Chapter Three  Interpreting the *Philebus*—II

Pleasures in the soul

This chapter exclusively deals with the analysis of pleasure Plato provides in the second half of the dialogue. This is markedly different from the earlier part, which was analysed in great detail in the previous section. This is more descriptive and taxonomic in character. Plato resorts to making a myriad number of distinctions, being true to the divergence of pleasures he argued for in the beginning of the *Philebus*. However, the analysis of pleasure goes beyond the moral basis Socrates accepts in the previous sections. Socrates ventures into accommodating pleasures which do not betray any explicit moral basis, as it was in the case of differentiating good pleasures from bad pleasures. As a result, pleasure is accounted for from different angles: aesthetic, psychological, and physiological standpoints. Nevertheless, in the name of the false pleasures he explores a moral angle that is as yet unavailable in the dialogue.

Descartes is often indicted as having created a wedge between mind and body, a kind of division that has challenged philosophers most irrefutably ever since. By framing a proposition about the mind-body relationship, Descartes is not simply making a speculative advance, but is making a scientific statement as well. Much has changed since the times of Descartes, but the dualism remained a stubborn fact, a fact whose imprint is all too indelible. But even prior to Descartes, there was mind-body distinction made, but nothing was invoked to the tune of describing them as two independent ‘substances’, with no detectable conceptual link between them. Either the talk of such link was evaded, or a link of that kind had no purpose to serve in their theoretical pictures. In the Western tradition, right from Homer, there were distinct rumblings of soul talk, as opposed to bodies.¹ By the time of Plato and Aristotle, it became further clear. In fact, in the *Phaedo* Plato conducts an
extensive investigation on the nature of the soul, under the Pythagorean influences, as something that is detachable from the body, serving as a preparatory ground for his views in the *Republic*.

What is it that Descartes found and Plato missed? Without going into the historical reasons why this division came into being at a particular point of time, I shall simply stress the fact that ancients differed from moderns radically. One of the primary reasons for this difference is the concept of the individual specific to both these views. Ancient thought started with the individual as a unit by itself, however multiply forked it might internally be. Individuals admit analytical and ontological distinctions within, like parts of the soul, and bodies hosting souls, but they all constitute a singular unit which needs to be accounted for as a composite formation. This is not a virtue anymore for Descartes, but something that only clouds the truth of the matter. For Descartes, and for those who came after him, prying experience apart in terms of its mental and physical episodes is an easy matter after all. This is indeed a contrivance of enormous practical use, for one could know with greater confidence as to what belongs in the realm of the mind, and what does not.\(^2\) For example, assigning pleasure to the domain of the mind is an easy way of assigning, on clear evidence of introspection, where it belongs. As we are aware, we have quite definitive views about the nature of the mind and its effects in a person’s life. Ancient philosophers, perhaps due to their lack of detail about the anatomical view of the mind and its reality, were far less confident in segregating phenomena between minds and bodies. Therefore, pleasure is not so much an aspect of the mind simply as it is an aspect of the body. Pleasures are in the soul, undoubtedly, but the fact of the matter is that bodies are ensouled.\(^3\) Naturally, the wirings that tangle the soul and the body are so detailed and complex that they crisscross different aspects of affection and perception. In other words, perceptions and affections
have both mental and bodily components, and they are so intimately fused together that a supposedly neat soul-body division cannot capture the pattern of this fusion. This is evident in the *Philebus*, as we shall see shortly. In any event, there are enough evidences across Plato’s work to suggest that pleasure is a feature of the soul, but with a very complex relationship with the body. Besides, many other traditions within antiquity bear testimony to this claim, including Democritus, the one who had a very a systematic view on the place of pleasure in an individual’s life (Gosling and Taylor).

**The Nature of Pleasure and Pain**

The challenge which begins the dialogue *Philebus*, quite early on indeed, subsequently urges for a divergence among pleasures (14a). Just in the manner in which there can be different kinds of knowledge, so can there be a plurality among pleasures. This already hints at a taxonomy sort of view about pleasure and its kind. One can resist this suggestion, as indeed Protarchus does when he expresses surprise over Socrates’ proposal that there can be true and false pleasures, but how can one differentiate among pleasures? An experience of pleasure does not lend itself to be easily classified into kinds and types. Pleasure is the same whether felt in a wakeful state or in a dream. The quality aspect of it, either mild, sober or intense, admits only difference in degree and not in kind, and that too often left to the testimony of ‘subjective’ avowals. Pleasures are least like different genres of writing, be it novel, epic, poetry and their subdivisions, which are qualitatively distinct from each other despite being some form of writing. Here lies the first step towards redeeming pleasure from its singular attachment towards some unique and continuous segment of experience. Thus, as the Socrates suggests, there are indeed ways of making qualitative distinctions within pleasure. This allows us to view pleasure more liberally, disconnecting it from the restrictions later placed up on it by its empiricist successors.
Plato very frequently uses the image of lack and replenishment to capture the nature of pleasure. Nevertheless, he later concedes that there are exceptions to this. Dorothea Frede calls it, more suggestively, the disintegration and restoration view of pleasures. The logic is simple. Any thirsty person experiences a lack of water within his body, and the thirst is the disintegration of the harmonious state of his/her body due to his/her expressly felt lack. Meeting this thirst amounts to replenishment of what is felt to be lacking. This process of lack and subsequent replenishment correspond to two distinct states of the soul, namely pain and pleasure. As it happens, these are physiological processes within the body, accompanied by affective processes called pleasure and pain. This image is most efficiently exploited not only in the *Philebus*, but in other dialogues as well, like *Gorgias* (Gosling and Taylor, 69-82).

At 31b in the *Philebus*, Socrates expresses certain reservations about investigating pleasure without taking into cognizance its counterpart, that is pain. Even commonsense joins pleasure and pain into a Manichean structure, each viewed as the effective counterpart of the other. However, Gilbert Ryle disputes this view in a chapter entirely devoted to pleasure in his *Dilemmas*. He claims that the pleasure-pain duo do not share the binary structure often attributed to them. Concepts like pleasure and enjoyment have been mistakenly assigned to the same category as that of pain; more precisely, of the “same category with the kinds of occurrences which rank as causes and effects of other occurrences” (67). In short, the experience of pain, as Ryle seems to argue, belongs in the chain of causes and effects, as opposed to instances of enjoyment which abide by a peculiar logic that has no truck with whatever is said to cause them or flow as effects from them. At a surface level, Ryle’s interest was always in understanding the logic of terms as they are employed in ordinary language and the elusive discursive structuring concepts obey. For, it
is believed that problems of metaphysics do surface because we get the logic of ordinary language wrong. Sometimes, for the sake of sheer convenience, users of language attribute ‘discursive parity’ across terms which in fact belong to different families and are disanalogous for various other reasons, for instance the pleasure-pain duo. The value of Ryle’s point is however not limited to exposing the posturings pleasure takes in language as a concept, as enjoying, feeling happy, and so on. It is true that pleasure, as a category, is not like that of pain. Nevertheless, Ryle’s observations underplay the more significant part of the problem that is laid beneath the crust of the language. It is not possible to dismiss the pleasure-pain duo with one brush stroke, because certain concepts acquire meanings in our acts of understanding only in terms of the binary structuring they exhibit. Thus, the pleasure-pain duo is not about two different things, independently meaningful in their own right, but about how one thing contributes to the meaning of the other. They acquire their semantic properties due to their status as being valid contraries.

**Analysing pleasure**

It has been already noted that Plato works with figures and analogies. It is the corporeal figure of disintegration and restoration, observed in physiological processes (natural process 32a), that forces him to accommodate pain in its view. That is the advantage of working with analogies. Can this not be a disanalogy? Before we examine this question, we need to look at the three ways in which Socrates proposes pleasure can be analysed (31d-33d, 43d):

1. Pain as disintegration and pleasure as restoration
2. Anticipatory pleasures (experienced only in the soul)
3. A condition of life in which there is neither pleasure nor pain (as the life of gods)

Beginning 30a, Plato makes a series of distinctions involving pleasure. A major element of this exercise is an attempt to disambiguate pleasures of the body from those of the soul. An
important reason why he relies on his analogy from physiology is to get clear about the role
the body plays in understanding the nature of pleasure. Clearly, there are functions purely
of the body and functions purely of the soul. This is stated with clear conscience, with no
bad faith about the metaphysical compartmentalization the mind and the body otherwise
invoke for us. In the course of a disintegration, even before replenishment happens, there
is an anticipatory state of looking for an impending prospect of pleasure. In most cases, this
anticipation springs from traces of memory we retain of earlier replenishments. This takes
place only in the soul, and not in the body. The analogy is successful because it takes us
beyond the language of minds and bodies and enables us to see the exact structure of the
problem—disintegration in the individual.

It is interesting that Plato, while discussing pleasure, mentions a state of the soul which is
neither affected by pleasure nor by pain. And he likens it to the souls of gods, for the idea
of divinity requires that it is beyond affection. Socrates here hastens to enlist this as a point
in favour of the life of reason, as opposed to the life of pleasure. There are moments in life
which are neither pleasurable nor painful in particular, and these are plenty in anyone’s life.
Then, what point does Plato expect to score by noting this banal fact at this juncture? The
point does not lie in its making, but in extending it further. And in the course of this
extension, an important point is made. It goes like this. At 33a Socrates exhorts Protarchus
in the following words:

Soc: Make an effort to keep this fact in mind. For it makes quite a difference for our judgment of
pleasure whether we remember that there is such a state (without pleasure and pain) or not. But
we had better give it a little more consideration, if you don’t mind.
Protarchus: Just tell me how.
Soc: You realize that nothing prevents the person who has chosen the life of reason from living in
this state.
Protarchus: You mean without pleasure and pain?
Soc: It was one of the conditions agreed on in our comparison of lives that the person who chooses
the life of reason and intelligence must not enjoy pleasures either large or small.
Protarchus: That was indeed agreed on.
Soc: He may then live in this fashion, and perhaps there would be nothing absurd if this life turns
out to be most godlike (Complete 421).
Socrates here does not simply allege that there can be a state of the soul that is free from pleasures and pains, but urges one to take up the virtuous line of a "life of reason" that he/she can choose, a choice of life that is free of the affections due to pleasure and pain. The important word here is choice. And the choice here is for a superior life, the life of a philosopher, as exemplified in the Republic. But how is this choice possible? Is it a realistic option? Plato definitely thinks so, if not for ordinary mortals, at least for aspirant philosophers. The germ of the idea is important, in that it is here presupposed that pleasure can be a matter of choice, which inadvertently follows certain experiences. That is the reason why, in the same sequence, Socrates reserves this kind of a life as a probable contestant for the first prize. But to understand the word choice, applicable to pleasure, we need to recall what we have worked out in the name of reason in the previous chapter—the order and intelligence within the soul. This choice presupposes a certain order within the soul that is the cause of a mixed, as a measured, life.

**Perception, Affection and Pleasure**

Once Plato is clear that there are pleasures of the soul as opposed to those of the body, he is obligated to account for how they manifest in their respective locations. Strangely anticipating Spinoza, nearly two thousand years earlier, Plato proposes the doctrine of affections through Socrates. Socrates states that bodies and souls undergo affections, meaning changes brought into them by external means, and there are some affections which do not penetrate into the soul. Then, those bodily affections remain unperceived and do not feature in memory either. This makes it further clear that perception and memory belong in the soul, and not in the body (33d-e). Apart from these, there are some affections which penetrate both the body and the soul, and "provoke a kind of upheaval that is peculiar to each but also common to both" (421). This is an interesting suggestion because
now pleasure is slated to be viewed and investigated in a naturalist vein. Thus, this can be construed as an attempt to account for pleasure as essentially characterizable in physiological terms, but manifest in a dual aspect—psychic and corporeal.

The echoes of Spinoza are distinct enough to be passed off in silence. At 34a, Socrates says, “when the soul and body are jointly affected and moved by one and the same affection, if you call this motion perception, you would say nothing out of the way” (422). Plato is here exploring a model of the functioning of individuals by combining perception and affection under its aegis. Socrates’ proposal on the nature of pleasure, as it is shared between bodies and souls, can be properly understood only if the model of perception, which includes affections, he developed is clearly presented. Following this, Plato explores connections between perception, memory and its aspects like recollection. In the event of loss of memory, some process of recollection helps one recall what earlier pleasures were like, and thereby anticipate the pleasures to come. These, Socrates attests, occur in the soul. Such pleasures indeed may find no use in the body. We know from the Phaedo that, under the influence of Pythagoras, Plato actually maintained the position that souls can subsist independently of bodies. That apart, it is at least clear by now the kind of importance Plato was prepared to attach to pleasure by implicating it in the processes perceiving, knowing and recollecting.

