CHAPTER SIX

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In CHAPTER FIVE we have attempted a detailed exposition of Russell's proposed solutions to the conflict between freedom and organisations, vis-a-vis the taxonomy of social organisations taking as our examples (i) The State, (ii) Economic organisations (iii) The Church (iv) Educational organisations and (v) The family. From our analysis, we notice that the Russellian solutions are founded on the operation of a number of principles. They are; (1) the principle of the rule of law (2) the principle of World Government (3) the principle of right to self-determination (4) the principle of centralisation and decentralisation of power (5) the principle of socialism (6) the principle of cosmic piety (7) the principle of liberal education (8) the principle of love and transcendence. We will dwell on these principles vis-a-vis the organisations which are affected by the operation of these principles. Let us begin with an examination of the operation of the rule of law as envisaged by Russell.

6.1 THE PRINCIPLE OF RULE OF LAW

Russell's proposal is to bring all social organisations, the State most of all, under the rule of law to resolve the tension between freedom and organisation. Here Russell is in the finest tradition of Western Liberalism.
The view that rule of law is one of the essential components of a system that can guarantee human freedom and survival is as early as Socrates, who refused to escape from prison on the ground that doing so will strike at the foundation of rule of law. Thus the Socratic arguments in Crito contains in a seminal form ideas later developed by liberal thinkers including Russell. The doctrine that one must not return evil for evil is the first moral awakening against the use of violence, a doctrine that runs parallel to God's injunction in the Old Testament that he who kills Cain will be punished tenfold even though Cain was a murderer of his own brother. The plain truth is that if violence is allowed to beget violence such violence will strike at the very tree of life. End of violence begetting violence has its counterpart, although historically in a tortuous form, in the evolution of a unipolar centre of force.

The next Socratic argument in favour of rule of law is that a world bereft of rule of law is subject to the vagaries of chance. Russell's anti-anarchic argument in defense of the rule of law especially in its extension beyond the State system to the World Government more or less follows the same pattern of argument. There must be rule of law within the State as well as beyond the State (inter-State as well as trans-State) so that human freedom and more basically human existence is not destroyed by anarchic contingencies of men's own making in the form of nuclear holocaust.

The most crucial Socratic argument in defense of rule of law is, obedience to laws is a matter of choice on the part of the citizens in a system where they participate in the law making process. Black laws that goes against the life and freedom of the citizens; they have reasons to
change. But on this score the State is to be persuaded rather than abandoned or destroyed. The penultimate argument is, the rule of law provides a framework for a dialogue between the citizens as well as between the State and the citizens. The dialogue is a continuing one, a process that can take the place of use of force either by the citizens or by the State. The underlying assumption all the time is that in civic life, there is no problem that cannot be solved through dialogue. Surely, if there can be dialogue among the citizens, there can also be dialogue between the State and the citizens. The State although an unipolar centre of force or rather by virtue of being so, can impose upon itself the rules of dialogue in its relations with the citizens, so long as its foundation is not threatened with violent overthrow. This is Russell’s meaning when he asserts the liberal thesis that the State although all powerful, cannot deprive the life liberty and property of the citizens without the due process of law. There has to be a constant debate between what is to be done for reasons of the State and what is to be done in defense of individual life, liberty and property, till an omega point is reached where the reasons of State converges with the reasons of individual freedom. To the extent dialogue takes the place of force, the occasion for use of force as well as the degree of force used, are diminished. To maintain order and cohesion in civic life and to keep saboteurs of civic society at bay, a minimum of force may be necessary. But this will not be brutish, active force. Rather, it will be a force that lurks at the background, reminding any potential user of violence that nobody will be allowed to disturb the basic framework of rule of law. Here the question arises; if the rule of law is such a good thing that it transforms the State character from that of a beast of prey to an institution instrumental to human freedom, thus resolving the conflict of freedom and the State, how is it that there remains a lurking force at the background? Is it because rule of law change the State in
appearance only, while in substance the State remains essentially an
institution of violence? Is it that there is no guarantee against the return of
State violence with a vengeance, like the Freudian return of the repressed,
thus tearing asunder the facade of liberalism and the rule of law under
which the State monopoly of force hides itself. For those who advocate the
rule of law taming State violence and thus resolving the conflict between
the State and individual human freedom, merely saying that whenever the
State violates the rule of the game the citizens are entitled to open rebellion,
will not do. For saying so will be a clear admission of the doctrine that
ultimately counter-violence is the antidote to State violence. The tragedy
of such an admission is that ‘the winner is always right’ justification of
violence cannot stop at one point in the series, it has to proceed endlessly
in a spiralling circle. Once the doctrine of the rule of law is thrown
overboard, either all violence are equally good or equally bad. As contrasted
with this, if rule of law is to be the foundation of the State and civic life
then there is no reason why force must lurk in the background, ready to
stage a comeback under favourable circumstances. Why should not rule of
law shine in its intrinsic merit, doing away with the need to use force in
any form altogether and thus resolve the conflict between the State and
individual freedom once for all?

Russell is aware of this dilemma. He therefore envisions an omega
point in the evolution of social cohesion, at which, the State can altogether
dispense with the use of force. He does not show us a cut and dried road to
this omega point. He only throws up some hints. He, for example, suggests
that the advantages of the rule of law and impartial arbitration will become
so obvious that people will soon learn to submit to rule of law and impartial
arbitration without the threat of force as they do now.
We may try to work out the implications of Russell's suggestions.

We have seen above that rule of law is to provide the framework for conflict resolution through dialogue. If the framework is to be a viable substitute to use of force, the dialogue must be genuine. It must not be a manipulated dialogue where the reasons of the State takes precedence over the voice of reason. If rule of law is to provide an ever continuing framework for dialogue and impartial arbitration, the State must remain an impartial referee vis-a-vis the contending classes within the civic society as well as vis-a-vis the State and its citizens. Marx's critique of the State is that neither has this been the case nor will ever be so. The Marxist critique prominently emphasise the point that the State is an apparatus to facilitate the exploitation of one class by another class. Behind every law of the State lurks the interest of the propertied class. The rule of law is a sham one and the dialogue allowed only one-sided. And hence rule of law is not to substitute use of force, but rather to legitimise the State monopoly of force. Thus, what happens is not rule of law conquering force in defense of freedom. It is rather rule of law is ultimately founded on force, which it pretends to conquer but actually justifies.

As a liberal and yet a socialist at the same time Russell concedes this point of Marxist criticism. He admits that on many occasions law is bound to be on the side of status quo. But his solution to the problem is not a radical abandonment of rule of law as the continuing framework of social change. His demand is also not for a radical abolition of the State. For although Russell is a radical thinker inspired by revolutionary vision, in political practice he is far from advocating violent revolutions as a method of realising social goals. This is partly because of his belief that most
revolutions are stories of revolutions betrayed and partly because of his pragmatic scruples that questions the wisdom of sudden release of destructive forces howsoever noble the cause may be. Russell therefore, sticks to rule of law as the continuing framework within which the conflict between the State and human freedom is to be resolved. But he adds a condition to this operation of rule of law; a condition which may be unpalatable to a conservative liberal, but equally acceptable to Marxists and liberal socialists like Russell. The condition is that in a contention between the forces of status quo and forces of social justice and progress, law must side with the latter. Russell believes that in the affairs of men, there is always a contention of forces in which the balance of forces always tilts in favour of what is socially just, morally right, and in the larger interest of human freedom. As such, his considered opinion is that law must follow every new emerging of balance of forces to avoid social stagnation, social injustice on the one hand and violent revolution on the other. Then and then only can rule of law be the continuing framework for a dialogue of which openness is the rule of game.

Let us take the Russellite argument at its face value. It implies that in a contention of forces the privileged class must see which way the balance of forces is tilting and reasonably acquiesce to foregoing status quo and privilege, to equalisation and enlargement of human freedom within the rule of law. In simple terms, it means that when faced with the choice of either change or bloody revolution, the powers that be would choose the former. The lessons of History for the most part are to the contrary. Holders of status quo refuse to change. They use the State apparatus to resist change, which breeds counter violence. Hence societies are torn asunder by violent revolutions out of the bounds of rule of law, showing that it is ultimately
force that matters, that a State ultimately is to be founded on some form of force. Of course, there had been exceptions. One of the most remarkable decolonisation process in Asia, namely, India winning her independence, could take place as a sort of transfer of power within the bounds of a constitutional framework, without demonstration of brute force by the *dramatist personae* concerned. This was possible because both the protagonist (Indian people led by man of the millennium, Mahatma Gandhi) and the antagonist (leaders of the British Empire) were reasonable enough to anticipate the tilt in the balance of forces and thus change within the bounds of law. Gandhi’s doctrine of non-violence is not a metaphysical abstraction. It is, but in essence, a recognition of the importance of reasonableness in the regulation of human affairs.

