CHAPTER FIVE

THE RESSELLIAN RESOLUTION OF
THE CONFLICT OF FREEDOM
AND ORGANISATION
CHAPTER FIVE

THE RESSELLIAN RESOLUTION OF
THE CONFLICT OF FREEDOM
AND ORGANISATION

CHAPTER FOUR was devoted to Russell’s formulation of the conflict of freedom and organisation. CHAPTER FIVE will now be devoted to an exposition of Russell’s proposed resolution of the conflict vis-a-vis (1) the State (2) economic organisations (3) the Church (4) educational organisations and (5) the family.

5.1 RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE STATE AND FREEDOM

Earlier, we have given a detailed exposition of how, according to Russell, the State as the repository of force comes into conflict with human freedom. Now we will study the Russellian solutions towards resolution of the conflict.

The Russellian resolution of the conflict, first of all, centres around the issue of the taming of the force. Russell’s solution is that the State as an institution of force must be tamed and the State can be tamed by rule of law. The Russellian argument in defense of the taming of the force and his programme towards the realisation of this goal may be presented as follows.
5.1.1 RULE OF LAW

Force cannot wholly be abolished from the affairs of men as yet. Given the existing level of mankind’s development, it is undesirable that force be altogether abolished. In the absence of a Central Authority as the sole repository of force, there will be many centres of force contending against one another. This will be a society of one against all, all against one and each against the other, a state of Nature as Hobbes had said, where life is ‘solitary brutish, nasty and short’. In a free for all society nobody is free from individual predators using private armies against other members of the society and preying upon the weak. The evolution of a sole repository of force in the form of the State is therefore a great advance from the free for all society, where there are many centres of force. The transition from multipolarity of force to unipolarity of force is a big advance forward towards the taming of force. For, force can now be used only to prevent greater occurrence of force and that can be the only justification. In this sense, the State force has a civilising influence and this is what Hegel intended to convey when he pointed out the spiritual character of the State.

But what about the State itself as an institution of force having sway over the life, liberty and property of citizens?

The Russelian solution to this problem is as follows:

Whenever and wherever State force is used, such an use of force must be brought under the rule of law. That is to say, all uses of State force, without exception are to be brought under the rule of law.
Even the State use of force under rule of law must be reduced as far as practicable by reducing the occasions for the actual use of force.

Where force is actually used, the degree of force used may be rendered as small as possible.

Society may ultimately converge toward a stage where force is no longer necessary without relapsing into the lawless anarchy of the primitive times. There is the possibility that such a society will be to some extent above law, where the advantages now secured by the law are secured without loss of freedom, and without the disadvantages which the law and the police render inevitable.

The principle of rule of law implies among other things, impartial use of force. It means that parties to a conflict must not be the ones to decide when, how and where to use force. It also means that parties to a conflict are not the best judge to decide when to use force. Conflicts between individual citizens, between groups as well as associations must be submitted to the impartial arbitration of a neutral authority. Not only the conflict between individuals, but the conflict between the State and the individual in matters of their right to life, liberty and pursuit of happiness is also to be brought under the rule of law. No citizen is to be deprived of their right to life liberty and property without due process of law.

While offering rule of law as a solution to the use of State force against human freedom. Russell is aware of the fact that laws are made by men and as such laws reflect the existing domination of one class by another. Law is always on the side of status quo. Marx has said that behind every
legal enactment, there lurks the interest of the propertied class. Russell also opines that the rich derives maximum benefit from law and order. Therefore, rule of law in many instances is opposed to social change and progressive force aiming at social justice and freedom. Russell points out that this need not be always so. Rule of law can be a peaceful vehicle of social change and made to serve the cause of freedom, provided, law follows the changing balance of forces in society. By this Russell means to say that in the affairs of men, there is a contention between the forces of status quo and the forces of progress. The forces of progress and freedom is morally in the right and this rightness generates forces that tilts the balance of forces in favour of progress and freedom. Law must follow the changing balance of forces to be on the side of progress and freedom.

Thus, the Russellan paradigm is; unipolarity of force in the form of the State as the sole repository of force prevailing over all other forces in the society; the State force in turn controlled by rule of law, which in turn follows the changing balance of forces and balance of forces ultimately tilting in favour of what is morally right.

The taming of the State force through the rule of law is not complete if the operation of the principle is confined only to the internal use of force, that is, to the use of force within the territory of the State. The force reposed in the State is absolute, i.e. internally the State can use force against any individual or association within its territory and externally against any other State. This absolute character of State force is its sovereignty. At the present stage of development of mankind, there is not one State, but there are many States in the world. And each of them is sovereign. Each of them is free to use force against the other, at least
theoretically. Here Russell discovers a contradiction that runs through the heart of the State system, resolution of which is crucial to human freedom. Internal use of State force is brought under rule of law, but the external use is not. The State force is to end anarchy within the State, but the absolute character of the State force leads to international anarchy in the relations of States to one another. The State system is to ensure the unipolarity of force to be tamed and legitimised by rule of law. But the State system has also given rise to multipolarity of force in the relation of States with one another. The existence of many States as absolute centres of force following rule of law in the internal use of force, but expediency and self interest in the use of force against one another, is the contradiction at the heart of the State system. In this free for all State of anarchy, war is the last resort to resolve the differences or conflicts between States. This external anarchy leads to internal anarchy. Warring States are bound to suspend internal operation of the rule of law and thus violate human freedom. Therefore, there is no freedom without rule of law, and no rule of law unless its operation is complete. And the operation is not complete till it extends to the relations of States with one another. The rule of law seeking its own level strives towards unipolarity of force in international relations, a sole repository of force above the States exercising monopoly over the use of force and imposing rule of law in the relations of States. This Central Authority Russell calls World State.

In the quest of control of the dynamics of the State for the cause of freedom, operation of the principle of rule of law leads to the principle of World State.
5.1.2 WORLD GOVERNMENT

The World Government that Russell has in mind will have as of prime importance the monopoly of institutional forces, the armed forces. He maintains that the function of the World Government is to prevent war and it should have only such powers as are necessary to this end. He also rightly points out that this involves a monopoly of armed force, a power to sanction and revise treaties and the right to give decision in disputes between States.

The World Government will have judicial power to arbitrate between nations, if necessary even to the extent of transfer of territories. Nations will then resolve their differences not through the use of force but through the arbitration of a neutral body instituted by the World Government.

The use of force or war as a method of conflict resolution among the States is now deadly or counterproductive as war can cost mankind the tree of life. Science and technology have placed so much destructive forces at the disposal of States that the contention of forces will lead to the annihilation of mankind. To live or not to live - that is the choice before mankind. To be free, men must live; for men to live force must be tamed, to tame force, force must be brought under rule of law; to bring force under rule of law private use of force must be prevented. To prevent private use of force, there must be one single authority authorised to use force in a neutral and impartial manner. The use of force by this single authority having sole monopoly over force can then be brought under rule of law consented to by people whose lives are affected by exercise of such force. The taming of force by rule of law is not complete unless force is ultimately reposed in the World Government who will exercise it impartially in
accordance with the rule of law. Thus, World State is one of Russell's reply to State power, in defense of human freedom and survival.

To prove that the World State is not just a dream, Russell advances what can be called the structural argument. The sum total of material forces released through revolutions in science and technology, mankind's institutional and structural achievement have made the establishment of a World Government a structurally viable project. The argument is, man's political and social intelligence should be commensurate with the amount of material force released through man's contemplative and manipulative intelligence.