**Pleasure and Desire**

Affections could occur in bodies and in souls. But, for an affection to be experienced it must either penetrate to the soul through the body or occur in the soul directly. The soul is the principal source of consciously experiencing affection. Pleasure is a form of affection, and so is desire. Pleasure could occur in different parts of the body, quite unknowingly.
One has no means of knowing it. In contrast, the Republic proposes that different parts of the soul have pleasures appropriate to each one of them. Since these pleasures occur in the soul, in several of its departments though, still they are accountable in conscious experience and memory. Then, where does desire, as an affection, occur? In the body or in the soul? Socrates argues that desires can occur only in the soul (34c-e).

Pleasure and desire share an interesting two-way relationship. Pleasure occurs in the process of replenishing a lack experienced in the body, or anticipating pleasure on the basis of memory. Desire also springs from a lack, like thirst in the body desiring water. In the process of experiencing a lack, like thirst or hunger, pleasure and desire indeed run complementarily. For long Plato does not quite relinquish his analogies from physiology. As a result, any understanding of affections, either pleasures or desires, is largely confined to talking about them in terms of animal physiology. The natural state of being in thirst amounts to a desire for its fulfilment. The restoration of what is lacking comes in the form of changing from one state of being to another, i.e. the state of being empty to the state of being filled. This process does accommodate cognitive elements like memory and recollection. Hence, desire, apart from being the ‘drive’ like element pressing for fulfilling the felt lack, shares in the cognitive structure that includes perception and memory. Besides, it is also described as a ‘striving for’, that drives a living creature ‘towards the opposite of its own state signifies that it has memory of that opposite state (35d)’ (424).7 This movement, a transition in the being, must betray some sort of directedness. The language, of course Dorothea Frede's translation, merits a close look here. Socrates says: “By pointing out that it is memory that directs it towards the objects of desires, our argument has established that every impulse, and desire, and the rule over the whole animal is the domain of the soul (35d).” The idea that the impulse, the drive or desire in more homely
terms, is directed by memory, a cognitive aspect of the soul, lays bare the phenomenological structure of the very act of desiring, its forward movement reaching some intentional object further. This interpretation gets further support from Socrates’ preponderant emphasis on the authority of the soul, as the seat of order and intelligence, in this entire matter. This emphasis on the soul must be especially noted, for we return to it again when we discuss the place of pleasure among so many other constituents of the soul.

The advantage of invoking a physiological analogue to lay out the framework within which pleasure, desire, perception and memory have their places and relations is that it allows us to address the issues here without overstepping the limits of commonsense. In addition, one can now question, with a greater emphasis, whether commonsense, and its attendant naturalism, does adequate justice to the problem of pleasure. What we are working out on behalf of pleasure must allow us to appreciate its ethical significance, if it has any. In fact, many indeed, including Plato, in spite of subjecting it to an excruciating critique, did claim ethical significance for pleasure. This becomes more and more evident in the form of the dominant theme of the dialogue, namely the relationship between pleasure and reason.

**False Pleasures**

This issue has vexed many Plato scholars and especially the *Philebus* specialists. The scholarly interpretations are vastly divergent and there are still varying opinions surrounding the textual exegesis about this issue in that scholars are yet to come to an agreement. Without going into matters of scholarly controversy, I shall attempt at a presentation of basic issues involved in talking false pleasures. It must be borne in the mind that our interest is not to add or illumine the *Philebus*, but only to learn alternative ways of thinking about pleasure. The issue, on the face of it, is simple. Among the pleasures we
experience are there any false ones? The affront this question bears towards commonsense is understandable, since it lends itself to be construed if the very fact of experiencing pleasure is genuine and authentic enough to be called true. The issue, as indeed Socrates suggests, is not about being self-deceived while experiencing pleasure in such facts of experience as being in a dream state, or being partially awake or in a fit of delusion (36e), but about the normative context within which pleasure stands in need of a justification. This is indeed the strangest idea so far. This, Socrates argues, parallels the normative context of making judgments and propositions involving true knowledge. Beliefs and judgments can be either true or false, depending upon the rightness of our perceptions. One can be misled about a fact or one could misperceive a status of affairs, and thereby form wrong beliefs and issue out judgments which are patently false. Likewise, one could be misled about the cause of one’s pleasure, and therefore the pleasure felt could indeed be false. Socrates would argue that a person’s pleasure when he is misinformed that he won a huge lottery would be false, for soon he will discover that there is no such fortune that he won. Then the pleasure will disappear and he will realise that his earlier pleasure was false.

One important feature of the discussion that takes place between 36c to 50e is that Socrates explores different kinds of falsity among pleasures. There is no singular sense in which pleasures can be said to be false. This further complicates the problem. The truth of a claim depends on its justifiability, and no further criteria are admitted if, as it were, we are only interested in ascertaining the truth of that particular claim. However, Socrates provides multiple criteria for the falsity of pleasures, though pleasure by itself appears not being either true or false. In contrast, an avowal of pleasure by an individual would amount to being the kind of a claim which, in principle, must admit some form of a personal justification. But Socrates is not bothered by any avowals, at least as far as this context is
concerned.\textsuperscript{10} This, in other words, could mean that he extends the meaning of truth and falsity, at least as they are applied in the case of pleasure, much beyond the colloquial use and also the rarefied and technified use of a philosopher. Let us briefly look at different types of falsity among pleasures that Socrates enumerates.

1. A pleasure or pain can be false precisely in the sense in which a judgment can be false. When a statement is made whose truth is suspect, the entire process (of perceiving and judging) which issued in the delivery of this statement is held accountable. Something must have gone wrong in this process and the knowledge produced thus is false. Similarly, when one feels pleasure, it is not simply an isolated moment of gratification one enjoys, having no truck with what caused that kind of pleasure. Our affective reactions to the world around do presuppose some beliefs, right or wrong. Likewise, feeling pleasure or pain must be preceded by some beliefs which are true enough to convince a person that he/she is justified in experiencing pleasure or pain. In short, a pleasurable episode in the life of an individual must have a source genuine enough to be judged as the true source of pleasure. In any case, this is different from saying that pleasure shares the structure of a belief; that pleasure works like how a belief does. Even in Plato’s day pleasure was never far from being seen as a feeling or a sensation, as opposed to being a belief or thought.\textsuperscript{11}

Here Socrates gives a very imaginative analogy. He says that ‘our soul is comparable to a book’. If it is a book, then there must be a scribe within who inscribes letters, sentences and paragraphs in that book. And, besides, what is written in it must be true, and not false. So, there is a scribe within and, further, there is a craftsman (demiurge) who works along with his scribe colleague. The craftsman here happens to be a painter. It should be noted that Socrates chose to call him a craftsman, implying that his operations need skill, or techne.
The painter follows the scribe and provides images and illustrations for what the scribe records in the book of the soul. What get recorded and painted are propositions and judgments, as Dorothea Frede notes 'logoi' and not 'phantasmata', i.e. appearances. Judgments, and whatever else occur in the soul, are the result of the combined efforts of both these craftsmen, and both these crafts presuppose a mastery of certain skills, or techne. It is a matter of wide agreement that the idea of techne occupies a very special place among the Greeks, for it is often invoked to explain different kinds of activities and how they come to be conducted at all, from sculpture, painting, and shipbuilding to the art of politics, politicians and military service. Plato is including such mundane and inveterate activities as perceiving and judging among those which need skill and competence. That is what the craft-analogy is supposed to throw light on. In the absence of such abilities, questions about judgments being true or false do not arise at all. In other words, for a judgment to be true, the person who judges must possess certain skills, or competence of sorts, which enables him to make a true judgment and recognise a false judgment. Conversely, in case of a false judgment, one of the causes could be the absence of the required skill. The implications for pleasure are clear. One is mistaken if pleasure is simply construed as a state of mind or soul, which has no truck with such cognitive processes like perceiving and judging. Though this has been a contentious issue, it is plausible to argue that pleasure shares with beliefs certain structural features, even superficially perhaps, like propositionality and a justifiable connection with whatever makes it a true instance of pleasure. To sum up, pleasure could be false because they exhibit the structure of a belief or judgment in a very special sense. We shall leave this aspect here and turn to the main issue now, for what is the purpose of making this distinction?
The basic issue here is about the evaluation of pleasures. And this evaluation is not in terms of the quality pleasures are said to have in real life, like being good or bad, for their value depends on what qualitative difference they make to the individual in question (contrast the pleasures of licentious activities with that of temperance).\(^8\) We tend to assume an external standpoint when we evaluate pleasures thus. Nevertheless, we know that certain pleasures can be morally wrong, like the pleasure one feels at the expense of other’s loss or the pleasure of seeking underserved benefit. Judging that these pleasures are wrong can be a matter of afterthought, a matter of reflection and judgment. The difficulty here is to do with the combination of judgment and pleasure, for they are two different kinds of entities. Of course, evaluating a pleasure does not entail that we stop experiencing a particular pleasure the moment we come to judge it to be a wrong one. The absence of such an executive power on behalf of these judgments makes their connection with pleasures appear forged and effete. But, more fundamentally, the pleasure which we indict to be the wrong one, is a product of knowing a certain piece of information, that so and so had suffered a loss. This knowing here includes perception, cognition and judgment. Thus certain processes precede pleasure and these could go erroneous. Evidently, these processes have not gone wrong in our example. The man who suffered the loss had been judged correctly that he went through a loss. It is a true piece of information. If we want to get Plato right, what went wrong is something else, that is the inscription within the soul, perhaps because the scribe and the painter have jointly erred. They must have imprinted wrong inscriptions within the soul and therefore they should be subject to appropriate modes of evaluation. But what is culpable here? If I misperceive and wrongly judge something to be non-existent, then what should take the blame is the very act of misperception. And since in case of false pleasures acts of judging or perceiving occur along with feeling pleasure, we should infer that pleasure includes and presupposes a belief, in the form of a picture in the soul.\(^9\) The issue
is not that we are making wrong judgments, or that the very experience of pleasure is an illusion. On the contrary, as Dorothea Frede argues, it is a matter of what this pleasure-picture refers to, that is the very content of the inscription in the soul. Then the content of this pleasure must be false not in the sense that it is a feeling or a sensation, but as something—cognition along with feeling—that is brought out by the joint endeavour of the scribe-painter duo. What needs evaluation is this content, the psychological processes which correspond to errors of judgment. Derivatively, these errors and processes refer, not to facts related to perception, but to the character and the formation of a personality. The judgements that underlie false pleasures become erroneous because they are determined by the shape and the quality of an individual’s character, rather than by perception or cognition alone. This is a classic instance in the Philebus of pleasure being viewed in relation to its connections with the structures of personality. What is important to note here is the fact that evaluation brings an occasion when one gets an opportunity to examine one kind of self-relation, hosted by the deliberation that accompanies false pleasures, and therefore becomes a feature of the very understanding of personality.

Why should pleasures, understood thus, be subject to evaluation? We evaluate actions, decisions, emotions and beliefs from both moral and non-moral standpoints; but we do not evaluate rocks and trees, nor pure impressions and behavioural reflexes from a human standpoint. Only issues and categories which admit evaluative stances can be subject to valuing. Plato’s ingenuity lies in recognizing something in pleasure that allows an evaluative stance to qualify it. This something, in fact, is what the scribe-painter duo capture in the form of a ‘painted image’ in the soul, that is, whatever the pleasure consists in. This implies that pleasure can be morally judged just like how one would judge a belief, or an opinion. We are not much concerned about the overall truth of this picture as much
as we are concerned about its attempt of linking pleasure with processes—deliberative—that turn a person into a personality. The salience lies in Plato’s unwillingness to separate, while talking about pleasure, its psychology part from the conceptual and the logical part. The idea, quite in sympathy with Plato, is to discover aspects of pleasure that are not pure psychology or pure physiology, but a combination of all in the light of the roles they furnish in the description of a personality. At a later point (44b), while discussing another type of false pleasure, Socrates very explicitly exhorts of the enemies of pleasure, the people “with a tremendous reputation in natural science who say that there are no such things as pleasures” (433). Therefore, the idea is to find out the structure of pleasure, within the picture of the soul Plato is familiar with, but with enough caution as to keep it in right balance with those phenomenal aspects of the soul like psychology and any incursion from physiology. Evaluating pleasures is not a simple issue of having some criteria to separate the false ones from the true ones. It presupposes many important and advanced functions like self-criticism and reform that we tend to value very highly in life. These functions are indeed thought to be crucial for any description of personality in terms of an economy of beliefs and desires that speaks for the rational behaviour of an individual.

