).

It is about the same time, i.e., towards the end of the eighteenth century, that many others besides Lowth also emphasize formal criteria for determining moods. Priestley (1761) denies the existence of any mood in English, except the subjunctive in a minor way. The curious thing is that
Lowth and Priestley both apply formal criteria and reach different conclusions. Priestley looks strictly at the form of the verb and finds that, except in the case of 'if I be', which he grants as a case of the subjunctive, the English verb shows no inflexion variation for anyone to justify the recognition of any other moods. Pickbourn (1789) doubts the existence of even the subjunctive. He says: "I have some doubts whether it has a real existence or not. What is called the subjunctive may possibly be only the infinitive, governed by an auxiliary verb understood. For example, 'Though he slay me' may be 'Though he (may) slay me.' But even Pickbourn finds 'were' in 'if he were' an obstacle to his theory. He, however, disregards it as a single exception.

It is only a little later, in 1790, that Gregory, Professor of Medicine at Edinburgh, read out his paper on the 'Theory of the Moods of Verbs' to the Royal Society of Edinburgh. It was published in the Transactions of the Royal Society of Edinburgh. In that paper Gregory makes a clear distinction between formal and notional criteria. He says: 'The moods of verbs may be considered in two very different points of view, either with relation to any particular language or with relation to human thought, which must be supposed the same in all ages and nations. For the sake of distinctness, I shall call the expression of them, by inflection or otherwise
in language, grammatical moods, and the thoughts, or combinations of thoughts, though not always, or perhaps never expressed in the same way, I shall call energies or modifications, or moods of thought." (p.12)

Gregory rejects the whole idea of enumerating the moods of thought, as he suspects they may be numberless. His paper is a valuable contribution to general linguistic theory, as far as mood is concerned. It is also widely acknowledged for this. With Priestley, Pickbourn and Gregory being present on the scene towards the end of the eighteenth century, one could expect that English would free itself from the influence of the classical tradition and develop an independent grammatical description of its own, based on its own intrinsic formal properties. Was this expectation fulfilled? Let us look a bit further to find an answer to this question. But before we do so, let us have a look at the table of moods, representing the traditional position up to the end of the eighteenth century:
### SYSTEMS OF MOODS

#### Group I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.9</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Infin.</td>
<td>Opt.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>1662</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.10</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>Imper.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>1695-1795</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.11</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>Imper.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Pot.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1686-1711</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.12</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>Imper.</td>
<td>Infin.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>1764-1801</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.13</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>1712-90</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I.14</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>Imper.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1737</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

#### Group II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.4</td>
<td>Elective</td>
<td>Imper.</td>
<td>Infin.</td>
<td>Participle</td>
<td>1764</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.5</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>Infin.</td>
<td>Participle</td>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>1765-88</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.7</td>
<td>Indic.</td>
<td>Imper.</td>
<td>Infin.</td>
<td>Subj.</td>
<td>Interrog.</td>
<td>Precative</td>
<td>1777</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total number of classifications**: 204

**Grammars explicitly denying moods in English**: 19

**Grammars silent about moods**: 35

---

(*Michael, 1970: 434*)
3. **The Nineteenth Century**

The Nineteenth century begins with Haywood (1800) and Dalton (1801) who propose only three moods: indicative, imperative and infinitive. But both of them reject the secondary modes of White and Lowth. They put all the auxiliaries, namely, 'may', 'can', 'shall', 'will', 'should', 'would', etc., into the indicative. Even in a case like 'if he love' Haywood does not recognize a separate subjunctive mood, but treats it as a conditional form of the present indicative. Although Dalton recognizes it as a subjunctive, he does not use the term 'mood' for it, as he knows that it differs little from the indicative mood. A still stronger rejection of the subjunctive comes from Brown (1862), who says: "The subjunctive mood is so called because it is always subjoined to another (sic) verb. It usually denotes some doubtful contingency, or some supposition contrary to fact. The manner of its dependence is commonly denoted by one of the conjunctions: 'if', 'that', 'though', 'lest', 'unless'. The indicative and potential moods in all their tenses may be used in the same dependent manner to express any positive or potential condition; but this seems not to be a sufficient reason for considering them as parts of the subjunctive mood. In short, the idea of a subjunctive mood in the indicative form (which is adopted by Chandler, Frazee, Fisk, Greene, Comly, Ingersoll, Smith, Sanborn,
Mack, Butler, Hart, Weld, Pinneo and others) is utterly inconsistent with any just notion of what a mood is, and the suggestion, which we frequently meet with, that the regular indicative or potential mood may be thrown into the subjunctive (sic) by merely prefixing a conjunction is something worse than nonsense." (quoted by Harsh, 1868:20).

3.1 Henry Sweet

The clear light about the criteria that emerge from time to time again starts fading towards the end of the nineteenth century. Sweet (1955) defines moods of a verb as "grammatical forms expressing different relations between subject and predicate." (p.105) He believes that from the point of view of mood, statements fall into two classes, according as they state something as a fact, or only as a thought. To him even doubtful statements, such as 'Perhaps it is true', are just as much statements of facts as the most positive assertions.

Discussing 'thought' as opposed to 'fact' he says that thought can be expressed by means of hypothetical clauses which occur in conditional and concessive types of sentences, e.g. 'If you are right, I am wrong', or 'Even if it is necessary, I won't do it'. Thought can also be stated as
wish, as in 'God save the Queen!', or can be expressed by clauses of purpose, which are a special class of wish-sentences, e.g. 'I wrote to him that he might know I was at home.' Even indirect narration, as opposed to direct, is treated by Sweet as a statement not of fact, but of thought.

Having presented the above conceptual framework, Sweet tries to equate the above conceptual distinctions of fact and thought with two moods, which he calls fact-mood and thought-mood. He claims that languages like Latin, French, German and Old English have only two such moods, known as the indicative (fact-mood) and the subjunctive (thought-mood), but Greek, he says, has other moods as well to distinguish different kinds of thought-statements, such as the optative mood, used primarily to express wish, which is expressed by the subjunctive in languages like Latin.

In English Sweet recognizes only two inflexional moods, the indicative and the subjunctive, although he admits that the distinction is very slight on account of scanty inflexions in the English verb. The only regular inflexion that distinguishes the indicative from the subjunctive is that of the Third Person Singular Present which drops the s of the indicative (he sees) in the subjunctive (he see). The verb 'be', however, shows further distinctions, such as 'I am', 'he is', 'he was' (indicative), and 'I be', 'he be', 'he were'
(subjunctive). Besides them the subjunctive is also said to be present in constructions like 'God save the queen!' expressing wish. This is treated as equivalent to the Greek optative.

Besides these fact and thought-moods, Sweet also recognizes an imperative mood in English in which the relation between subject and predicate is said to be not that of statement, but of hortation, i.e., of command, request etc. The marker of the imperative is said to be "a purely negative one being merely the common form of the verb used as a sentence-word in the second person, no distinction being made between singular and plural, any more than in the indicative (you see)." (p.112)

In addition to the above inflexional moods, Sweet distinguishes two other types of moods in English: auxiliary or periphrastic moods (conditional, permissive etc.), and tense-moods (preterite). He thinks that the few distinctions that are made in English between fact-statements and thought-statements are mainly expressed not by inflexions, but by auxiliaries (periphrastic moods), and by some peculiar use of tense distinctions (tense-moods). He calls the combination of 'should' and 'would' with the infinitive in the principal clause of a conditional sentence a conditional mood. A similar combination of 'may' and 'might' with the infinitive is called
a permissive mood. The latter mood is supposed to occur not merely in sentences used in seeking or granting permission, but also in those expressing wish, as in 'May you be happy!', or purpose, as in 'let the dog loose that he may run about a little.' Another combination of the verb 'to be' with the supine is called a compulsive mood, as in 'What am I to do?' or 'What is to be done?' But conditional sentences like 'If it were to rain, I don't know what we shall do' are regarded as instances not of a periphrastic mood like the compulsive, but of a pure (inflexional) mood.

Having discussed a few periphrastic moods, Sweet discusses what he calls the tense-mood. He thinks that the preterite tense, used to express thought-statements in hypothetical clauses of conditional sentences, such as 'If I knew his address, I would write to him', or 'If it were possible I would do it', is tense-mood. In the latter example, the hypothesis is said to be expressed not only by the preterite tense, but also by the subjunctive inflexion, which is superfluous.