Russell further argues that once concentration of force in World Government is achieved, it will be freed of internal as well as external threat. The monopoly of force will render rebellion impossible. Freed of the need to use force, actual occasions of its use will gradually diminish. In most cases the mere threat will be enough for a World Government to implement its decisions.

On the other hand, the World Government would base its decisions on arbitration by neutral bodies. The practice of submitting dispute to arbitration would increase. So is the realisation that the supposed conflicts of interest between different States are mainly illusory. The benefits resulting from the substitution of law for anarchy would become obvious. Hence international Government would acquire an unquestioned authority and States would not rebel against its decisions. Once this moral authority is established, international order can safely depend on moral authority
and respect for law. The use of forces in the form international army and
navy would become unnecessary. Thus the sum and substance of the
Russellian arguments is, the spiralling interplay of forces leading to absolute
concentration in World Government is to end the use of force once and for
all. The aim of force is to end force. The World Government for Russell,
therefore, is not an end, but an instrument for the survival of mankind and
guarantee of the civilized values of life which are ultimately founded on
the freedom of the creative individual.

This Russellian analysis of the dynamics of State power demystified
the mystique that is commonly associated with the sovereignty of the States,
now to be brought under the rule of law. The principle of rule of law leads
to the principle of World Government, both in turn points to the right to
self-determination. If the taming of State sovereignty through World
Government is part of the operation of the rule of law, then the same
dynamics demands that the belongingness of a human group to a State
system be given the freedom of choice and this freedom of human groups
to shape their destinies be considered an inalienable part of the freedom of
the individual belonging to the groups. Sovereignty is no longer sacrosanct
nor are the territories a State acquired through might or diplomacy. The
principle of sovereignty is to be subject to the imperatives of the survival
of mankind, the unity of mankind, the rule of law, changing the unjust
status quo and the individual freedom or the realisation of the best human
nature is capable of. Thus if neither sovereignty nor territory is sacrosanct,
then the right of people to self-determination shines in its intrinsic merit.
5.1.3 SELF-DETERMINATION

The right to self-determination means according to Russell;

... if the well being of the citizens were the end in view, the question whether a certain area should be included, or should form a separate state, would be left freely to the decision of that area.*

So far all great States are almost invariably opposed to the exercise of the right to self-determination by small nationalities. Nothing but defeat in war has induced States to part with territory. This is because great States had colonised small nationalities through conquest and unequal treaties. They had always wanted to increase their power, especially power in war by inclusion of unwilling citizens. Added to this, the old superstition that the desire for independence from a State system on the part of a human group or nationality is high treason and must be strenuously resisted, still persists. Therefore, great States have been prison houses of unwilling citizens. If the well being of people were the end of the States, they could be left freely to carve out their own destiny. If the right to self-determination of nationalities were granted, one of the main reasons of war would be obviated and State tyranny against the freedom of nationalities and individuals constituting the nationalities, would be removed.

Let us analyse further the Russellian the principle of the right to self-determination as a solution to the conflict of the State power and

* Russell, Bertrand, Principles Of Social Reconstruction, p.45
human freedom. Russell's argument is, if the dynamics of State power is brought under rule of law to be sanctioned and enforced by World State, then the boundaries of States can be made co-terminus with the people or peoples willing to constitute that particular Nation State. State boundaries will no longer be prison walls of captive nationalities, who happen to be there through accidents of History such as conquest, unequal treaties or instruments of accession. How many States there are in the world will depend on how many people are there willing to constitute themselves into a Nation on the basis of an instinctive sense of belongingness and not on the fluctuating tilts of the balance of power. Nor will the increase in the number of States be chaotic, since each will be divested of sovereignty if by sovereignty is to be meant the right to the use of external force. In the Russellian scenario, States will be administrative units constituted by a people having a common bond (for whatever reason) exercising absolute freedom in the release of individual as well as collective creativity, but without the authority to use external force against other States. States will be independent but not sovereign. That is to say, States will be free to develop in accordance with their individual genius, but not sovereign enough to have the final say over the life and death of other States through exercise of external force. The independence of States so visualised will be different from the autonomy envisaged at present by big States, superpowers and even the United Nations, which is a sham autonomy, a lip service to freedom. In the Russellian new world order where the principle of right to self-determination will apply, the world will be both multipolar as well as unipolar. That is to say, having as many centres of growth as there are local diversities and only one centre as far as repose of force is concerned. The principle will be in harmony with the survival of mankind since creation of new States will not precipitate a world war, as State are ipso facto
divested of external use of force. Nor does it rule out unity of mankind as amalgamation of States through the mutual consent of peoples is also not ruled out. The principle will operate strictly in conformity with the rule of law as claims and counterclaims of peoples in the exercise of right to self-determination can be decided in accordance with a truly impartial international court of Justice under the aegis of World Government. The operation of the rule of law in the control of force will promote a just world order since law, not to be stagnant must not side with unjust status quo, but must rather advance along with the emerging forces of liberation. It is thus that the principle of self-determination will resolve the conflict between the dynamics of State power and freedom of human group, and in turn, become an inalienable part of individual freedom. Freedom means realisation of the best human nature is capable of and the best things come from within the individual - they are such things as creative art, love and thought. The individual can realise the best only in a community which is free. And no community is free until and unless it can shape its own destiny without external constraints.

5.1.4 CENTRALISATION AND DECENTRALISATION

Russell's advocacy of the principle of the right to self-determination makes it amply clear that in the resolution of the conflict between State power and human freedom, he makes use of two opposite but complementary principles; the principle of concentration of power and the principle of devolution of power, the principles of centralisation and decentralisation. If centralisation of force in the World Government is a necessary condition of human survival and hence of freedom,
decentralisation or diffusion of power is a must lest men be overwhelmed by mega structures. It has already been pointed out that vastness of modern States have created individual helplessness even in democracies where even popular will operates like the forces of Nature, taking its own toll. This is because in vast modern States, most men can find little outlet for initiative except in subordinate organisations formed for specific purposes. Russell rightly points out that without an outlet for political initiative, men lose their social vigour and their interest in public affairs. They become a prey to corrupt wire-pullers or sensation mongers who have the art of capturing a tired and vagrant attention. Russell’s solution to this is the principle of decentralisation or devolution of State power.

Decentralisation may take two forms; one, devolution of the many of the non-essential functions of the State to voluntary organisations, two, devolution of the essential powers of the State, legislative, judiciary and executive powers from the apex to the bottom.

Coming to the first form of devolution, Russell rightly points out that many of the non-essential functions of the State may be given away to voluntary organisations without any loss of efficiency. Education is one such. The sphere of material production is another. Religion yet another sphere. Pursuit of art, science, knowledge, sports and such other areas of human excellence be better left with voluntary organisations. Similar is the case with political activities also. Scope for political activities must be given to voluntary organisations of concerned people.

Modern States have been encroaching almost on all areas of human activity. And take over by mega-States means takeover by impersonal mega
bureaucracy in which case individual feels helpless and is unable to find a level of participation at which he can take individual initiative. Rather than increasing the function of the States, these functions should be delegated to various bodies formed voluntarily for specific purposes. In voluntary organisations where individuals come together of their own free will, each individual is able to take initiative and find his own level of participation. The functions that the State can perform in a cumbersome, bureaucratic and oppressive manner can now be performed by voluntary organisations more freely and efficiently. As members of voluntary organisations, they can take initiative and experience the exercise of their creativity. The State can then assume the role of a federal authority or a court of arbitration. The State would then confine itself to insisting upon some settlement of rival interests, that may arise among various organisations working more or less in the same field. The principle the State is to follow in deciding what is the right settlement would be an attempt to find the measure most acceptable on the whole, to all the parties concerned. Thus, freedom and organisation can be combined by securing power for voluntary organisations, consisting of men who have chosen to belong to them because they embody some purpose which all their members consider important, not a purpose imposed by accident or outside force. The State, being geographical, cannot be wholly voluntary association. For this very reason, there is need of a strong public opinion to restrain it from a tyrannical use of its powers. This public opinion in most matters can only be secured by combinations of those who have certain interests or desires in common. These independent organisations who have taken over the positive purposes of the State, should be left completely free so long as they satisfied the State that they were not falling below a necessary minimum. For example, in elementary and higher education, the State on
behalf of the citizens has a right to insist on these institutions that a minimum standard be maintained. Apart from this these organisations should be left free to carry on their own work.