2. Pleasures and pains, more than any other form of affection, always admit impressionistic valuings. For instance, a relief from an acute physical distress can appear, quite plausibly indeed, to be the source of a great pleasure. The pleasure experienced impresses upon us and appears great because the preceding pain makes it so. This is a clear case where there is little chance of deciding the right measure of pleasure. There is pleasure in this experience, but is rated much higher than what its rightful value would be. This kind of a pleasure is a false one (42a-c). While building up the conversation towards this type of false pleasure, Socrates makes a very important observation on the nature of desire. He rhetorically
questions: “wasn’t it the soul that had desires, desires for conditions opposite to the actual ones of the body, while it was the body that undergoes the pain or the pleasure of some affection”? From this, Socrates concludes that, “under these circumstances pains and pleasures exist side by side, and there are simultaneously opposite perceptions of them, as we have just made clear” (430). Two things about desire are evident in these observations; firstly, there is a desiring element within oneself, in the soul to be more precise, whose character is such that it aspires to exceed the limitations of the body; secondly, the desiring element could engineer affections in the form of pleasure and pain. Though, Socrates does not explicitly mention, it is easy to infer that he had machinations of desire also in mind in overrating the proportion of pleasure.27

3. In an earlier passage, while discussing what is it like shunning the life of affections, and being godlike (33b), Plato advocates a life that is far from pains and pleasures, a neutral kind of life. Plato is always a partisan of a life that is least disturbed by the perturbations of desire and its temptations. That is the highest form of life only meant for philosophers. However, he is not oblivious to the effects of desire and its ineliminability from an individual soul. Since gods do not possess affections, they live the best form of life thinkable. But mortals live the life of affections, though it is advisable that they imitate gods, it is not compulsory that they totally relinquish affections like gods do. In fact, there is the greater danger of denying the existence of pleasure altogether, as many natural philosophers did. In the midst of arguments like this, pleasure was castigated by many of Plato’s predecessors because nothing healthy has been acknowledged to be part of it, and its attractiveness is construed as witchcraft (44c). At any rate, evidently, pleasure should not be reduced to something as base as witchcraft. There is something valuable in it which needs to be legitimately accounted for. Plato is not inimical to hedonism, but he is very
intolerant of the brand of hedonism that is particularly egoist in character, like the one that is represented by Philebus. This is one of the reasons why he develops a very detailed view of the structure of the soul—agency—in this dialogue. While arguing for a defensible form of hedonism, he needs to counter those who see no value in arguing for pleasure at all, namely anti-hedonists. An anti-hedonist could deny pleasure its rightful place among the things that make human life valuable citing that it is merely a psychological phenomenon, that it is nothing but the absence of pain. Plato knows that this cannot be the right argument against hedonism, nor limiting pleasure to the binary structure of pleasure-pain duo would do justice to its value. The third kind of false pleasure, Socrates points out, is when the absence of pain is equated with pleasure.

4. I shall begin this sub-section with a quotation from the dialogue (46c-d):

*Soc:* There are mixtures that have their origin in the body and are confined to the body; then, there are mixtures found in the soul, and they are confined to the soul. But then we will find mixtures of pleasures and pains both in soul and body, and at one time the combination of both will be called pleasure; at other times it will be called pain.

*Protarchus:* How so?

*Soc:* When someone undergoes restoration or destruction he experiences two opposed conditions at once. He may feel hot while shivering or feel chilled while sweating. I suppose he will then want to retain one of those conditions and get rid of the other. But if this so called bitter-sweet condition is hard to shake, it first causes irritation and later on turns into wild excitement (435).

Another type of ‘false’ pleasure is the case of mixed pleasures. Things get really complicated here because, first, these pleasures represent the majority of pleasures we are familiar with, and second, calling them false will naturally devalue them. Value apart, the analysis is more important. Socrates mentions repeatedly the case of itching and scratching as an example of mixed pleasures, in that pains outweigh pleasures when the part to be rubbed is not on the surface of the skin but somewhere beneath. There are different ways of alleviating the distress caused by itching, and each such method promises some pleasure or other. The pleasure of rubbing, scratching or exposing the itching part to the warmth of fire
can result only if there is a painful condition of itch preceding the pleasure. There can be cases where pleasures would be more in proportion to pain. In any event, there are many pleasures that are in general mixed in character.

In the above quotation, the adjective Socrates uses to describe the phenomenal state of experiencing a mixed pleasure is ‘bitter-sweet’. This word is common to both the translations I consulted, of Frede’s and Hackforth’s. I here suggest to gather the associations and applications what in general this term attracts. In addition, the passage above could appeal even to a contemporary reader with such striking tenacity and insightfulness that we may be tempted to read it, fruitfully indeed, out of its immediately preceding and following sequence. There are many facets of our affective dimension, for the lack of a better term, we chose to describe them as bitter-sweet. The experiences that can take the attribute ‘bitter-sweet’ are as follows: pleasures involved in sexual activity, pleasures of tragedy and comedy, jealousy, greed, malice, the range of emotions one experiences during courtship, possessiveness, literature of certain kinds, and fear and horror in certain contexts. The list could be endless. But the adjective bittersweet is what suggestively captures the crux of the matter here, rather than the entire description. All these experiences, even commonsense suggests, has elements of both pleasure and pain, of desire and avoidance, mixed in varying proportions; and such a mixture is what makes for the appeal of these pleasures.28

Socrates dwells for a considerable amount of time in making the phenomenological character of this experience further explicit. Part of the above list of things described as bitter-sweet is drawn from the list Socrates himself provides (47e). Before he talks about them, he marks a sharp distinction between those affections which are limited to the body
and those which are limited to the soul, and besides, those which surface because the bodily element is not in agreement with that of the soul. Among the affections that feature in the soul, he considers a range of negative emotions, of which some are malevolent in character, like wrath, jealousy, malice, love, longing, and lamentations as causing mixed pleasures. Here Plato's insight into human psychology is indisputably acute. These are affections in the soul whose incidence combines pleasure and pain. His illustration of this point, using comedies and tragedies, is particularly worth elaborating.

A sitcom is a genre especially meant to entertain, not to educate or explore some aspect of the human world. It is designed only to engineer pleasure in the viewers. If Plato were to watch a sitcom, he would no doubt be pleased, but would attest at the same time that this pleasure has a hidden pain in it. It seems paradoxical, as it is indeed. Plato was certainly aware that drama, either comedy or tragedy, does meet some of our deeply inscribed emotional needs. Thus, the logic that underlies amusement in comedies is of such an order that it would not work unless our characters, as lovers of comedy, harbour sentiments of malice and wickedness deep within. This is perhaps debatable. However, at any rate, laughter is always at the expense of someone's 'ridiculous' nature, in that the object of the ridicule cannot help himself/herself transcend the imposing limits of appearing ridiculous (48c). And the resulting amusement is the product of an emotional need, and this suggests that Plato's picture of psychology is nuanced enough to be able to give an appropriate description of the actual composition of human character pertaining to comic representations. Easy as it seems, this holds within it an insight of mighty proportions. It is because what is implicit in these summary observations is a theory of aesthetic reception, of how works of art tend to be received by ordinary citizens, rather than just a theory of mixed pleasures (Frede). In addition to this, this reflects the keen sense Plato always
showed about the real dimensions of emotions and their character. In the same sequence, Plato provides a taxonomic view of how false ideas about oneself, when combined with the extent of power he/she commands in society, can likewise spawn tendencies of either appearing ridiculous or hateful. We need not deflect into a discussion of this. It just suffices to say that Plato was making no random statements while analysing the nature of the comic and the ridiculous, but is providing a sophisticated analysis of the human nature anchored in sharp observations and an acutely realist account of human psychology.29

Socrates extends the same theory to tragedy, though he does not discuss it as he does comedy and comic characters. Dorothea Frede notes that this theory is far superior and ‘much subtler’ than the more famous argument against arts in the Republic because it implicitly assumes an account of what makes pleasures attractive. In any case, it is debatable whether Socrates is all that right in treating tragedy along the same lines as comedy; for tragedy, despite sharing the general assumptions about the nature of dramatic representation and fictionality, differs much from comedy both in style and substance. The pleasures of tragedy need a subtler account.30

All the four types of false pleasures correspond to different ways in which they fall beneath the mark of being called true pleasures. We are yet to explore the genuinely true pleasures. The ostensive purpose of calling a pleasure false is not to denigrate it, nor to advocate a therapeutic solution to it, but only to illustrate how pleasure plays different kinds of variations liaising with the conditions of its origin and temperamental needs of individuals. Plato’s intention is not to altogether flush out the false pleasures from a person’s life since they are, or tend to be, false by nature, but to classify pleasures broadly along the lines of the most familiar kinds of distinctions we work with. Being false is not here equivalent to
being infected or corrupt all the time, unless it happens to be of the first kind of false pleasure. And the distinctions Plato relies on to furnish his keen analysis relate to as mundane and routine acts as perceiving, knowing and believing.

**True pleasures**

While discoursing on the second type of false pleasures, namely those which result from overrating or misestimating the true worth of a pleasure experienced, Socrates says the following at 42c:

Soc: But if you take that portion of them by which they appear greater or smaller than they really are, and cut it off from each of them as a mere appearance and without real being, you will neither admit that this appearance is right nor dare to say that anything connected with this portion of pleasure or pain is right or true (431).

The important words here are “appearance” and “real being”. These are the staple terms any devoted reader of Plato must be familiar with, for they play a very crucial role in articulating the structure and content of Plato’s metaphysics, apart from bequeathing their legacies down the centuries of Western thought. The real thing is hidden beneath the veneer of appearances, due to the distortions engineered by senses. One must circumvent these distortions and ‘climb up’ towards reality. This idea surfaces in different forms and guises, though the form in which it is presented here is explicitly Platonic in kind. Plato suggests that there are appearances about pleasure, as opposed to its reality. Though he does not dwell on this figure any elaborately, this is indeed a very suggestive analogy to work with. As he himself attests, the false pleasures are like appearances which mislead us about the genuine nature of pleasure.

What then is the reality about pleasure? What are the criteria which would help us decide on the truth about pleasure? These are interesting questions, because answering them appropriately could help us appreciate pleasure in a better manner. I shall want to
prevaricate a bit into some discussions which have been dealt with in one of the previous sections. Though this entire project is to investigate the name and nature of pleasure, we did not begin with a strong conviction that what we mean by pleasure is one definite thing. Thus, right from the beginning, there is a healthy sense of cautious treading, gradually unpeeling the mystery surrounding this concept. In the course of it, we have stumbled over many ways of approaching the problem, understanding it from multiple angles, and presenting it in ways that capture more and more of its tricky aspects. Now we have reached a point where, after so much of exorcism, we finally confront with what is reported to be an instance of true pleasure. As it happens, we are forced into reckoning its truth by way of negating what has thus far been negatively established about it.

Pleasure is a form of affection, and this stands undisputed. But, it is an affection, either in the body or in the soul, that is quite unlike other varieties of affection like those engineered in us by emotions. It is a special one in that it is deeply connected with an exclusive human function called gratification or satisfaction. Besides, we are looking for a form of affection that is free of the all the flaws that could turn them into false pleasures. And if it admits a kind whose truth counts not so much as a matter of the true essence of pleasure alone, but as something whose derivative values have implications for ethics as well, then our pursuit stands justified.

The promise of true pleasures is related to the promise of obtaining objects in the world around, concrete or abstract, which are unalloyed and pure. Plato is very demanding on this count. It is indeed plausible to presume that there are pure aspects to perceptible objects, like their colours, the sounds they make, and the shapes they exhibit, some of which are, ironically, imperceptible by the naked eye. They are pure because they can only be
conceptually segregated one into another only in the simulacrum of experience. Apart from this, they stand for the absolute and the perfect states of these objects. It could be termed absolute because each bit of a pure colour, say pure whiteness, is so pure that there cannot be an improvement on it further (53a-b). For Plato, this sense of perfection informs the choices of valuation also; that is, an instance of pure, unmixed white, even a modicum of it, is to be valued much higher than a huge quantity of even slightly impure whiteness. The pleasure derived from pure instances of colour, sound and shape are hence derivatively pure, and furthermore, true. Interestingly, their truth is the derivative feature of being pure. What is valued here is the quality, for whatever its worth, rather than the quantity.

