CHAPTER - IV

CONCEPT OF PURUŚĀRTHA

The doctrine of “Puruśārtha” owes its origin from Hindu religious scriptures. But it is not largely metaphysical in outlook but essentially spiritual and transcendental in nature. “Puruśārtha” is not a technical term but a words of common usages in Sanskrit and many modern Indian languages. M. Hiriyana translates it to mean human value consciously pursued, an object of ‘desire’ (ista). Even etymologically, it means that which is aimed at or desired. It denotes the objects of both positive and negative desires, i.e. anything one’s desires to have (upadaya) or to avoid (heya). But in classical discussions about puruśārthas references are generally made only to the former and the latter are taken to have been discussed by implication. The classification of puruśārthas can, therefore, be taken to be a classification of what human beings aim at. Puruśārtha is applicable to all individuals who are selective in their desires.

From time immemorial the Sanskrit word “Puruśārtha” or the ends of a person is used as a term denoting a basic socio-ethical concept on which the colossal of Indian civilization has rested: it is the foundation of the orthodox social psychology of India. By means of it the conduct of life in India is modulated in a harmonious way. Four cardinal ends of human life, according to this term, are: ‘dharma’ (religion, law, righteousness); ‘artha’ (economics); ‘kāma’ (desire); mokṣa (liberation); and they are mutually interrelated and interdependent in such a manner that artha and kāma based on dharma lead to mokṣa. Kāma again is based on artha. Indian ethos admits dharma, artha and kāma only if they have the efficacy to usher in moksha. Puruśārthas are consummated by mokṣa while dharma, artha and kāma may be compared to the flowers of a garland.

Similar view was adopted by Plato in Drake’s the People’s Plato 1 – the virtues of the individual and bases them on the three distinct elements found in the
human personality, namely (i) physical needs or desires, (ii) spirited part and (iii) the rational element, and grades them in an hierarchical order placing reason at the top. Satisfaction of physical needs is necessary for life but often they may have to be held in check, which means that temperance is the characteristic virtue of the first element. The rational element in us guides us to the right path and goal its virtue lies in wisdom or knowledge; and the spirited part is the natural ally of the reason in so far as it helps us to face the hazards and difficulties of the path shown by the ‘kindly light’ of reason. Its virtue is courage. The virtue of temperance, wards off the temptations of pleasure and indulgence. Hence all these elements should work in harmony in an ideal character which is characterized by justice which is the fourth virtue.  

The “Puruṣārtha” are the traditional ideals of India, coeval with philosophy and having intrinsic value. Although it is a traditional value it makes new innovations into philosophical thoughts in all ages in all minds above the value, which is only the legitimate and inevitable development of our estimation of things. The application of “puruṣārtha theory of value” is discernible equally and clearly to all minds in all ages. Four Puruṣārthas are generally known, they being, dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa. In the ascending order they may be arrange as kāma, artha, dharma and mokṣa.

Even in the field of Sanskrit literature the concept of puruṣārtha has played a vital role. In India a good piece of literature has always been a significant vechicle of the concept of puruṣārtha. Authorities in Sanskrit poetics have regarded the preaching of puruṣārtha to common people as the chief aim of literature. It is literature alone, according to most poets, that can communicate the essence of the concept of puruṣārtha in a simple but appealing way, while the shastras present this concept in a scholastic fashion.
Reference to the *purusārtha* have been made to the early Hindu scriptures such as the *sūtras*, the epics, i.e. the Rāmāyana and the Mahābhārata, the Puranas, the Dharma Sstras, Nitiśastras etc. They are closely related to the *Varnashrama Dharma*, which refers to the four stages in the life of the Hindu, viz., Brahmacarya, Grhaṣṭha, Vanaprastha and Samnyasa. Later on in the period of the philosophical systems, *purusārthas*, occupy very important place in the philosophical discussions.

The *purusārthas* are basic to Hindu ethics also. Hindu seer recognized the need for considering carefully the personal as well as the social aspects of man—in-society. The four-fold aspirations of man, being organically related to his nature and spotlighting his distinctive features—also give an insight into the underlying principles of ethics as conceived by the Hindu philosophers. The ‘social consciousness’ of the Hindu philosophers can be appreciated fully when we consider the four ends or the *purusārthas* in detail—when, the social aspects of each of these become apparent.

An important pre-requisite, according to the Hindu philosophers for realizing the *purusārthas*, is life in a community. The dynamic nature of the relationship between the individual and society gives us that substance of the opportunities for personal development that the *purusārthas* provide.

According to Hindu philosophy, the function of society is to afford the individual opportunities for the disciplined and well—balanced realization of the *purusārthas*. Life in society provides a form of discipline to the individual. It acts as a check on the anarchic, impulsive and antisocial instincts in man. Hence, for the realization of the *purusārthas*, life in a well—ordered society is absolutely essential. The doctrine of *purusārtha* is very relevant for this purpose.

It has provided guidelines for the individual in the pursuit of the ideal of good life. The physical world is organic to the biological; the biological is organic to the physical and the physical world to the spiritual. Life in its organic relation to the world progressively unfolds its possibilities and realizes the fuller and fuller stature of its being as it approximates to the spiritual reality of the whole.
Man by nature is the seeker of his biological needs and he is a social animal. And at the same time he is the worshiper of beauty. In trying to find these basic needs of human being the puruṣārtha theory of values give fundamental and complete thoughts since it distinguishes man from other beings in the mode of searching their needs. The earliest book of fables in India neatly summarizes the distinction between man and animal in the following words: “Hunger, sleep, fear and sex are common to all men and animals. What distinguishes man from animal is the knowledge of the right & wrong (Hitopadesā, Prastāvika, 25). These means that ‘puruṣārtha’ is the intellectual pursuit of artha and kāma. Similar view was expressed by the Sanskrit poet Bhatrihari when he said that man and other animals are similar in their desire for food, drink and sexual relationship, the only difference being that man alone can follow the path of dharma.

These theory of four -fold aspirations of man is based on the Hindu philosopher’s view of man. In Hindu thought the pursuit of certain ends in preface to certain others, by man, is referred to as ‘seeking the puruṣārthas’. Even ends which man shares with others animals like food and rest may become puruṣārthas provided they are sought knowingly. The significance of the word purusa in the compound puruṣārthas, is not, accordingly, the restriction of the scope of the ends sought, but only the manner of seeking them. The implication of the other word artha is that the end is non-existent at the time it is cognized as worthy of pursuit and is still to be accomplished. There should be effort on the part of man seeking it. For this reason it is deliberately described as sādhyā, which in the terminology of modern philosophy may be described as a ‘value to be realised’.