In the economic sphere, i.e., in the sphere of material production, the State ought to exercise control. But the real activity of material production must be left to the initiative of the community of producers. Russell certainly is not in favour of command economy, State socialism so to say. But he is not for free for all competition of the laissez faire theory. He is in favour of giving freedom to a community of producers whose members co-operate freely, as far as practicable, for the purposes of material production. The more freedom is given to voluntary organisations to work; the more opportunities of initiative there are and share of initiative to each individual. The State can act as the arbiter exacting efficiency, minimum standard and securing amicable settlement of disputes, whether within or without its borders.

Let us proceed to the second form of devolution of power, namely, decentralisation of the essential powers of the State vis-a-vis the World State.

The State structure represents a power axis having many centres of power which are related to one another vertically as well as horizontally. As part of the State structure, every centre in the axis must have as much volume of power as is commensurate with functional efficiency. Otherwise, they cannot perform. And each centre of power must operate democratically, ensuring the participation of the members of society who are directly or indirectly affected by the dynamics of the power centre.
Democratic participation of all the members of society in the power centres is one of the counterforces against State power in defense of human freedom. No centre of power must concentrate surplus volume of power in excess of what is commensurate with functional efficiency. The reason is, any functionally redundant quantum of power at any point in the power axis tends to be oppressive, ultimately leading to worship of power as an end in itself. Hence such surplus but oppressive volume of power accumulated in any centre of power must be displaced either vertically or horizontally or both so that power be delegated to centres where it is bound to be controlled democratically. Thus, prevention of anarchy and functional compatibility decide the quantum of power to be concentrated at various levels. Considerations of democratic control of power, on the other hand, decide the quantum of power to be delegated to different centres.

Russell’s favourite example, the case of the sovereignty of Nation States as related to war. War is the greatest enemy of freedom and war affects all mankind. Hence Nation States must be divested of their power to make war. The power so displaced, or in other words, the power to use force in the relation among the Nation States will repose in a Central Authority in the form of trans-national World Government who will monopolise and use it strictly in accordance with the rule of law. Unless force is so concentrated in the World Government, mankind faces the peril of extinction. Here, the imperatives of survival and of freedom dictate that use of force be solely reposed with the World Government. But the World Government will have only so much power as is compatible with the prevention of global war and impartial arbitration of international disputes in accordance with the rule of law. Beyond this, no power should be concentrated in the World Government. Nation States should be left free to run their own local affairs.
Within the nation States, the power to enforce rule of law and control of private use of force must solely repose with the State. Thus, while monopoly of force reposed with the State, the *modus operandi* may be such as to transform the monolithic character of the State. The actual exercise of impartial State power to counter private violence may be through local policing bodies, where people at the grass roots can identify themselves with the law enforcing agency as their own brethren. This will render use of State power not only impartial, but also transparent subjecting it to democratic check and balances through voluntary participation of the citizens at the grassroots level. Similarly, there are functions which only a State Central Authority can fulfil. Communication is one such. For example, in a vast country like India only the Central Government can invest on communications infrastructure, as returns on these infrastructure is invisible, slow and a long process. Only the long arms of the State can maintain and protect communication network running through vast regions and territories. Indian railways is one of the biggest public undertaking in the world. It is able to cater to the demands of the nation, look after the interests of the poor and weaker sections of the society, simply because it is State run.

Currency is another subject on which only a Central Government must have the sole monopoly. This is because only a Central Government can ensure and guarantee a universal medium of exchange which is necessary for distribution of commodities and social division of labour within a country. With the emergence of global economy and a just world division of labour, that day may dawn when the whole of mankind have one single currency.
Apart from these subjects on which centralisation is necessary either because they concern the whole mankind or the whole citizens, governance of local affairs is best left to the local people concerned. The central Government at the apex, who will act as the federal authority will have smaller units as constituents. From the apex there will be a devolution of administrative, legislative and judicial powers down the line, till it reaches the bottom at grassroots level of the village. Let us take the example of a vast country like India. She is a land of cultural, religious, racial, ethnic and regional diversities. A strong Central Government is necessary as the impartial arbiter and as the centre of centripetal force holding together various constituent units in common interest. But again, too much centralization will lead to the negation of the identity and initiative of the constituent units, leading to a loss of their freedom for self governance. Thus we have a Central Government representing the whole nation and a State Government representing local diversities and power to self governance of the constituent States. There is a federal devolution of power from the Centre to the State. Within the constituent States, there are regional and local diversities. The local people of this level need the power of self governance in local affairs that basically concern them and of which they are the best judge. Only thus can they have the freedom of democratic participation, initiative and the feeling of participation in the shaping of their own destiny. Therefore, there is the devolution of the powers of the State Government down the line to the local bodies at the district, block and village level. The panchayati-raj or the empowerment of the elective body at the village level is a good example of devolution of State power. There can be various forms of devolution of State power, through which the Leviathan is not chained but harnessed and creatively diffused. The Russelian paradigm is a devolution of power from the World State to the
Nation State, down the line to the federating units to the district, county and village level. The devolution can again be a horizontal functional devolution of the non-essential functions of the State through intermediary structures. Russell's argument in favour of the principle of devolution of power is that the principle in itself is a solution to the conflict of the State and human freedom. To sum up his arguments all over again:

The State power tends to concentrate and become an end in itself and power dynamics gathering its own momentum is oppressive and a danger to human freedom. A counterforce to this is the principle of functional commensurability which states that in the power axis around which hinges the destiny of mankind, from the World State at the apex to the Nation States down the line, to State structures at the village level - no surplus power should be accumulated in any of the centres in the axis than is commensurate with functional efficiency.

Individuals can take initiative at a level of social organisation corresponding to his capacity and means. Effective participation at the decision making process at such level make him feel that he is shaping his destiny and exercising his creative freedom. Therefore there must be devolution of power at all these levels of participation so that the individual may overcome his sense of impotence in the presence of the gigantic State structure, take initiative and experience the freedom of creative choice in decision making.

The guiding principle behind the devolution of power is that no individual or community be subjected to a decision arising out of a decision making process to which the individual or the community is not a party. Decision making is best left to the concerned people or community whose lives are directly affected by decisions so taken.
This also means that the principle of self governance by any group of people on affairs that exclusively concern them is a counterforce to the tyranny of State power and hence an inalienable part of freedom. The principle of devolution of power leads to the principle of the democratic participation of the governed in the affairs of governance and seeking the structural level where devolution is commensurate with performance and democratic participation.