After laying out the above taxonomy, Sweet issues a warning regarding the correspondence between what he calls fact-statements and thought-statements, on the one hand, and fact-forms and thought-forms, which he calls moods, on the other.
He says that the correspondence between them is not always logical. In languages like Latin fact-statements are not always expressed by the indicative mood, nor thought-statements by the subjunctive mood. He suspects other languages may also have such divergences. The glaring instance that he points out is that of a conditional sentence. Although all conditional sentences express thought-statements, as opposed to fact-statements, most languages use the indicative mood in sentences having open or real conditions, and the subjunctive mood in those having unreal conditions, although even a sentence expressing open condition does nothing more than leave the truth of the statement open without in any way confirming it. Sweet believes that in many cases the distinction between thought form and fact form is levelled in English, as the English verb makes no distinction between true and false reasons, or between direct and indirect narration.

4. The Twentieth Century

4.1 Otto Jespersen

Let us now have a look at some eminent grammarians of the twentieth century. Otto Jespersen discusses mood in various works of his. He mentions five moods in the *Philosophy of Grammar* (1968): indicative, subjunctive, imperative, infinitive and participle. But he prefers to discuss only
the first three, as he finds it difficult to coordinate the last two, the infinitive and the participle, with them. He admits that the first three moods are sometimes called fact-mood, thought-mood and will-mood respectively. But he does not think, as Sweet does, that they express different relations between subject and predicate. He believes that they only express certain attitudes of the speaker towards the content of the sentence, though in some cases the choice of a mood is determined not by the attitude of the actual speaker, but by the character of the clause itself and its relation to the main nexus on which it is dependent. To Jespersen mood is a syntactic, not a notional category; in other words, mood exists only when the speaker's attitude is in some way marked by the verb.

Talking of the indicative and the subjunctive, Jespersen expresses his dissatisfaction over treating combinations of auxiliaries with the infinitive as periphrastic moods, or substitutes for pure moods. He argues that as one cannot treat 'to the boy' as an instance of the dative case, one cannot also treat combinations like 'may come', 'should come', 'would come' etc., as instances of the subjunctive mood, even though they serve to translate simple subjunctives in German or Latin. Similarly, he rejects 'bless' as an instance of the optative in a sentence like 'God bless you!' as distinct from that of the subjunctive in 'if he bless you ...' when the form is the same
in both the cases. Reiterating formal criteria he says: "We should use the term 'optative' only where the language concerned has a separate form, as the case in Greek." (p.315) He rejects Sonnenschein's theory of moods which is based on notional distinctions.

Jespersen briefly refers to some notional moods, proposed by some grammarians. They are said to be based on the philosophies of Wolff and Kant. He lists some of them. Those like jussive, compulsive, obligative etc., are said to contain an element of will, and others like apodictive, necessitative, assertive etc., no element of will. But Jespersen does not attach any importance to them, and frankly says: "there are many "moods" if once one leaves the safe ground of verbal form actually found in a language." (p.321) He clearly perceives that there is no one to one correspondence between a certain type of meaning and a particular mood. This makes him distrust labels like fact-mood, thought-mood, and will-mood, if they are meant to indicate the functions of the indicative, the subjunctive and the imperative too literally. He points out many cases where the indicative is used for meanings that are typically associated with the subjunctive. He doubts whether any neat formula, applicable to different languages, can be found where subjunctive and indicative meanings are clearly distinguished. In view of the usage, one can
not always maintain that the indicative mood always expresses what is downright real, and the subjunctive never does that, or the subjunctive always expresses hesitation or doubt or uncertainty as to the reality of something, and the indicative never does that. Jespersen claims that the indicative is used for typical subjunctive functions so much in Modern English that there is very little left for the subjunctive to do now, with the result that many modern grammarians have now refused to acknowledge a separate subjunctive mood in English. We shall discuss this development later. Jespersen does not deny its existence, although he does not always find it distinct from other moods. He says: "The three moods (indicative, subjunctive and imperative) are not kept clear distinct in English in the same way as in many other languages." (1969:293) About its infrequent use he says: "in the old language the subjunctive served in clauses to express various subjective moods, uncertainty, hesitation, diffidence, etc. But these meanings are no longer felt with the same force as formerly, as the subjunctive is hardly ever used colloquially; it may now, to a great extent, be considered a literary trick to remove the style from every day associations." (1969:294).

Whether the feelings of uncertainty, hesitation, diffidence, etc., are felt today with the same force as formerly or not, one is not sure; what one cannot is
Jespersen's recognition of the fact that apart from certain stereotyped phrases the subjunctive is little used in modern spoken English. (Jespersen, 1958:624). He quotes Webster's remarks with approval: "Our students are taught in school the subjunctive form: 'if thou have', 'if he come' etc., and some of them continue in after-life to write in that manner, but in the course of more than forty years I have not known three men who have ventured to use that form of the verb in conversation. We toil in school to learn a language which we dare not introduce in conversation, but which the force of custom compels us not to abandon." (Quoted by Jespersen, 1958:624)

On the subject of the indicative encroaching upon the sphere of the subjunctive also, Jespersen's remarks are quite illuminating. He does not accept this view. He says that the means to express the special attitude of mind generally connected with use of the subjunctive is not now the indicative as such, but generally a combination of a modal verb, without any distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive, and an infinitive (may go, should go etc.). (1958:623) This may lead to a further enquiry whether a clear distinction between the indicative and the subjunctive really exists in English. We shall take up this issue later.
Jespersen's remarks on the imperative reinforce his view of the multi-functionality of a particular grammatical category. He says that the imperative is used for making requests which range from the strictest command to the humblest prayer, but it is also used for granting permission as in "Take that (if you like)!" and also in specifying condition, as in "Drink that (polluted) water, and you will soon fall ill." He also points out that requests can be expressed not only by the imperative mood, but also by other grammatical devices, as by the indicative mood in declarative and interrogative sentences, e.g. 'You will pack at once and leave this house.', 'Would you open the door?'

As regards the formal identity of the imperative, Jespersen asserts that it is a formal, not a notional category, but he has to admit that it has no particular ending in English. He fears that it may make people think that the sentences supposed to be containing the imperative contain only infinitives. But he consoles himself by saying: "Parallel uses in other languages show us, however, clearly that they contain imperatives." (1968:314) Can this alone justify the imperative in English, if it is not formally quite distinct there?

Around the time Jespersen was writing his grammar of English, and commenting on modality and mood, KRUISINGA and
Poutsma, two equally prominent grammarians, were also writing their grammars of English. Let us now see what they have to say about mood.

4.2 Kruisinga

Kruisinga does not say much about mood as such, although he discusses the use of modal auxiliaries at length in A Handbook of Present-Day English (1932) and in An English Grammar (1960), which he wrote in collaboration with Erades. He recognizes the modal use of the preterite, and also the irrealis. But he rejects the subjunctive mood by saying: "English does not possess such a system in contrast, for instance, to French and German." (Quoted by Harsh, 1968:25) Although we cannot find in the grammars mentioned above a clear discussion of mood in English as in the grammars written by people like Sweet, Jespersen and Poutsma, Poutsma believes that Kruisinga distinguishes four moods in English. He mentions them in his own grammar by saying "Kruisinga also distinguishes four moods; i.e. besides the indicative, the subjunctive (which in his system includes the conditional), and the imperative, he adopts an 'emphatic mood', which in speech is evidenced by a particularly strong stress of the finite verb of the predicate, and in the printed or written language by 'do' and sometimes by italicizing, as in 'I do
like this picture; I am an admirer of this picture." (Handbook 222) (Quoted in A Grammar of Late Modern English, Part II, Section II, Poutsma, 1926:12).

Poutsma does not include the emphatic mood in his own system of moods saying that as such forms of the predicate are called emphatic mood only so far as they serve to express emphatic assertion or negation they can hardly find a place in the mood-system.