Indian philosophical thoughts were not purely theoretical. They have practical purposes and the ideal is regarded as the realisation of the puruṣārthas or the values of life. All the systems of Indian philosophy aim at the attainment of these values. Puruṣārthas are commonly used in Indian philosophy in the sense of the values for the purusa or finite individual. That which is ultimately valued or prized by
the purusa can only be that in which his true being lies that which constitutes his highest good or value. This highest good of the purusa is his fullest nature and the fullest nature is his freedom or moksa. So, philosophy inquiries were considered essential for having the true knowledge of reality as well as for the realisation of the ultimate goal of life which consist in freedom or liberation from the sorrows and sufferings of human life. ‘The theory of puruṣārthas’, which is in substance a theory of human values, is by common acception one of the basic theories of classical Indian philosophy. It is also central to classical Indian ethics and even to the whole of classical Indian philosophy of life. It pervades the latter in its various pictures, visions pictures, visions and utopias of human well – being.

Generally four puruṣārthas are recognized, namely, dharma, artha, kāma and moksha. These are known as the four goals of life. These values are inter related and there is a gradation among these values: The lowest is kāma or the satisfaction of sensuous desires; the second is artha which is the satisfaction of economic needs; the third is higher than kāma and artha, in fact both kāma and artha should be based on dharma. The ancient Hindus regarded dharma as the foundation of all the activities in human life. The fourth is moksha, which is the highest values. This value is regarded as the highest goal of life or the ‘summum bonum’ in all the systems of Indian philosophy. These four aspiration of man, being organically related to his nature spotlighting his distinctive features. They also give an insight into underlying principles of ethics as conceived by the Hindu philosophers. So, the term “puruṣārthas” uniquely stands for the goal of life, which can lead a man to happiness. Every school of Indian thought emphasises on the realisation of the ‘puruṣārthas’. The four puruṣārthas of Hindu Sāstra are also known as caturvarga.

The four values of dharma, artha, kāma and moksha cannot be realised apart from life in a society. The four ‘puruṣārthas’ as they are called, are said to be distinctive or typical pursuit of human life effort. The doctrine of the puruṣārthas has a certain surface simplicity or obviousness about it. One’s first reaction is to take it
as an empirical representation of human values. Thus the *puruṣārtha* is a values
category in the sense that each *puruṣārtha* denote a class of value or objective and
not any particular one. According to common understanding the four *puruṣārthas*
(i) artha (ii) kāma (iii) dharma and (iv) mokṣa may further be explained as follows:

(i) **Artha** :- Various philosophical meaning of the term artha – artha which
is enumerated as one of the *puruṣārtha* has been described as having economic
value in Indian tradition and it has been taken as an aid to fulfill human wants. A
human being is described as an embodiment of complex desires. Any type of desire
presupposes the motive for having certain object. An individual thinks certain object
as desirable and he inclines to attain it. For, the feeling for the object is called desire.
Hence, ‘desire’ means ‘desire of something when it is said’. One should perform
sacrifice if one desires of having son. In the same way ‘desire for having heaven,
riches etc’. Hence the term ‘*artha*’ is to be taken in the sense of desire. The term
‘*artha*’ also means ‘possessions’. It also indicates ‘the attainment of riches and
worldly prosperity, advantages, profit wealth’. It can indicate the whole range of tan-
gible objects that can be possessed, enjoyed or lost, and which we require in daily
life for the upkeep of a household, rising of a family and discharge of religious du-
ties. Kautilya asserts that the term artha means human activity, motivation, desire
and the whole earth or society where human being lives. From this, it follows that the
term ‘*artha*’ does not mean the wealth only.

*Artha* plays an important role in promoting human welfare – It is not correct
that our seer were always in favour of denouncing wealth. Moreover, it is admitted
that wealth plays a prominent role in the fulfillment of one’s desire. All kinds of
meritorious works and religious acts may be performed if there is sufficient wealth.
According to the *Mahābhārata*, poverty is a state of sinfulness.

In this connection we may recall Swami Vivekananda’s view on poverty. He
says ‘what we want is not Advaita into the material world. First bread then religion’.6
Dogmas or theories will fall flat upon others if they feel hungry. (Sariramadyam khalu dharmasadhanan). The term 'artha' also suggests that one should fulfill one's economic requirements in life 'economically' i.e. in a balanced way. That is, one should acquire wealth for the satisfaction of his own sense organs as well as for achieving nobler purpose. At the same time it should be clearly borne in mind that no one should acquire more wealth that is not essential for meeting day-to-day need. We should desire that much of wealth which is essential for satisfying our hunger.

According to the contemporary thinkers like Rabindranath Tagore etc., the fundamental thing for the performance of high austerity in the whole world is to curb the enjoyment and to curtail the desire of happiness. We should go in such a way so that we do not lean towards a particular side in which there is too much burden without adhering to harmony. In other words, the minimization and limitation of enjoyment helps us to maintain harmony. This phenomenon may be described as economy of consumption. The Hindu view of the economic pursuit is to be understood in terms of the Hindu philosopher's visualizing the fruitful role of wealth from a purely secular point of view as well as from the viewpoint of the ultimate goal of human existence. The Mahābhārata stresses the great importance of wealth in human life by saying: "Poverty is a state of sinfulness"7 "All kinds of meritorious acts flow from the possession of great wealth, as from wealth spring all religious acts, all pleasures and heaven itself."

"Religions acts, pleasure, joy, courage, wrath and learning, and sense of dignity, all these proceed from wealth "9 "From wealth one's merit increases. He that has no wealth has neither this world nor the next."10 "The man that has no wealth succeeds not in performing religious acts, for the latter spring from wealth like rivers from mountains."Kautilya was opposed to widespread and indiscriminate renunciation since it interfered with economic production and recommended that the state should punish those who renounced the world without having first satisfied the claims of society and family. He would not allow ascetics to enter villages of the kingdom for fear that they may cause disturbance in the economic activities of the villagers. The ordered scheme of the four stages of human life
(asrama – scheme) in the developmental scheme of Manu insists on the householder’s working for wealth, to enable him to obtain satisfaction of the basic needs of him and his family. To toil for wealth is to avoid living on other’s labour and is a commandment familiarized by all the smṛtis.