To tame the State power, the devolution of power is to be reinforced by the realisation that the State organisation or for that matter any social organisation is not an end in itself. The State is not something intrinsically sublime in itself, not an object of worship as the fascists suppose. To think that the State and other social organisations are ends in themselves, is, according to Russell, the administrative fallacy. It is the habit of looking upon the society as a systematic whole, a sort of a perfect machine that is thought good if it represents a perfect model of order to contemplate, 'a planned organism with parts neatly dove-tailed into each other'. A society or social organisation does not exist merely as an object of contemplation, a value in itself. Social organisations exist to bring a good life to the individuals who compose it. They are a means to a good life for those individuals who compose it, not something having a separate kind of excellence on their own account. In the final analysis, it is the individual that has values in himself. The comparison of the society with an organism and the individuals with the parts of the organism has led us to think that just as organs of the individuals exists for the sake of the individual whose organs they are, the individual who are parts of the society as an organism exists only for the sake society. According to Russell the analogy had been carried too far and is fallacious. It has led us straight to totalitarianism. Says Russell:
When it is said that a nation is an organism, an analogy is being used which may be dangerous if its limitations are not recognised. Men and the higher animals are organisms in a strict sense: whatever good or evil befalls a man befalls *him* as a single person, not this or that part of him. If I have toothache, or a pain in my toe, it is *I* that have the pain, and it would not exist if no nerves connected the part concerned with my brain. But when a farmer in Herefordshire is caught in a blizzard, it is not the government in London that feels cold. That is why the individual man is the bearer of good and evil, and not, on the one hand, any separate part of a man, or on the other hand, any collection of men. To believe that there can be good and evil in a collection of human beings, over and above the good or evil in the various individuals, is an error; moreover, it is an error which leads straight to totalitarianism, and is therefore dangerous.*

Again Russell Says:

There are some among philosophers and statesmen who think that the State can have an excellence of its own, and not merely as a means to the welfare of the citizens. I cannot see any reason to agree with this view. ‘The State’ is an abstraction; it does not feel pleasure or pain, it has no hopes or fears, and what we think of as its purposes are really the purposes of individuals who direct it. When we think

* Russell, Authority And The Individual, p.89
concretely, not abstractly, we find, in place of the State, certain people who have more power than falls to the share of most men. And so glorification of ‘the State’ turns out to be, in fact, glorification of a governing minority. No democrat can tolerate such a fundamentally unjust theory.*

And on how decentralization will do away with the worship of the State and free the individual from despair arising from being overwhelmed with vast problems and dangers of world catastrophe, Russell says:

Fear of war, fear of revolution, fear of reaction may obsess you according to your temperament and your party bias. Unless you are one of a very small number of powerful individuals, you are likely to feel that you cannot do much about these great issues. But in relation to smaller problems - those of your town, or your trade union, or the local branch of your political party, for example - you can hope to have a successful influence. This will engender a hopeful spirit, and a hopeful spirit is what is most needed if a way is to be found of dealing successfully with the larger problems. War and shortages and financial stringency have caused almost universal fatigue, and have made hopefulness seem shallow and insincere. Success, even if, at first, it is on a small scale, is the best cure for this mood of pessimistic weariness. And success, for most people, means breaking up our problems, and being free to concentrate on those that are not too desperately large.**

---

* Ibid., pp.89-90
** Ibid., p.91
The spirit of federalism and decentralisation of power, the realisation that the State is only a means, must be reinforced by a love of freedom. In the fight against State power and in striking a balance between individual freedom and social cohesion, ultimately there is no substitute for individual love of liberty. The self governing units to which power is devolved must love their freedom to make decision and zealously guard it against encroachment by the State. The individuals must love their freedom and be ever ready to pay any price for its safeguard. A strong public opinion must be built up in favour of freedom.

5.2 RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS AND FREEDOM

From a study of Russelian formulation of the conflict between freedom and economic organisation we now know that resolution of the contradiction centres around answering the following questions.

1. How to end the alienation of the worker from his work? A corollary to this question is how to retain the individual initiative of the worker in the face of giant organisations?

2. How to emancipate man, and human creativity to be precise, from the oppression of division of labour inherent in large economic organisations?

3. How to overcome the divorce between the management and the worker?

4. How to liberate economic organisations and man from the domination of self-perpetuating oligarchs?
5. What will be the mode of economic development most consistent with human freedom?

6. How to secure individual freedom from the tyranny of the employer?

7. In this context, what will be the placement of work in a new social ordering for human freedom?

Let us now dwell on Russell’s proposed solution towards resolution of the conflict between freedom and economic organisations in the light of the above questions.

5.2.1 END OF ALIENATION AND ABOLITION OF CAPITALISM

For one thing, Russell like Marx opines that when the fruit of labour is taken away from the worker, he is alienated from his product. When so alienated from his product, the worker is also alienated from the machinery with which he works but over which he has no control or ownership. He is equally alienated from the process of production, which to him is merely a means to wages. Work is not interesting and creative, but tedious and oppressive.

The first requisite towards a resolution of the conflict, according to Russell, is to restore to the worker some of the feelings connected in the past with ownership. In the past, workmen used to take pleasure in fashioning his tool, enjoyed both his work and fruits thereof. In the modern capitalist mode of production, the workers do not own the instruments of
production, the machinery to be precise. In organised production, actual ownership by a individual worker is not possible where machinery is involved. Under these changed circumstances, the worker is to overcome his separateness from the work, the machinery and the product.

Russell points out that abolition of capitalism is fundamental to the resolution of the alienation of the worker from his work, technology and fruits of labour. Capitalism means private ownership of land and capital which includes machinery, to the exclusion of the workers. It also means control over the process of production and distribution by the capitalist or an industrial bureaucracy that represents the capitalist only, to the exclusion of the worker. The individual capitalist of the classical capitalism was substituted by the more or less impersonal shareholder capitalists of modern corporates that came into being as a result of post industrial revolution. But the relation of exploitation remains the same or is even intensified in modern corporations. The worker feels helpless and overwhelmed by the work, the machinery and the industrial bureaucracy. To overcome this oppressive system, those who work must own the productive unit and control the production process. By this Russell does not mean actual ownership by individual workers of the machinery as means of production, which is not possible in vast modern organisations. By workers acquiring ownership of machinery Russell means the actual use of the machinery by a community of producers in a production process where those who work also participate in the management. According to Russell, this is one way of securing the kind of pride associated with the feeling that 'this is my work', or at any rate, 'our work', where 'our' refers to a group of producers small enough to know each other and have an active sense of solidarity.
Here Russell is clear on one point. The alienation of the worker cannot be overcome by nationalisation or State socialism, which leaves managers and officials almost as remote from the workers as they are under a capitalist regime. Nominal ownership will not do. What matters is actual control and say in the process of production. This can be achieved, within a large economic organisation, through local small-scale democracy in all internal affairs. Thus, in any industry, foreman and managers should be elected by the workers or members of the producing community over whom they are to exercise authority.

This Russellian solution is extension of the principle of democracy to economic organisations in defense of freedom. The principle of democracy as applied to economic organisations simply is, those who produce or create must be allowed to participate in the governance of the productive process so that they may identify themselves with such process as their creative activity. In the absence of such democracy, the impersonal and remote character of those in authority over an industrial undertaking is fatal to any proprietorial interest on the part of the ordinary employee. To drive home the point, Russell quotes from Mr. James Gillespie’s *Free Expression In Industry* and we reproduce the quotation in full as it highlights the issue of alienation:

"There is a sense of frustration when an individual or a group has a serious problem and cannot get to the top with it. As in civil bureaucracy, so it is in industrial bureaucracy - there are the same delays, the reference to X or Y, the statement of the rules and the same feeling of helplessness and frustration. "If I could only get to the chief, he would know, he would see ..."
This desire to get to the top is very real and very important. The monthly meeting of representatives of employee groups is not without value, but it is not an effective substitute for a face-to-face relationship between owner and employee. It does not help this situation when a shop steward, or an operator, goes to the foreman with a problem and the foreman, shorn of authority, through transfer of controls, can do nothing but pass it on the superintendent. He, in turn, passes it to the works manager who puts it on the agenda for the next meeting. Or the matter may be referred to the welfare department, a big department in a big company, and a substitute for the welfare or personnel manager, himself a substitute for one role of managing director or owner, deals with it or passes it on.