Shorn of a reasonable model of man and a reasonable model of social change; the Russelian thesis of the rule of law taming State power is riddled with a paradox which may now be stated as follows:

Force is sought to be controlled and made subservient to the cause of freedom by the rule of law whereas, ultimately, rule of law itself is founded on force. Hence in the ultimate analysis, rule of law can be sustained if and only if, it draws its nourishment, either directly or indirectly from an unipolar centre of force. In other words force allows itself to be controlled by rule of law so long as it serves the end of force. Rule of law will always run into crises the moment it comes into real conflict with the force on which it is founded.

In the concluding chapter, an attempt will be made to resolve the paradox by using a reasonable model of man and a reasonable model of social change.
According to Russell, the operation of the rule of law must extend to economic organisations as well to resolve the conflict between freedom and economic organisations. One of Russell's important solution is that the relation between the employer and the employee in economic organisations must be brought under the rule of law. Especially law must protect the individual from the tyranny of the employer, be it the private capitalist or the corporation or the State. The history of labour from the days of classical capitalism down to the present times bears out the validity of Russellian solutions. Laws have been instrumental in protecting the worker from retrenchment, the employee from loss of job. Similarly laws have protected employees from persecution while in employment because of his intellectual, religious or political convictions. Laws have also protected a person from being discriminated against in employment because of scientific, religious or political convictions, unrelated to the job.

Russell also suggests that law must intervene to ensure the participation of workers in the management thus facilitating the end of alienation of the worker from his work and enabling the worker to realise his creative freedom. In fact, legal enactments have been responsible for reducing the working hours and thus create more leisure to release their creativity.

According to Russell, rule of law must regulate not only the internal dynamics of economic organisation but also the relations of economic organisations with one another. The doctrine of classical capitalism is that competition is the golden law that regulates the life of economic organisations. Marx made the point that the so called golden law of competition is in reality economic forces overwhelming man, making him
a slave. The command economy that emerged after the 1917 October Revolution was not the mode of production that Marx visualised, i.e. production by a free community of free producers. Command economy substituted iron laws of competition with the iron laws of bureaucracy. That makes things, as far as the workers and expression of their creativity are concerned, back to square one. Russell rejected the thesis that mankind can be redeemed from the domination of economic organisations, if such organisations are run by a State bureaucracy. He rightly points out that a much more sinister form of violation of human freedom would follow. He also equally rejects the thesis that the so called free enterprise and law of competition will deliver the goods, freedom included. He believed that economic organisations can be subjected to a gradual process of democratisation that will ultimately ensure workers control of the production process through their democratic participation in the management. He further believed that rule of law can facilitate to a great extent the democratisation process and regulate competition to take away its anti-human stings and predatory impulses. With the disintegration of the Soviet Union in 1991, neo-capitalism has installed market force again as the God that can deliver. But the emergence of international laws to regulate relations of economic organisations and the emergence of world bodies like W.T.O. vindicated Russell’s position, Even in the USA, the State intervenes to control the absolute monopoly of a giant corporate through the operation of the rule of law.

But here again the same paradox reappears. Every legal enactment to end the exploitation of the worker, every legal measure to emancipate man from the domination of economic organisations were achieved at the cost of life and death struggle either in the form of democratic struggle or even
of violent revolution. Here again it is the struggle of the contending force and the way in which the balance of forces tilts, that is at the basis of legal enactment. Contending forces submit to legal intervention and legal arbitration only when both the parties are reasonable enough to see that it is in their interests to do so. Where they fail to reason with one another; the struggle going out of the bounds of law is not ruled out.

6.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF WORLD STATE

Russell is right in maintaining that war is the greatest enemy of freedom. States at war with each other suspend the freedom and fundamental rights of the citizens on the pretext of winning the war. The institution of war welded to the State externally threatens the freedom of the citizens of other States, and internally, that of its own citizens. It is the State as the wager of war that comes into conflict with human freedom.

Russell’s another proposal towards resolution of this conflict is to curb the sovereignty of the States, that is to curb the power and legitimacy of the States to wage war against other States, by a World State. We have already given an exposition of Russell’s principle of World State. We have explained the Russellian arguments that lead to World State, also showing the reason how, according to Russell, the World State will be instrumental in resolving the conflict between the State and human freedom. We will now examine here the viability of the Russellian principle.

The first point to be noticed is the consistency with which Russell extends the principle of rule of law beyond the State system to arrive at the
principle of World State. Russell is right in pointing out the basic contradiction at the heart of the State system that so far internal use of force is concerned, the State is bound by rule of law; whereas in its external use of force, the State is not so bound. The taming of State force in defense of human survival and freedom cannot be complete unless inter State relations are also brought under rule of law under the aegis of a super State, here in Russell’s proposal, a World State. Thus, the World State is a logical corollary of the principle of rule of law, being a necessary extension of the principle beyond the State. Here Russell is consistent throughout his formulation.

The next point of observation is that Russell is right in holding that unipolarity of force, to be consistent, must lead to World State. If evolution of the rule of law has to transcend the State system to be complete, the same logic demands that evolution of unipolar centre of force must transcend the State to reach the World State. In inter State relations, multi polarity of force is anarchy. Unipolarity of force in the form of a World State is the first step to order. But mere unipolarity of force alone gives order, but not freedom. One of Russell’s invaluable insight is, the parallel and symmetrical evolution of force on the one hand and rule of law on the other, in the affairs of men. Russell is right in pointing out that the evolution of institutional force and the evolution of rule of law are both universal in character. The Russellian problem, as we have pointed out already is that of resolving the paradox of which of the two is more fundamental.

We may also observe that Russell’s espousal of World State as the institutional principle necessary to human survival and freedom is in the finest tradition of large scale world views. Thus, Christianity and Marxism
are world views universal in scope. Both believe that either mankind will be all free or none will be. Russell is neither a Christian nor a Marxist. He is a liberal socialist whose world view is universal in scope. His principle of World State and his concept of world citizenship is an assertion of the universal humanist tradition of the large scale ideologies in a new form. It drives home the point that human freedom is one and indivisible, that men cannot be free if they continue to be citizens of the predator States only, warring against one another. Dreams of human unity are as old as mankind. But very few have stated with so much force of logic as Russell did from a liberal standpoint. We may also further observe that although Russell has argued at length why he is not a Christian; he comes closer to the Christian doctrine, “Blessed are the peacemakers: for they shall be called children of God”, than most of the professing Christians. Throughout his life Russell was a committed pacifist and as a peacemaker he intervened fruitfully in the Cuban crisis, the Indo-China conflict and the Vietnam War in the interest of peace and sanity. Russell's concept of a World State as a peace keeper of the world is his pacifist response to war that threatens human freedom and particularly to nuclear war that now threatens human existence.

With these observations in favour of the principle of World State, let us proceed to how Russell conceives the evolution of the World State through force in real politics. Writing as early as the 1940s, Russell opined that the World State has to come through the domination of a superpower around which an alliance will grow to which nations will be ultimately forced either to join or be conquered. The world was by that time bipolar, with the two superpowers, the USSR and the USA, contending for world domination. Russell thought the evolution of World State through the domination of a superpower most realistic as any world body through
agreement had so far been a sham and is likely to be so in future. Even the United Nations, born out of the agreement of big powers who were winners in the Second World War, is not a substitute for World State. For the UN is not a sole repository of force capable of imposing its will on all nations indiscriminately. In the evolution of the World State, the leadership Russell prefers is that of Anglo American alliance because of his conviction that cherished democratic values are likely to be respected by a World State born of this alliance. With the disintegration of the USSR in 1991, the world suddenly became unipolar. It seemed as if the NATO alliance led by the USA would now be dominating the world. The NATO handling of the Kosovo crisis that sidelined the UN even, seemed to be a demonstration of the emergence of an unipolar centre around the USA. But side by side with this phenomenon, the emergence of European Union is also a reality now. So is the possibility of Russia-China-India axis appearing at the horizon.