4.3 H. Poutsma

Poutsma defines mood as "a form of the finite verb, or a verb group, by means of which the speaker expresses his mental attitude towards the fulfilment of the action or state expressed by the predicate". (1926:9) He thus adapts formal criteria which he affirms again by saying; "The forms of the predicate which correspond to this attitude are called moods". (1926:9) He distinguishes four moods in English: indicative, subjunctive, conditional and imperative, and illustrates them with the following examples:

(1) I have read this book. (indicative)
(2) Long live the king! (subjunctive)
(3) It were well that were forgot now. (conditional)
(4) Leave the room! (imperative)
So far Poutsma talks of the formal criteria, although his examples do not clearly reflect that; but later he gets stuck in notional criteria when he starts associating different types of predication with different moods. It is the pitfall of such neat correspondence that Jespersen so carefully avoids. Poutsma says that the predication involving the attitude of considering the fulfilment of the action or state as a fact is the predication of certainty which is symbolized by the indicative mood. He also regards it as the neutral mood. Similarly, the predication involving the attitude of uncertainty is the predication of uncertainty which is symbolized by the subjunctive mood; the same predication is said to be symbolized by the imperative mood, as uncertainty of fulfilment is associated with command or request. For the subjunctive mood Poutsma extends the scope of predication, and includes also the attitudes of volition, hope, fear, concession etc., along with that of uncertainty. Finally, he believes that the predication involving the attitude of rejection i.e., the speaker's wish to be understood that he rejects the fulfilment of the action or state, either as being contrary to some known fact, or as being a mere supposition with regard to the future or present, made only for the state of argument, is the predication of rejection, which is symbolized by the conditional mood.
Besides the above, Poutsma mentions some other types of predication also, such as the predication of conviction, which, he says, is symbolized by no particular form of the verb, but by the auxiliary 'must'. Unlike Jespersen, he treats modal auxiliaries as substitutes for moods, as is evident from his statement: "combinations with 'may', 'might', 'let', 'shall', 'should', 'would', and 'were to', which serve as substitutes for the subjunctive or conditional proper, may be called periphrastic subjunctive or conditional respectively, as opposed to the mood-forms proper, which may be called the inflexional subjunctive or conditional." (1926:10-11) Apart from 'let' which he considers to be an imperative, he considers the modal auxiliaries to be either subjunctive or conditional forms. But he also admits at the same time that the above auxiliaries, including 'must' and 'will', are often used in combinations with infinitives for which there can be no corresponding mood e.g., 'The train may be late'; 'Speak harshly to no soul whom you may meet'; 'Stand by the word you shall speak'; 'From whom should the letter come?'; 'I must have been mistaken'; 'This will be the Tower of London, I suppose'.

Poutsma thinks that the term 'mood' cannot be applied indefinitely to all such combinations, even if they symbolize in a periphrastic manner different types of predication. He rejects a mood-system, based on a notional or emotional basis,
which comprise under the term 'mood' all the forms of the predicate, whether synthetical or analytical by which the speaker may express his psychical disposition regarding the predication. He thinks that such psychical disposition may be endless, and may lead to a practically countless number of moods, such as moods of fear, hope, scorn, expectation, positiveness, doubt, hesitation etc.

As other grammarians who abide by formal criteria have uneasy moments in their life when they do not find clear formal distinctions in English to support their classification of moods, Poutsma also feels uneasy when he finds that the same form sometimes represents more than one mood. He says "In many cases, therefore, there are not any audible or visible signs betraying the speaker's attitude towards the fulfilment of the action or state described. This deficiency makes itself particularly felt in the preterite, which, except for the verb 'to be', has the same forms for the subjunctive as for the indicative". (1926:163-64) He sometimes tries to allay these doubts by adopting notional criteria without fully realizing what he is doing. In connection with the conditional mood he says that that mood employs tense-forms that are at variance with the time-sphere of the predication. He considers that to be a powerful and unequivocal means of marking the attitude of rejection. He easily believes that it may render the use of a special conditional form, as opposed to a preterite
indicative, unnecessary. One may ask Poutsma whether temporal reference should be the only function of tense, and whether, even if it is the preterite tense in a conditional sentence, it cannot have a modal function of rejection or unreality in addition. The question of multi-functionality which Jespersen had in mind is quite relevant here. We shall discuss such questions after we have completed the picture of the traditional position on modality and mood.

4.4 George O. Curme

We find a discussion of mood also in the work of another eminent grammarian, George O. Curme (1935). He defines moods as "changes in the form of the verb to show the various ways in which the action or state is thought of by the speaker." (p.223) He lists three moods, indicative, subjunctive and imperative. The indicative mood is said to be the form which represents something as a fact, or as in close relation with reality, or which in interrogative form inquires after a fact. Curme divides the subjunctive mood into two classes: 'old simple subjunctive', and 'the newer forms consisting of a modal auxiliary and a dependent infinitive of the verb to be used'. He classifies the various meanings associated with the subjunctive under two heads - the optative subjunctive and the potential subjunctive. Elaborating them he says: "The optative
subjunctive represents something as desired, demanded, or required (by a person or by circumstances). The potential subjunctive marks something as a mere conception of the mind, but at the same time represents it as something that may probably or possibly be or become a reality, or on the other hand, as something that is contrary to fact. (p.224) The imperative mood is said to be the mood of command, request, admonition, supplication, entreaty, warning, prohibition etc. Curiously enough, it is also said that the optative subjunctive is often closely related in meaning to the imperative. A number of examples are given to illustrate each mood, such as 'Part we in friendship from your land.' (Optative subjunctive), 'It may rain today' or 'if he confess, I shall overlook the offence' (Potential subjunctive) etc. Finally, talking of the old subjunctive form, Curme says that it does not occur so often as the newer form with a modal auxiliary. Although the old simple form is still highly prized in elevated diction for its peculiar effect, the new form has gained ascendancy in both literary and colloquial language by virtue of its finer shades of meaning. (p.227)

Curme, we can see, does not follow Jespersen's line, but goes back to an older line of thinking in treating constructions with modal auxiliaries as realizations of moods. He seems to have at the back of his mind a distinction of pure and
periphrastic moods, which Sweet makes, when he talks of the old and the new subjunctive mood. But he does not clearly show the formal distinctions that are supposed to be the basis of the three moods distinguished by him.

4.5 R.W. Zandvoort

We may now move on to the middle of the present century (1962) and see what Zandvoort has to say on mood in English. Zandvoort starts by affirming that there is an opposition in English between the third person singular present tense, on the one hand, and the simple present associated with other persons in singular as well as plural, on the other, for example, 'play' - 'plays'. But in literary English he says, the opposition is on a different plane: "The third person singular of a verb may occur either with or without s; the form without s is known as the subjunctive, the one with s as the indicative, and the difference is said to be one of mood". (1962:86)

Zandvoort lists three main functions of the subjunctive: expressing a wish, expressing possibility, and expressing unreality. It is these functions which sometimes prompt grammarians to call the subjunctive optative, potential, or irrealis. Of the three functions it is the irrealis that Zandvoort considers to be in common use in spoken and ordinary written English, the optative and the potential being mostly
confined to literary use. He lists various conditions for the use of the subjunctive in relation to 'be' and other verbs, and also gives a number of examples to illustrate them.

Zandvoort does not mention anything like tense-mood, but he thinks that if the preterite of an auxiliary is used with a modal function, it should be called an auxiliary of modality, for example, in 'If I were to tell you all I know, you would be amazed', 'were' is to be taken as an auxiliary of modality. He probably thinks that in such a case tense is completely superseded by mood. In a later essay 'On the so called subjunctive' (1970) he clearly says that the s-less form (i.e., the subjunctive) is indifferent in tense, as it can have a past tense context without a past tense form; for example, "The men had suggested that she wait". (p. 127)

Zandvoort feels extremely unhappy over the controversy regarding the use of the term 'subjunctive'. He thinks it has been misunderstood and misused by several people. He points out specifically two cases, one of Onion's in his Advanced English Syntax (1904), and the other of the author of 'A Survey of the subjunctive mood in English' published in American Speech (1959). While the latter confuses the term with the actual forms denoted by the term, and treats the subjunctive mood as a matter of prescription by grammarians, the former mixes up formal and notional criteria. Zandvoort does not agree with . . . Close (1962) who says "apart
from a few archaic remains the subjunctive has disappeared from English altogether." (p.15) He firmly believes that the forms called 'subjunctive' are found in Modern English, but to avoid confusion, he says that it is better not to identify them with the subjunctive mood, as the term has done too much harm and for a description of the concerned linguistic phenomenon it is not absolutely necessary. He thinks that it may be the best course to drop it, if the student of Modern English wishes to relate the facts of Modern English, without interference from Latin or Old English, or any other language, to a different grammatical system.