In the large company there is more than a sense of frustration; there is a peculiar meaninglessness about its operations to the member of the rank and file. He knows little of the significance of his job in the company as a whole. He does not know who is the real boss; he frequently does not know who is the General Manager, and often enough, he has never been spoken to by the head Works Manager, The Sales Manager, the Cost Manager, the Planning Manager, the Chief Welfare Manager and many others, are just people with good jobs and short hours. He has no part with them, they do not belong to his group."*

No matter who is the owner, the need for democracy remains in industry as it is in politics, if the worker is not to be alienated from his

* Quoted by Russell in Authority And The Individual, pp 64-65
work. The workers must not feel that the Government or management is 'they', which goes its lordly way. Otherwise, the sense of alienation and frustration remains. The monarchical or oligarchic management of large size economic organisations must be radically changed through a process of democratisation to end the alienation of the worker from the creative process of production.

Here Russell also points out that although science and technology gave rise to large economic organisations, by themselves they are not responsible for the modern predicament of human alienation. Technology can either liberate or enslave depending on how it is used. The road to freedom is humanisation of science and technology, with an understanding of the springs of life and happiness. Humanely used, modern technique can do away with alienation, poverty, suffering and cruelty. In the lack of a human concern, science and technology that gave rise to giant economic organisations may become a new prison. Russell rightly observes that such a prison created by science and technology will be an all encompassing prison, since nothing will be outside it. In such a prison like society man is alienated from (1) his work, (2) technology, (3) his essence, (4) Nature, (5) his fellow beings and (6) product of work. Under such conditions of alienation, life will be dreary, joyless and spiritually dead. Therefore, humanisation of science and technology through a process of democratisation is a must if we are to end alienation of man from his creative essence and freedom.

The principle of democracy, of necessity, leads to the principle of self-determination and the principle of devolution of power in the management of economic organisations as a necessary condition of end of alienation. The application of these principles to the resolution of the
conflict between freedom and economic organisations will be dwelt upon as we proceed to the subsequent questions.

5.2.2 RESURRECTION OF HUMAN CREATIVITY FROM OPPRESSIVE DIVISION OF LABOUR.

Now let us proceed to the second question on the conflict between division of labour and human creativity. Russell’s considered view is that the baby need not be thrown away along with bathtub. Science and technology which goes with some form of division of labour and specialization need not be abandoned. This will be turning the hands of the clock back and will be thoroughly reactionary. Rather, the oppressive character of division of labour vis-a-vis the application of science and technology is to be radically changed. According to Russell, the desired change may be effected in the following way.

Science and technology will enormously increase the productivity of labour. A few hours of labour will be enough to meet the material needs of the members of society. With the abolition of capitalism and private property, there can be a rational distribution of the burden of material production (which of course includes the burden of division of labour) and also an equitable distribution of the fruits of labour. Socialism, will thus humanise material production. Under human condition of material production, the working hour will shrink to the minimum. Inversely to the shrinking of working hour, man’s leisure hours will expand. During these leisure hours when man is freed of the necessities of material production, he will be equally freed of the oppression of division of labour. In his leisure hour, he is in the kingdom of freedom (to quote Marx) where he can
realise his freedom in creative activities which are pursued as ends in themselves. i.e, artistic and spiritual creations. Thus a rational use of productivity of labour to limit the working hour to the minimum is one way of resolving the conflict between division of labour and human freedom.

Another potential use of science and technology to counter oppressive division of labour is, a machine take over of those monotonous and repetitive works, which demands relatively little skill, but needs a high degree of steadiness and reliability. Application of computer, for example, has transferred many of the mechanical and monotonous work from man to machine. The post industrial era is witnessing radical changes in the concept of work and work-place. Thus, not throwing away technology, rather even more application of technology is the answer to the problem of division of labour.

According to Russell, mobility in industrial and trade employment also constitute one of the solutions to the conflict between division of labour in industrial organisation and human freedom. To be sure, conditions have to be created for professional and functional mobility within the same industry as well as between different trades and industries. It must be possible for a working person to change his work from one industry to another and also his placement within the same industry, not only in accordance with the fluctuating demands, but also according to one’s own taste and temperament. People will be taught not only one trade but several trades, so that they can vary their occupation according to the seasons and fluctuating demand. Suppose, a particular trade is not wanted, and persons employed in it is in danger of facing unemployment. Then such persons should be taught some other trade at the community’s expense. Russell’s
point is that changes in division of labour and trade relations are social in character and therefore problems arising from such changes are to be resolved socially through a reorganisation of economic activity. Changes in the division of labour will no longer threaten any member of the society with starvation so long as one is willing to work. Of course, to achieve this condition, private ownership of the means of production must be abolished and socialism established. Under socialism Russell had that vision of free expression of versatility of man, in his capacity to move from one vocation to another, like a free bird. Thus can he obey the dictates of the creative spirit in him, even within the trammels of material production. This is a vision which Russell shared with Marx. Marx’s vision of a free society is one in which man is freed from division of labour as an alien force opposed to him - a society where an individual can become accomplished in any sphere of activity he wishes. This can be done because society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for the individual to do one thing to-day and another to-morrow. In Marx’s own words.

... The division of labour offers us the first example of the fact that, as long as man remains in naturally evolved society, that is, as long as a cleavage exists between the particular and the common interest, as long, therefore, as activity is not voluntarily, but naturally, divided, man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him. For as soon as the division of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, a
shepherd, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic.*

Man transcending the constrains of division of labour and choosing and changing his vocations freely, not out of economic compulsions but from the fullness of the creative spirit in him, is the vision both the thinkers share.

5.2.3 WORKER’S PARTICIPATION IN MANAGEMENT

The third point of conflict is reflected in the divorce between the management and the worker in any vast economic organisations, whether private or State run.

Here, Russell opines that vast economic organisations are inevitable in modern life. They cannot be abolished. But they can be combined with the greatest possible scope for worker’s initiative by resolving the conflict between the management and the worker. The most important step toward

this end according to Russell, would be to render democratic the
government of every economic organisation. The Government of vast
economic organisations are either monarchical or oligarchic. This is true
regardless of whether the economic organisations are public or private.
For example, every limited liability company is run by a small number of
self-appointed or co-opted directors. Similarly, the so called nationalised
undertakings are run by some bureaucrats at the top. Those who are directly
engaged in the production process hardly have any say in the management.
Until the workers are also there in the management, the divorce between
the workman and management will remain. Economic organisations must
be democratised through participation of the worker in the management.
And there can never be real freedom or democracy until the men who do
the work in a business also control its management. Along with this worker’s
participation, there must be diffusion of power within these vast economic
organisations. There must be increase of self-government for subordinate
groups within the vast economic organisations. Here Russell opines that
the diffusion of power in the economic sphere, instead of its concentration
in the hands of captains of industry would greatly diminish the opportunities
for acquiring the habit of command out of which the desire for exercising
tyranny is apt to spring.