How are artha – values and moral-values (dharma) to be related? Plato subsumed all values under the “Idea of the good”. The idea of harmony (amubandha) of values is suggested by Indian writers. But harmony, like the subsumption of values under the highest, which works against the interest of any one value, is not valid. When Kautilya asserts that moral value (dharma) is the root of happiness (sukhasya mūlam dharmah) and material gain (artha) is the root of moral value (dharmasya mūlarthah), the ground of dependence is purely ontological and not axiological and if axiological ground is applied, the process of valuational preference may have to be reversed. Hence, in accordance with the twin criteria of strength and height, artha is antilogically superior to dharma and conditions its content, while dharma is axiologically higher than artha. This viewpoint represents the relative importance of such values as artha and dharma, although from the synoptic standpoint dharma should be at the foundation of the extrinsic values such as kāma and artha.

Regarding the above discussion we can conclude that ‘artha’ is a name for all values belonging to life, wealth, power, socio – economic set up etc., which can be known as the material biological and political values of life. So far as it is a value, it is a value in its own right, as absolute, self – existent and intrinsic, as may other, although in the axiological status, it stands at the lowest level.

(ii) Kāma:- Kāma means desires. Desires generally are of two types – the desires for ordinary experiences in life and those, which are not powerful enough to activate man. These can be referred to as the desires for the pleasures of the moment and the pleasures that are yet to be realised. The difference is between those which man has as a result of his own innate cravings and those, which he comes to realise as
logical value’, not in its usual sense of subjective value in general, but in that of an end, which satisfies the natural impulses of an individual as such.

Another version of kāma is sex or love. The psychology of love is not entirely disregarded and the ‘ethics of moderation’, which is suggested, is again based on the inquiry into the conditions under which man can derive the most enjoyment out of sex. Vatsyayana does not regard sexual love as a random activity or as the expression of wild emotions, for he observes; ‘Pleasures,⁹ being as necessary for the existence and well-being of the body as food, are consequently equally required ......... They are ........ to be followed with moderation and caution. The moderation approach suggested, it should be followed with moderation and caution.¹² The moderation-approach suggested, it should be emphasized, is still with a view to enabling the individual to derive the maximum amount of sexual enjoyment. The clear implication here is that indulgence in sex without a sense of proportion is self-destructive in as much as the individual is bound to lose his capacity for enjoyment.

Vatsyayana describes the sixty-four arts concerning the science of love and enjoyment (kāma). They can be classified into four groups, viz, first, five arts like music, dance, painting etc., numbering twenty-four in all; second, the gambling art numbering twenty in all; third, arts of mating, numbering fifteen in all and fourth, later art like promising, crusing, etc. five in all. A man who is well versed in these sixty-four discipline is a man of culture, successful and lucky with women.¹³ He says that some people doubt that utility of the study of the science of love, because they feel that sex-behaviour in natural and universal and if birds and beasts can do it without any training, there is no point in studying this science. Vatsyayana, however, feels that manners, morals and culture distinguish man from beasts, and he decides that by the study of this science alone, can arrive life be fruitful. Vatsyayana’s approach seems to be more refined and sublimated than what common people believe about his famous treatise ‘Kāmasūtra’.
Vatsyayana’s earnest endeavour is to reconcile the freedom of sexual life with social control in the life of a voluptuary (nagaraka) who has learned to be faithful to his goal (kāma) and refine its expression and also abide by the rules of social life. Disturbed sexual pursuit on account of social transgression is not only the cause of pathological perversions, but brings in its wake unhappiness. The motion of happiness (sukham) is different from that of pleasure (kāma). In that case his position can be interpreted to imply that sexual pleasures (kāma) pave the way to happiness (sukham). The relation between kāma and dharma – If kāma stands for pleasure may say that is desired by all, for pleasure is always welcome to everyone. Indeed, we cannot help desiring our own felicity. But not everything desired is necessarily desirable. A sick person may long for a certain kind of food, but it may not at all be advisable for him to partake of it from the standpoint of his physical well being. That is kāma, while it may be an object of desire, may not always be desirable; and, though appearing to be a true value of life, it may not really be so or may even prove to be a disvalue. How then can we distinguish these two kinds of kāma? To speak with reference only to the dharma, artha, kāma which we are now considering dharma furnishes the necessary criterion. That variety of kāma is a true value, which is in accord with the requirement of dharma, but not any other. In thus helping us to discriminate between good and bad kāma or in rationalising life, as we might put it, consists of superiority of dharma, which is thus reckoned as the highest of the three values. This conception of dharma as a regulatin of principle is so important in the philosophy of conduct that all the Sastras and all the higher literature of India (the latter through only implied) emphasize it. That is, for example, what Sri Krishna means when he says in the Gītā, ‘Dharmaviruddhah ............... kāmo’ami (I am kāma, not at strife with dharma)

Kāma is the central force that is responsible for propelling man into action. The uniqueness of the psychological concept of kāma is that it is an inspiring force behind all human activities, and at the same time it is the goal of all human activities. It inspires man to undertake activities, which make for his basic material well-being.
The materials he obtains (as a result of kāma) help him in fulfilling his desires (kāma).

(iii) Dharma: - The Sanskrit word 'Dharma' connotes ethical value. It bears some relationship with the Greek word 'logos' meaning the principle or law governing the universe. Dharma is one word, which for Indians cannot duty, virtue, norm, culture and the highest moral value. As in the ethics of Kant, it is also associated with concern for others as extensions of oneself. This ethical motion of “Dharma” is prominent in the Buddhist contribution to Hindu thought.

“Dharma” is also used in very many senses, such as different sects and cults of Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, etc. In other words it is a question of ritualistic and social observance. And a Hindu is one who generally follows the rules of conduct and ceremonials laid for him particularly regarding food and marriage and the adoration of the Gods.”

From the early age till they die man always lives with Dharma. By practicing dharma, he enlarges the boundaries of human activity and realizes his own potentials in keeping life’s eternal goal. Law is found in the physical world and virtues in the moral world. Both these worlds can be fulfilled by law and regulation of dharma. Dharma works as a mechanism of social control. What Dharma approves of is desirable, what it disapproves of is undesirable and should be avoided.

In some ancient works, ‘Dharma’ has been idolized, hypostatized and said to have been created by God we also come across statements speaking of dharma as appearing in person and addressing human beings. But such descriptions of dharma should be taken only in a metaphorical or an allegorical sense, as attempts to emphasize the objective, obligatory character of the dharmic principles. It is a fact that dharmic requirements have changed in course of time and that there have been debates about the binding of this or that dharmic principles. The hypostatic character of
*dharma* if taken too seriously, can lead to the perpetuation of even such social practices which might have ceased to possess any functional utility due to abrupt, pervasive or basic changes in the nature of social realities.

*Dharma* denotes the totality of moral as well as non-moral obligations, the totality of prescriptions and prohibitions, which govern the network of social relationships. It includes the obligations one has to fulfill in virtue of his position in society. It refers to the conditions of contractual of transaction which he has entered into with some other member or members of his society. If also means what he ought to do in virtue of his just being a human being.