We have now enough indicators pointing to a multipolar world in near future, with the UN playing a mediating role. Historically therefore, subsequent unfoldment of international relations did not bear out the expectations Russell had in the 1940s. It is probable that the World State Russell visualised in the 40s was essentially a Western institution. Towards the latter part of his career when Russell became actively involved in CND (campaign for nuclear disarmament) and start using the Gandhite method of non-violent civil disobedience, he started thinking in terms of collective will of mankind for survival and freedom giving rise to a unipolar World State.

Apart from this historical problem, let us dwell on the operational aspect of the World State, assuming it as an institutional model for resolving the conflict between freedom and organisation, in a future time scale.
First on the positive aspects of what a World State can perform in defense of human freedom.

Russell is right in maintaining that there are common problems of mankind, education and population for example, in which a World State can creatively intervene. Thus a World State can prevent Nation States from using their education machines to inculcate narrow loyalty, narrow sympathy, narrow patriotism, narrow dogmas like racism and national superiority, and whipping up of war hysteria. For example, Russell is certainly right in pointing out that in certain areas such as teaching of History, an International commission under the aegis of a World State can ensure impartial presentation of facts. Even though we have entered the third millennium, our world is not yet free from fundamentalist and nationalist perversion of education. In India, the largest democracy of the world, both the leftists and the rightists are vying with each other for control of academic institutions of higher learning, with absurd consequences. In such a situation we agree with Russell that if there is a World State it can actively intervene to make educational organisations instrumental to the making of free citizens of the world. But we agree with a qualification that the Russelian contention is valid provided the World State is a free one. And there are dangers that it may not be a free one. But we will dwell on this point a little later.

Russell is also right in maintaining that a World State can stop Nation States from waging demographic warfare against one another. Changing demographic balance is one way in which a Nation State can acquire dominance over another. Now that States have the scientific means to manipulate demography both quantitatively and qualitatively through birth
control and application of eugenics, a World State may see to it that States do not use population policies to acquire demographic dominance over other States. Rich countries espousing a new economic order in which the rich will prey upon the poor is injustice. So is populous countries espousing a new demographic order in which the demographically powerful will have advantage over the less powerful ones.

The Russellian principle may be further extended to generate larger world perspective. The World State, for example, may deal more effectively many of the problems UN is dealing now. For example, the problem of ethnicity, the problem of many cultures and many religions and most of all, the problem of environment, that of preserving the land, the ocean and the air for the future generation. The World State can also deal more effectively the problem of human rights especially the rights of the child, prevention of child labour, prevention of depletion of resources. Dr. Robert Muller, Chancellor UN University for peace and Former Assistant Secretary General, United Nations, highlighted these problems as follows:

And where we were with the result of thousand of years of history and development, we emerged into this century with 5000 religions, with 5000 languages, with innumerable countries And each one believing that it had the truth. And not even thinking, at the early stages, that we should also take care of the earth. We thought that the earth was unlimited. And suddenly came the environment issue. The future of the earth. The United Nations was confronted with every problem under the sun. One day, I ask the international union of associations, which is working for the UN, to come up with
inventory list of world problems. To find out how many world problems we have. They came to a total of 11,000 and 400 world problems.

Now if you can solve only a good number of them, you can be very happy and in the meantime, new problems occur. Like bio-genetics, the manipulation of genetic of the human species and so on. To the young people, who are listening to me, to us here, I would say that - 'do not say that there is nothing to do on this planet' Just look at this encyclopedia and you can choose one of the 11,400 problems and you can work on them *

We can as well imagine in future, free citizens of the world working on these problems under the aegis of a World State.

Now, let us raise the moot issue. Can a World State, if realised in the manner Russell conceives it, prevent war? Can a World State resolve the conflict between State power and human freedom. In other words, can it ensure human survival, freedom and peace?

To begin with, it may be pointed out that if the World State is to be the sole repository of force having absolute monopoly over the arm forces and destructive weapons, the World State can prevent large scale global wars. Here there will be two operative dynamics; the dynamics of power and the dynamics of rule of law. The World State and only the World State

* Interview of Dr. Muller by Prof. Naorem Sanajaoba, Professor of Law, Gauhati University. Courtesy AVRC, Manipur University Archives.
will command the physical force necessary to wage war and to prevent war. The States will be deprived of such power. Therefore, it will not be physically possible for the States to wage war against the World State or against one another. Again only the World State will have the legal legitimacy to use force. The States will be deprived of the legal legitimacy to use force. Thus the dynamics of power and the dynamics of law will work together to empower the World State to prevent State violence in the form of war that threatens human freedom and survival.

It is the same paradigm all over again. The World State as the unipolar centre of force preventing the States from use of force and rule of law regulating the World State in the control of force. The contradiction inherent in the heart of the Nation States, namely, that internal exercise of force is governed by law whereas external exercise is not, is sought to be resolved at the level of the World State. The crucial question is, is it a genuine resolution or is it just a case of passing on the buck. We have to show that the evolution of unipolar centre of force necessarily lead to rule of law and that the latter can ultimately replace the former.

If evolution of a unipolar centre of force is prior to rule of law, then force is fundamental and rule of law is founded on force. Force, then, may not need rule of law except by way of legitimisation. But then even this need for legitimisation may be dispensed with, once force becomes so confident of itself. In such circumstances, whenever the operation of force comes into conflict with the operation of the rule of law; force may suddenly decide to dispense with rule of law. Suppose we have a World State with a monopoly over the use of force. Russell maintains that the function of the World State will be confined to prevention of war and control of force
only. But once monopoly of force is achieved, where is the guarantee that it will not encroach on other areas? After all, power has its own logic and its own momentum. Russell was always critical of State power. The same prudence ought to warn us against World State encroaching upon the freedom of the citizen. Of course, the tragedy can be avoided provided at the level of World State again rule of law ultimately can take the place of force. For this to take place, there has to be complete identification between rule of law and moral law which men regards as intrinsically to be obeyed, of necessity. Unfortunately, we have not been able to show a synchronism between rule of law and moral law. Therefore, for reasons of the State, be it the Nation State or the World State, rule of law can always be relegated to contingency as and when the need of doing so arises. Whenever the dynamics of power takes precedence over the dynamics of rule of law, there is the ever present possibility of the State turning into an enemy of freedom. The Russellian World State may ultimately turn out to be a World slave State, more diabolic and sinister than there had been any. In such cases the positive operational aspects of the World State referred to earlier become wholly irrelevant.

In contemporary times, the greatest danger to world peace and human freedom comes from international terrorism rather than conventional war. Russell was sensitive to the dangers arising out of States being sovereign in the use of force. But he did not take a serious view of terrorism, perhaps because the phenomenon did not acquire during his time that sinister, diabolic and international dimension as it does now. We now know that a small group of terrorists can hold the international community to ransom. Even if there is one World State having a sole monopoly of force, small terrorist groups may continue to function and given latest scientific and
technical know how, they may command potent destructive arsenals of the
scale now commanded by any modern State. For example, under changed
circumstances, it may be easily possible even to assemble A-Bombs in
their own way. The quest for world peace and human freedom shall have
to go much deeper, beyond the World State, perhaps even beyond any
institutional arrangement.

6.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION

It has been pointed out again and again that according to Russell,
freedom ultimately is freedom of concrete living individuals. But the
individual realises his freedom in relation with his fellow beings. Certain
forms of enjoyment of rights and freedoms are collective in nature. For
example, freedom to development by appropriating one's own natural
resources, educational and cultural freedoms, freedom to use and propagate
one's language, freedom to conserve and project one's own cultural heritage
etc. are forms of freedom that one enjoys in a collective. The making of
the free man and the making of the free society are two inseparable elements
of an integral process. So is the expression of the creativity of the individual
and expression of creativity of the society to which the individual belongs.
An individual therefore, cannot be free while the collective to which he
belongs is held in bondage. Nationalities are such human groups towards
which an individual develops a sense of belongingness through a long
historical process. Now, nationalities may be held in bondage within State
systems towards which they have no sense of belongingness. In such cases
individuals belonging to the enslaved nationalities cannot be free. If the
nationalities are not free, the individuals belonging to them are also not.
This is Russell's fundamental reason for advocating the principle of the right to self-determination in defense of human freedom.