4.6 G. Scheurweghs

The 'Handbook' of Zandvoort came out in 1957. Only two years after, i.e. in 1959, G. Scheurweghs published his Present Day English Syntax. Except for the modal past tense and the modal pluperfect in subordinate clauses, there is no mention of mood in it. The imperative and the subjunctive are discussed, but not as moods. Of the imperative it is said that it differs from the present tense only in stress and intonation; only the verb 'to be' has a different form. To this he adds that occasionally the subject may be expressed in an imperative sentence. There is no discussion of the modality associated with it, nor are its various uses brought out as done by Jespersen.
As regards the subjunctive, Schewrweghs has to say only that as far as it survives in English, what is called the present tense of the subjunctive is distinguishable from the normal present tense in the third person because it has no ending, and also from all the forms of 'to be' (p.344). About its related modalities he only says that the subjunctive may represent will, order and advisability, and doubt and uncertainty in adverb clauses (p.345).

4.7 Strang

A little later we have Modern English Structure (1962) by Strang. She regards mood as one of the seven grammatical categories in relation to which verb-forms must be distinguished. She agrees with the definition of mood given in the OED as "anyone of the several groups of forms in the conjugation of a verb which serve to indicate ... whether it expresses a predication, a wish or the like". (1964:126) She distinguishes two moods: indicative and subjunctive. The former is said to be the negative term of the opposition i.e. unmarked. The formal marker of the subjunctive in the non-past is said to be the absence of inflection for the third person singular. But she admits that the subjunctive is formally no more than a vestigial survival in modern English, and that the only obligatory use of the non-past subjunctive is in certain forward-looking formulaic expressions, mostly of wishes and prayers, such as 'God bless you', 'God save
the Queen', 'Long live the King' etc. The past subjunctive is considered to be still more restricted. It is said that "its forms consist of the past plural used in all persons of the verb, and it is only the verb 'be' that makes a distinction of singular and plural in its past forms, and so is capable of having a past subjunctive." (1964:135).

It is for this reason that the past subjunctive is said to belong not to the form-class 'verb', but to the single verb 'be' in present day English. The unique form is 'were' which indicates either rejected hypothesis or unfulfilled wish. Even for these functions 'were' is not considered to be obligatory, as 'was' can always be substituted for that.

The imperative is treated not as mood by Strang but as a non-finite verb form along with the infinitive and the participle. The discussion of mood has now reached a thin end when grammarians are not prepared to accept that it has an important place in the structure of Modern English. Its status seems to be considerably reduced.

Having surveyed the field up to the sixties of the present century let us now have a look at the two important works of the seventies: A Grammar of Contemporary English by Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik (1972), and The English Verb (revised edition) by Palmer (1974), and see what status mood has in them - we are ignoring here a number of grammars of English written for foreign students by distinguished
scholars like Close, Christophersen etc., as we think that reference grammars alone will provide a proper historical perspective for our study, as far as the description of English is concerned.

4.8 Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech & Svartvik

In *A Grammar of Contemporary English* (1972) there is not much discussion of mood. The term 'indicative' has been mentioned only with reference to verb classes, namely, the indicative verb as opposed to the subjunctive verb (p. 833). The implication here seems to be of a modal contrast in the subordinate clause, as the following examples show:

(a) Indicative verb: I suppose that he will be coming.
     I will be coming.
     I will come.
     I has come.

(b) Subjunctive verb: I request that she go alone.

The imperative is also not recognized as a mood. It is treated as a sentence type expressing commands, requests etc. The subjunctive is referred to here and there, but not as a mood. It is clearly admitted that it is not an important category in contemporary English and is normally replaced by other forms. Three types of subjunctive have been distinguished. The first is the

The mandatory subjunctive in 'that clauses' when the main
clause contains an expression of recommendation, resolution, demand, surprise etc. It is reflected by loss of concord between the subject and the finite verb in the 3rd person singular present, for example, "There was a suggestion that Brown be dropped from the team". The second type of subjunctive is said to be the Formulaic subjunctive which also has the base V, and is used only in certain set expressions as 'God save the queen!'; 'So be it then!' etc. The third type is the 'were' subjunctive. It is obviously restricted to only one form i.e., 'were', and is hypothetical in meaning. It is used in conditional and concessive clauses, and also in subordinate clauses after optative verbs like 'wish', for example, "If I were rich", "I wish I were dead" etc. (pp.76-77)

4.9 F.R. Palmer

Lastly, we may look at The English Verb (1974) by Palmer where mood is altogether rejected. Even the age-old subjunctive has been dropped. Palmer says: "the notion of a subjunctive mood is a simple transfer from Latin, and has no place in English grammar, since all the potential subjunctives turn out to be past tense in form (or to be simple uninflected form as in 'God save the queen!'). Even the formal 'If I were you' does not prove the existence of a subjunctive. For those speakers of English who insist on 'were' the 'subjunctive' is exactly like a normal past - the
same form throughout the paradigm - 'were' just like 'took' 'loved' etc. The unique feature of the past tense of 'be' is that when it marks past time it has the two distinct forms 'was' and 'were' - unlike any other verb in the language. 'Were' in 'If I were you' is thus more 'regularly' past than the 'was/were' forms of past time". (p.48-49)

Palmer is not prepared to set up a different category for functions that are said to be typically subjunctive. He adds the function of unreality to the past time function of the past tense. The present subjunctive he dismisses, just because the verb has a simple uninflected form there like the present tense.

From the above historical account we can easily see that English grammar starts under a very heavy influence of the classical tradition when five, six or even ten moods are believed to exist in English by some grammarians, but gradually as the criteria for identifying moods get clarified, and also as English grammar frees itself from classical influence, grammarians start looking into the structure of English with unconditioned eyes. Some of them think that English has no moods, while others still uphold the subjunctive.

We have so far examined the grammars written by those who have had no definite commitment to any particular theoretical model of linguistics, viz, structuralist transformationalist etc. Many of these grammars, especially those belonging to
the seventeenth, eighteenth, nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries may be classed as traditional grammars, and others i.e., the more recent ones, may be classed as strictly eclectic grammars, as Leech once characterized

A Grammar of Contemporary English (in private oral communication). Let us now have a look at some typically structuralist grammars of English also in order to see what the structuralists have to say about modality and mood in English.

5. Structuralist grammars of English

5.1. Bloomfield

Let us begin our account with Bloomfield who right at the beginning of his book Language (1933) acknowledges the fact that the Greeks distinguished mood as one of the chief inflectional categories of their language, but they defined it not in terms of clearly identifiable linguistic forms, but in abstract terms which only indicated the meaning of the category (1973:5). He refers to the grammars of Dionysius Thrax (second century B.C.) and Appolonius Dyscolus (second century A.D.) in this connection.

Talking of English Bloomfield says: "English has many modes, distinguishing various approaches of an action to its actual occurrence." (p.273) He perceives a morphological
distinction between 'real' (he is here) and 'unreal' (if he were here), a syntactic distinction in a whole series by the peculiarity of certain irregular (auxiliary) verbs which are followed by an infinitive without to: he 'will write', 'shall write', 'can write', 'must write', 'may write' etc. He mentions the subjunctive mode in connection with the unreal in clauses introduced by 'if' or 'though' (p.273).

5.2. Fries

Discussing mood in his American English Grammar (1940: 103-107) Fries says that in present-day English modal functions are mostly marked by modal auxiliaries instead of verbal inflections. Even those distinctive subjunctive forms which were present in old English have fallen together with those of the indicative mode, except for the verb 'be'. For 'be' he admits there are forms that are distinctly subjunctive. He has a number of examples in his data. But in spite of that he concludes his discussion of the subjunctive by saying: "In general the subjunctive has tended to disappear from use. This statement does not mean that the ideas formerly expressed by the inflectionally distinct forms of the verb, called the subjunctive, are not now expressed, but rather that these ideas are now expressed chiefly by other means, especially by function words". (p.106)
Headds: "The failure to use the subjunctive form in non-fact conditions and in 'that clauses' after words of suggesting asking, requesting, etc., is not a characteristic of vulgar English only. The practices of standard English and vulgar English do not differ significantly in this respect." (pp. 106-107) No other moods are mentioned by him.

5.3 Bernard Bloch

Bloch (1947) recognizes the optative and concessive uses of 'he' in 'God be praised', 'the public be damned' etc. He also acknowledges that formulas like 'God forbid!', 'God have mercy!' etc., are generally regarded as instances of the subjunctive. Besides the use of 'be' as finite present, he also recognizes the peculiar modal use of were, but he calls it not the subjunctive but the unreal. He considers it different from the preterite 'were' which contrasts with 'was'.