The principle of democracy and the principle of self-determination
will equally strike at the domination of economic organisations by self-
perpetuating oligarchs. The Russellian paradigm is, the workers in a given
industry should all be combined in one autonomous unit. Their work should
not be subject to any outside control, including that of the monarchs or
oligarchs of industry. The State should fix the price at which they produce,
lest industries whose products are essential and highly in demand dictate
the terms of trade and become predators in their turn. Otherwise, industries
should be left to govern themselves in all other respects. An industry through
technological ingenuity and innovations may introduce radical
improvements into its productive process. The State while fixing the prices
must allow these industries to profit by their own improvements. But the
State must prevent undeserved loss or gain through changes in external
economic conditions. This will ensure incentive to progress, with the least
possible danger of unmerited destitution. Here Russell rightly observes
that large economic organisations are bound to continue as they cannot be
dispensed with to meet the needs of modern societies. But there will be
diffusion of power which will take away the sense of individual impotence
from which individuals suffer at present.

Russell also rightly observes that the management of economic units
should not be in the hands of a State oligarchs, just as they ought not to be
in the hands of a set of irresponsible capitalists. Take for example, the
railways. The democratic way of running a railway would be one which
left the internal management of railways in the hands of the men who work
on them. "These men should elect the general manager and a parliament of
directors if necessary. All questions of wages, conditions of labour, running
of trains, and acquisition of material, should be in the hands of a body
responsible only to those actually engaged in the work of the railway". *
This is how monarchical or oligarchical domination in economic
organisations can be countered.

* Russell, Bertrand, Political Ideals, (Reprinted; London: Unwin
Hyman Ltd., 1988) pp. 46-47
Russell maintains that the same argument holds true for other large trades also, like, mining, iron and steel, cotton and so on. His ideal vis-a-vis these organisations is not to organise labour as a permanent counterforce to capital. It is rather conquest of democracy and self-government in economic organisations as it is in the political sphere. It is total abolition of the power now wielded by the capitalist on the one hand and opposition to a take over by a monolithic State power on the other. The man who works in an industrial enterprise, railway for example, ought to have a voice in the government of the railway, just as much as the man who works in a State has a right to a voice in the management of his State.

5.2.4 RUSSELL’S LIBERAL SOCIALISM

We will now proceed to the fifth question, what according to Russell is the model of economic organisation most consistent with the freedom he espoused?

Russell emphasizes again and again that capitalism is to be abolished because it is predatory in nature and preys upon human freedom. The regime of private property, the private ownership of land and capital, under which we live encourages private use of predatory force. The possessors of land and capital are able, under the capitalist regime, to use force against those who have no possessions through economic pressure. The rich using force against the poor is sanctioned by law, while force exercised by the poor against the rich is illegal. So long as the economically powerful has the freedom to prey upon the economically weak, there will be no freedom in the society. Hence, the programme of abolition of capitalism. But this
programme by itself is meaningless unless an alternative model is provided. Russell offers us his own model. But before going into the Russelian model, we will try to see the reason why Russell rejected all the hitherto existing alternative models to capitalism, as this will put Russell's model in the right perspective.

In the first place, Russell rejects State socialism. His argument is that State socialism will introduce an even pervasive and thoroughgoing form of slavery. Once the State exercise ownership and control over land, capital and means of production, the State will have absolute control over employment of its citizens. This control, according to Russell, can be used to curtail freedom of thought. If this be the case, all independence of spirit will gradually die out.

Russell also argues that State take over of industrial enterprises does not necessarily guarantee freedom from the evils of capitalism. His favourite example, State purchase of railways. Such a purchase seems to be practicable socialistic, piecemeal approach to collective welfare etc. But in reality there is no real advance towards democracy, freedom and justice when a State takes over the railways after full compensation to share holders. The holders of railway share are given government stock to replace their share from which they may derive an income in perpetuity equal to what they might have derived from their shares. Therefore, the whole operation does nothing to alter the distribution of wealth. Neither do the workers have more freedom after State take over. During the capitalist regime, the workers had to fight the directors, but there was the possibility of an appeal to the government. With the State take over, the workers have now to fight the government and have to contend against the organised might of the
State. Nor is there any real advance towards democracy. For, State take
over does not necessarily mean worker’s participation in or control over,
the administration. The administration of the railways will still be in the
hands of officials who are autocratic and biased towards labour. The so
called democratic machinery by which these officials are controlled are
far from effective.

Added to this or as a corollary to this, State socialism is intolerant of
self-governing units within an industrial establishment. It abandons the
internal affairs of a subordinate group to the control of men not responsible
to that group or specially aware of its needs, opening the door to tyranny
and destruction of initiative. Thus State socialism in which the State is the
employer and all who work receive wages from it involves dangers of
tyranny and interference with progress. This makes State socialism worse
than the capitalist regime.

Russell gives another very interesting argument. He makes a distinction
between ‘ownership’ and ‘control’. An individual or a group of people
may have nominal ownership of a thing without having control over or use
of a thing. For example, if a railway is owned by the State and the State is
considered to be the body of citizens, then theoretically the citizens own
the railway. But it will be absurd to conclude from this that the average
citizen will have any control over the railway. Just as the share holders are
helpless against the self perpetuating board of directors in large
corporations, similarly the average citizen or worker are helpless against
the State in any State run enterprises. The moment the average citizen or
worker try to assert possession or control they will soon be put in their
places.
The matter remains the same even if the State is a so-called worker’s State. The basic point according to Russell is, economic power is now a matter of government rather than nominal ownership. Those who govern, they control and they appropriate. Suppose the United States Government is to take over the United States Steel Corporation. It would still be the same earlier men who will manage it or men with similar abilities and a similar outlook. It is hardly to be expected that they will be responsible to the interest of the workers or citizens. Those who have control over economic power, i.e., control over the process and means of production are those who really use and appropriate the fruits of material production. Under State socialism, not checked by effective democracy;

... those who control economic power can, without ‘owning’ anything, have palatial official residences, the use of the best cars, a princely entertainment allowance, holidays at the public expense in official holiday resorts, and so on and so on. And why should they have any more concern for the ordinary worker than those in control have now? There can be no reason why they should have, unless the ordinary worker has power to deprive them of their position.*

Thus, Russell rightly points out that public ownership and control of large-scale industry and finance is a necessary condition for taming of economic organisations for the cause of freedom. Such public ownership must be supplemented by a democracy “more thorough-going, more carefully safeguarded against official tyranny, and with more deliberate

* Russell, Power: A New Social Analysis. p.197
provision for freedom of propaganda, than any purely political democracy that has ever existed”.*

As early as 1938, Russell opined that the Soviet experience is a testimony to the dangers of State socialism divorced from democracy. Milovan Djilas, himself a comrade-in-arms of Marshall Tito drew the attention of the world to the emergence of new class in the socialist countries. Subsequent events confirmed Russell’s apprehensions. Mankind’s dream of creating a new man was betrayed by a monolithic bureaucracy. In ringing words Russell observed;

... how rash it is to expect irresponsible power to be benevolent.**

State socialism represents the coalescence of economic and political power. In the absence of effective democracy, devolution of power to subordinate groups which should be given a large measure of autonomy and immunity from extra-legal punishment, this new State power becomes an appalling instrument of tyranny.

Syndicalism which originated from France as a trade union movement also aimed at the abolition of State for the emancipation of the workers from external control. The State is to be abolished because it does not directly participate in the productive process and is thus an extraneous force that overwhelms the workers. All production and distribution process can ultimately be taken over by workers, as they are ones who directly

---

* Loc. cit.,
** Ibid., p.198.
participate in the productive process. Actual work in factories can be radically reformed and industries reorganised so that all institutions extraneous to the production process are eliminated. Such organisation can be done by the workers themselves into syndicates at the local, national and international level. Thus, through the syndicates and federation of syndicates, the workers can cater to the interest of local industries as well as realise the brotherhood of international workers. Each industry or trade is to become autonomous or self-governing. Syndicalism believes in federalism, self-determination of economic units and worker’s democratic control of the production process. Thus, the basic ideas of syndicalism are; a) the spirit and structure of federalism as the institution and vehicle of international brotherhood of workers (b) for those who participate in the process of material production, the very productive activity as the basis of brotherhood as well as basis of common struggle against State machinery. (c) since the State structure is extraneous to the production process, a revolution in the organisation of the productive process can easily paralyse the State machinery.