Russell is right in maintaining that the exercise of the right to self-determination will emancipate nationalities from the prison house of State systems to which they happen to belong through some contingencies of History, but towards which they have no desire to belong. Hence, the exercise of the principle will be an inalienable part of individual human freedom also. It will curb the oppressive power of the State to rob the liberties of the nationalities and of the individuals belonging to oppressed nationalities.

Russell's demystification of the State, his assertion that neither State sovereignty nor State territory is sacrosanct, help him advance a radical thesis of the right to self-determination. The thesis is that if the well being of the citizens were the end in view, the question whether a certain area should be included or should form a separate State, would be left freely to the decision of that area. Nationalities may freely decide to form a separate State or amalgamate into a new State or remain with the parent State. The essence of the Russellian thesis is that human groups should be left free to shape their own destiny. Needless to say, this thesis has become an article of faith of civilised international relations and a fundamental right enshrined in the UN Charters.

In the Russellian scheme, the presence of World State ensures smooth and bloodless exercise of the right of self-determination. As the World State will have the authority to transfer territories or revise treaties or institute impartial inquiry, armed conflict hitherto associated with the
exercise of the right to self-determination may be dispensed with in the Russellian scheme. Assuming the scheme, increase in the number of States through the exercise of self-determination will not be chaotic as States will be deprived of the sovereignty to wage war while the authority to use force will repose with the World State.

Even before the emergence of the World State, the world had been witnessing the operation of the principle of self-determination, with the active intervention of the UN; sometimes with the active intervention of a big power, sometimes because of internal changes as was the case with the disintegration of the erstwhile Soviet Union. The post World War-II political developments had witnessed dramatic territorial re-alignments and liberation of an additional one hundred and forty colonised nations. The exercise of the right of self-determination by the constituent republics of the erstwhile Soviet Union leading to the emergence of fifteen independent countries, similar process in Yugoslavia, and German re-unification are eloquent examples of operation of the principle of self-determination. Within the framework of the United Nations Charter, the two historical political and cultural covenants, 1966, the right to self determination is regarded as the universal human right. The principle also constitutes the cornerstone of United Nations General Assembly Declarations and several significant principles of contemporary International Law. The principle of the right to self-determination of nationalities is at the basis of the decolonisation movement going on all over the world. The principle had enabled around one hundred and forty newly independent countries to emerge out of nearly forty plus parent countries in the mid 1940s. India, the largest democracy in the world is also committed to the principle. The Indian representative to the UN who addressed the General Assembly on
20 November 1991, urged upon the world body to work earnestly to eradicate the remaining vestiges of colonialism before entering the 21st century.

But there will be a fundamental difference between the principle of the right to self-determination as it operates within the framework of a world body like the UN, which does not have the sole monopoly of force and the same principle as it operates under the aegis of World State which has the sole monopoly of force.

The exercise of the right to self-determination by a nationality within the existing framework of the United Nations depends to a great extent on the existing balance of power on the one hand and the inner momentum of national liberation movement of the nationality concerned. The actual exercise depends partly on the merit of the case and to a great extent on whether it suits the game plan of big powers, those in the Security Council of the UN to be precise. Tibet’s demand for the right to self-determination is legitimate, but because of China, a powerful member of the Security Council, none could dare lift a finger in her favour. The UN Security Council as per its Resolution No.665 on compliance of Sanction Against Iraq dated 25 August 1990 intervened against Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait and restored Kuwait’s independence. But this was possible because of the active role of the U.S.A. who had oil interest in Kuwait. Again when using the UN forum was not possible because of the possible exercise of veto, by Russia or China, the NATO alliance led by the USA cared two hoots for the UN, and they actively intervene in the Kosovo crisis, paving the way for further dismemberment of Yugoslavia. The NATO alliance subjected Yugoslavia to the worst blitzkrieg ever since the Second World War. This was not
because the NATO alliance led by USA has any love lost on the Kosovars or on human freedom per se but because of USA's ambition to fill in the power vacuum in Eastern Europe after the disintegration of USSR. The same USA evinced no interest in the ethnic issues of the Kurds involving the right to self-determination. The power game of the superpowers apart, no nationality can have its case heard however genuine it is, without a sponsoring member country of the UN. Thus, although the principle of self-determination is in defense of freedom, its actual practice in real politics follows the twists and turns of the international balance of power so that many a genuine cases of weak, small and dumb nationalities remain unheeded.

In the Russelian scheme, the exercise of the right to self-determination will depend on the merit of the case, that is, on the legitimacy of the aspirations of the nationalities concerned. It will depend less on the balance of forces of the States, since there will be an unipolar centre of force in the form of a World State having the sole monopoly of force. The World State will ensure impartial arbitration to decide the legitimacy of nationalities aspiring to self-determination vis-a-vis the claims and counterclaims of nationalities and parent Nation States. To this extent, armed conflict can be avoided. But here again, we need a proviso; that such a World State must be a free one, and not a slave World State. And we have seen how difficult it is to identify the parameters that will ensure the Russelian free World State.

It may be pointed out that an indiscriminate exercise of the right to self-determination may not necessarily lead to freedom of nationalities and of the individuals belonging to the nationalities. Contemporary scenario is full of perversions in the exercise of the right to self-determination.
Firstly, ironically, there is always a wrong way of doing a right thing, a bad means adopted towards achieving a good end. Adopting terrorism as a means of achieving the right to self-determination is one such instance. Many terrorist groups operate all over the world with the avowed aim of liberating the nationalities to which they belong from foreign domination. No means is bad for them. Assassination, recruitment of minors as killer cadres, use of human bombs, kidnapping, ransom taking, highway robbery, indiscriminate killing, attack on civilians are all acceptable to them. Initially they started with armed conflict against what they call the colonial State depriving them of their freedom. But very soon they train their guns on their people as well, stifling their voice and liquidating whosoever raising any voice of dissent. They violate life with impunity, how many dies in their acts of sabotage is just figure for them. But when it is their turn to die, they invoke the UN Charters and Human Rights Covenants. Ironically, those who demand the right to live are depriving others of their right to live. Those who avowedly fight for freedom, are depriving others of their freedom. Worse still, they degenerate into extortionists extorting money from their own people in the name of freedom. Thus, the demand for the right to self-determination is transformed in reality, into a money minting machine and violence the latest fashionable commodity thrown up by the market forces and exportable all over the world. Such violence naturally meets with counter violence from the State. Thus the principle of self-determination by itself does not guarantee the freedom of the oppressed nationalities or curbing of State power. The fruitful operation of the principle in defense of freedom depends on a number of parameters which have to be identified and worked out in detail.

Whether the principle is sought to be exercised within the framework of the Russelian World State or the UN, the criticism will hold water. For,
under the emerging contemporary scenario, terrorist rebellion in the name of freedom will still be possible despite the presence of the World State.

The principle of self-determination may be used in a perverted manner to destroy a Nation State rather than in defense of freedom. The emergence of a Nation State is in itself a long and tortuous historical process. It is a process in which original building blocks gets transmuted in a synthetic unity leading to the emergence of a new identity to which all the members of the original building blocks have equal claim. We agree with Russell that neither Nation States nor their territories are sacrosanct. But we also think it true that certain forms of freedom have been made possible within the Nation State. Going beyond the Nation State towards a higher human unity in the form of World State may be progressive. But disintegrating a Nation State where all citizens are feeling free and equal, to the earlier building blocks by reviving atavistic instincts is certainly reactionary. To be sure, where nationalities are enslaved, the principles of self-determination must be invoked. Where a Nation State persecutes its national minorities or perpetuates genocide on them, the oppressed nationality has a right to break away from the Nation State. In other words, where a Nation State misbehaves and transforms itself into a prison house of nationalities, the nationalities have a right to secede. But where equal citizenship extends to the members of all the nationalities and where living together is in the interest of all, internal self-determination in the form of local autonomy to safeguard local identity may be sufficient. In such a case, inciting the minority nationalities to rise in arm against the parent State on the pretext of exercise of the right to self-determination may amount to waging a proxy war against the parent State and may not serve the cause of freedom.
Terrorist States and international terrorist organisations who export violence in the name of helping small nationalities in their exercise of the right to self-determination always have their own axe to grind. They are out to victimise the small nationalities, once they break away from their parent State. One may argue that within the Russellian framework of World State neither will there be war nor proxy war. That the exercise of the principle of self-determination is to be under the aegis of the World State. Precisely so. But we have seen that other parameters cannot be ignored and new ones may come up. Although conventional global wars may be avoided, we cannot wholly rule out local conflict and terrorism as a form of local proxy war.