*Dharma* is an intrinsic value and therefore has an end in itself. This view is maintained by some Mimamsakas. They ridicule the idea that virtue should appeal to man's personal interests. According to some classical thinkers, for instance, Prabhakara, *dharma* is a *purusarth* in its own right and hence leading a dharmic life is an end in itself. A steadfast pursuit of it, in its double aspect of self-regarding and other regarding virtues, results in one's good here as well as elsewhere, and this good whether it stands for worldly happiness or heavenly bliss - is, as a whole, designated as *abhyudaya* or 'prosperity'.

Speaking the truth, virtues of the soul (*atmaguna*) like kindness and purity are the moral and spiritual *dharma*. Indian philosophy since very early times gives importance to the moral and spiritual *dharma* more than ritual even though ritual and virtue are necessary relation of dharmic life. Ceremonial is of little avail to those who are morally impure, the practice of virtue becomes a necessary condition of ritualistic life. We also find it stated in some ancient works of this tradition that as between ritual and virtue, the latter is certainly to be preferred. The *Mahabharata*, in a familiar verse declares that 'speaking the truth is far better than celebrating many horse sacrifices'. In general usage, *dharma* functions like an omnibus term denoting the essence of a thing, costum, ritual, legal system, religious, morality etc. In
all matters of practice, custom is conceived as a moral rule, which decides what is right and what is wrong. The custom handed down in regular succession since time immemorial ...... is called the conduct of virtuous man.19

Over and above this, dharma would consist in the eradication of imbalance whatever it is found, not only in the field of education but also opportunity provided to different groups of people. The relation of dharma and other puruṣārtha: - Dharma serves as the double aspect for guiding principle of artha and kāma and at the same time it is a means to mokṣa. In the Vaisesika sūtra,20

Dharma is claimed to be the means to the acquisition (siddhi) of prosperity (abhyudaya) and salvation (niḥsreyasa i.e. mokṣa) (Yato abhyudayanis' reya sasiddhisa dharmah). Dharma is the regulaterr of kāma and artha in the sense that any kāma can be said to be permissible, or really worthwhile, only if it does not conflict with or go against dharma. It is human short sightedness that Vyasa, for example, has in his mind when, in concluding the Mahabharata, he says, “Here I am, crying out with uplifted arms that dharma bring’s with it both artha and kama; but no one listen to me”

Dharma is claimed to be primarily a means to mokṣa is stated is some other works. Perhaps it is Śaṅkara, due to whom this conception of dharma has become prominent. For several thinkers dharmic life is nothing but a condition for the attainment of mokṣa and mokṣa the ultimate justifier of dharma. Even some technical philosophical treatises follow this tradition by announcing that the philosophy, they are going to expand is worth expounding because it is a means to mokṣa. For example, in the first Sūtra of his Nyaya Sūtra, Gautama claims that the exposition of the sixteen categories is a means to the attainment of niḥsreyasa i.e. mokṣa.

(iv) Mokṣa: - Mokṣa is derived from a verbal root ‘muc’ which means to give up, to get rid of, to leave or to be free from. It means liberation, emancipation and
freedom. S.N. Dasgupta observes that *mokṣa* is the pivot on which all the systems of Indian philosophy revolve. A.K. Lal writes, "Thus *mokṣa* is the highest value on realising which nothing remains to be realised". 

The exact nature of this ultimate ideal is help by some to be a state of absolute bliss; and by other, as one merely absence of all pain and suffering. The distinction depends upon in difference in the conception of the Self in the various systems. Bliss or joy is intrinsic to it, according to some, and if therefore, naturally reveals itself when the Self is released from bondage.

In Indian Philosophy *mokṣa* is the highest value. Indeed in the depth of this word *mokṣa* lies the real peace of the universe. According to Indian philosophy, *mokṣa* or liberation is the "*summum Bonum*" or the highest good of human life. *Mokṣa* consists in freedom from the bondage the arising out of the physical, biological and psychological attachments of the individual and social life. It is regarded as the final value, the *Parama Puruṣārtha* – a state of perfection in which bliss is attained. *Mokṣa* is also known as *Nirvāṇa* or *Mukti*. Rāmānuja, the concrete monist of Indian, also, has given us to understand that in *mokṣa* the Self attains the absolute values of truth, goodness, beauty, love, freedom, but retains its individuality without merging in the Absolute Reality and in this attainment of the absolute values, the consciousness of these values will always be 'emotional intuitive'.

The ultimate aim of Indian philosophy is the manifestation of the essence of the soul already in man to attain the highest ideal of life the *summum bonum*" or "freedom". This highest ideal of life can be attain through the liberation of the soul from many attachments. The essence of the soul in intrinsic and pure condition which individuals have to regain for the attainment of freedom. Indian philosophy does not have a science of morals in the fashion of some Aristotelian or Thomistic model. However, it does have a moral philosophy, which postulates a "*summum bonum*" and specifies the proper means for achieving it. This highest ideal is the state of libera-
tion or mokṣa. In it a man finds his self-fulfillment and deepest bliss. It is founded on the metaphysical conviction of the oneness of reality, which is attainable through direct experience. Mokṣa serves as the ultimate standard of right conduct. It measure the value or disvalue if an act by the extent to which it either helps or hinders the attainment of freedom. Actions most distinctively oriented to mokṣa are those characterized by truth, non-violence, sacrifice and renunciation.

Mokṣa has been accorded the highest importance in the scheme of values. There seems to be no doubt as to the valuational character of the state of liberation (mokṣa), and since it is the highest goal of human life, a keen study of the concept must bring to light the nature of ultimate values. It is on account of its ultimate quality that sometimes it is considered in isolation from other values of life like the economic, hedonistic and moral values. The distinction between them is maintained on the difference between empirical and transcendental values. The state of liberation (mokṣa) seems to transcend empirical categories; its transcendental nature is thorough going. It is, therefore, imperative to know exactly the mode and ground on which empirical and transcendental values are related, and whether or not there can be a positive transition from the empirical to the transcendental. It is sometimes said that on the attainment of the highest, there remains nothing to be attained. This implies that in the face of the spiritual, other so called empirical values must lose their value. But this position jeopardizes the very basic of the four-fold aim of human life. Hence, a further study is needed to characterize spiritual values in relation to other values. The problem of mokṣa has been the primary theme of many philosophical systems called the science of liberation (mokṣa sastras). They concern themselves with the concept of liberation and the means of its attainment (mokṣa sadhana).