It is a strange doctrine, for truth is predicated upon purity, and furthermore, purity is predicated upon abstract objects which admit no relative valuings. This is a very austere theory, singular in ambition and minimal in requirements. This appears very close to the ascetic imperative of the Modernist aesthetic. These affinities are no doubt Platonic, even if they are found in as remote a period from antiquity as modernism, as perhaps the remnants of the debris of Platonism. While explaining what he takes to be instances of pure pleasure to Protarchus, Socrates call them beautiful. From the *Symposium* one might recall the premium placed on beauty as the end, as leading one on a path tending towards higher forms of life, beginning with the sensuous forms as vehicles. Searching for beauty, either in the sensuous or in the intellectual modes, corresponds to the search for ultimate forms of human pursuit, that is attaining the splendours of philosophical life. There must be ways of identifying beauty either in the perceptible, and therefore the sensuous, or the imperceptible, and thus the intellectual modes of knowing. Socrates here, while discussing pure pleasures, attributes beauty to those forms of intellectual intuition, comparable
perhaps to that of Locke's intuitive grasp of primary qualities manifest as pure forms of perception in acts of understanding. Socrates' words here are worth quoting in full (51c-d).

Soc: What I am saying is not entirely clear straightaway, but I'll try to clarify it. By the beauty of a shape, I do not mean what the many might presuppose, namely that of a living being or of a picture. What I mean, what the argument demands, is rather something straight and round which and what is constructed out of these with a compass, rule and square, such as plane figures and solids. Those things I take are not beautiful in a relative sense, as others are, but are by their very nature forever beautiful by themselves. They provide their own specific pleasures that are not at all comparable to those of rubbing! And colours are beautiful in an analogous way and import their own kinds of pleasures (441).

Apart from stating that these pleasures are of intellectual origin, this account roughly parallels the modern accounts of aesthetic pleasure we are familiar with since at least the 18th century onwards. It is to say, works of art tend to be beautiful, as indeed "the smooth and bright sounds that produce one pure note" not in relation to "anything else but in and by themselves' (Complete 441). And the pleasures that accompany them are likewise pure and occur by themselves. This is remarkably close to our intimations about what we construe to be pleasure, in its highest sense, in the context of expressive arts and aesthetics. Subsequently, Socrates further goes on to enumerate kinds of pleasures connected with different other experiences in that they do not presuppose any explicit reference to any element of human interest; these are pleasures which result from smells, learning, and attaining knowledge. All these are pure pleasures as opposed to those violent, impure, multiform, and enormous pleasures (52d) one actively seeks, shunning moderation, in pursuance of his/her desires. Besides, Socrates believes that these pleasures admit no clear cut measurements, in that the suggestion is not that they cannot be measured, even if we were to have a way of measuring them. The idea is that when an object or a phenomenon admits clear cut measurement, it is a mean between a possible excess and a deficit, something like a measured mean between the limited and the unlimited. In other words, as we have learnt while discussing the fourfold ontological division, measurability for Socrates is equivalent to coming into existence by honouring the principle of harmony
among the different constituents of a whole. Hence, the best form for a pleasure is when it
can be measured in terms of a principle; a principle that threshes out its excesses and helps
maintain a stable and steady measure of its desirable quantity. Subsequently, later in the
dialogue, Socrates argues that reason provides this principle.

It is instructive to note here certain assumptions, almost like convictions, Plato shared over
a life time of philosophy, whose role is not insignificant in the formulation of his views. They may seem like biases or prejudices, but their origins are rational and well-motivated. They make good sense if we were to closely examine the layout of Plato’s views at
different junctures of his career. But that is beyond the scope of our project. Besides, in a
sense, they form the conceptual contours that act as delimiting factors in his thought. A few
of these founding assumptions are; for anything to be accounted at all, it must be
measurable; phenomena like good, beauty and truth admit absolute measures; and all these
three are very closely interconnected with each other; that the abstract and the intellectual
is always superior to the sensuous. These assumptions, though not gratuitous, govern the
basic choices Plato makes, like looking for pleasures which are latched onto absolute
properties, and pleasures which are indisputably associated with phenomena which bear
absolute attributes, and invoking strong and impersonal requirements for evaluative
assumptions. These principles, in a way, also enable Plato in arriving at the criteria that
separate the pure pleasures from the impure ones. As it happens, then pure pleasures belong
in the category of the ‘limited’ in the fourfold division worked out earlier. One must here
notice the admonitory tone Plato carries through and through. There is what appears like a
clear bias here that is drawing him toward pleasures that preclude those, impure ones,
which could potentially distort the moral well being of an individual. Though nowhere in
the dialogue does Plato explicitly castigate impure and mixed pleasures as deprecatory of
the moral well-being, it will not be too farfetched to presume that they contain the germ of what could lead an individual towards the state of an internal disharmony. However, Socrates concedes that mixed pleasures can still be a source of good.34

Plato understands that life, especially as it is lived among common folks, is a mixed bag. There cannot be a viable escape from the mixed pleasures, false or impure. We know from the Republic that Plato makes many qualitative distinctions, involving different kinds and patterns of lives sharing their appropriate places in the social hierarchy required for an ideal republic. Only the lives which occupy the highest rung of this hierarchy, those of philosophers, could show enough willingness and courage to forgo different kinds of pleasures for the sake of living a philosophical life.35 On the contrary, the rest indulge in their pleasures, mixed or otherwise, as they are found appropriate for them. In the ninth book of the Republic Plato famously argues that there are kinds of pleasures suitable to different types of persons and characters (Gosling and Taylor). Their good lies in how best they could understand and judge their own character and seek pleasure accordingly. In any event, in terms of an evaluative standard, the mixed pleasures are always ranked lower than the true pleasures. No doubt there is a distinct moral angle to this entire argument. But this should not lead us to the impression that Plato is tendentiously arguing in favour of a higher life, and whatever contributes to it, by underemphasizing the role of mixed and false pleasures. The issue of true pleasures needs a detailed engagement in the light of the central concerns of this dialogue. Thus, we shall come back to this issue towards the end.

Pleasure as a Process

From the point of view of the ontology worked out in the earlier part of the dialogue, there are phenomena which are static and admit a singular being (limited, peras) at any one point
of time, while there are phenomena which are perennially in the process of becoming (unlimited, *apeiron*). And, as Plato’s fourfold division worked it out, pleasure belongs in the category of the ‘unlimited’. It then appears that Plato is not very well disposed at all towards pleasures since they are classed under the aspect of becoming. Pleasures are indeed part of a process, recall the earlier image of restoration and replenishment. However, the case of pure pleasures testifies to belonging to a special kind because they are not either regeneration or restoration of any lack or destruction. Though pleasures are in general classed under *apeiron*, not all pleasures are the kinds of processes involved in restoration. Pure pleasures, if they are processes, they must be of a very different kind then. This ambiguity mars a better understanding of the dialogue.

If pleasure is taken as a process of restoration, it could be reckoned as a good since it involves a movement within a person towards ending the damage done to him owing to a preceding destruction. It is a sort of remedial good, as Dorothea Frede suggests. It may be a secondary good, but still is a good. On the other hand, if pleasure is a pure thing, not any fulfilment of any lack, it will still be a process, but one which is geared to meet or ‘replenish’ needs which are more primordial in character, like the need for pure pleasures or of cognitive and ethical character, like those of learning and knowing.

Plato always wants pleasure to be subservient to the larger ends of reason and good life. Seeking pleasure will be a good only so long as it aims to contribute to the further good of making a life self-sufficient which is otherwise incomplete. Thus, one must cultivate pleasures for attaining the larger ends of self-sufficiency, rather than provisional and recurring ends of temporary satisfactions that a crude hedonist is after. Given what we have gathered about pleasure so far, it seems unlikely that the process-view of pleasure would
have found any great favour in Plato’s reckoning. It is because the process never lets the product come into view. And it is always important for Plato have the product in his reckoning, as a Form, or a measure. Precisely because pleasure does not admit measures of any kind, like limit and proportion, Plato wants to work out the relational schema which locks pleasure and reason into one neat package. This relational schema must become evident in any conduct that involves human motivation. Though pleasure may not become evident as a product, the process view—Heracleitean in inspiration—is ill-equipped to account for the pleasure-reason nexus.

**Can Pleasure be Measured?**

It has been noted already that Plato has an undue fixation with mathematics and the sciences of proportion. To attest this claim from the *Philebus*, Socrates, while trying to put pleasure to the severest possible test (55c), says that, “if someone were to take away all counting, measuring, and weighing from the arts and crafts, the rest might be worthless” (445). He follows it up thus: “All we would have left would be conjecture and the training of our senses through experience and routine. We would have to rely on our ability to make lucky guesses that many people call art, once it has acquired some proficiency through practice and hard work” (55e) (445). Later, in the same sequence, he draws a distinction between two kinds of measuring and calculating: the one used by commoners, like builders and merchants, and the other used by philosophers (56e). This is not to suggest that there are two different arts here, but that there are two ways in which they are understood. In other words, there is an enlargement of the idea of measure which is now extensive enough to cover many kinds of measure under one head. The idea of measure became extensive to include many kinds and types which are qualitatively related.³⁶ Arithmetic or geometry in the hands of ordinary folks is meant to assist them in their routine and utility bound
activities, part of the mixed life; while a philosopher also makes use of these arts in pursuing something that is too far afield from the sphere of the ordinary, that is the realm of the true knowledge. Though in the *Philebus* it is not explicitly mentioned, we could infer from other Platonic dialogues, particularly *Republic*, that Plato reserves a special use for mathematics in understanding the true structure of reality. The instruments—mathematics here—appear different, despite bearing the same name, quite appropriately, in view of the use they are put to.37

Now the question is could pleasure be measured? Can pleasure be included among those which allow for some kind of a measurement at least? It should be borne in mind that Plato’s ideas of measurement majorly draw on what was considered latest in his days in the field of measuring objects—namely, geometry and arithmetic. As it is not difficult to conjecture, he was not quite aware of the modes of quantifying and measuring that we operate with. So when he invokes measurement, it should be taken to mean some kind of an order and proportion, the use of which helps one employ the world around, the experience of its objects, for his/her purposes. That is where, I maintain, he can still speak to us. It could be that we have methods of measuring far superior to the ones he was familiar with; nevertheless, the idea of measuring applicable to phenomena—objects with a certain kind of being—which are measurable is quite the same. Earlier, in the *Protagoras*, Plato thought that it is possible to account for the circumstances that could bring pleasure to a person in terms of how perfectly they admit the case of being knowable. Therefore, the famous Socratic dictum: if you know what is good for you, then you will not do anything that goes against that knowledge of what you know is good for you.38 Pleasure was something, of course the terminal stage in the course of an action, and a state of soul, is still something that could be pursued by means of methods and procedures that are scientific.39
Coming to the *Philebus*, there is a great change. This time things take a dramatic turn. Plato appears, as a metaphysician, at the best of his ambition. He does not claim anywhere that pleasure is an imponderable, but he knows that pleasure is not easily measurable. He devises ingenious strategies to understand it. Though he does not relinquish the idea of measuring, he does not subject pleasure to simple forms of quantitative measurement anymore. This is one of the reasons why he assigns the category "indeterminate" to pleasure while making his fourfold division. As we shall see, it only indicates that he gained a more sophisticated sense of the required notion of measure applicable to pleasure.

"The fountain of pleasure" and "the fountain of intelligence"

So far we were on a journey of an unusual kind, going over a Plato’s dialogue, just trying to make sense of what it is doing with itself while dealing with pleasure. It is now time to gather the different threads we are pursuing together and weave them into a coherent pattern of views about pleasure, for as yet we have only attempted, as summarily as we could, exploring different departures which unfortunately do not seem to offer a cogent sense of how they might belong in one single set of views. This is one of the reasons why the *Philebus* could contribute to our impression that its ways are desultory. It is only an impression, in any case; and my effort is to prove this to be a wrong one.

It has been mentioned quite early on that we intend to deal with this dialogue as one would approach a work of art; and the benefits of doing so show up by enabling us to understand the complexity of the issues this dialogue thematises. The theme of this dialogue is the contest between pleasure and reason; which one of these should have a greater stake in managing the life of an individual? At 61d, Socrates says,

Soc: We stand like cub-bearers before the fountains—the fountain of pleasure, comparable to honey, and the sobering fountain of intelligence, free of wine, like sober, healthy water, and we have to see how to make a perfect mixture of the two (451).
It seems the resolution of the debate lies in finding that fountain where the honey of pleasure and the sober healthy water like intelligence are obtained flowing in mixed proportions. One could be struck by the images of sobriety, associated with intelligence, and the sense of salubriousness of pleasure, naturally following something like tasting honey; the first one gives the power to reason and think, while the second one stands for the ability to be drawn to pleasure. The context of this debate could be properly interpreted and understood only against the backdrop of assumptions that support pleasure as a kind of value that deserves a pursuit either for its own sake or for something else. Whatever one’s attitudes or convictions about pleasure, we are only seeking to develop a balanced and well-tempered view which is fair to pleasure as one of the values in life. There are at least four principal issues, interrelated with each other, which connect the entire dialogue into one single enterprise. We shall in due course go over one after the other.