Russell is very clear on one point. The operation of the principle of self-determination is only one among many conditions of human freedom. For a given human group, freedom from foreign domination does not necessarily guarantee that other conditions for freedom will obtain. In the term ‘self-determination’, “self” denotes a people or human group, ‘determination’ means shaping their own destiny towards development and freedom. While external constraints to development and freedom must be removed, internal conditions must also be present. India and Pakistan got independence on the same day. Democracy takes its roots in India, while Pakistan always remains a victim of military plutocracy. Therefore, in the resolution of the conflict between the Nation State as an organisation and human freedom, the principle of self-determination must operate in harmony with other principles.
6.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION OF POWER

Russell also proposes the operation of the principle of centralisation and decentralisation of power to resolve the contradiction between social organisations and human freedom. Let us take the example of a Nation State. The sovereignty of Nation States to wage war is a threat to individual human freedom and survival of mankind as a whole. The resolution of the conflict is to be sought in the operation of the principle of centralisation. Nation States are to be divested of their power to make war. The power so displaced, or in other words, the power to use force in the relations among the Nation States will repose in a Central Authority in the form of transnational World State who will monopolise and use it strictly in accordance with the rule of law. This is centralisation. But in consonance with this principle of centralisation the principle of decentralisation will also operate. The World State will have only so much power as is compatible with the prevention of global war and impartial arbitration of international disputes strictly in accordance with the rule of law. On all other matters, the Nation States will be left free to decide their own affairs in accordance with their local genius. This is decentralisation of power.

Similarly, the helplessness individuals feel in modern mega States welded to modern techniques can be reduced if there is a devolution of State power to various kinds of bodies - geographical, industrial, educational, cultural, local - according to their functions. Individuals can then participate in decision making and shaping of events in these autonomous bodies with a sense of adventure and initiative. Thus Russell advocates the principle of federation aiming at displacement of powers from centres where power tends to accumulate and become oppressive.
Horizontal as well as vertical devolution of State power through democratically manageable bodies is Russell’s alternative model to the programme of abolition of State.

According to Russell, the principle of centralisation and decentralisation is operative in the resolution of the conflict between economic organisations and human freedom. Economic organisations, whether State owned or privately owned or corporates, must ensure the democratic participation of the workers to release their creativity in material production. This means following the principle of democracy in the management of economic organisations. The principle of democracy again implies the economic version of the right to self-determination. Here right to self-determination means that at all levels of an economic organisation from apex to the bottom those who work at any particular level should be able to decide on how best to work; their decision being commensurate to the level to which they belong. This again means decentralisation of power from the apex down to the bottom of an economic organisation. To the extent, co-ordination of work at different levels is necessary, centralisation may be necessary. To the extent initiative is necessary to generate creativity, decentralisation of power to all levels is also necessary.

Let us now attempt at giving a critique of the principle of centralisation and decentralisation as proposed by Russell.

The essence of the Russelian principle is that the volume of power of any social organisation must be commensurate with functional efficiency and democratic control through participation of the members of society, who directly or indirectly are affected by the operation of such power
dynamics. That is, an organisation must have only such intensity and extent of power as is necessary for its smooth functioning. The power reposed be such that those who are directly or indirectly affected by its operation must participate in the democratic control and exercise of such power. Any functionally redundant surplus power reposed in an organisation tends to be oppressive. Any such surplus power must be displaced and delegated where they are necessary.

Similarly within the body of an organisation, the volume of power at any level must be commensurate with functional efficiency and democratic control through participation by members of society who are directly or indirectly affected by the operation of such power dynamics. A process of concentration and diffusion of power upwards as well as downwards from the apex to the bottom must ensure displacement of functionally redundant but oppressive quantum of power at any point in the power axis running through a social organisation.

Let us now try to anticipate some of the problems the Russellian paradigm might face.

The fundamental problem arises from the very nature of power, on which Russell himself conducted a social analysis. The inherent nature of power is such that power tends to seek its own level. In Nature water seeks its own level further away from its source of origin downwards till it reaches the lowest level. In social organisations also power seeks its own level, but in a manner and direction opposite to what we find in Nature. Power always seeks its level upwards, coming back to its source of emanation but spiralling with an increased volume of power, otherwise power does not remain power
but loses its character. It is this peculiar character of power that makes it such a civilising as well as oppressive force, liberating as well as a binding force - a force at once social and material in the true sense. We agree with Russell that concentration as well as diffusion of power in accordance with the principles of functional efficiency and democratic control is the way to tame power. But the parameters that goes into defining of functional efficiency and democratic control is so complex that they are beyond the reach of the present state of Social Science.

6.5 THE PRINCIPLE OF SOCIALISM

According to Russell, the abolition of capitalism is a precondition of any emancipation of men from the constraints of economic organisations. This is because capitalism alienates man from (1) his work or the productive process (2) the fruits of productive process (3) technology (4) his fellow beings and (5) Nature. The abolition of capitalism and its replacement by socialism is a programme that Russell shares with all other schools of socialism. But he also differs from those schools on fundamental points. State Socialism is rejected because it merely replaces private by State bureaucratic control, which is more sinister and pervasive. Anarchism is rejected firstly because the anarchist programme of abolition of the State is self defeating and secondly because scarcity as a social category has put a question mark on the anarchist programme of distribution and production. Syndicalism is not accepted because in the absence of a Central Authority to act as the neutral arbiter, trades may wage war against each other and trades with more bargaining power may prey upon those with less bargaining power. And although Russell shares many things in common with Marx,
he differs from Marx in his doctrine that (1) the State will wither away 
(2) the abolition of capitalism and the State take over for the time being 
will lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat; even accepting that the 
dictatorship of the proletariat as conceived by Marx is in essence worker’s 
democracy.

But we have also seen that there are many points which Russell has 
in common with other schools of socialism. Thus, Russell’s liberal socialism 
has as one of its component the principle of democracy that those who 
produce must participate in the governance of the productive process. 
Another common component is the logical corollary of democracy, namely, 
that within vast economic organisations there must be self government for 
subordinate groups. In its attitude to science and technology, Russell’s 
liberal socialism like Marx’s could choose humanising science rather than 
scienticising men. Like Marx’s, Russell’s liberal socialism aims at 
humanisation of material production by humanely enduring the surd of 
necessity inherent in material production and by expanding creative leisure 
through shortening of working hours. Russell also shares Marx’s vision of 
versatile men by maintaining that oppressive division of labour necessitated 
by application of technology in production can be counteracted by ensuring 
mobility of labour through State labour training at the community’s cost. It 
may be observed here that Russell’s liberal socialism as a proposed solution 
to conflict between human freedom and economic organisation is an attempt 
at a synthesis of the best in the liberal tradition and the socialist humanist 
tradition. In the history of thought, it is one of the most remarkable attempt, 
to harmonise human creativity with order necessary for material production, 
democratic freedom with economic justice. Russell’s brilliance lies in that 
he gave the ongoing debate between two lines of thought a decisive turn,
transforming its polemical tenor into a quest for a model that will have the best of both.

What sharply differentiates Russell's liberal socialism from other schools of socialism is its attitude to the State and the means of production. The role of the State in Russell's liberal socialism depends on a number of components and principles, namely, (1) ownership (2) control (3) trusteeship (4) the principles of check and balance by allowing co-centres of power to exist.

To analyse how far Russell's liberal socialism is a viable solution, we have to analyse these components and principles.

Ownership may be understood in two senses; legal or nominal ownership and two, actual use or appropriation. Russell's proposal of State ownership of land and means of production means that the State must legally or nominally own without having actual use or control or appropriation. The reason is, if both ownership and control are reposed in the State, the State may become oppressive.

Control means actual use and management of the means of production including land. Control is to be exercised by a community of producers with the full participation of the workers in the management through their elected representatives. The management in different factories in a given industry are to be federated into a National Guild, who will ultimately look after the production and marketing of the industry as a whole.