According to others, neither bliss nor its opposite belongs to the self and it is therefore without either in the condition of mokṣa when its true nature is restored to it. Before describing this condition further, it is necessary to refer briefly to an objection that is sure to occur to the reader at the above characterization of mokṣa in
terms of pleasure and absence of pain, viz. that the ideal is hedonistic — a view which is now regarded as psychological quite faulty. This is an objection which on a superficial view, applies to the whole of the Indian theory of value; but whatever the answer to that general objection may be, the charge of hedonism does not, in the least, affect the conception of the ultimate value with which we are now concerned. For the pleasure for which it stands should be unmixed, and there should be no lapse from it when it is once attained—conditions which the kind of pleasure the hedonist has in view does not, and is not meant to satisfy. In fact, mokṣa means absolute or unconditioned bliss (or alternatively, absence of suffering), which is vastly different from the pleasure that hedonism holds to be the supreme end of life.

The problem of destiny of men (mokṣa) is linked with the problem of Self, for according to classical view it is not the attainment of something foreign to self but constitutes the realisation of its own essential nature. The nature of self is the metaphysical ground of the state of liberation (mokṣa). There are various views as to the nature of self. They can be classified into two main groups, viz., those who do not believe in the existence of a soul substance (anātma-vāda), like the Buddhists, and those who believe in the existence of self (atma-vāda). The latter view is further divided into those who maintain many selves (anekātma-vāda) and those, which believe in one supreme self (ekātma-vāda). The Buddhist concept of nirvāṇa and Śamkhya’s view of release (mokṣa) represent the first two groups, while the study of the theory of oneself (ekātma-vāda) is concerned with the Brahman as value. Saṅkara and Rāmānuja, the two stalwarts of the Vedānta School, have made valuable contributions towards the problem of liberation (mokṣa) and without a discussion of their systems, no account of the concept of liberation is considered complete. It is on account of their significance that a full chapter is founded necessary to discuss their point of view. Brahmānḍa is unique and yields us an exact rationale of value—philosophy and it is not proper to mix it up with any other point of view on liberation (mokṣa).
‘Mokṣa’ introduces a personal element. It emphasizes such values as acquisition of eternal bliss, equanimity, peace of mind, absence of suffering, even indifference to pleasure and pains, etc. ‘mokṣa’ means freedom and it is said to be freedom in the negative as well as positive sense. In the negative sense it is said to be complete freedom from bondage, ignorance, suffering, etc. and in the positive sense it is said to be the state of the self’s return to its original nature. Leading a dharmic life is a precondition of all attaining ‘mokṣa’. It is an unsublatable or indestructible state in the sense that once attained it cannot be lost. The attainer of ‘mokṣa’ the mukta cannot again be non-mukta. The Indian thinkers referred to the attainment of ‘mokṣa’ either in this life or life hereafter. The former is called Jivanmukti and the latter is called Videhamukti. The Indian thinkers also maintain that after one has achieved liberation in this life one must work for the liberation of other fellow human beings. This is known as sarvamukti or the liberation of all. This is the ideal of Bodhisvata, which has been set up as the ideal of a liberated person by Lord Buddha.

We have described the state of ‘mokṣa’ from the standpoint of what is called “Jivanmukti” or “the liberation while one is still alive,” for it is sure to make a better appeal to the modern mind. This ideal, however, is not accepted in all the systems, but only some like the Advaita, Samkhya and Buddha. The others insist that spiritual freedom will not actually be attained until after physical death. It is known as Videhamukti. But even these systems may be said to admit Jivanmukti in fact, though not in name, for they postulate final release in the case of an enlightened person as soon as he leaves his physical body implying thereby that there is nothing more to be done by him for attaining “mokṣa”. The distinction between the two views reduces itself finally to whether or not the discipline prescribed for the spiritual aspirant should as such (that is under a sense of constraint) continue in the interval between the down of true knowledge and the moment of physical death. According to these who do not accept the ideal of Jivanmukti, it should continue, while according to the rest is need not.
Some Highlight of Trivarga Scheme

In the above discussion, we have referred to the four puruṣārtha which belong to curtuvarga i.e. the four fold classification. But there is another categorization of puruṣārtha which is known as “trivarga theory of puruṣārtha”. According to this scheme, there are three puruṣārthas such as dharma, artha and kāma. In ancient Indian scriptures such as in the Rāmayana and the Mahābhārata we find these three values were mainly mentioned. Modern Indian thinkers like Rajendra Prasad also gives emphasis on the “trivarga theory of puruṣārtha”. According to his theory, the value of mokṣa is included in the value of kāma in the sense that it is personal urge or pursuit of one’s peace. He says that the value of mokṣa is not relevant in the modern society because one’s personal peace is one’s own peace, it has nothing to do with the problems of society. That means one’s peace does not help in solving the problems of society because one’s peace is only for himself not for other.

Artha, kāma and dharma, according to the trivarga theory, are goals of the life of individuals. Among them dharma, besides being credited with the role of determining which kāma is worth pursing, is also considered to be a necessary condition for any successful pursuit of the other two. Both artha and kāma are goals only pursuable in society, but they can be successfully pursued only if society has at least some amount of stability and harmony. It provides a set of rules and norms, the observance of which is considered to be a necessary condition for the later. Therefore, the observance of dharma, in virtue of its being a necessary condition of social stability and harmony, also works as a necessary condition for the pursuit of artha and kāma.

Artha, kāma and dharma thus form a well knit cohesive trio. The pursuit of the three together, in their proper order, is taken to constitute an organic whole, a whole not only quantitatively richer but qualitatively better than the pursuit of artha and kāma alone. Looking at the shining and majestic personality of Ravana, seated
on his beautiful throne, in the city of Lanka, full of all sorts of riches and splendour, Hanumana exclaims that had Ravana not been antagonistic to dharma, he would have been the patron of the entire kingdom of gods, including Indra, their king. Ravana's mode of living presents here a glaring example of tremendously successful but dharma less pursuit of artha and kāma. The point of Hanumana's exclamation is that however successful in its pursuit of artha and kāma a life is, it cannot be considered to have all the excellence of the good life unless it is also a pursuit in accordance with the lows and norms of dharma. It could also be interpreted to mean that the pursuit of dharma is not just one of the three constituents of the good life but one which heightens the value of its other two constituents the pursuit of artha and that of kāma.

The theory of Trivarga seems to have been inspired by a very important insight that the puruṣārtha, the pursuits of human goals, have any meaning only in a relational human complex, only when it is assumed a network of social, interpersonal relationships existing among human beings, obligating them to perform various functions so that society and the individuals composing it may live a life which they not only like to live but is also worth living.