**Firstly, it is hedonism.** One of the basic issues here is hedonism and the dialogue intends to explore plausible ways of defending and articulating a moderate form of hedonism that is sensitive to the demands and requirements of ethical behaviour. However, Plato does not stage the drama entirely as a debate between hedonism and its opponent, say anti-hedonism, in the form of two fully articulate ethical positions, but conducts it in the guise of an investigation on pleasure. Except for dramatic occasions when Socrates had to clarify how his views on pleasure differ from those of Philebus, most notably at 60b and other miscellaneous occasions, there is no significant reference to any aspect of hedonism as a doctrine. Strictly speaking, hedonism is conventionally taken, along with Philebus, as a view of life which equates pleasure and good. In Socrates words, “good and pleasant are but two names that really belong to what is by nature one and the same” (60b) (450). Obviously, for all right reasons, Socrates argues that this view is a wrong one. Simple
pleasures by themselves cannot be good in life. But, that is where the salience of Plato’s genius comes to the fore, Plato does not dismiss hedonism altogether as an unworkable and unrefomrable doctrine. On the contrary, it is viewed as offering a valid departure for ethics, but only after sustaining some reforms and changes. This is quite different from summarily rejecting hedonism on the charge that it is only concerned with pleasure, and nothing else. Although there is little mention of hedonism as a view of life, and it was used merely to launch on a wide ranging intellectual excursion centred on pleasure, the larger purposes of writing this dialogue stand justified only in terms of working out the right sort of a balance between hedonism and anti-hedonism. That is indeed the reason why we attempted a Literary reading of sorts to understand the role argument and disputation play, in terms of where they stop and where they reign, while discussing hedonism. We are, in a sense, imputing a certain intention to Plato that he wanted to bring out a certain aspect of hedonism—that it is averse to dialogue—using the dramatic form of the dialogue. As argued in the previous section, we have evidence from the structure and the design of the dialogue itself. It must be remembered that it is an ethical doctrine whose basis is found, not in demands external to the individual like collective good, or social justice, but within the individual soul, more particularly in its desiderative element. A hedonist understands desire in a particular manner: desire, as a source of motivation, is only aware of its inner requirements, like craving or wanting. As we saw in the previous chapter, Plato invokes the image of an oyster to capture the general orientation towards the world and the functioning of a hedonist, whose sense of desires are urges based purely in needs. Though Plato does not offer a theory of desire in the *Philebus*, as he does in the *Republic* (Kahn), the theory of reason he proposes is rich enough to account for what he thinks would be the right understanding of human motivation. We are not molluscs to move barely from desire to desire. What is needed is a superior understanding of the fact that our motivations operate
in a much complex a manner. So, once we join the theory of reason explicated in the previous chapter, with the theory of desire of the Republic we will have the right theory of motivation required for a defensible form of hedonism. I attempted to do this partially in the previous chapter, in section titled "Three Kinds of Life".

It has been argued that reason in this dialogue is equivalent to the order and intelligence within the soul, analogous to the order and intelligence that governs the cosmos. Though there are no indications in the Philebus that Plato has in mind a tri-partite psychology that he worked out in the Republic, it is reasonable to conjecture that he still subscribes to some notion of the soul that admits divisions within itself. If this were not the case, then it would be difficult to make sense of the idea of order within the soul. The order must be among the elements of the soul. Consequently, among these elements, there will be those which correspond to our sources of motivation, like desire or hope. Now the question to be asked is, what kind of a system or understanding would govern the relationship between reason and the motivation? We know from the dialogue that within the soul an "incorporeal order" keeps the harmony between different elements (64b). The harmony here fundamentally refers to the kind of coordination that is required between reason and motivation to keep the notion of mixed life intact; a mixed life is a measured life. Thus, it is not very difficult to conjecture for Plato that in the life of a hedonist of Philebus' kind, this 'incorporeal order' that corresponds to intelligence and reason is not in the right mode of its functioning. Now, the basis for ethics, if it were to be traced to this 'incorporeal order', that coordinates reason and motivation, would be the soul and its internal organisation. However, if someone construes this basis inadequately, as a Phileban does, while it does not make an ethics based upon it totally invalid, but it does let itself remain immune from further argument and improvisation. One still cares, as Plato does, to salvage the good part of
hedonism because its departure, to say the least, is radical and fundamental enough, namely the desire. He does not want it to be let out of ethics simply. In the Republic he did it by way of proposing a theory of reason that incorporates cognition and judgment, along with desire (Kahn)\textsuperscript{42}; in the Philebus he does it by way of a theory of pleasure, since the main concern of hedonist is pleasure and not desire. I claim this on the evidence of the extant attention he directs towards understanding pleasure. The problem with the hedonist is that he tends to overlook the significance of desire by reducing it to some projection of the soul or the body, as a want or a lack experienced within, that is independent of any act associated with reason like cognition and judgment. Thus, a right picture of seeking pleasure requires that we should not construe this act as simply being an agreeable feeling that follows the fulfilment of a desire. On the contrary, its mandate should be expanded so as to implicate the larger frame, of order and intelligence within the soul, in actions involving pleasure as an end. Thus picture is much different from how we tend to understand pleasure in common parlance, and also how an empiricist would be willing to have a theory about it.

\textit{Secondly, the personal idea of ethics.} As already mentioned, the interest in pleasure has clearly an ethical basis. In chapter two, and while discussing false pleasures, the ethical angle came to the fore much more perspicuously. However, if we are to seek an ethical framework that supports the explorations of the Philebus, one could plausibly suggest that it can be an enlightened form of hedonism. In contrast, I suggest that the best characterization of this framework would be, following Michel Foucault, an idea of personal ethics.\textsuperscript{43} In other words, I am recommending that hedonism be viewed as a form of personal ethics. Hedonism foregrounds pleasure as an important value in life. What Plato did through this dialogue is to work out what is thought to be the right picture of
personality, using his dialectical method, so that the frame that sustains relations between pleasure and reason will be personality itself. This picture presupposes that human motivation must cogently fit the pleasure-reason matrix. Since hedonism emphasises the pursuit of pleasure, and the gratifications which thereby follow, it does not make it evident that there is a parallel picture of human motivation implied in this doctrine. I argue that by redescribing hedonism as personal ethics, we are bringing the motivation part of this matrix into focus.

In the course of his discussion Socrates makes many proposals, and they no doubt appear tedious and long drawn. But, in the course of making these, he elaborates on many points which facilitate our endeavour to understand a personal conception of ethics. The most important aspect of this entire exercise is not that Socrates analytically exhausted pleasure, nor that he made some irrefutable discoveries about the structural relations that bind pleasure, desire and reason, but that he showed a way of self-exploration which corresponds to a certain way of addressing the personal ethics. What in sum he did was to weave pleasure and reason into a web called personality. Though a distinction is made between true and false pleasures, whose basis is not completely logical or epistemological but ethical, Socrates nowhere advocates that only true pleasures should be sought in life. He knows that such an advocacy will only amount to being very unrealistic about human beings. He thought out an apposite place and value for false pleasures too in the life of a person. He demonstrated a way of self-analysis that unpacks the relations that govern different elements of the personality.

A personal idea of ethic means rules for oneself, which perhaps do not apply elsewhere. Personal morality is not so much like a code, or a set of rules, than that sphere of struggle
and pressure an individual undergoes in the face of the pressure from impersonal ethical
precepts and conventions of social morality. It is an effort to form oneself, either
therapeutically or through deliberation, in the image of a right combination of the
proportions of reason and pleasure in a particular judgment or decision. This process of
struggle within oneself is describable in terms of an hermeneutic sort of understanding of
the relations that govern the psychic economy of reason, motivation and pleasure. And
*Philebus* only demonstrates one way of doing this. The idea is not only to address a
problem, of hedonism or sophistry or politics simply, and propose a resolution; it is for the
sake of making people “better dialecticians”, so that one is better equipped to use one’s
internal resources of deliberation.\textsuperscript{45} These resources, as the *Philebus* taught us, are nowhere
else but within the soul: they are of motivation, cognition and judgment. The manipulation
of these resources requires that we understand how they work, both severally and in
combination. One could gain such an understanding, as *Philebus* demonstrates, by
mastering the art of dialectic.

It is a matter beyond dispute that our moral assumptions, the ones we learn to carry within
us, are never too sharp and fully formed. They are always in a partial state of mutating, not
being clear to oneself, and are made, essentially flexible, in so much as to accommodate
even quite dramatic changes in our attitudes and temperaments. No ethics, if construed as a
set of rules and explanations, could capture the complexity of this aspect of our
personalities. In contrast, if ethics were to be viewed as a practice involving the right use
and understanding of internal resources—dialectic, reason and pleasure, as the *Philebus*
does, then our sense of ethics need not hinge on assumptions and beliefs, moral or
otherwise, which we acquire and drop at different points in life.
Thirdly, the relationship between pleasure and the dialectic. As we saw in this and the previous chapter, the dialectic as a method employed by Plato has a great role in uncovering different kinds of details about pleasure: that it is unlimited, that it is of many varieties and kinds, and that there is a right view of its relationship with reason. To say the least, without having mastered the art of dialectic Plato would not have succeeded in making all these discoveries about pleasure.

Plato works with a stringent criterion for knowledge requiring a strong principle of coherence and systematicity. All propositions and judgments which constitute knowledge must exhibit a strong tendency to gel with each other, it is a condition if not met will amount to a total collapse of knowledge itself (13e-14a). Interestingly, Plato imports this requirement into talking about pleasure, on the analogy of the case of knowledge: all instances of what we construe as pleasure must be structurally of a similar kind so that they can be identified as belonging to one larger category of pleasure. Pleasure is not knowledge, though it is an object of knowing. Apart from the analogy, pleasure shares with knowledge the relation that defines the transactions between the known and the knower. The question is what must have prompted Plato to draw an analogy from the instance of knowledge, rather than something else. One pat answer would be to say that Plato wants a role for the dialectic in the investigation of pleasure. Another one would be to follow a suggestion implicit in Plato’s ideal of knowledge that since all things must hang together in some well-motivated manner, so must pleasure—as the object of knowledge—feature as one part in the corpus of knowledge. In other words, at some level it should be possible to talk about pleasure in terms of knowledge—that is in terms of what we can know about it. This second suggestion indeed calls for a stronger requirement. Both may be right in their own respects. However, what remains undisputed in this contrast and comparison is that
pleasure, after all, is not a frivolous offshoot of want, desire or, as the natural scientists of Plato's time suggested, witchcraft (44b-c), but something whose value for life is of substantive character. Even in days of Plato there were many detractors of pleasure. And the reason is not very difficult to guess: as a concept pleasure gives itself to many definitions, each one further reducible to some basic sense of how pleasure essentially must be related to human character. Some views may have an exalted sense of this relation, while some might have quite a crass and uncharitable view. It is obvious that Plato is trying to find some ways of defending and maintaining the exalted sense associated with pleasure by fighting the advances of those who are quite crass about pleasure. My suggestion is to understand Plato's views as charitably as one could. And it is part of a hallowed move on Plato's part that he wrote Philebus, to consecrate and sanctify pleasure, so that it is treated as eminently deserving the labours of the 'dialectic'.

By pleasure Plato does not mean one single thing; but many different kinds and varieties, all at once, but showing no apparent and singular logic that binds them into one. But, we could conjecture that all forms of pleasure are related to some basic sense of gratification or satisfaction understood in a psychological sense. If it were not the case, the very use of the concept of pleasure may have to be suspected. Besides, the fact that it has been undisputedly thought to be the most basic reason one possesses to do anything at all further reinforces the availability of a common denominator for it. Furthermore, at the level of introspection, pleasure in some basic sense corresponds to the intentional structure of directedness that characterizes the teleological nature of human action, namely, that all of us seek pleasure. I caution the reader not to confuse this broad concept of pleasure with the usual empiricist one that we are mostly familiar with. The latter one is purely psychological in character and epiphenomenal in appearance, understood as a state of mind.
causally related to something else. Additionally, at least in principle, it can be measured and quantified.