As in the Gandhian framework, trusteeship is the moral element in Russell's liberal socialism. The State owns the means of production and
land, not for appropriation and use, but as a trustee on behalf of the citizen. The State nominally owns to make organisation of material production possible. The article of faith of trusteeship imposes a moral responsibility on the State not to encroach upon but to take care of the interests of the citizens. Here Russell's point is crystal clear. The introduction of the element of trusteeship rules out the State bureaucracy fattening itself on the community's wealth through the control, use and appropriation of the means of production and the land. The State may be an abstraction but the State bureaucracy and the managerial class is a concrete historical reality. Just as the individual citizen is to be protected against the rapacity of the private capitalists, he is to be protected against the encroachment by the State bureaucracy and the managerial class. How right Russell is on this point has been amply proved by the world wide communist experiment that happened in history.

Similarly, while the State nominally owns as a trustee, the Guilds would manage the means of production and land also as trustees for the community. They are to manage not for their self perpetuation but to protect the interests of the producers and be accountable to the community as a whole. Ultimately, trusteeship is on behalf of all the members of the community, who are, ipso facto, consumers. Russell's point here again is clear. The mode of ownership and the mode of management in material production is to be so organised as to ensure the release of creative freedom of the members of the society by conquering the constraints of material production as far as possible. All the structural and functional changes that Russell proposes are directed towards this end.
The element of trusteeship is reinforced by the presence of both the State and the Guild as two co-centres of power counterbalancing one another. The Guilds will see to it that the State does not encroach upon favourable conditions of production, and that producers get their due, especially gains from their own creative technological innovations. The State on its part will see to it that citizens are not taken to ransom through the exercise of the bargaining power of the Guilds. The basic idea is that two co-centres of power operating in their own spheres and mutually keeping vigil on each other's encroachments will render institutional dynamics less oppressive and more responsive to the needs of human freedom. Lest the two power centres become entirely independent of one another, there will be a form of centralisation of State power and the Guild. There will be a Joint Committee of Parliament representing the State and the Guild. The State represents the consumers, and the Guild represents the producers. The Joint Committee then represents both the State and the Guild. The Joint Committee will be above both in deciding problems of production and distribution. This is the principle of centralisation operating to ensure order. Thus the whole thrust of Russell's liberal socialism is to ensure creativity within order in material production. Freedom, but not anarchy, order but not regimentation is what Russell aims at. Apart from material production artistic creation is one realm where men's anarchic impulses can find expression in creative activities which defies any set order. But such artistic creations are possible only in a society that has solved the problem of combining individual creativity with social order, human freedom with the best form of governance. Thus the principle of democracy, the principle of self-determination, the principle of centralisation and decentralisation, the principle of check and balance have all to operate to make liberal socialism possible.
Given the above analysis, let us try to answer the following questions:

Was Russell right in holding that abolition of capitalism is a precondition for the emancipation of the individual from the stranglehold of economic organisations?

Is the institutional innovations suggested by Russell sufficient to ensure the triumph of liberal socialism?

The questions are such that it may not be possible to give conclusive answers. Here in this thesis, we suggest some tentative answers, keeping these as open ended questions.

Russell is right in his criticism of classical capitalism. He is also right in pointing out many irreconcilable conflicts between capitalism and human freedom. So was Marx. Here one may point out that Russell is talking about classical capitalism, red in tooth and claw. Neo-capitalism, the argument may continue, is capitalism with a human face. The oft quoted argument in defense of capitalism is that capitalism is self corrective and self regenerative in nature, that it is the only system most consistent with individual initiative, that its exploitative tendencies can gradually be reduced and that ultimately, only capitalism can secure the material conditions of human freedom. In fact after the collapse of what the economists call command economy in the erstwhile Soviet Union and East European countries, neo-capitalism is having its innings. The market has been extolled as the new God, the market force as the only emancipating force and the law of demand and supply that regulates the operation of market force more sacrosanct than the laws of Nature. There is, therefore, no need to abolish free enterprise, free trade and free competition. The high priests
of neo-capitalism are now triumphantly preaching from the pulpit that human freedom means free enterprise, free market and free competition. The human and material cost, if there be any, is too small a price to be paid for the system.

But in defense of Russell again, we may point out a number of considerations.

The market is never friendly to the poor of which the world, even including the advanced countries led by the USA, is full. It is universally acknowledged that those without purchasing power cannot enjoy freedom under the new dispensation. This means in cold statistics that more than three-fourths of mankind are yet to exercise their freedom.

The market is never environment friendly. Depletion of resources, degradation and pollution of the environment are a necessary part of the operation of the market forces. If profit from buying and selling is what matters, how does it matter if the environment is affected in the process? The advanced countries sharing more than seventy percent of the world’s wealth is responsible for most of environmental hazards for which countries of the Third World have become handy whipping boys.

The market is never value friendly. This ethical implications of the new economic order have not been worked out in detail. This is partly because of the fear of the new God, market, and also partly because of crisis of confidence among those who are yet to think in terms of alternative models. The implicit premise is that all is fair and good enough in business and money making. One is reminded of the character of Monsieur Verdoux
in Chaplin's film, MONSIEUR VERDOUX (1947). Here in this film, Monsieur Verdoux courts and kills his lady loves one by one, all for their properties. When he was caught, sentenced and about to be hanged, the prison warder asked him whether he felt any remorse for his crimes, his reply was "Nonsense! It was business!" Capitalism and its world of business allows any form of buccaneer. The market force also throws up bizarre commodities in its wake. For example, who could have imagined that violence could be such a fashionable saleable commodity, exportable all over the world? Or that the industries and merchants of death would be so successful in dumping their merchandise in the Third World countries for the materially and mentally impoverished people to eliminate one another.

Even assuming that purchasing power opens up a whole range of freedom, distribution of purchasing power in the new economic order is neither even nor just. The Third World with its immense resources and man power is deprived, simply because she is politically weak. The unjust status quo of the rich and the poor continues through perpetuation of existing concentration of wealth.

The contention that under the new economic order the workers are neither exploited nor deprived of opportunities of their creative expression does not hold water. It is now well known that although the workers in the advanced countries get a better deal than their counterparts in the Third World countries in their material incentives and better working facilities, this does not mean that there is no more exploitation. The extraction of surplus labour from the worker through improved technology may be even increased, without a corresponding equity in the distribution of the fruits of industry.
On the basis of these arguments, we think it reasonable to suggest that it is the same old soul of capitalism that is transmigrated in neo-capitalism, the same conflict with human freedom that continues in the new economic order. We therefore think that Russell is right in maintaining that to resolve the conflict between individual freedom and economic organisations, capitalism must be abolished.

Let us address ourselves to the second question. Russell’s institutional innovations are aimed at achieving radical effects through essentially democratic, reformative and time tested methods and principles. The idea is to have social change without irreparable institutional ruptures and social fissures. Russell is a radical thinker inspired by revolutionary vision. But in his political practice he is a pragmatist who would opt for legal, democratic and non-violent means rather than violent means. He distrusts violent revolutions, as most of them are revolutions betrayed. Where legal and constitutional means fail to change status quo and deliver social justice, Russell would choose non-violent civil disobedience rather than violent methods. His road to liberal socialism and the institutional dynamics he proposes to sustain material intellectual and spiritual freedom are all based on democratic time tested principles and methods. Russell’s article of faith seems to be that any experiment on social change must avoid playing with human life. Therefore, techniques of social change must avoid taking high risks and needless uncertainties.

The success of Russell’s institutional operatives with their corresponding structural and functional adjustment depends on a number of parameters.
The most fundamental of these is the quality of individual human beings who constitute the social system. After all, a social system is built up of living individual human beings, not of bricks and mortars. It is on these individuals that institutional operatives, their structural and functional adjustments ultimately depends. Their quality is what ultimately matters in the realisation of individual human freedom in a free society. But then what are the factors that go into the making of qualitatively improved human beings? Here again institutional dynamics play a great role. An individual can realise his potentialities, not in an isolated atomised existence, but in relation to his fellow beings and Nature. And an individual relates to his fellow beings and Nature always within an institutional framework. The whole process can be summed up in one sentence; men make institutions and institutions make men. This is not a vicious circle but a cyclical chain that goes into the shaping of human destiny. Any programme for realisation of long term social vision of human freedom and happiness must take into account this delicate cycle of chain interaction between individuals and institutions.

We now dwell upon yet another problem that Russell’s programme of liberal socialism might face.