Since dharma is assigned the role of regulating or guiding the pursuits of artha and kāma and is itself functional the entire scheme of trivarga can be said to be a functional scheme of values or goals of life. Any pursuit of artha or kāma is a puruṣārtha as a matter of fact, but not in the normative or prescriptive sense. To the latter category belongs only those of such pursuits which are in conformity with dharmic prescriptions or prohibitions, and the latter are quite importantly relative to the functions assigned to a person. In some very important sense, a good man is a good Brahmān (Priest), a good Kshatriya (warrior) a good householder, a good student, etc. that is a good man is good greatly on account of the good performance by him of his assigned functions.
But it is a questionable one that whether the process of self-realisation in an endless one or has a culminating stage; and if it has such a stage, whether if is attainable. The ‘trivarga theory of puruṣārtha’, however, has its own purpose accounting for the three functions of man’s life. So, the inseparability of the ‘caturvarga theory of puruṣārtha’ will be mentioned under the heading of psychical values, that is, Truth, Good and Beauty.

The doctrine of Trivarga has great relevance to the life of man in the modern society. In the present day context, people are not aware of moksa or liberation. People usually do not think of the after life or the liberation of the soul after death. They are deeply engrossed in the stark reality and challenge of life in this world.

*Growth of Trivarga and Caturvarga & their synthesis*

The conception of puruṣārtha is the culmination of a long processes of historical synthesis of different religious, ethical and philosophical views belonging to different traditions. It is truism to say that this concept in not a homogeneous or monolithic one but formed by different values base on two, differing, philosophical outlooks of two traditions like Sramanical and Brahmanical systems. It is to highlight the root cause which gave to the controversies rise between trivarga and caturvarga value schemes.

Fuller information of Śrāmaṇa is to be had from early Jaina and Buddhist literature. The Śrāmaṇa’s doctrines were from early Jaina faith. The Śrāmaṇa were wondering groups, tawny-dad ascetics and sometimes styled as Munis who were the precursors of the strange ascetics of later India. They led a celebate life, could disappear at will and teach to Brāhmaṇas the way beyond sin.

The Śrāmaṇa world-view may be summarized in order to see clearly its relationship to Brāhmaṇa thought. Practically all the Śrāmaṇas sects help towards the world an attitude of ascetic pessimism, disbelived in a personal cause or creator of
the universe, accepted a plurality of souls and an ultimate distinction between soul and matter, regarded the world of common sense as real and as due to one or more real factors at least partly independent of the soul, and consequently regarded as indispensable for salvation some form of strenuous practical discipline aiming at effecting a real alteration in the situation of things. We might loosely say that these Śramaṇas were, in general, ascetic, atheistic, pluralistic and realistic. The essential basis of this world-view seems to have been the idea of samsara of karma and transmigration.

The Śramaṇas claim that life is full of suffering and spiritually evil. The suffering they speak of is not social suffering which is dependent on some special social situation and is removed by a change of organisation or application of technology. But they speak of existential misery of life, its liability to disease and decay, old age and death. They speak, not of any particular and alterable social relationship, but of social relationship in general which causes distress by the clash of interest and egoism, the bondage of obligation and the changeability of situations and relations. The misery of which the Śramaṇas speak is not accidental but essential to life.

The Śramaṇas believed greater spiritual sensitivity and wisdom. They looked open-eyed at the transitoriness of pleasures and it seemed to them to cancel the very existence of pleasures. When pleasures end they have behind pain. They appear, thus to be merely the foretaste of pain. Not merely is the greater part of experience directly painful, the remaining is heavily tinged with pain. This is not all. Even while they last, pleasures are enjoyable only in a state of mental agitation since they represent a constant change and alteration in the psyche. Hence the pleasure may themselves be directly described as painful. Life, then, is not pleasure and pain through and through.
For the Śrāmanas, this world be foolish since birth and death are only punctuations in the beginning less process of life called samsara. This belief in the doctrine of transmigration constitutes one of the most characteristic tenets of Śrāmanism, which has since become perhaps the most characteristic feature of the tradition of Indian thought. The human soul was considered not to have any essential connection with the body, which wholly perished at death and was never to be renewed.

Śrāmanism held the distinction between good and evil to rest on spiritual discrimination. Whatever injures life is evil, whatever helps it is good. Himsa is the radical evil and goodness must avoid it. Only may go further and state that the distinction between good and evil is ultimately one of the recognition or disregard of spiritual being. Evil arises from disregarding the spiritual nature of being. It is only through overlooking the spiritual sameness of other beings that one can proceed to injure them for the sake of oneself. Such action not only further obscures the spiritual perception of the agent but also tends to drag it in rebound towards a state of suffering which would be the natural expiation of the evil action.

In fact, the Śrāmanas placed the spiritually perfected man above the gods. In this sense Śrāmanism gave a new dignity and status to man. Asceticism instead of rejecting humanity exalts it. The man who is perfected (siddha), enlighten (Budha), victorious over the passions (jina) is greater than the gods because while they are subject to karman, he is not. He is free all attachments and desires, from all sense of possession. In particular his freedom from lust or sexual attractions is total. He is free from all vanity and egoism and has no family or property. He has superhuman knowledge and wisdom and supernatural powers but he does not use them for any selfish purpose since he has none. He lives in imperturbable peace and radiates it. He is the spiritual teacher and that is the sole mission for which he lives and works.

The Brāhmaṇas formed a proud caste in this epoch and placed before themselves the ideal of priest’s and teacher’s life with its pursuit of Vedic study and the
performance of sacrifices. In practice, however, many Brāhmaṇas were not priests; some of them were engaged in administration, some were landlords and yet others were petty cultivators, and lowly serfs.

Brahmanical religion had long passed its “springtime phase”, when it had been a simple harmony between gods and men. Now a sharp contrast had developed between its prevailing tendency, which was formalistic, ritualistic, and at heart quite worldly, and the new departure of the Upanisads, which tended increasingly in an esoteric and ascetic direction. We have seen that in the Upanisads the doctrine of ritual act is often replaced by that of knowledge, and sometimes by that of theistic devotion; and at the same time the moral rather than the ritual component of action tends to be emphasized. In the Bhagavadgītā and the Santiparvan of the Mahābhārata this conflict and change of ideas receives a clearer and fuller expression. Ritualism is here seen definitely worsted in its struggle with ascetic renunciation and the creed of a life of virtue and devotion.

There is thus no doubt that within the religion of the Brāhmaṇas there was a growing cleavage of ideas about the fundamental values of life, which resulted in the adoption of mokṣa as the summum bonum in addition to the trivarga. The scheme of caturvarga thus become completed, and the Vedic religion became truly a synthesis of Pravṛtti-dharma and Nivṛtti-dharma. This change found its social reflection in the formulation of the theory of the four stages of life in the Dharma Sūtra.