**Fourthly, Plato's attitude towards pleasure.** It is widely believed and proved that Plato is a puritan, sometimes too refined to allow his puritanism to be construed as a flaw\(^4^8\). Not unreasonably, one would expect Plato to have views about pleasure which are denunciatory in letter and spirit, echoing Victorianism back in ancient Greece. Likewise Plato, despite his exalted sense of pleasure, is not someone who would be prepared to give free reign to pleasures of any kind. He is particularly quite stern and hostile toward pleasures which by nature have immoderate dimensions. He is all against indulgences and excessive pleasures (45a) because they, quite reproachably, break the precepts of moderation and intelligence. He does not even hesitate to say that some of these pleasures have a violent character (63d-e). But this is not all nor does it define his basic attitude. According to him, there is nothing intrinsically bad or ugly about pleasure, as Christianity is often charged with having portrayed pleasure thus, but the goodness or the desirability of pleasure depends on the kind of use it is put to; pleasures moderately pursued, with a proper calculation of its costs and benefits coupled with wisdom, pose no threat to anyone. It is only when moderation fails and reasoning collapses that we succumb to the excessive charm of pleasures. Evidently, this is a very Socratic argument, and when pleasure is blamed for some of our wrongdoings, what is brought under fire is our ratiocinative-deliberative faculty, and not some pleasure. In fact, Plato has no reason to be negatively disposed towards pleasure at all, in any serious sense. This point might seem too obvious to be made at all, but not so obvious if we consider the reasons why Plato is favourably disposed towards mixed pleasures. By now we are familiar with Plato's general approach towards pleasure, which is to view and understand it in relation to a certain view of personality.
Even if we ignore all the controversies surrounding Plato’s choice of classifying pleasures as true and false, jettisoning commonplace distinctions, and even if we dispute the plausibility of such a classification, there is something about these which holds the most important key to certain principal assumptions Plato made to understand the place of pleasure in life. It is because this classification reveals something quite dramatic about pleasure per se. The point of calling something true or false, even prior to making it relative to what is taken to be the true or the real paradigm, is to accept that what is false must fall through, and only what is true must stick out, and that there must be some obverse sort of relation that sets a true pleasure in opposition to its false counterpart. Plato does honour both these requirements, for he, as we noted already in one of the previous sections, marks for the true pleasures a role that is exclusive and exaltative, while on the false pleasures no such higher value is placed. Then, one might ask, is Plato not guilty of the same fault, as our recent predecessors in aesthetics are, in letting a certain kind of pleasure to be used to accede to some form of immediate transcendence, either through perception of art or nature or sheer abstractions? It is not easy to answer this question at one go. For this we have to analyse, more keenly, the structural kinship true and false pleasures share with each other in the overall programme set up by Plato.

Whenever Plato ventured into examining different kinds of pleasures, he did so by way of attending to the conditions of pleasure and pain in real life situations (42b-c, 46a). Some conditions bring us pain, while some bring pleasure. When we consider pleasure in terms of its conditions, involving objects and individuals, we concomitantly bring in sequences and situations involving direct experience. These situations indicate in the direction of laws, or law-conforming conditions at least. One need not invoke causal-mechanical models to describe this phenomenon. Plato had in mind situations in their complete shape and
structure, which perhaps far exceed descriptions in terms of laws and principles. Any average life would span over conditions that bring pleasures and pains of different kinds and hues and it is possible to describe the details of these situations in terms of how they are brought about and experienced. Thus, some conditions are at work even when one is led to experience a pleasure which according to Plato is false. There are no gratuitous pleasures. This state of affairs entails that conditions—of sickness or maladies, for example (46a)—at whose instance pleasures and pains follow, are a combination of factors both external and internal to the constitution of the soul. The salience of Plato’s view consists in that he places both kinds of pleasures, true and false, in the same scale only differing in degree and not kind. However, this is not basis enough to suggest that Plato only resorts to making quantitative distinctions among pleasures. There is a certain ambiguity over the nature of distinctions Plato is willing to admit among pleasures, for, as we shall see in the next section, the true pleasures also are of a kind which exhibit qualitatively a very different character. This only reflects an acute kind of ambiguity that is at the heart of pleasure which inevitably affects any move to systematize its territory.

Plato makes it mandatory that pleasures should be understood in relation to the conditions—internal and external—that bring them about. This in other words is to say that there are elements within human soul which become capable of, in combination with external influences, engineering changes in our affections in proportion to how one experiences pleasure or pain. This is broadly in keeping with how pleasure is general is approached, even among modern thinkers. However, the issue lies in how prepared we are to extend the discussion on pleasure beyond this threshold.
One way of looking at true and false pleasures is that they are different from each other only in terms of degree, and not of kind. Since certain pleasures are false, should we shun them? Socrates says, in no equivocal terms, that “in all of life’s tragedies and comedies, pleasures are mixed with pains, so is it infinitely on many occasions” (50b) (440). There are many types of mixed pleasures. Socrates knows only too well, that most of our pleasures in life exhibit different kinds of falsities. In other words, what comes naturally to us is mixed life, a life where pleasures—both false and true, different types of pains, and intelligence are expected to have their rightful place in right proportions. If we ought to seek good, it is in the mixed life that we should and not in the unmixed life (61b). Clearly, calling pleasures false does not mean that they are forbidden or that they have no functional standing in life; nor, since they involve misrecognitions and misjudgments, their record should be set straight. In contrast, there cannot be a life of pure and unmixed pleasure alone. Such lives, from the point of view any ordinary individual, will be artificial and can only be lived or nurtured under laboratory conditions. This is not to lose sight of the fact that Socrates still keeps the option of living the life of pure intellect, and the pleasures associated with it open. In the course of this exposition, there are chances that we have overlooked some crucial similarities and distinctions, thus being unfair to Plato. However, our idea is not to prove Plato’s views on pleasure to be either right or wrong, but only to learn from his attempt to understand pleasure in the wake of its relationship with a certain view of personality. This will further enable us to think about pleasure along with the strategies he developed in the course of writing this dialogue.

As it were, if Plato is not too negatively disposed towards the false pleasures in life, then what about the true pleasures? What role do they have in a person’s life? This question is tricky, because Plato already consigned the search for good in the constituency of mixed
life, and therefore mixed pleasures are not *non gratae* in a person's life. Then, what would be the place of true pleasures in an individual's life? A revisit to one of the earlier sections of this chapter, on true pleasures, would set it out for us that they result from perceiving the pure aspects of objects—their formal attributes—either sensuously or intellectually. It seems one can perhaps dispense with pleasures of this kind, because they do not feature among the mixed pleasures. At any rate, Plato was not prepared to drop the exaltation the true pleasures were already subject to. Subsequently, towards the end of the dialogue, there is an intense discussion involving the usual Platonic themes: beauty, proportion, reason, measure, and truth. The question is what among pleasure and reason, the two initial contestants represented by Philebus and Socrates respectively, is closer to beauty, truth and measure. Socrates, almost irrevocably, makes a case for reason that it is closer to all the three than pleasure. It seems finally Protarchus is convinced, though we have no indications of the same about Philebus, of Socrates' arguments. For Protarchus pleasure becomes "the greatest impostor of all" (454). And the only allowance Socrates was prepared to make for pleasure was to those pure, unmixed pleasures, and he ranks them in the fifth position in the scale that decides the position of truth, measure, proportion, beauty, sciences and pleasures vis-à-vis their relative significance in human life (66a-d); for, in a different context, while discussing the true pleasures, Plato admits that they share kinship with truth, beauty and proportion (53a-c).

In summary, firstly, whether one agrees with Plato over his hierarchies and value assumptions, it is at least by far clear that understanding pleasure needs a nuanced and balanced approach and that any investigation into it must take into account its conceptual standing in relation to other crucial attributes of personality like motivation and reason. This is about understanding the place of pleasure in the structure of soul's economy.
Secondly, pursing pleasure is never a result of a simple decision, for it involves a management of desires—as motivational sources—with a prior understanding of what these elements of human will entail in terms of their consequences. Therefore, Aristotle writes, "for it (pleasure) seems to be especially proper to our animal kind, and hence when we educate children we steer them by pleasure and pain. Besides, enjoying and hating the right things seem to be the most important for virtue of character" (Nichomachean 266). There is connection, as he argues, between the virtue of character—Aristotle’s term for his view of personality—and pleasure. The biggest challenge for him is to anchor pleasure in virtue and not in nature completely (Broadie 358-363).

Thirdly, it is difficult to have a theory, even of sorts, that comprehensively covers all instances of pleasure, as indeed the Philebus proves. In the course of coming to terms with this dialogue, we have gone over many ways in which pleasure was approached, and even the best of our (Plato’s) efforts could only come as close as to specify and describe the situations that give talking about pleasure a context, either as hedonism or a personal ethics. Pleasure is not something that some one theory could fully describe and characterise, nor would it be something that allows any sort of complaisance on our part because its relationship with human nature admits a multi-form complexity at different levels, cutting across the run-of-the mill distinctions of convenience we make like psychology, ethics, aesthetics and ontology. However, one can still operate along broad theoretical parameters, like how it has been attempted in the Philebus, of unpacking the relations that bind pleasure into a view of personality.

Fourthly, the idea of bringing pleasures under the control of reason and intelligence is a great advance over many crude forms of hedonism. The best form of this idea, available in
Aristotle, can be of the kind which sees a pedagogic relation between acts of pursuing pleasures and the cultural institutions and factors that contribute to these. Finally, it is now possible to talk about pleasure, not as isolated moments of gratification and so on, but as a product of acculturation and education with an implicit view of human nature.

**Managing Pleasures**

One essential aspect of this re-evaluation of pleasure, through a discussion of the *Philebus*, is a certain reversal of values and assumptions. There are two concepts, especially with a greater share of relevance for understanding art and aesthetics, which have suffered a drastic fall. They are pleasure and beauty. It should be borne in mind that Plato, whose views on pleasure we have examined so far, is no easy friend of pleasure either. In contrast, he is perhaps only surpassed by Plotinus in talking about beauty. And there are many passages, extant ones, in the *Phaedrus* for example, across his oeuvre when his eloquence about beauty was combined with rare insight. And in the *Philebus*, of course only in passing, he tries to make a connection between beauty and pleasure. Socrates urges Protarchus to agree to his suggestion that an instance of pure whiteness, a perfect and unadulterated colour, should be the truest and the most beautiful of all instances of white (53b). One need not suppose that Plato meant to seriously equate being beautiful with the form of beauty, for he may have used the word ‘beautiful’ quite in commonplace terms. Nevertheless, Plato shall not lose even a single chance, whenever he could, to celebrate the non-sensuous. And the true pleasures are a case in point where it is more than clear that they result from the non-sensuous—intellectual—perception. And for Plato the highest form of beauty is manifest only in the absolute and non-sensuous perception, though the ascent towards it begins with the visible and the sensuously perceptible instances of beauty. True pleasures are the ones which come into being at the instance of a ‘pure’ kind
of perception, rather than perception intercepted by senses. These are clues enough to
conjecture that when instances of pure colour or shape are called beautiful, Plato has their
intellectual aspects of perception in mind.

There is an interesting issue here; the true pleasures, on which Plato is prepared to confer
an exalted status, and the reasons for this, as we just noted, may well have to do with
Plato's own personal propensities; how do these pleasures fit into the larger theory that
pleasure must be made Subservient to reason and intelligence? There is a sense of unease
here that Plato does not address. But, as I shall argue, the unease disappears the sooner we
begin to make explicit what is only implicit in his account. The broad and general aspects
of Plato's framework make it mandatory on our part to subsume even true pleasures to the
management of reason, intelligence and wise planning, personality in short. Of course the
true pleasures are so called because they have no excesses which need to be controlled by
the exercise of restraint and moderation. It is difficult to say that looking at a pure and
unalloyed patch of colour could fill a person's mind with a violent kind of pleasure (52c).
There are pleasures appropriate to the occasion and the objects involved in that. It so
happens that looking at such samples could make one experience pleasure. It seems one
cannot help registering pleasure, let alone wanting it or managing it. Typically, aesthetic
pleasures—in particular pleasures we seem to experience at the instances of fine art—
exhibit similar characteristics as true pleasures. In one sense, whatever applies to the latter
should apply to the former as well.\textsuperscript{53}

Just like aesthetic pleasures, as it is argued, over which it seems one cannot exercise any
kind of control, the true pleasures too cannot be brought under the reign of a reformed and
enlightened hedonist, who in principle, is capable of managing his practical ends in as
much as to seek the kind of pleasure that is most compatible with the matrix of his personality. And for Aristotle it would the kind of pleasure that would be in agreement with his virtue of character. This also entails, rather superficially, without invoking any talk of motivation and reason, one could decide what is good or bad about pleasures in view of the consequences they would have in a person's life, of course only vis-à-vis what is a considered view of good life for that person. But how about those pleasures which do not show any ostensive sign of being either good or bad, like true pleasures, though Plato enlists them among the goods to be pursued precisely for the reason that they are neutral. The problem with these pleasures is that we have no scope to reason about them, nor compare or contrast them with their worst or better forms. It almost gives one the impression that they are of a different kind altogether, and not degree, going squarely against what we have advocated in the previous chapters. This may be a wrong picture after all. We will have more to look at these aspects of pleasure in part two.