5.4 Nelson Francis

Later, we have The Structure of American English by Francis (1958) in which mode has been distinguished as one of the formal distinctions that verbs exhibit (p. 330). Modal distinctions are said to be numerous (p. 524). But the thing worth noticing is that these numerous distinctions are said not to represent traditional moods like indicative,
subjunctive, imperative etc., but are to be divided into two classes: (1) those formed by the modal auxiliaries with the base form of the verb, viz., 'will go', 'may go', etc., and (2) those formed by certain other auxiliaries with the infinitive (to-base) form of the verb, viz., 'have to go', 'are to see' etc. (p.334).

5.5 James Sledd

Sledd gives a 'glossary of grammatical terms' in A Short Introduction to English Grammar (1959) in which he defines mood as follows: "The term 'mood', or 'mode', refers to distinctions in verbal forms which indicate the relations between one verbal in the sentence and another, or which show the speaker's attitude toward the state of affairs which a verbal represents." (p.227) He distinguishes three moods in English: 'indicative', 'subjunctive' and 'imperative'. But he does not give the name 'subjunctive' to such verbal phrases as 'would go', 'should say', and thus does not confuse inflectional distinctions with positional distinctions.

The above recognition of three moods looks quite unusual for a structuralist. Sledd defines other moods also in his glossary. Simple predicates in most English clauses, except imperatives and subjunctives, are said to be in the indicative mood (p.218). Of the imperative mood he says that it is generally believed to be the uninflected form or the bare form of the verb. (p.217). As regards the subjunctive mood he says that
most English verbs have only one distinctive subjunctive form, the third person singular, present tense, without the -s of the indicative. The verb 'to be' is said to have two subjunctive forms: be throughout the present tense, and were throughout the past. Subjunctive forms are said to be used in nominal clauses after verbs like 'ask', 'demand', 'move', 'suggest' etc., or in some adverbial clauses expressing an unreal condition (pp.250-51).

5.6 W.F. Twadell:

In the English Verb Auxiliaries (1963) Twadell mentions the modal uses of the past tense like unreality, lesser assurance in predication, etc., but he treats the typically subjunctive use of 'be' and the 's'-less forms of verbs as mere relics of the past which do not have much place in the present day English. He claims that such subjunctives are rapidly giving way to catenatives and modals with contingent and prescriptive components (pp.23-24).

5.7 E.A. Nida

Nida published A Synopsis of English Syntax in 1964. Except where he criticizes traditional grammars for their notional approach (pp.12-39), he does not mention mood at all in his account of English syntax. He only mentions modal auxiliaries.
5.8 **H. A. Gleason**

Gleason also does not mention mood in his *Linguistics and English Grammar* (1965). He mentions only modal auxiliaries like Nida, and discusses their use.

5.9 **Martin Joos**

Joos also does not mention moods, but discusses the use of modal auxiliaries in *The English Verb: Form and Meaning* (1964).

5.10 **M. A. K. Halliday**

Halliday defines *Mood* in *Language Structure and Language Function* (1970) as a sort of grammatical realization of the inter-personal function that language performs. He says: "... one function of language is to provide for interaction between people by allowing the expression of statuses, social and individual attitudes, assessments, judgements and the like; and this includes participation in linguistic interaction. Language itself defines the roles which people take in situations in which they communicate with one another; and every language incorporates options whereby the speaker can vary his own communication-role by making assertions, asking questions, giving orders, expressing doubts and so on. The basic speech functions of statement, question, response, command and exclamation fall within this category..."
(though they do not exhaust it), and these are expressed grammatically by the system of mood (cf. Sweet, 1955:105), in which the principal options are declarative, interrogative, (yes/no and wh-types), imperative etc." (pp. 159-60)

The reference to Sweet, made above, is slightly misplaced, as although Sweet says "by the moods of a verb we understand grammatical forms expressing different relations between subject and predicate" (1955:105), he treats mood as a property of the verb, and does not relate it so clearly, as Halliday does, to communicative roles or speech functions, and their realization in different sentence types. In fact, Halliday's thinking is closer to that of Petrus Ramus, the Renaissance grammarian (1572) who also says that the whole sentence rather than the verb expresses modal meanings. In 'Functional Diversity in Language as seen from a consideration of Modality and Mood in English' (1970:322-361) Halliday says:

"There is thus no one single place in the clause where modality is located. It is a strand running prosodically through the clause" (p. 331). That is quite understandable as modality, according to him, is expressed by both verbal and non-verbal means. Word order and prosodic features are also said to express it. But the curious thing is that when Halliday lists verbal means he only lists modal auxiliaries (p. 330) and none of what are traditionally distinguished as mood's, such as indicative, subjunctive etc.
To the best of our knowledge no TG grammarian distinguishes moods like indicative, imperative, subjunctive etc., in his account of the structure of English. The Aux. rule in the phrase structure component of most TG grammars has an element, called M, but it is realized only by modal auxiliaries like 'will', 'shall', 'can', 'may', 'must' etc., and not by any traditional moods. One could refer in this connection to the TG grammars of English written by Jacobs and Rosenbaum (1968), Lester (1971), Broderick (1975), besides Syntactic Structures (1957) and Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965) by Chomsky in which the data for illustration are mostly from English.

Those who subscribe to the view that auxiliaries are main verbs (Ross (1970), Huddleston (1974 & 1976), Pullum & Wilson (1977) etc.) treat modals as main verbs, but do not distinguish any of the traditional moods. So modality is by and large considered to be expressed by modal verbs, as far as the verbal group is concerned. That is why most recent grammars of English, structuralist as well as transformational generative, talk more of their use and meaning than of the traditional moods.
A Critique

We have so far presented the views of some major grammarians of English regarding mood in English. The main purpose of setting these views in historical perspective is to bring to a clear focus the controversial nature of mood. As we have seen, some grammarians distinguish as many as ten moods in English, while others reject mood altogether. This rejection is not recent. Even as far back as the eighteenth century some grammarians of English doubted the existence of mood in English. Our historical account clearly shows how English grammar has for a long time been under a heavy classical influence, and how it has taken long for the right kind of criteria to emerge and stabilize. Although with the onset of modern structural linguistics most grammarians became keenly aware of the importance of formal criteria, it is not true to say that traditional grammarians never realized their importance. People like Gregory, Priestley, Pickbourn, Haywood, Dalton etc., did realize their importance in the past, and more recently Jespersen, Kruisinga, Poutsma and others have greatly emphasized their importance. But somehow formal criteria could not always be applied consistently to mood, and the controversy continued. It is not yet resolved fully. Grammarians like Zandvoort who firmly believe that there is mood in English do not now insist on its being called so. Other grammarians
also seem to be prepared for this kind of compromise. In a recent grammar of English, written by Quirk and Greenbaum (1975:151-52) it is not the system of mood as such but different types of subjunctive that have been distinguished. The statement on mood is rather strange. Mood is said to be expressed in English to a very minor extent by the subjunctive, as in 'so be it then!', to a much greater extent by past tense forms, as in 'If you taught me, I would learn quickly', but above all, by means of the modal auxiliaries, as in 'It is strange that he should have left so early.' (1975:51)

Mood in the above statement has been treated perhaps as synonymous with modality, which is a semantic, not a grammatical category. Although no clear statement has been made whether the subjunctive is a mood expressing a particular kind of modality, the implication seems to be that there is a clear contrast between the indicative and the subjunctive forms. This contrast is overlooked by Palmer and many structuralist and T.G. grammarians who do not distinguish any mood in English.

One may now ask why the attitude towards mood has changed so radically. It has changed perhaps with the general reaction against the traditional grammar and its dependence on the classical tradition. Structuralists always emphasize that since every language is unique (sui generis), its
its structure cannot be described in terms of the categories of any other language. They criticize traditional grammarians for imposing classical categories on the grammar of English. They believe that grammatical categories have to be determined by clear formal criteria, not by semantic ones, nor by mixing them in any way. Many of them also believe that it is not necessary for a grammatical category to have a unique semantic function. A category may be multifunctional representing any number of semantic functions. For example, while tense may have a modal function besides its normal temporal one, mood or a modal auxiliary may have a temporal besides its normal modal function. The net result is that grammarians have now come to realize clearly that mood is not something absolutely necessary even for the representation of various types of modality and illocutionary force. If a language does not have any formal distinction that could be characterized as mood, we may expect that other categories in it will perform all the modal functions. Let us now look at the different moods, distinguished by various grammarians of English, with this in mind, and see how far they are supported by clear formal distinctions.