One of fundamental components of Russell’s liberal socialism as well as Marx’s scientific socialism is the shrinking of working hour to give more leisure for creative expression and realisation of the best in the individual. Increased productivity of labour, because of technological revolution in material production and distributive justice in socialism, will make this possible. The Russellian and Marxian projections are valid provided there is no corresponding increase of human needs. If men’s needs
increase disproportionate to the productivity of labour due to technological innovation, then the working hour may remain constant or even increase. Men's needs must be kept within reasonable bounds so that the delicate balance of man, technology and Nature is not disturbed. Setting a reasonable limit to human wants is the spiritual condition in the absence of which it will be not possible to realise the kind of liberal socialism that Russell visualised. Satisfaction of genuine needs is essential to the realisation of the total man; creation of false needs is distortion of human nature. Man is neither to be reduced to a wantless animal, nor is he to be transformed to an insatiable consumer. Quest for human freedom and happiness, is, therefore, inseperable from quest for sustainable life style.

6.6 THE PRINCIPLE OF COSMIC PIETY

Russell's alternative to the dogmatic and passive acceptance of the dogmas of the Church is mental adventure into the mystery that is our Universe. Here we agree with Russell that our Universe is intrinsically valuable for the infinite beauty and mystery that it bestows on us. We also agree that pure contemplation on the beauty and mystery that constitute the fabric of the Universe can make a man feel free and wonderful. Wittgenstein's life is a living testament to this truth. Russell's considered opinion is that fidelity to truth and commitment to the enterprise of inquiry that embraces the whole of the Universe is the principle of cosmic piety that will replace Christianity. By fidelity to truth, Russell means knowing things as they are and communicating the knowledge to others without fear of persecution or reprisal. By commitment to inquiry, he means being inspired by the mystery of the Universe to probe deeper and deeper, the
commitment to follow the pathways of inquiry, no matter where it leads to, heaven or hell. It hardly matters, according to Russell, if our cherished dogmas get shattered in the process. If a man has cosmic piety, he can be free from the dogmas of religion and the domination of the Church.

While we agree with Russell on many points, we consider it pertinent to dwell on certain aspects of religious life and the Church. A religious life need not be a mere passive acceptance of dogmas. Just as one explores the Universe with the intellect, so also one may probe the Universe with the faculty of the spirit. One intellectually knows the Universe, but one may also spiritually experience the Universe. Russell himself has admitted this when he identifies three faculties inherent in human nature, namely instinct, intellect and spirit. An authentic religious life is ultimately based on spiritual experience. If religious teachings for example, teachings of Christ, are verified in the spiritual experience of the saints, we cannot straightaway reject them simply because they do not satisfy the specific rules of game of rationality. Who knows one day we may be able to find a convergence between the world as is known through the intellect and the world as is spiritually experienced, one complementing the other. But as far as the Church is concerned, it has persecuted not only scientists, free thinkers and agnostics, but also some of the finest saints and martyrs. It is also equally true that the Church subsequently canonised most of them as saints. The history of Church proves that whenever there is a conflict between the indomitable human spirit and the Church, it is the Church that mended its ways. The historic role of the Church had been to sustain the tension between the dynamics of the making of the saint and the process of conservation of their highly original individual spiritual experience within an institutional framework to serve as a beacon light for the future. In the
process, the Church has tended to become oppressive as all custodians are. But the Church had also performed the thankless job of discriminating between the genuine and the fake, the true adventure of the spirit from aberrations and had thus helped the spiritual evolution of man.

It is also necessary to make some observations on the relation between faith and the freedom of thought. For any commitment, be it intellectual or spiritual, some form of faith is necessary. Thus, our commitment to know the world presupposes a faith in the rules of game of rationality. Such a faith is not derived from a pragmatic success of the rules of the game, but is rather at its basis. Similarly, some kind of faith is at the basis of men's spiritual experience of the world. Russell himself had this faith that sustained him in his intellectual quest, fight against war, campaign for nuclear disarmament and fight for academic freedom. In his Autobiography Russell tells us how he inherited this faith from his grandmother:

I have realized more and more the importance she had in moulding my outlook on life. Her fearlessness, her public spirit, her contempt for convention, and her indifference to the opinion of the majority have always seemed good to me and have impressed themselves upon me as worthy of imitation. She gave me a Bible (emphasis mine) with her favourite texts written on the fly-leaf. Among these was 'Thou shalt not follow a multitude to do evil'. Her emphasis upon this text led me in later life to be not afraid of belonging to small minorities (emphasis mine). *

Thus, although Russell criticised the dogmas of the Church and on many points his criticisms were valid, it is also true that throughout his life he was sustained by a faith, not altogether unlike the Christian faith.

Russell is also right in maintaining that freedom from fear is an essential component of freedom and that fear cannot be conquered by simply conjuring up a make believe world, as such a world is bound to collapse sooner or later. He is also right in maintaining that the real solution lies in understanding the true nature of man and man's rightful place in the Universe. But Russell is not the only philosopher who discover this truth. Before the birth of Christ, the Sakyamuni Gotama the Buddha declared that (1) man is the maker of his own destiny (2) his destiny is the state of Buddhahood, a state free from fear or desire, attainable by every individual (3) the state is attained by seeing through the fabric of existence, knowing one's nature and place in it. Here a crucial debate may centre around the interpretation of human nature and man's rightful place in the Universe. The theist still has the argument that men's relation to God is one of love, not of fear. He may further argue that human nature and the Universe are ultimately founded on God, that understanding man and his place in the Universe is not complete till his relation to God is understood. He may cite the living spiritual experience of saints and mystics as his ground. When insisted upon following the rules of rationality, he may reply that his rules of the game are different. He may even retort that to insist on the rules of rationality only in our encounter with human nature and the Universe is neither logically warranted nor practically justifiable.

We also agree with Russell in holding that fear of death can be conquered by realising love and beauty in this life. But here again, Russell
is not the lone pioneer. Manipuri Vaishnavism as a way of life, for example, is a celebration of love and beauty, here in this life, in this world. In love and beauty as perennial values, Manipuri Vaishnavism finds a convergence point between this world and the other world. Similarly, Govinda Anagarika Lama finds the eternal values of compassion and beauty enshrined in Buddhism. A beautiful flower is to be valued, the Lama says because in such a transitory existent, eternal beauty is reposed. 9

Russell’s contention that fear of sin can be conquered by understanding the psychic mechanism that gave rise to the sense of guilt can be sustained by contemporary researches into recesses of human mind. But it will be unfair to attribute this research solely to the psycho-analytic tradition of Freud, Adler and Jung only. In India for example, there had been deeper probes into the recesses of consciousness arriving at results that can confound any contemporary psycho-analyst. The Vedanta for example clearly holds that there is no sin but error only.

We also agree with Russell that a good life need not necessarily be a religious life in the conventional sense. But it is also equally true that a religious life need not be a formal one of empty rituals only. It may be a life of living spiritual experience in which one embraces the whole Universe as well as transcends the Universe. According to Russell, a good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge. To be good and to do good, which is a way of realising a man’s freedom, love is the driving force and knowledge is the means. Those who can do good to their fellow beings and the world may not do so if they do not have love for them. Those who love their fellow beings and the world may not be able to do good to them, if they do not have knowledge. Thus both love and knowledge are essential
to good life. Swami Vivekananda succinctly makes the same point by saying, a real man is one who has the heart of a Buddha and the intellect of a Sankara.* Here it may be pointed out that love introduces new rules of game other than rules of rationality, since no rationale can justify love. Love is an absolute commitment, not conditional on any rules of rationality.

6.7 THE PRINCIPLE OF LIBERAL EDUCATION

Russell's proposal for a radical reorientation of the goal of education to advance the cause of human freedom deserves serious attention. Education is to aim at (1) the fullest development of the individual faculties (2) the emergence of children as the free citizens of the Universe and (3) preparing the individual for the joy of mental adventure in exploring the Universe. To achieve these ends, there must (1) a spirit of reverence of the child as an end in himself and for what he can become (2) disengagement of the ends of education from the political, religious or economic motives of the State, the Church and economic organisations. (3) loyalty to mankind, human unity and freedom is to replace loyalty to the State (4) intervention of the World State to ensure this loyalty (5) conquest of love of uniformity (6) freedom of education from bureaucratic control and to this effect creative localisation of education (7) inculcation of scientific spirit and the principle of devolution in education (8) humane solution of economic needs in liberal socialism so that education need not be hooked to competition arising out of economic needs. (9) freedom of choice in training in vocation (10) hope and not fear to inspire educational and social institutions.