Aesthetic pleasures, as they are understood, also seem to more or less share the same kind of issues as the true pleasures. They are disinterested; they just happen in us; it appears that they involve no element of an individual's active pleasure-seeking character; they admit no rational deliberation; they set up a relation with works of art that are in sharp contrast with the cognitive relations with bear with other objects. In sum, the idea, or perhaps the charge, is that these pleasures remain far from the outreaches of any effective effort to interpret and understand them in view of how their relations with our personalities. It must borne in mind that a comprehensive picture of our interactions with works of art must take into account the fact that they are transactions between objects, called artistic and literary, on the one hand and personalities on the other hand. Pleasure must feature as an element, or a relation in these transactions. \(^{54}\) That is to say, it would be lame and uninformative to
suggest that these pleasures occur because we are so programmed to register them as responses to works of art. Besides, it is difficult to extend this point to account for the reasons and causes why we seem to register responses like these, which stand in no immediate relationship with our cognitive efforts of interpreting and understanding fine art. In a sense the polemic implicit in the idea of 'anti-aesthetic' springs from these conventional characterizations of the aesthetic, that it is "ahistorical", "class-specific", "accultured" and "hypostatized" and "ideological" (Foster). At a further conceptual level, the trouble is with the lack, or an inability, to find a single principle of human nature or personality that could unify different aspects—cognitive, affective and, as Spinoza would have it, conative (Curley)—of our engagement with works of fine art, or the world for that matter, under one measure of explanation. I don't claim that I am to offer one such principle, or that one such explanation is in the making. I am only recalling, or making it explicit, that such a task is in principle feasible.

Against the backdrop of what we have been arguing so far, it now seems natural to charge Plato with the similar kind of complaint that true pleasures stand apart from this singular principle, which in other words is the principle of reason and intelligence, which is the "order" within the soul. It is indeed true that Plato did not find or erect one rubric complete enough to include all kinds of pleasure, unexceptionably, and it seems, quite evidently, that when he shifted the focus of his dialectical investigations from larger questions pertaining to the order in the cosmos, and its replication in the soul and the body to an analysis of pleasure (beginning 31a), he reserved his quest for finding such a unitary principle for pleasure to the structure of the soul. In other words, knowing the principle that underlies the function of the soul—the management of its parts—is equivalent to knowing the principle that works for pleasure, true or false. He knew that dialectic would come to his
help in finding this principle. Therefore he employs it with unreserved willingness. And, being fair to Plato, he was not after a grand unifying principle of only pleasure, but a principle of human nature or personality without which the connections between pleasure and reason would remain unintelligible. This is the principle that sets in place, justifies in a way, the relative importance of pleasure (66a-c)\textsuperscript{55}, among the different other attributes of the soul—knowledge, reason, intelligence and motivation.\textsuperscript{56} Of course, true pleasures always have an edge over the false ones. This would be a primary truth about the relationship between persons, personalities and the fact that they accede themselves to pleasures of different kinds, including true pleasures. This is much different from our parallel case in point, that of the aesthetic pleasure. What seems intractable about aesthetic pleasures is the possibility of working out a reconciliation of the affective aspect of aesthetic experience—agreeable feelings—with the basic fact that it must feature as an integral part of the personality. This lack of bridging makes aesthetic pleasure appear to be something that is let off from the conceptual bind that constitutes the organizing principles of personality.

It is the right moment to recall a point that is applicable not just to the *Philebus*, but to the entire work of Plato. It is that there is an inalienable pedagogic context to *Philebus*, not just because it is a dialogue where Socrates practices elenchus as a teacher in the streets of Athens; but because what he does in the dialogue along with his interlocutors, by way of practicing the dialectical inquiry, is seen as a legacy bequeathed by gods “to inquire and learn and teach one another” (16e) (404-05). We have straight evidence from the dialogue itself. However, Plato does not make it explicit beyond this point. It remains confined to the larger aspects of the inquiry conducted, and the transformative effect it is supposed to have on its practitioners. If we extend this point a little further, when Socrates claims that
the true pleasures are the beautiful, the truest and the most proportionate (64d-e), it is implied in them, given what we have learnt about the art of dialectic, that some sort of a dialectical process must come to an individual’s assistance to be able to register perceptions of the kind that produce pure pleasures. Given the larger contexts of Plato’s views on the nature of personality, and the objectives he expects his dialectical inquiry to fulfil, there are enough reasons to further a reasonable guess that a prevenient pedagogic process is always at work when individuals experience true pleasures, which in other words serves as the necessary link between pleasures and the personalities of the individuals’ who experience them. The link here is that of motivation, for it gives us the reasons why people understand and enjoy pleasures of this kind. These reasons may show up as desires too. Besides, this pedagogic process shapes and informs individual acts of cognition and judgment. That is perhaps the reason why Plato was prepared to grant these pleasures the fifth position in his hierarchy of values. In a sense, much the same applies to mixed (false) pleasures also, but since they are naturally accompanied with elements of corruption they become ineligible for the system of values Plato erects at 66a-c. Plato’s larger edifice should never miss our purview; for, if we ignore his larger system of values, it will become infinitely difficult to explain what appear like the choices he is making in judging the relative positions of “soul’s own properties”(66c).

This interpretation amounts to suggesting that a certain cultural ethos engulfs even acts as mundane as seeking pleasures, of whatever kind or origin. Thus, pure or true pleasures may well appear to have just been derived from pure objects, but quite contrarily, they presuppose acts of intelligence and judgment simultaneously at work along with perception. It then becomes easy to look for motivational factors attached to acts of perception in the history of the formation of a personality. What is only implicit in Plato, one would find
quite well developed in Aristotle, though that is beyond the scope of this discussion. This naturally presupposes that acts of perception, which lead to experiencing pleasures, are not simple, basic, more pejoratively brute and instinctive reactions to whatever is perceived, but involve complex operations of decoding, cognition and interpretation. And, such processes do not occur as simple arithmetic do; instead they require some evaluatively neutral processes of formation of character, personality, outlooks, and deliberations. Now it falls into place why Plato took enough courage to suggest, so earnestly, that pure pleasures are the truest, the proportionate and the beautiful, under the implicit assumption that they are subject to rational management.

It is then not a matter of mere suggestion, or even a wild conjecture, that pleasure, beauty, truth and measure fall in one league (64d-e). They all do so precisely for the reason why pleasure has been construed as something that ought to survive the management of reason and wisdom. Beauty has aspects, perceptible and sensuous, that become manifest in objects, which are thereby judged beautiful. Without going into arguments or tricky aspects of the debate on the nature of beauty, let's come to accept a few theses which need not brook too much of a controversy. They are; beauty is relative to perception; there cannot be absolute measures and principles for 'subjective' phenomena like pleasures and beauty; there is no way one could assimilate the commonplace sense of truth with any talk of truth associated with beauty. There is now a sense in which we have agreed to conduct our discussion on beauty without confusing the terms that feature in it with their commonsense analogues of the ordinary parlance. When we judge something to be beautiful, in all probability, we intend to make the prior pleasure derived from that object as one of the bases for our judgment. And the idea of pleasure must latch onto some intimation of measure and proportion, not necessarily of a numerical kind, but could borrow its descriptive terms from
any other discourse, either adjacent or remote. Likewise the notion of truth Plato employs has to find itself at some level of proximity with pleasure. They all fit into one neat package, and what enables such a fit is the larger thread using which Plato weaves them around a conception of personality, if not a strict theory. In this package some remain constant, like beauty, measure, proportion and truth, while some retain the freedom of variability, like pleasure, as true and false pleasures.

It is time that we draw to a close this adventure with the *Philebus*. My objective in the last two chapters has been to prove that pleasure must be understood as something that is embedded in the description of personality. And, at every significant stage of the dialogue—one/many distinction, the divine method dialectic, the three kinds of life, the fourfold division, false pleasures, true pleasures, measurement—not a single effort has been wasted to notice different aspects of pleasure that each one of these issues brings to clarity in the descriptive context of personality. The detailed excursus of the *Philebus* that we have conducted so far has been more of an exegetic exercise with a clear focus rather than a pure scholarly attempt. The focus has been pleasure and its relationship with a certain view of personality. Two points significantly emerge here: 1) A theory of pleasure must be anchored in a conception of personality; 2) Any talk of pleasure implies a corresponding theory of motivation. These two points have been proved in the preceding analysis. As indicated in the beginning of chapter two, the picture of personality that emerged in the course of our analysis is that of Plato. This could imply that understanding pleasure requires a conception of personality that Plato developed. This does not work like that. The primary thrust has been to dispel the dominant assumption that pleasure is something like an agreeable feeling alone. And one of the effective alternatives is to work out the relations pleasure admits with the structures of personality. That is why I am
generalizing that what we need is a conception of personality, not necessarily of Plato's. And the better view of personality we have, we would be able to understand pleasure in a better way. In the next part, as we shall see, there will not be any attempt to deploy Plato's conceptions and assumptions. There will only be various assays to understand the concept of aesthetic pleasure in relation to a view of personality.

ENDNOTES

1 Bruno Snell’s *The Discovery of Mind* is a valuable study on these issues. More recently, Richard Sorabji’s *Self: Ancient and Modern Insights* has quite rich discussions on the ancient views of selfhood and agency.

2 Descartes *Passions of the Soul* extensively deals with these problems.

3 Some details about pleasure merit consideration here. Plato is known for not holding pleasure in great esteem. And the picture portrayed by Gosling and Taylor in their history of pleasure confirms this about Plato, particularly with reference to his earlier dialogues, like the *Protagoras* and the *Gorgias*. One of the reasons is that it is regarded as a feature and function of the body which consists in gratifying bodily needs. Besides, pleasure is attributed to the lowest part of the soul (Frede, “Rumpelstiltskin”). In contrast, pleasure is definitely better placed in the *Philebus*, for pleasure is not construed simply as a bodily function, nor does this dialogue is explicit about any view of multi-part structure of the soul. Besides, as we shall see, true pleasures only occur in the soul.

4 The book IX of the *Republic* develops a clear view on this matter. Gosling and Taylor’s *Greeks on Pleasure* fully documents Plato’s views on pleasure, across his entire oeuvre.

5 This has been touched upon in the previous chapter in the section “Three Kinds of Life”.

6 Henceforth, whenever the idea of reason is invoked, mainly as an attribute of the soul, it refers to the ‘order and intelligence within the soul’ view worked out in the previous chapter. Besides, one important feature of the *Philebus* is that there is a great amount of repetition, of themes especially, to be more specific, one theme in particular—that of the superior standing of reason in relation to pleasure, played out very differently in each variation of its argument.

7 Reginald Hackforth’s translation, an earlier one of considerable repute, uses more or less similar kind of language.

8 This point has been noted with due attention by Dorothea Frede in her commentary.


10 Protarchus initial reaction to Socrates proposal was that there can be true and false beliefs, but not false pleasures, for a pleasure must always be true. As indeed Verity Harte suggests that Protarchus must be “thinking that it suffices for one's pleasure to be true that one is really pleased, in that he might think this because he equates the truth of a pleasure with its reality” (120). This is a solid objection to Socrates’ proposal. However, Socrates soon overrules it by saying that “what if we notice that a pain or pleasure is mistaken in what it is pleased or pained about, shall we then call it right or proper or give it other names of praise?” And he adds, “as to pleasure, it often seems to arise in us not with a right, but with a false, judgment” (37e) (*Complete* 426). It is Socrates’ strategy to push for a certain connection, perhaps only what seems like an analogical one initially, between making a judgment and feeling pleasure. However, it will soon emerge that there are deeper connections implicating judgments and cognition in the activity of pleasure.

11 Gosling (1959) contests that the parallels Socrates furnishes between pleasure and belief are barely sufficient to infer that pleasures can indeed act like beliefs. Kenny (1960) responded saying that the pleasure
is false because the corresponding belief is false, making an error of judgment as the cornerstone of false pleasures. Dybikowsky followed it up, overruling both Gosling’s and Kenny’s interpretations, claiming that there is something like a picture within the soul (the scribe-painter analogy) combining both pleasure and judgment. Protarchus assents to this because this picture-pleasure is a composite fact about an individual. Protarchus agrees to Socrates’ suggestion that a wicked man’s pleasure can indeed be false and like wise a good man’s pleasures be true (40b) because the pleasure here refers not to some agreeable feeling alone, but to that “painted image” within the soul—of a wicked or good man—which is to be judged in relation to the other facts about that person. The truth or falsehood of pleasures is made subservient to the moral evaluation of individuals which, in all fairness to Plato, does not hinge on any narrowly construed sense of truth or falsity. This exercise is to illustrate that the contents of pleasures are not immune from moral evaluation. That is to say, it is worth recalling the arguments made in the Gorgias, that pleasures can be either good or bad, and that their moral quality depends on the sources of their origin. Ultimately, an interest in pleasures, notwithstanding the support from psychology and philosophy of mind, must address the implications that flow from them toward ethics. And Plato never lost sight of this.