Although some grammarians distinguish the infinitive and participle moods, these moods have not met with general approval. Jespersen regards participles as a kind of adjectives
formed from verbs, and infinitives as having something in common with substantives (1968:87). Most other grammarians also regard them as non-finite forms of the verb having different functions. The attempt to install an infinitive mood and define it as a mood without number and person (Miege, 1889:50) has really failed. This mood has been distinguished mostly because some Latin grammars have it. So as English grammar gradually gained its independence from Latin grammar, both infinitive and participle moods were rejected. They cannot be distinguished as moods, also because moods in English are the property of finite verbs, while infinitives and participles are only non-finite verbal forms. They do not also represent any kind of modality or illocutionary force.

The moods that still remain prominent in most traditional grammars of English are the indicative, the imperative and the subjunctive. Besides them, the optative and the potential are also mentioned in some grammars, partly in imitation of Latin grammar. One cannot, of course, object to the indicative mood, if it is only meant to be an unmarked member in opposition to some other marked members of the system of mood. That is to say, if other members exist on distinct formal grounds, the indicative can also exist as a neutral mood. But the question is whether such a formal contrast exists to justify even the indicative mood.
Let us first look at the imperative mood. Notionally, it is said to be the mood of command and request, but formally, as Sweet (1955:112) says, it is "a purely negative one being merely the common form of the verb used as a sentence-word in the second person, no distinction being made between singular and plural any more than in the indicative." Although Jespersen affirms that the imperative mood is a formal, not a notional category, he admits that it has no particular ending in English. He even fears that some people may treat the so-called imperative as an infinitive without 'to'. Other grammarians either do not want to face the question of formal distinction, or easily satisfy themselves by saying that the imperative has no overt marker. How does one then distinguish it from the indicative which too has no overt marker? The only distinction may be of syntactic environment; that is, the unmarked form, called the indicative, occurs in a declarative sentence with all the three persons as subjects, while the unmarked form, called the imperative, occurs in a different kind of sentence, usually called the imperative sentence, only with the second person as its subject. This hardly justifies the distinction of two classes, called the indicative and imperative moods, especially when in the tradition of English grammar 'mood' has largely been distinguished as an inflexionally marked category. On purely formal basis one could say that the same verb form occurs in both declarative and imperative sentences, and that it is
nowhere marked for mood. That is what many modern grammarians of English actually say when they reject the imperative mood.

One cannot, of course, distinguish as imperative mood (Vorlat, 1975: 330) anything that "biddeth or commandeth" as Lily does. This would be tantamount to determining moods by applying purely notional criteria. Besides, if we give up verbal ending as the distinguishing criterion, we may have to recognize any linguistic device that signifies command or request as imperative mood. This will conflict even with the basis of sentence types which is supposed to underlie the distinction between the so-called indicative and imperative, as any declarative or interrogative sentence may then be supposed to have imperative mood in it, if it signifies command or request, for example, 'you won't/shan't leave this place' (command), 'would you pass the salt?' (request). Imperative mood will, in that case, cease to be a formal grammatical category, but will function as a semantic category identical with the speech act having the illocutionary force of command or request. That seems to be implication of what Sweet says about the imperative mood, namely, that in the imperative mood the relation between subject and predicate is not that of a statement, but of hortation, i.e., command, request, etc. In the interrogative sentence, cited above, the relationship between the subject and the predicate is, of course, that
of hortation, as the subject 'you' is being requested to pass the salt, but is that sufficient for distinguishing imperative mood, when in Sweet's own words no distinction can be made between the indicative and the imperative, as the markers of both are purely negative.

(1926)

Not very different is the position of Poutsma with regard to the imperative. After defining mood as 'a form of the finite verb, or a verb group, by means of which the speaker expresses his mental attitude towards the fulfilment of the action or state expressed by the predicate' he distinguishes four moods in English of which the imperative is one. But he does not clearly show the formal distinction between the indicative and the imperative; on the contrary, he admits that predications supposed to relate to different moods sometimes overlap. For instance, he says that the predication involving the attitude of uncertainty is the predication of uncertainty which is symbolized by the subjunctive mood, but the same predication is symbolized by the imperative mood also, as uncertainty of fulfilment is also associated with command or request. Poutsma seems to be aware of the situation when the same form is supposed to represent more than one mood. He says that except for the verb 'to be', the preterite has the same form for the subjunctive as for the indicative. We shall argue the case of the subjunctive later, but it is proper to say here that if the distinction between the subjunctive
and the indicative is valid in some, if not all, cases, there is at least some case, for distinguishing the subjunctive. Poutsma cannot show that the verb-forms used in the indicative and the imperative are different anywhere. They, of course, carry different constraints with them; for example, the verb in the imperative sentence cannot be marked for past tense, or perfective aspect etc., while that in the declarative sentence (supposed to be in the indicative mood) can be marked for all these. But such constraints can be the consequence, not the sole basis, of a modal contrast which is completely missing in the morphology of the verb.

If we go back from this particular sentence type where the imperative mood is supposed to occur, i.e. the sentence type having the ellipsis of the second person subject, we are seized with the same fear with which Jespersen was. The fear is that without any verbal ending people may not agree to distinguishing any mood being associated with the verb. They may think that the sentences supposed to be containing the imperative mood contain only bare infinitives, or the neutral form of the verb without any inflexional marking. They may, however, not agree with Jespersen who distinguishes the imperative mood in English by saying: "parallel" uses in other languages show us, however, clearly that they contain (1968:314) imperatives." One is only surprised how Jespersen can treat the structure of other languages as an adequate basis for
distinguishing a certain category in English. This is the major shortcoming of traditional grammarians against which most structuralists have so strongly protested. Languages like Latin may have an imperative mood, if there is a specific verbal ending to mark that, but it may not be proper to distinguish the same mood in English when there is no particular verbal ending to mark that. In place of the imperative mood, one may say that English has a type of sentence which drops its second person subject (in the surface structure), and takes the neutral form of the verb. This type of sentence is one of the devices in the language to signify command or request. But it may be misleading to call the above type of sentence 'imperative', believing that the verb in it has the imperative mood. It should rather be called the jussive type of sentence, as Lyons has rightly suggested (1977:748). Many grammarians of English who still call it the imperative type seem to be influenced unconsciously by the belief that English has an imperative mood which is carried by the verb in this type of sentence, although consciously many of them reject the imperative mood.

The only one left to deal with now is the subjunctive mood. It has also been rejected by some modern grammarians, but the fight for it has been much more vigorous than for retaining any other mood. It is still going on. A distinction
between the indicative and the subjunctive was originally
drawn on syntactic grounds. Mattaire (1712) treats the
indicative as absolute and independent, and the subjunctive
as relative and dependent. The former is said to occur in
the main verb of every sentence, while the latter in the verb
of only such clauses as are joined to and attending upon
the main one, whether expressed or understood. Accordingly,
only such verbs are treated to be in the subjunctive mood
as are preceded by a conjunction. For example, some grammarians
of the eighteenth century treat 'may' and 'can' as signs of the
potential mood, but if the same verbs occur in clauses that
follow conjunctions, they are regarded as a special case of
the potential and as signs of the subjunctive or conjunctive
mood. The traditional term 'subjunctive' comes from the Latin
translation of the Greek work meaning 'subordinating'. "For
the traditional grammarian the subjunctive is the mood of
subordination par excellence." (Lyons, 1974:312) It is marked
inflectionally in the subordinate clause in those languages which
claim to have it. For example, French has a contrast of 'Je
crois qu'il vient'. 'Je ne crois pas qu'il vienne.' 'vient'
is in the indicative mood, while 'viene' is in the subjunctive.

Two questions arise at this stage: (1) Does the verb
always have a different form in the subordinate clause in
English and (2) Does the said form represent any kind of
modality to support its distinction as a mood. To the first question the answer has to be 'no', as except in a few cases, which we shall discuss soon, the form of the verb is the same in the subordinate clause as in the main clause; for example, 'I believe you know all that'. The only cases where the forms are different are the cases of subordinate that-clauses where the main clause contains an expression of recommendation, resolution, demand and so on (we demand, require, move, insist, suggest, ask etc. that ...).

(Quirk & Greenbaum, 1975:51) Such cases are called the 'mandative subjunctive', which is said to occur chiefly in formal style, especially in American English. The characteristic feature of the mandative subjunctive is the non-marking of concord in the verb in the present tense, even when the subject is third person singular number; for example, 'His father suggests that he spend his summer holidays at home', 'It is necessary that he be present at 5 o'clock'.