According to the syndicalism, the worker’s take over of industries from the capitalists on the one hand and the abolition of the State as the extraneous authority on the other hand is to be accomplished not through political but through industrial actions. The syndicalists has a dislike for political action within the Union, because politics has caused dissensions in the ranks of the workers. It is through the worker’s strike that the syndicalist aim is to be realised. The methods to be used are strike, boycott, the label and sabotage. To cap it all, syndicalists have a dramatic conception of general strike, a D-Day on which the organised workers all over the world will refuse to co-operate with capitalist employer and abstain from
work. This will pave the way for the final capitulation of the capitalists and the State alike.

Russell, on his part, rejects syndicalism. The principle of self-determination or self-governance as applied to trades or economic units has a prima facie case. But each industry or trade becoming not only self governing, but also completely independent of any arbitration by a neutral Central Authority is an altogether different proposition. Russell points out that the most vulnerable part of the syndicalist programme is the area where it introduces anarchy in trade relations. Where each industry or trade would be self governing and completely independent without the control of any Central Authority, some trades are in a much stronger bargaining position than others. For example, coal and transport could paralyse the national life and could levy blackmail by threatening to do so. On the other hand, such people as school teachers, for example, could rouse very little terror by the threat of a strike and could be in a weak bargaining position. To regulate trade relations with one another, industries ultimately will have to resort to force. Where interested parties are free to exercise unrestrained force in their own interest, economic justice can hardly be achieved. Syndicalism violates the principle of autonomy within and submission to rule of law without. The abolition of the State as a neutral authority will introduce anarchy in industrial relations in which the strong will prey upon the weak. And this is hardly congenial to economic justice.

Russell is equally critical of the syndicalist method of worker’s take over. According to the syndicalists, after adequate preparation, one day the whole proletariat would unanimously refuse to work. The property owners would acknowledge their defeat and agree to abandon all their
privileges rather than starve. Russell opines that this is a dramatic conception and love of drama is a great enemy of true vision. He argues that even if the syndicalists are successful they are bound to give up their principle of eschewing politics and their opposition to a Central Authority like the State. For example, let us suppose the syndicalist programme succeeds. Then the victorious workers would be compelled at once to form an administration, to create a new police force to prevent looting and wanton destruction, to establish a provisional government issuing dictatorial orders to various sections of revolutionaries. This amounts to commitment in political action as well as creation of a new Central Authority. The State as an impartial neutral authority will be found inevitable to regulate trade relations between conflicting industries. As the syndicalists have been eschewing politics till the time of revolution, when the time comes for them to take part in politics, they will find themselves ill trained and ill prepared for the job.

In his search for viable alternative to capitalism, Russell also examines Anarchism as a theory of social and economic organisation. Anarchism is opposed to every form of force exercised against the individual or the community. It is opposed to the exercise of force over the individual by the community. Anarchism is opposed to the State because the State represents the force employed in the government of the community. According to Anarchism, a government to be tolerated, must not be merely that of a majority, but must be one assented to by all. The Anarchist objects to such institutions as the police and the criminal law, by means of which the will of one part of the community is forced upon another part.
As regards their economic programme the Anarchist shares with the socialists the belief that private capital is a source of tyranny by certain individuals over others. They therefore believe in the communal ownership of land and capital. But by communal ownership they do not mean the State ownership of land and capital. The State ownership will merely inherit the tyrannical propensities of the private capitalist. Anarchism desires communal ownership of land and capital along with the abolition of the State. Kropotkin, a disciple of Bakunin sought to achieve this through a better and scientific organisation of production. Science and technology will greatly improve the productivity of labour. Short working hours will be enough to ensure the necessaries of life. This will give more leisure, by which art and science will progress. Such progress in turn will again increase the productivity of labour. It will soon be realised that productivity of labour can deliver goods for all members of the society. With the abolition of predatory instinct of the capitalist and the all pervasive coercive power of the State, people will discover that a community of producers freely co-operating can deliver goods to itself more efficiently and spontaneously. In fact, Kropotkin visualised a society in which work will no longer be mandatory, but rather participatory and voluntary. That is to say, people will no longer work for a wage to avoid starvation. Rather, they will work because they are happy to do so. Not only overwork, but also excessive specialisation that industrialism has brought about, will also be avoided.

Russell is sympathetic to the Anarchist on many points.

Firstly the Anarchist programme of ownership. Russell is sympathetic to communal ownership of land and capital. He is also opposed to State Socialism or the State take over of the means of production.
Secondly, the Anarchist programme of production. He goes to the extent of saying that the Anarchist ideal of mankind as a community of producers co-operating and creating freely in freedom and out of spontaneity, without any external control is the ideal we must try to approximate. Abolition of wage system and obligatory work from the production process, reduction of the working hour to the barest minimum are the ideals towards which the society must strive.

Thirdly, the Anarchist programme of distribution, making available the material necessities of life freely to all the members of the society as advocated by Kropotkin in his two books, The Conquest Of Bread and Fields, Factories And Workshops. Russell opines that the programme is not so absurd as it initially appears to be. For one thing, the Malthusian fear of starvation because of population explosion is now regarded as unfounded. The contention that productivity of labour will be counterbalanced by increase in population now no longer holds true. Rather, development itself is now acting as a check to population increase. So what the community produce will be more than what all the members can consume. Added to this is the fact that our natural wants minus luxuries, have a natural limit. Therefore, the principle of unlimited supply could be adopted in regard to all commodities for which the demand has limits that fall short of what can be easily produced. And certainly when our production is efficiently organised the necessaries of life including even education can be produced more abundantly than we need. Thus Russell opines that once we free ourselves from the familiar idea of purchase and payment, it will be seen that the Anarchist idea of free distribution is not so fantastic as it seems to be.
But, inspite of his agreement with the Anarchists on so many points, Russell rejects the Anarchist model of political and economic organisation of society. His basic reasons are as follows:

One, the Anarchist programme of liquidation of the State and all other forms of coercive authority is self defeating. As the merit of liberty, non-interference and non-coercion is not equally transparent to all the members of the society, there is always a danger to freedom from unsuspecting quarters of organised gangs. Let us imagine a situation in which Anarchism triumphs and is thus able to eliminate all forms of authority. The elimination by itself is not a sufficient guarantee against any future growth of tyrannical power centres from unsuspecting quarters. How to tackle the problem posed by creation of organisations intended to subvert the Anarchist regime by force strictly in conformity with the principles of Anarchism. On the one hand, creation of a private army could not be prevented except by a general prohibition of carrying arms, i.e., interference which is a violation of the Anarchist principles. On the other hand, non-interference and inaction against real or potential enemies will be the death of the Anarchist regime itself. Thus, the sum and substance of the Russelian critique of Anarchism is that Anarchism to be consistent must sign its death warrant. Anarchism, if true must eschew employment of any method of interference against organised attempt to destroy Anarchism. The moment Anarchism tries to save itself through interference it abandons its principle of non-interference and is thus not true.