Russell is right in maintaining that if cultivation of the faculties of the individual and unfoldment of the best in him is the end of education, the conflict between educational organisations and individual human freedom will be resolved to a large extent. Educational organisations will no longer impose their extraneous ends on the individuals while educating them. The crucial point here is how to make the State, the Church and the economic organisations who are running their own educational organisations accept the ends of education as visualised by Russell. The State will always run and control educational organisations for its own end. The Church is still using its educational organisations to inculcate religious dogmas. Likewise economic organisations gear educational organisations run by them to their economic ends. Under these circumstances, realisation of the Russelian ends of education depends on obtaining a number of parameters. Thus, training children to become free citizens of the Universe is possible under the aegis of a World State that will act as a limitation to State power. The State sponsoring of the Russelian brand of liberal education will depend on whether the State is truly democratic and enlightened, one which believes that the making of the free individual is the basis on which the functioning of a free democratic, modern State depends. Again, education may be freed of the oppressive dynamics of economic competition if Russell’s liberal socialism is realised. In the earlier chapters we have already discussed problems about obtaining these parameters. Apart from this where private organisations are allowed to experiment in education, the mode of their funding has influenced considerably their conception of the goals and methods of education. In the contemporary scenario, where the working of educational organisations are left to the operation of market forces, hopes of providing the Russelian brand of liberal education to children are receding in the background.
6.8 LOVE, TRANSCENDENCE AND THE FAMILY

We have discussed Russell’s proposal for State intervention on behalf of the child, women and other weaker sections against the constraints of a patriarchal, male dominated family.

We have also discussed why Russell favoured State intervention in family on eugenic principles for breeding improved human being with better capacities for freedom. This intervention is to be supplemented by the World State intervening in the population policy of States so that States may not use demographic warfare and the science of eugenics against each other. In other words, the World State is to make the State intervention in family one on behalf of world citizenship. Now we will discuss the principle of love and the principle of transcendence as proposed by Russell to resolve the conflict between family as an institution and individual human freedom.

We may again very briefly put Russell’s argument as follows:

It is in the relation of love that men and women can realise their freedom transcending the limitations of their egos. Love in essence is a relation men and women enter into on their own, exercising their freedom of choice, free from economic as well as procreational compulsions. Gender equality arising out of economic emancipation of women following industrial revolution on the one hand and optional conception following contraception on the other, has made it possible for a women to exercise her freedom of choice in love. Now marital, pre-marital and extramarital love is possible for a women. A woman can love many men just as a man can love many women. Such love which may include sexuality need not
conflict with family system. The reason is, the essence of the family system is certainty of paternity and this can always be assured, because by contraception a woman can choose impregnation by her husband only, despite many lovers she may have. Thus love, a fundamental expression of freedom may co-exist side by side with certainty of paternity, which is the essence of family system. Only the conception of chastity as enshrined in the conventional morality is to change.

What Russell is suggesting in effect, is that both adultery and fidelity to paternity in marriage can be accommodated within the relation of love. What is required to make this possible is only a new sex morality that has its basis on freedom of choice in love and sex, that sexual relation is always justified when both partners are willing, be it before, within or outside marriage.

There can be little difference of opinion with Russell in maintaining that man and woman, husband and wife relation must be fundamentally one of love. He is also right in holding that love between men and women must not be conditioned by any extraneous factor. But here also, Russell is not the only philosopher who maintains this. Marx had also said man woman relation is the most natural human relation. But on the nature of commitment in love, and on the operation of the principle of love vis-a-vis the family as a social institution, one may differ with Russell. One may maintain quite cogently that love in men and women relation is indivisible, that the commitment is total and lifelong. Love is a pure emotion of losing oneself in the other or rather to put the same in another way, love is finding oneself in the other. From this one may further argue that marriage be based on love and being so founded in love derives the absolute character of its
commitment from love. Russell is right in maintaining that a man or a woman must be free to walk out of a loveless marriage to find love elsewhere. He may also be right in maintaining that a boy and a girl are free to love each other and commit pre-marital sex out of love only, provided they avoid pregnancy which involves other moral responsibilities. But here individual freedom is realised by negating the institution of family, not in harmony with it. Likewise, a man and a woman may decide to live in, avoiding child birth. Here love and sexuality is thoroughly disengaged from the traditional function of the family. In these cases, the tension between love as expression of individual freedom and family as a social institution is not resolved but simply dissolved by cutting the gordian knot. This is not exactly what Russell wants, for, unlike Plato, Russell never believes that the State is a substitute to the family to regulate biological reproduction. He aims at a harmony between love as freedom and family as social organisation. He does this by stipulating that while love as freedom can be one-many, many-one or even many-many relation, let biological reproduction within marriage be one-to-one relation only through conception. Here one wonders why Russell should make biological certainty of paternity so sacrosanct especially when he has gone so far in quest of love as freedom. After all, paternity can be transformed to a cultural function as authentically as it is a biological function. Russell opines that if a man or a woman loves freely within marriage without the need for extra-marital relation, this is a happy situation and under these circumstances marriage is one of best things that can happen in an individual’s life. But if somehow, husbands and wives, feel like falling in love out of wedlock to express their freedom, (this despite the Russellian stipulation that marriage is to be based on freedom of love) they are advised to keep fidelity to marriage through contraception. The question naturally arises; why should husband
and wife clinging on to the marital relation in that case? If love is as serious a relation as marriage and vice versa, involving a total commitment of being, insisting on a one-to-one relation in the one must also imply the same in the other. Otherwise partners may not be able to carry on their relationship with as much authenticity as Russell would desire it to be.

Considerations of love and authenticity lead us to the issue of divorce which is Russell’s solution to an unhappy marriage, which each partners feel can no longer be sustained without encroaching upon each other’s freedom. It may appear at first sight that Russell is right in suggesting divorce in extreme cases of marriage turned sour which both parties mutually agree to terminate. But as we reflect further more problems appear. So long as husbands and wives adhere to the principle of the Church that marriage is an irrevocable sacrament, joining of flesh to flesh, bone to bone, there was a stability about marriage which is socially desirable. It is universally acknowledged that the love, warmth and togetherness of the parents is very congenial to the healthy growth of child, for which there are little substitutes. Russell himself had stated this at many places, stipulating that moral responsibility to the child is one fundamental reason to avoid divorce as far as possible. But if divorce is made optional on the mutual agreement of the partners, the stability of marriage is seriously affected to the detriment of the rights of child and consequently the fabric of the society. There is no doubt that freedom is valuable in itself, but so are the moral parameters of the exercise of freedom in real life situations. Unfortunately for us mortals, love, freedom and responsibility are not variables which can be easily quantified. In concrete decisions of divorce, it is extremely difficult to identify how much is due to lack of love or exercise of freedom of choice or disregard of the moral parameters of choice.
Thus, although it is never Russell's intentions, one possible consequence of Russell's new sex morality may be to render divorce fashionable in the name of freedom. As things are now in the Western societies, partners are getting divorced even for snoring loudly in sleep. Break up of family is really threatening the fabric of Western societies. A society that fought for freedom to divorce is now busy organising counselling centres for persuading married couples not to divorce! The real solution has to be, love, freedom and stability of marriage co-existing together.

Russell's principle of transcendence is yet another quest for this real solution. Russell is right in observing that the problem of divorce and stability of marriage is there in the Western world mainly because freedom has come to be associated with individuality so much so that men and women conceive their freedoms and identities in terms of their individualities only. His solution that men and women must transcend their individuality in their relation has a religious fervour.

From their love of one another, man and woman move to the love of the child. Love of the child again leads to love of the community and the future mankind to which the child belongs. It thus embraces the destiny of mankind and whole of the Universe. Love which begins as a unique relation of individuals is universalised. Russell is right in holding that the principle of transcendence universalises love. Love and sexuality as expression of love are freed of narrow instinctive cycle. Love becomes a deep, serious and spiritual emotion that can embrace the whole Universe. Only love so conceived can resolve the tension between individual freedom and family. This dimension of Russellian thought has many things in common with the mystic tradition of the East.
To sum up, we have identified and examined the Russellian principles of conflict resolution. We have dwelt at length on the points where we see eye to eye with Russell. We have also noted that the Russellian resolutions give rise to certain problems and paradoxes. The concluding chapter will take care of these, while pointing out the possibilities the Russellian resolutions hold out for the future.