The Brāhmaṇas were also ascetic like Śramaṇas, but the Brāhmaṇa attitude was not so uncompromising towards secular life, it envisaged renunciation only after the proper fulfillment of social duties. Jacobi has suggested that the Brāhmaṇa ascetic supplied the common archetype which was copied by the Buddhist as well as the Jainas. In support of this view is adduced the resemblance which both the Jainist and the Buddhist rules of disciple for the mendicant bear to those found in the lawbooks of Gautama and Bandhāyana. In the first place, it must be remarked that the
resemblances consist in the main of rules of a very general character; “the first four great vows of the sammyāsom” for instance, may be said to belong to the universal repertoire of asceticism. In other words, if there was a borrowing, it was not so much of particular regulations as of the ideal of the ascetic.

Brāhmaṇas originally hostile to the “Fourth Asrama” – The passage already quoted from the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa may be considered in this light. The whole sacrificial tradition with its material values points in the same direction. It is true that, as witnessed by some of the latest Upanisadic texts, (considering only the authentic Upanisads) there was towards the end of the later Vedic period a revolt against this tradition in some sections of the Brāhmaṇas themselves. But the very rarity of the report suggests the isolated and new-tangled character of this movement. At one place in the Nikāyas we find a prominent Brāhmaṇa criticizing the “Pābhajjadhikarana” as something alien and opposed to the “Yaññadhikarana” Frequently in the Nikāyas the Samana. Muṇḍakas are delineated in sharp opposition to the Brāhmaṇas, and it may not be without significance that the Upanisad most vociferous in the denunciation of sacrifice and the advocacy of the “Fourth Asrama” is entitled the “Upanisad of the Muṇḍakas”.

When the Aryan migrated to Indian their struggle for socio-political control over the indigenous people led to the assimilation of the local ideas which are represented by the Srāmanical ideas. The spirit of synthesis seen in the conception of puruṣārtha is perhaps the result of a continuous process of Aryanisation of the pre-Aryan settlement. That is Aryanisation through cultural assimilation.

Puruṣārtha and Advaita Vedānta

Advaita Vedānta considers the world as unreal. Sāṅkara, the extreme monist is not concerned with the actual nature of the appearance, but he has fixed his mind on the ultimate and unchangeable ground which always remains true. In keeping with the view then it is a questionable that if the reality of the world is denied altogether and
if life in the world is declared empty of all significance is there any place of ethical values in Advaita Vedanta? Regarding this question, an important thing to notice is that the world’s reality is denied in Advaita philosophy only from the transcendental standpoint (paramārthika) for the simple reason that the reality of Brahman is then truly realized. But from the empirical point of view (prativasika or vyavaharika) the reality of the world is asserted since by hypothesis, knowledge of identity of Brahman and Atman is not yet realized. This is the reason why Sāṅkara expressly refutes the idealism of the Buddhists who have denied the reality of the objective world. So, there is significance of ethical values in the Advaita Vedanta, because of Sāṅkara has not completely denied the world.

Another view of Sāṅkara is that the highest Reality is unchangeable and therefore changing existence has no Ultimate Reality. But he warns us against concluding that the world is completely real or that it is totally illusory. Though the world is not real, it is not a phantom. Sāṅkara maintains that the world is not non-existent; it is not absolutely real. Brahman with maya or sakti as its power is the cause of the world. The world has a relative, empirical existence. The world is sat because it exist for a time; it is asat for it does not exist for all time according to Sāṅkara. Therefore he says that a thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted.

Sāṅkara says that after filling our sight with wisdom let us see the world as Brahman. Such a vision is fruitful, not the vision which looks solely at the tip of the nose. If the Hindu adopts an exalted morality, it is not founded on Hindu metaphysics but is inconsistent with it. This world is our home and our lives are dedicated to action. We are not strangers in the world.

In keeping with the view that the ultimate aim of life is attaining Brahmamubhava (the experience of non-dual Brahman), Sāṅkara says that one should undertake enquiry into Brahman only after he acquires the necessary qualifications for studying the Vedanta. The necessary qualification are —(i) discriminative knowl-
edge of what is eternal and non-eternal, nityanitya Vāstu viveka, (ii) disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures of this world or the next, ihamutra-phalabhogaviraga, (iii) attainment of tranquility, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration and faith, sama-damadisādhana-sampat and (iv) desire for release, mumuksutva.

In the Śādhanā Catusthaya, the fourth qualification, mumuksutva is also involved along with the concept of mokṣa, the fourth value of puruṣārtha, eventhough the mokṣa agress with gradual liberation (krama mukti) whereas mumuksutva does not relate to gradual liberation but both are trained the mind and the spirit. These four Śādhanā Catusthaya are valuable for making individual’s perfection and these imply in bringing a peaceful society. It adopts exalted morality. They cannot be seen in isolation from the values under the puruṣārtha scheme. In as much as both the Advaita ethics and the ethical views represented by the puruṣārtha do occur in a social context, there should not have any serious contradiction between them. The Advaita’s rejection of ‘Jnana karma samuccaya’ (synthesis of jnana and karma) and the underlying emphasis on the path of knowledge (jnana margā) in the idea of the Śādhanā Catustaya on the one hand and the implied sense of rigorous moral activism or some form of integration between nirvrtti margā and pravṛtti margā in the notion of the puruṣārtha on the other are to be properly assessed as to see the point of conflict or else. For the time being this conflict may be resolved through the Gītā.

The real or apparent conflict between the ethics of Advaita and those of puruṣārtha may be examined in the light of the niskāma-karma yoga of the Gītā and the philosophy of Swami Vivekananda who gives emphasis on raja guna (action). This problem may also be studied in relation to the integral idealism of Sri Aurobindo.
The spiritual goal and the ethical means are bound up with each other and not externally related. The moral law within us is evidence of our citizenship in the world of spirit. Moral discipline makes for spiritual insight. Their relationship is not adventitious. To reach the goal is to perfect the means to it. We cannot bypass the ethical. Almost all the religious classics of Indian insist on ethical conduct as an indispensable means for spiritual life. Ethical is the basic of spiritual life and its substance.

In relation to the above discussions we can conclude that there is no serious contradictory views between the Advaita Vedānta and the value scheme of puruṣārtha. Both are aiming at individual’s perfection and attaining a spiritual life.