Other cases are those of such conditional and concessive subordinate clauses as imply hypothetical condition or concession, or those of such subordinate clauses as follow optative verbs like 'wish', for example,

(i) If I were you, I would not keep quiet.
(ii) Even if John were to die for Mary, she would not care for him.
(iii) I wish I were in England now.
Here also the number-concord is missing between 'were' and its subjects. Such cases are also regarded as those of the subjunctive. The above examples clearly show that in some cases the number-concord is not marked in subordinate clauses while it is always marked in the main clause. This formal distinction does deserve the grammarian's attention. The distinction is clear in subordinate clauses where such concordless forms are in contrast with the forms having full concord, for example,

i) His father suggests that John spend his summer holidays at home.

ii) His father believes that John spends his summer holidays at home.

iii) If I were you I would not keep quiet.

iv) If I was ever to visit Delhi, I would surely see you.

Such a contrast is not confined to subordinate clauses alone, as far as the present forms are concerned. It can be found in even some of the simple sentences, for example,

i) God save the queen!

ii) God saves the queen

iii) God bless you!

iv) God blesses you.
concordless verbs like 'save' and 'bless' here are also regarded as being in the subjunctive mood. Since the sentences in which they occur are more or less set expressions, or fixed formulas, they are regarded by Quirk and Greenbaum as cases of the formulaic subjunctive. If we now treat these concordless forms both in the present and the past as subjunctive forms we can have a clear formal contrast between the subjunctive and the non-subjunctive forms.

Let us now see whether such a formal contrast has any connection with any contrast of modalities. Such a connection is necessary to support the case of the subjunctive as a mood. While discussing the modality of subordinate clauses, Lyons (1974:312-13) distinguishes three relevant possibilities in the case of languages in which one set of verbal forms occurs mainly in subordinate clauses: (1) forms A and B may be partly complementary and partly overlapping; and whenever they contrast, the contrast may be of a modal nature. (2) If A or B occurs in the subordinate clause, it may be related to a distinct kind of modality present somewhere in the sentence, as in the case of 'Je ne crois pas qu'il vienne' where the modality of doubt represented by 'ne...pas' is in contrast with that of relative assurance represented in 'Je crois qu'il vienne'. (3) There may be no relationship between a certain form, A or B, and the modality of the context by which it is determined. Lyons's conclusion is that in the third situation
"one would not describe the difference between A and B as modal, even though one might quite reasonably use the term subjunctive to refer to that set of forms which was more or less restricted to subordinate clauses." (1974:313) He believes that the subjunctive in Greek, Latin and some other languages is regarded as a mood just because it satisfies both the first and second of the above conditions. The immediate problem now is to enquire whether it does so in English to justify its being called a mood. The examples that we have given above to illustrate the distinction between the subjunctive and the non-subjunctive forms show that the contrast in every case is also of a modal nature. In 'God save the queen!/God saves the queen.', and 'God bless you!/God blesses you.' the concordless forms 'save' and 'bless' are associated with the modality of wishing, and occur only in modalized utterances, while the forms with concord occur in statements of fact. Similarly, in cases like 'we demand/require/insist/suggest/ask etc., that he leave this house immediately,' the concordless form in the subordinate clause is related to the deontic modality of demanding, insisting, requiring, etc., which is represented by the performative verb in the main clause.

Let us now look at the past form 'were' which occurs with singular subjects violating the rule of concord. We find that this is also related to a certain kind of modality. In the case of 'I wish I were in England now' the modality is that of
wishing, which is represented by the performative verb 'wish' in the main clause; and in the case of 'If I were you, I would not keep quiet', the modality is of hypothetical condition, which is quite different from that of a categorical assertion, and even from that of real condition in a sentence like 'If I am there, I will not keep quiet'.

The above account shows that the forms that we have so far called 'subjunctive' meet the first two conditions laid down by Lyon and are thus entitled to being regarded as the subjunctive mood. These are the forms in which the distinction between the singular and the plural gets neutralized, and the number-concord between the subject and the verb is completely lost. In the case of the present subjunctive, it is the concord marker 's' that is lost when the subject is third person singular, while in the case of the past subjunctive, 'were' occurs even with singular subjects.

Now the next question is whether we should distinguish the subjunctive mood only in the above cases, or also in other cases which are formally identical. For example, in 'I suggest he go there', 'go' may be considered to be in the subjunctive mood as a result of which the concord marker 's' is lost, but should we consider 'go' again to be in the same mood in another sentence with the only difference that the subject of the subordinate clause is 'you' (singular) rather than 'he'; for example, 'I suggest you go there.'? Here, unfortunately,
there is no formal distinction associated with the verb that can account for its being in the subjunctive mood. The modality of suggestion is, of course, there in the main clause, but the subordinate clause has only the present tense to support it. There is obviously no modal distinction in the verb as in the case 'I suggest he go there.' The mere presence of modality in the main clause cannot be an adequate basis for distinguishing the subjunctive mood in the subordinate clause. The same difficulty arises in the case of the past subjunctive 'were'. 'Were' may be considered to be in the subjunctive mood wherever the subject is the first or the third person singular, but if it is the second person singular, or any of the persons in the plural, no loss of concord occurs to account for the presence of the subjunctive mood; for example, 'If you/we/they were to do it, you/we/they would find it extremely difficult.' On the same analogy, we may have 'If you tried to do it, you would find it extremely difficult.' In these cases the modality of hypothetical condition is represented by the past tense in 'were' and 'tried' respectively.

The conclusion we reach after the above discussion is that English has a modal contrast between the subjunctive and the non-subjunctive mood, but that operates only in highly restricted cases where the subjunctive mood is marked by the loss of concord in the verb, and the non-subjunctive is the neutral mood.
In view of this it is perhaps wrong to reject the subjunctive mood altogether in English, howsoever formal and infrequent its use is. We shall now examine some of the arguments advanced for and against it within the tradition of English grammar.

Miege (1688:51) says that the subjunctive is much the same in English as the indicative, but that it is used with conjunctions before it, from where it has got the name of subjunctive. It is not altogether true, as the subjunctive is not the same everywhere as the indicative, and it is not always used with conjunctions before it, as is evident from the examples of the subjunctive mood we have so far given. Even Maittaire (1712:138) is not right in claiming that the subjunctive mood lies in the verb of such clauses in English as "are joined to and attending upon the main one." 'God bless you!' 'God save the queen!' etc. are some of the counter-examples that disprove it. Willis (1653) and Greenwood (1711) abide by formal criteria, and reject moods saying that English does not have any verbal endings to express them. There are surely no such verbal endings in English to mark mood as there are to mark tenses, but, nevertheless, the loss of concord, which marks the subjunctive mood, is a formal signal which cannot be lightly dismissed. It is perhaps not right to think that modality is expressed in English only by means of modal auxiliaries.
and not at all by means of moods, as Wallis, Greenwood and many others seem to think. In fact, Priestley (1762) and Pickbourn (1788) are more cautious in this regard. Priestley rejects mood seeing no inflexional variation in the English verb for that, but admits the case of 'if I be' as a genuine case of the subjunctive mood. Pickbourn does not admit even this, saying that such a subjunctive may be only the infinitive governed by an auxiliary verb understood, so that in 'If I be', 'be' is governed by 'should', which is understood: 'If I (should) be'. But even he finds 'were' in 'If he were ...' an obstacle to his theory. However, he disregards it as a single exception. Can one dismiss the subjunctive mood like that? Even to suggest that what is called subjunctive is only an 'infinitive governed by an auxiliary verb understood' is perhaps not right, as the subjunctive occurs chiefly in formal style, whereas the same form with the auxiliary 'should' occurs in less formal contexts. (Quirk & Greenbaum, 1975:51)

They are thus not altogether interchangeable, just because they do not have the same social and stylistic meaning.

The subjunctive mood continues to be controversial in the nineteenth century. Haywood (1800) distinguishes not the subjunctive mood, but the conditional form of the present indicative in a case like 'if he love ...'. Dalton (1801) thinks that it differs little from the indicative mood, and therefore cannot be called the subjunctive mood. Neither of them adequately explains the formal feature of the loss of concord.
They completely disregard the difference between 'If he loves' and 'If he loves ...'. Truly speaking, it is the latter which is the neutral form, or the conditional form of the present indicative.