12 In “The Double Session”, included in the Dissemination, Jacques Derrida uses this stretch of dialogue to illustrate what he calls a ‘mimetic system’. This has been briefly commented upon in the introduction.

13 One can here notice another glimpse at Plato’s view of discourse, for it is an important theme in the Philebus. Even in the previous chapter, while discussing the role of dialectic, one of the larger issues was how does one deal with judgments (logoi) in the discourse. It should be remembered that Socrates does not denounce the occurrences of the one and the many in discourse, because they are always present as ‘logoi’, but he condemns only their irresponsible by sophists and immature youth. Cynthia Hampton deals with this aspect substantially.

14 Terry Penner (1970) uses this account to further his explanation of false pleasures exploring an analogy between pleasure and perception.

15 Christopher Janaway’s is the recent attempt to explore questions centred around techne in the context of arts.

16 Dorothea Frede calls these propositional pleasures, since they exhibit the character of judgments and propositions.

17 Kenny, Dybikowsky, Penner, Frede and Harte, though their arguments are quite different from each other, they all broadly agree to this formulation.

18 In the Gorgias Plato divides pleasures along the lines of being good and bad in terms of the consequences they have for the well-being of an individual (499d).

19 This is indeed Dybikowsky’s point.

20 Dorothea Frede developed some of these issues in her erudite article “Rumpelstiltskin Pleasures”. I owe my formulation to her.

21 The complete picture of personality, as Plato viewed it, will soon emerge.

22 Sabina Lovibond’s point resembles this. Verity Harte also interprets Lovibond along these lines.

23 Consider the case of someone who believes that Nazism was not wrong. There are many ways in which we could prove why this person’s beliefs should be morally evaluated. Similarly, Plato is arguing that anyone who seeks pleasure while someone else is being tortured (he may not hold any beliefs in particular as his justifications) should be subject to the same kind of evaluation as the one who holds Nazi beliefs. This is perhaps the best moment of Plato as a moral psychologist.

24 It is appropriate here to commend a salutary and interesting attempt made by Sabina Lovibond to our attention, in clinching a distinction to the tune of true and false pleasures as a putative basis for value perception. Though her attempt does not invoke the Philebus’ strategies and ideas, she is attentive to the benefits of making a distinction of this kind. Verity Harte made an attempt to interpret the false pleasure
aspect of the *Philebus* along these lines. Harte argues that what we judge to be wrong, from a retrospective standpoint, reflects an effort to see past pleasures as false, and the present ones as true. This requires that we learn from experience how to make qualitative distinctions among pleasures. This implies that the difference between true and false pleasures depends on something like a moral perception and how we improve it.

25 I refer to Dorothea Frede’s extensive introductory essay which offers a thorough review of these criticisms especially those sections which directly deal with false pleasures, xlv-liii.

26 Donald Davidson’s (1982) search for what constitutes rational behaviour led him into addressing some of these issues, though not in the name of false pleasures. Recognizing false pleasures implies that there is a desire or a value that can spark off actions to the tune of changing the desires which earlier led us to experience those pleasures that we later recognize as false. In fact, recognizing false pleasures entails a complex pattern of rational behaviour.

27 One of the most attractive aspects of Plato’s views on mind, or soul for that matter, is its treatment of desire, as we see in the previous chapter, footnote 31. The desire Socrates mentions here, in this context, fits into the picture of motivation we sketched in the previous chapter. Of course, that is a view specific to the *Republic* only. Besides, to see Plato’s views on desire in the light of how we, as students of literature, would tend to understand it, Bas Van Fraassen’s excellent article “The Peculiar Effects of Desire” would be a great help.

28 There are always enticements from literature which are very hard to resist. One such allure, in this context, which only expands the limits of the frame within which Plato’s deploys his preferred description of pleasure as ‘bitter-sweet’ comes from Keats’ ‘On sitting down to read King Lear once again’. The reverberations are far too many, and it is not just the word that resonates, but the sequence of associations it recalls and recommends in any reader. The poem deserves to be quoted in its entirety. I only advert to the reader’s attention the resonance this poem carries in the context of what ‘bitter-sweet’ could mean to us in the melee of Platonic themes and motifs we are discussing.

> O golden-tongued Romance, with serene lute!  
> Fair plumed Siren, Queen of far-away!  
> Leave melodizing on this wintry day,  
> Shut up thine olden pages, and be mute  
> Adieu! For, once again, the fierce dispute  
> Betwixt damnation and impassioned day  
> Must I burn through, once more humbly assay  
> The bitter-sweet of this Shakespearean fruit,  
> Chief poet, and ye clouds of Albion,  
> Begetters of our deep eternal theme!  
> When through the old oak forest I am gone,  
> Let me not wander in a barren dream,  
> But, when I am consumed in the fire,  
> Give me Phoenix wings to fly at my desire. (155)

29 One could consult Mitch Miller’s “The Pleasures of the Comic and of Socratic Inquiry: Aporetic Reflections on *Philebus* 48a-50b” to seek a greater understanding of the role of the ‘comic’ in Socrates’ life and his vocation.

30 Susan Feagin’s account of tragic pleasures is a worthy attempt. She argues that tragic pleasures are ‘metaresponses’; that is “they are responses to direct responses to works of art, which are themselves painful and unpleasant.” The direct response to tragedies is sympathy, and it gives us pleasure to be responding in such a manner. The idea is interesting not just because it captures the subtlety of the psychology of a viewer of tragedy, but because it reveals deeper structures of what we call aesthetic reception.

31 Friedlander’s presentation and interpretation of the *Symposium* in the second volume of his work on Plato, one can find all these themes explored with a great sense of literary sensibility combined with philosophical understanding.

32 Mitch Miller’s interpretations of pleasures of the comic take into account the pedagogic context of learning and the pleasures related to it.
Any good introductory account of Plato’s philosophy, like that of Friedlander’s or that of Gosling’s (who does not share the Friedlander’s catholic approach to dialogues, but looks primary at the arguments of Plato) would furnish us the details of these assumptions.

Though mixed pleasure is a larger category that includes false pleasures, it is not clear yet what would be the relation between mixed pleasures and different kinds of false pleasures. Thus, I shall use the term mixed pleasure generally to avoid confusion. Another straight fact is that both true and false pleasures are not contraries because the one is not the pure opposite of the other. They are so called for very different reasons.

Julia Annas’ Introduction to Plato’s Republic is one of the best introductory accounts of the Republic published in recent times.

Martha Nussbaum’s interpretation of the Symposium in her Fragility of Goodness makes a point analogous to this when discussing Plato’s understanding of the nature of beauty. She claims that there is a qualitative homogeneity to beauty, at least as far as Plato’s views are concerned, which underlies the quantitative heterogeneity of instances of beauty. For instance, the beauty of Alcibiades must be different from the beauty of Socrates not qualitatively, but only in terms of contingent factors (179). Likewise, the notion of measure admits a qualitative homogeneity that is distinct from that of being different kinds of measures—arithmetic, geometry etc—applicable for different types of objects. The advantage of this view is that it does not restrict the idea of measure only to something that we know how to measure. There are measures applicable to things that we cannot handle or know or apply.

The chapter in Gosling’s Plato called “Mathematics and Goodness” is very informative on this account.

This is the argument used by Socrates in Protagoras to counter acrasia, the problem of the weakness of will.

Martha Nussbaum’s chapter “Protagoras: The Science of Practical Reasoning” in her Fragility of Goodness has an insightful account of the hedonism explored in the Protagoras.

I refer the reader to footnote 1, on hedonism, in chapter 2.

What we understand by hedonism is restricted to the premises of this dialogue alone. Whenever I invoke the word hedonism, it is not meant to refer to the hoary and scholarly tradition of hedonism in the Western world. I took enough precautions to circumscribe the definition of hedonism as it was captured by Socrates in the initial stages of the dialogue itself.

The basic idea that “reason as a desire for the good” implies that desiring a good presupposes rationality.

It must be recalled from chapter one that Foucault’s understanding of pleasure is premised on a certain view of personal ethics.

See footnote 31 in chapter two.

The dialogue Statesman (285a) is more explicit about becoming “better dialecticians”.

I borrow this concept from the framework of phenomenology.

We shall look at this contrast in greater detail in chapter five.

Stephen Halliwell calls Plato a romantic puritan in his work on Mimesis. One gets this impression because of Plato’s rather high-handed sense of contempt towards faulty methods of argument and disputation. This attitude is underlined by a more stringent kind of conservatism that informs his politics too. Karl Popper offers a tendentious view on the whole matter, reinforcing our sense that Plato is a puritan.

Though Aristotle owes primarily to Plato for his views on pleasure, his approach is quite different. His views are direct and systematic, pointing out in the direction of a theory of pleasure. For a close analytical review of Aristotle’s positions on pleasure, one can consult G. E. L. Owen challenging interpretation.
However, his discussion of pleasure in *Nichomachean Ethics*, mainly concentrated in Book X, is an attempt to see the metaphysical connections between pleasure, nature and the good, without actually succumbing to a simple form of hedonism which equates being pleasant to being natural, and therefore being good. Aristotle's view also echoes that of the *Philebus* for him the pursuit of pleasure has implicit in it a certain view of cognition and value judgment, beyond the processes we identify as 'natural' or 'animal' to our natures. This has been argued quite effectively by Sarah Broadie.

50 The influential anthology, edited by Hal Foster, *The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on Postmodern Culture* is an instructive case in point. The introduction states, in no ambiguous terms, that the 'anti-aesthetic' signals that the very notion of aesthetic and its "network of ideas" are in question. This marks a cultural position meant to interpret contemporary times purely from the vantage point of the present. The very category 'aesthetic', in view of its recent history, came under sharp attack. It seemed untenable for most of the contributors that concepts like taste, beauty and pleasure have any role to play in the appreciation of art and literature in the face of radical and profound changes in the production and consumption of art.

51 *Symposium* has the most impressive and philosophically sound theory of beauty, in views of its relationship with our desire for beauty, that Plato ever attempted in his works. Of particular interest would be the passage in the dialogue when Diotima, the priestess interlocutor of Socrates, describes the ascent to the form of "amazing" beauty (210e-211d). One can consult Nussbaum (1986) and Friedlander (1969) for very imaginative interpretations of this passage.

52 This is an idea presented in the *Symposium*.

53 Iris Murdoch makes a note of this point in here Romanes lecture *The Fire and the Sun* (54), with reference to the *Philebus*.

54 We shall comprehensively address this aspect in chapters four and six.

55 This refers to that stretch of the dialogue, at the fag end, when six ranks are awarded among the different attributes—"properties"—of the soul—knowledge, reason, intelligence, and kinds of pleasures.

56 Though there is no mention or discussion of motivation, it is implicit in Socrates' account of reason.

57 It is recommended that the reader should have a glimpse at what exactly Socrates says at 64d-e, corresponding to these observations:

That any kind of mixture that does not in some way or other possess measure or the nature of proportion will necessarily corrupt its ingredients and most of all itself. For there would be no blending in such cases at all but really any unconnected medley, the ruin of whatever happens to be contained in it (454).

And immediately after this,

But no we notice that the force of the good has taken refuge in an alliance with the nature of the beautiful. For measure and proportion manifest themselves in all areas as beauty and virtue.

58 For Plato human motivation is not a desire simply. It is capable of admitting rational capacities like cognition and judgment. I refer the reader to the section titled "Three Kinds of Life" in chapter two where this issue has been dealt.

59 It is here worth recalling the controversial proposal made by John McDowell his *Mind and World* and numerous other articles, largely inspired by Aristotle, that the fact that we have ethical outlooks, as people capable of virtuous characters and dispositions, could be explained by some 'naturally' ordained 'second nature' which is responsible for whatever manifests as ethical behaviour.

60 Alexander Nehamas has a similar point to make, but at much larger and general level, that there are no acts of perception that do not presuppose at least some amount of interpretation. As he himself claims, he took it from Nietzsche and developed it quite fruitfully to provide wider perspectives on analysis and interpretation in general.

61 I refer the reader to the footnote 21 on this issue.