**The Value of Puruṣārtha and Social Life**

The puruṣārthas should be pursued only in the social context. None of the four values of dharma, artha, kāma and mokṣa can be realized apart from life in a society. Artha as a value, cannot be realized by isolated individuals, for example in the life of Robinson Crusoe, who life alone in an island away from society. Its realization and functioning is possible only in a social contest. But, though it is one of the necessities of life and must be “aspired for”, if wealth is sought through unlawful and unscrupulous means, it may endanger society. So, seeking of wealth should not be at the cost of others in society. This is the way in which the pursuit of dharma get concretized, in this case, by its regulation the principle of wealth-pursuit. Similarly, the concept of kāma gets its distinct significance in social life since no individual can realize his sex-desires unless it be in the company of others, if however, kāma is not regulated by dharma if sees-are indulged in for their own sake, it would not be conducting to the good of society. As mokṣa understood as complete integration of personality in its deeper sense, cannot be realised unless morality in the broad sense indicated is realized as well, we may maintain that social life is necessary preliminary for realisation as well.
In short, life in society is the backdrop against which alone man can hope to actualize his aspiration for values. According to Hindu philosophy, the function of society is to afford the individual opportunities for the disciplined and well-balanced realization of the *purusārtha*. Life in society provides a form of the anarchic, impulsive and antisocial instincts in man. For the realization of the *purusārtha*, life in a well-ordered society is absolutely essential. The doctrine of *purusārtha* is very relevant of this purpose. It has provided guidelines for the individual in the pursuit of the ideal of good life.

Professor Daya Krishan is critical of the four-fold classification of the *purusārtha* into *dharma* and *kāma, artha, mokṣa*. He raises the question whether these “terms designate in any clear manner the goals men pursue or ought to pursue? He says that if we forget dharma and concentrate only on *artha* and *kāma*, we shall find it difficult to know their real meaning. *Kāma* in the widest sense, may be understood as desire and, by implication, anything that is or can be the object of desire. If this is the case everything will come under the category of *kāma*, since we desire not only *artha* but even *dharma* and *mokṣa*. Moreover, there are many other kinds of man’s desire. The desire for knowledge of understanding is one such important desire. But the question is: How shall we characterize desire for knowledge? Shall we treat it as a *purusārtha* under the category of *kāma*? In the perspective of Samkhya Darsana everything including *manas* and buddhi form part of *prakṛti* and hence knowledge or understanding may be put under the category of *kāma* as *purusārtha*. But in the case of other systems we cannot do so.

Again if we consider the polar concepts *kāma* and *nīskāma*, than also a problem arises about the interpretation of *Purusārtha*. The point is that if *kāma* means desire, then *nīskāma* should mean desirelessness or a state where desire is absent. But not all desire leads to action. Further if *sakama karma* or action performed from desire leads to bondage, then there is no reason to believe that desire or *kāma* by itself would lead to bondage.
Professor Daya Krishan further maintains that we are not very sure about how the term puruṣārtha is to be understood. "Is it to be taken for example, in a descriptive sense, that is, as describing what men actually pursue in their life? Or is it a prescriptive word, which suggests what men ought to pursue in order to be worthy of being human? Artha and kāma as examples of

Puruṣārtha tend to suggest the former, while dharma and mokṣa lead to the latter interpretation. There does not seem much sense in saying one ought to pursue artha or kāma as one naturally pursues them and needs no great exhortation to do so. And if one does not pursue them with great zeal or intensity, one is normally praised and not admonished for not pursuing them, particularly if one is pursuing some other ideal value, say, knowledge, social reform, political freedom, end of exploitation and repression, or even such a thing as the creation of beautiful objects". Daya Krishan has suggested that the best interpretation might be to regard it as descriptive and prescriptive.

There is also a problem with regard to the meaning of the term dharma, which is an important principle among the puruṣārtha. The problem lies in the relationship between dharma and mokṣa. "Is dharma necessary for attaining mokṣa? The usual answer is that it helps one in getting svarga but not mokṣa. Dharma as well as adharma are the causes of bondage and rebirth. For liberation one has to go beyond both, that is, not only beyond adharma but dharma also. That, is why the author of the Gita has treated the Vedas as the realm of the three guṇas, that is sattva, rajas and tamas, whose heart is kāma and whose injunctions, if followed, lead to bhoga and aisvarya. Mokṣa, on the other hand, is beyond the three guṇas, and hence beyond the world which is constituted by them." 30

The relationship between the puruṣārtha and the hierarchy between, them have been the subject of discussion among the scholars since the early days of the philosophical schools. Professor Rajendra Prasad has devoted learned discussions
on this issue. He is critical about the classification of the puruṣārtha into four. In his opinion the fourth, viz, mokṣa does not find much logical justification inclusion among the puruṣārtha. It may be pointed out in this regard that in the present day life mokṣa sums not to have much relevance. One thing is that people in general are not concerned about it. Another is that in the modern life, which very complex, there are more intimate human concerns and goals than the mokṣa which is a far cry. Moreover, man in the present world are least concerned about the so called future life. Man wants to live in the reality of the present and face the challenges of life in this world.

Professor K.J. Shah has suggested that the puruṣārtha as goals of human life should be treated as interactional in character, and not as hierarchical. He says: “We must realize that artha will not be a puruṣārtha unless it is in accord with kāma, dharma and mokṣa; kāma in turn will not be kāma unless it is in accord with dharma and mokṣa; and dharma will not be dharma unless it is in accord with mokṣa. Equally, mokṣa will not be mokṣa without the content of dharma; dharma will not be dharma without the content of kāma and artha. The four goals, therefore, constitute one single goal, though in the lives of individuals the elements may get varying emphasis for various reasons.”31 We think that if we consider the puruṣārtha in the above light, we shall be understanding the puruṣārtha in the proper sense.

1. Plato believe that virtue is a natural gift from God. Cf. Drake: The People's Plato, pp.174
2. Cf. G.C. Field: The Philosophy of Plato, Oxford University Press, Longam, 1949, pp.95-
8. M.Bh. 12.8.16.
10. M.Bh. 12.8.22
11. M.Bh. 12.8.23
14. Cf. Mahabharata, Shantiparva (The concept of happiness) 177.43.48.
15. B.G.VII-II
18. 'Asvamedhasahasrat tu satyam ekami visisyate?
20. Sutra 2.,
24. Lecture on Jainism, pp. 14ff; Mrs. Rhys Davids, Buddhist Psychological Ethics; kosh, 5th chapter; Madhyamaka, XVII.
25. Cf. The Conception of Āyatula in Āyaramga, 1.7; Gītā, 6.32- ātmaupamya.
26. Perhaps the best known image of the spiritually liberated person is that given in the Gītā 2.55ff. on Budha’s compassion see The Nature of Buddhist Thought.