Later, Brown (1862) resists the suggestion, namely, that the regular indicative or potential mood may be regarded as the subjunctive mood by merely prefixing a conjunction. It is perhaps not right to treat the placement of conjunction as the sole characterizing feature of the subjunctive mood in English, as the subjunctive can occur even in simple sentences. The characteristic feature is the loss of concord. Sweet correctly distinguishes this feature. Opposing the modality of thought to that of fact, he distinguishes the subjunctive as the mood of thought which is realized by the loss of 's', the concord-marker of the verb in the present with the third person singular subject. If one could interpret 'thought' here as any qualification of the factual status of the proposition, one might think of the subjunctive as the mood of thought, as it could perhaps never be used in a statement of fact. But this only pertains to its meaning.

Jespersen does acknowledge the subjunctive, although he says that it is hardly ever used colloquially and is a literary trick to remove the style from everyday associations. This may be an overstatement, as expressions like 'If I were
If he were to do it ..., etc, in which the subjunctive mood is used, are frequent colloquial expressions.

Kruisinga's rejection of the subjunctive mood under the plea that English does not possess such a system in contrast to French and German is a bit rash. He does not pay enough attention to that part of the system of English where a modal contrast between the subjunctive and the non-subjunctive really exists. Poutsma distinguishes the subjunctive mood, but he further distinguishes the inflexional subjunctive from the periphrastic subjunctive which is said to be represented by modal auxiliaries like 'should', 'would', 'may', 'might' etc. We shall discuss the case of periphrastic moods a little later, but it is proper to say here that Poutsma does not seem to be very clear about the inflexional subjunctive. His statement (1926:163) that in many cases there are no audible or visible signs betraying the speaker's attitude towards the fulfilment of the action or state described, and that this deficiency makes itself particularly felt in the preterite, which, except for the verb 'to be', has the same forms for the subjunctive as for the indicative is really questionable, as the subjunctive mood lies only in the verb 'be', not in other verbs. As far as other verbs in the preterite are concerned, there is indeed no modal contrast there. Such a phenomenon is not unique to English. The accusative case in English exists only in relation to
pronouns where it is formally marked. Nouns occurring in the object function are not marked similarly, and are not therefore in the accusative case. The whole distinction between the nominative and the accusative case simply does not exist for nouns in English. Why should we then consider verbs like 'went' in 'If he went there ...' on the analogy of 'were' in 'If he were to go there ...' to be in the subjunctive mood when the contrast between the subjunctive and the indicative is not at all relevant to such cases?

Curme follows Poutsma in distinguishing the old simple subjunctive from the form consisting of a modal auxiliary and an infinitive. He further classifies the old simple subjunctive into the optative and the potential subjunctive. He confuses the issue when he says that the optative subjunctive is often closely related in meaning to the imperative, and gives 'Part we in friendship from your land!' as an illustration of it. We do not find any formal marker of the optative subjunctive in the verb 'part' in the above illustration, nor of the imperative. The confusion gets worse when the potential subjunctive is illustrated by 'It may rain today' and 'If he confess I shall overlook the offence.' How does a form with a modal 'may' and the infinitive 'rain' become the illustration of the subjunctive on a par with 'If he confess ...'? While in the former case there is no formal distinction marking the subjunctive, in the latter the loss of concord in 'confess' with the subject 'he' is a clear formal signal of that.
Zandvoort clearly distinguishes the subjunctive mood as the verbal form without the concord marker 's' with the third person singular subject, and properly distinguishes it from the indicative. He also recognizes various conditions for the use of the subjunctive in relation to the verb 'be'. But he does not insist on the term. It is not clear by what name he would like to identify subjunctive forms.

Strang still more clearly distinguishes the subjunctive mood. She divides into the past and the non-past subjunctive. She finds the non-past subjunctive in certain formulaic expressions and the past subjunctive only in the verb 'be' in the plural number. She clearly states that the past subjunctive does not belong to the form-class 'verb', but to the single verb 'be'.

Quirk Greenbaum, Leech and Svartvik do not mention the term 'mood' with the subjunctive, but state all its formal features under the heads 'mandative subjunctive', 'formulaic subjunctive' and 'were' subjunctive. This makes their position a bit unclear. One does not know whether they admit a modal contrast of a restricted kind in the English verb. They do say at one place that mood is expressed in English to a very minor extent by the subjunctive (1975:51) but, here 'mood' is probably used in the sense of 'modality'.

Palmer (1974) completely rejects the subjunctive mood saying that it is a simple transfer from Latin, and that all the potential subjunctives are past tense in form, or simple uninflected forms. He does not admit the presence of the subjunctive mood even in a case like 'If I were you ...'

He thinks that 'were' here is exactly like a normal past—the same throughout the paradigm, i.e. like 'took' or 'loved'. He concludes that 'were' in 'If I were you ...' is more regularly past than was/were forms of past-time. This is surely too rash a dismissal of the subjunctive mood. Palmer does not pay sufficient attention to the modal contrast of the present and the past subjunctive to which Zandvoort, Strang and others draw our attention. Most structuralists and TG grammarians are wholly indifferent to the issue. The auxiliary component of the English verb phrase is believed by them to have no mood; it has only modal auxiliaries in it.

While we find the modal distinction between the subjunctive, and, by contrast, the non-subjunctive mood, we do not find any case for distinguishing the potential or the optative mood in English, unless by following notional criteria we characterize the subjunctive as optative wherever it expresses wish, and potential wherever it expresses some condition. This would result in the mixing of formal and notional criteria. On purely formal grounds English does not have distinct markers for the
optative or the potential. Miege's statement that the subjunctive is called optative because in it we make wishes, and likewise potential, because the verb 'may' and 'might' are used in this mood, is perhaps governed by a notional bias. Auxiliaries like 'may' and 'might' cannot be the markers of mood which is supposed to be an inflexional category. Jespersen's rejection of the optative is based on such a formal ground.

Let us now look at what Sweet calls periphrastic and tense-moods. Some grammarians treat even modal auxiliaries as marker of moods. White (1761) proposes a scheme of ten moods of which five are marked by different modal auxiliaries. Lowth also distinguishes secondary moods which are marked by different auxiliaries. Jespersen expresses his unhappiness at the practice of treating combinations of auxiliaries with the infinitive as periphrastic moods, or substitutes for pure mood (as Poutsma believes). If we treat modal auxiliaries as the markers of moods like potential, determinative, obligative, elective, compulsive, etc. (White, 1961), the whole concept of mood changes. It no longer remains an inflexional category. If we do not want to change the concept, we should not mix up mood with modal auxiliaries, but instead treat the latter as representations of different types of modality.
Similarly, there is no need to distinguish a category like tense-mood. What is implied in tense-mood is the use of a particular tense for representing a certain type of modality. Why should we call it a mood at all? Instead, we can say that the past tense in certain sentences has a modal meaning, such as that of unreal condition, for example, 'If the skylab fell upon India, it would cause terrible damage to life and property.' Tense in this case still remains the past tense with a modal function or meaning. It does not turn into a mood or tense-mood.

Lastly, we may briefly look at the syntactic moods proposed by Halliday. Halliday believes that mood is realized at the clause rank, not at the group, or the word rank. Verb is thus not taken to be the carrier of mood. It is the particular arrangement of elements of clause structure that is said to characterize a particular mood; for example, clauses like 'John is coming' and 'Is John coming?' which contain the subject-elements are said to be in the indicative mood, while clauses without the subject-element are said to be in the imperative mood. (Muir, 1972:93-94)

By proposing this, Halliday altogether changes the concept of mood. This cannot fully absorb what is typically called the subjunctive mood. Halliday seems to think that a whole clause, not any part of it, represents a particular modality or illocutionary force, and should thus be the scope of mood. This
may be fallacious, as sometimes even single words like modal auxiliaries, modal adjectives, or adverbs represent distinct modalities. Should we take them also to be the markers of different moods? Even a formal criterion like that of the presence or absence of the subject seems to be much too arbitrary. The question is: Why should we not treat word order and intonation-contour as relevant criteria, and distinguish declarative and interrogative moods in place of the single indicative mood, as Huddleston suggests: (1976:69)? Still more fundamental question is: Why should we treat these sentence-types as different moods? If we do so on the basis of the association of different types of modality or illocutionary force with them, we will have to distinguish many more such moods. On the other hand, if we treat pure formal features of clause-types as the main criteria in this matter, it is not clear why we should overplay the presence or absence of 's, and ignore features, such as inversion, word-order, etc. If we take all kinds of syntactic features into account, we may have to distinguish a large number of syntactic moods. We shall not, therefore, follow Halliday's classification of moods on account of these obvious difficulties, and stick to the concept of mood as an inflectional category. It is on that ground that we distinguish the subjunctive from the non-subjunctive (which may be called the indicative) mood in English.