As regards the Anarchist programme of free co-operation in production and free distribution of necessaries of life, Russell was very sympathetic in the early phase of his social theory. But his view underwent changes in
the later years. Thus, in his June 1948 Preface to Third Edition of Roads to Freedom, he introduced the category of scarcity in his social theory. Material scarcity has become a fact of human existence. As Russell says;

The world is now, and probably will remain for a considerable time, one of scarcity, where only stringent regulation can prevent disastrous destitution.*

With scarcity woven in the texture of social existence, the Anarchist programme of free sharing of material necessaries of life must wait for such times as mankind’s conquest of scarcity. The experience of Second World War and the emergence of totalitarian regimes in Germany and Russia led Russell to take a blacker view of human nature. Forcible control over man’s tyrannical impulses seemed necessary and the possibility of free participation of men in collective creative enterprise seemed to have receded further.

Having rejected State Socialism, Syndicalism and Anarchism, Russell offers us his own model, which agrees on many points with Guild Socialism - a movement that started from Great Britain. There will be communal ownership of land and capital but not with the State as the owner, as it is in the case of State Socialism. There will be a community of producers who will be managing the means of production. Each production unit or industry is to have autonomy. The workers are to be free to control their own methods of production by means of elected managers. The different factories in a given industry are to be federated into a National Guild. The

* Russell, Roads To Freedom, p.6
marketing and general interests of the industry as a whole will be taken care of by the National Guild. The State will not be abolished. Further the State would be allowed to own nominally the means of production as trustee for the community. The Guilds would manage them, also as trustees for the community. This means that the State and the Guild will be two co-centres of power, existing side by side and counter balancing one another. The State may nominally own but may not manage as the power of ownership and management combined may render the State oppressive. At best, the State will be entitled to a single tax or rent. The Guilds on their part will be accountable to the community and the State will see to it that they abide by the principle of accountability to the community. There will be a Joint Committee consisting of representatives from the Guild of producers and the State, which will represent the consumers. The Guilds will be free to distribute their income among the members, but they will not be free to prey upon the community by using their collective bargaining power. The State will represent the citizens in their capacity as consumers, while the Guild will represent them in their capacity as producers. The Parliament and the Guild congress will be two co-equal powers representing consumers and producers respectively. The Joint Committee of Parliament and the Guild will be above both in deciding problems of production and distribution. This will be a step towards ensuring freedom and justice in production and distribution both for the producers and consumers. Two co-centres of power counter balancing is one way to make the dynamics of institution more responsible and less oppressive. In taking up this position, British conservatism is getting the better hold of Russell. He is obviously pinning hope on the time tested doctrine of check and balances, use of opposing forces to maintain equilibrium. He believes in revolution in thought, creative innovation to be always on the side of social change for
distributive justice. But he distrusts violent revolutions, which almost invariably are revolutions betrayed.

5.2.5 FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL REORGANISATION OF LABOUR AND WORK

In all these models however, it is not possible to do away with large scale economic organisations. So long as there are large scale organisations, there will be employers in some form or other. Where there are employers, human freedom must be on guard against the tyranny of the employer. According to Russell, the tyranny of the employer is, in essence, the right of the employer to dismiss any employee with consequent loss of pay. By virtue of this right, the employer has sway over the means of livelihood of the employee. In productive units, such a right is supposed to be essential for men to have incentive to work. Here Russell opines that the threat of dismissal need not be a necessary component of the incentive of work. Reward for working well is, in his opinion, a better incentive than punishment for working badly. The principle is already in operation in the civil service. There the employer, i.e., the Government cannot dismiss its employees in any manner it likes. They are dismissed only for some exceptional degree of vice or virtue. A man may be dismissed from his job for murder. Or, just the contrary, a soldier may be dismissed for his refusal to kill the enemy (the pacifist may regard this as murder) in war. All these are done in strict accordance with rules and not at the sweet will of the employer. Likewise in all productive establishments, there must be rules to protect the employees from the tyranny of the employer. A person must not be dismissed from his job unless he or she is grossly incompetent or refuses to work or commits acts of moral turpitude. Neither shall a person
be denied employment nor dismissed from his job on account of his religious, political, scientific, intellectual or moral convictions. The world still is full of persecution of employees for his or her private convictions. So is the denial of employment because of one’s moral or intellectual convictions. Russell himself was denied a Professorship of Philosophy at City College New York under the influence of the Church, for his unorthodox views on morals and sex.

The solution lies in making a discrimination between private convictions and private life on the one hand and excellence in work on the other. The essence of Russell’s argument is, the democratic organisation of production units, must make not only the workers but also the employers accountable to the cause of human freedom. Employers will then be restrained from circumscribing the freedom of the employees by using their power over the means of livelihood.

Over and above curbing the tyranny of the employers, a good society must be able to exorcise the spectre of joblessness. This can be done by seeing to it that nobody starves because of lack of work so long as one is willing to work. Here, Russell’s suggestion is; sufficient pay to ensure a livelihood ought to be given to every person who is willing to work, independently of the question whether the particular work at which he is skilled is wanted at the moment or not. Suppose a particular trade at which a person is skilled is no longer wanted due to radical changes in the mode of production and relations of trade. Shall society leave the person to his or her fate. No, says Russell. That person should be taught a new trade at the expense of society so that he may earn his livelihood by being useful to the society again. By way of example, Russell points out that a
hansom - cab driver need not suffer on account of introduction of taxis.

Instead of allowing him to starve, he ought to be given instruction in motor
driving or any suitable trade. What is necessary is simply structural
adjustment in the utilisation of man power available in the society.

All industrial changes through technological innovations tends to make
skilled or unskilled labour of one form redundant to the preference of some
new form. Such change, therefore, causes displacement to a section of
wage - earners trained in or adapted to one form of labour. This is a reason
for the workers resistance to technological innovations, the tendency to
technical conservatism on the part of labour. Here Russell opines that
displacement of labour leading to their loss of the means of livelihood
need not be a necessary component of radical changes in industry. For, any
segment of worker so displaced can be absorbed in other forms of skilled
labour by making structural adjustments in manpower training and
manpower utilisation to correspond to industrial changes. On the one hand,
this will curb the tyranny of the employees and on the other hand facilitate
industrial change through technological innovations in a manner beneficial
both to the workers and the community. Technological changes in industry
can be and ought to be carried out without any unmerited loss to those
sections of the community whose labour is no longer wanted in the old
form; because a new form of labour can always be found for them through
structural adjustments. Technological conservatism is slowing the progress
of production process, which otherwise would have made more strides and
benefit the community rendering mankind’s road to freedom more smooth.
The unjust workings of technological changes in industry is forcing
technological conservatism upon organised labour. This, according to
Russell, is quite avoidable. Through structural adjustments and manpower
training that corresponds to technological changes in industry, the tyranny of the employers can be curbed and accidental displacement of workers from work can be avoided.

This brings us to the last point in Russell's conflict resolution, namely, a new social reorganisation of work for a new social order.

Russell, like Marx, maintains that productivity of labour through technological innovation has made it possible to reorganise work in a manner that will resolve the conflict between economic organisations and human creativity. Productivity of labour has made it possible to reduce the working hour engaged in material production as the community can now be sustained at a reasonable quality on a reduced number of working hours. Russell like Marx and the Anarchists, lays great emphasis on reducing the number of working hours in a radical organisation of work for the cause of human freedom. A society of self-governing production units having internal autonomy to decide on all issues of material production can always use productivity of labour to reduce the necessary working hour. Reduction of working hours necessary for material production will give more leisure to all the members of society. The leisure so gained may be used for creative engagements in art, science and aesthetics; in creative enjoyment of human self in freedom.

Necessary work can be reduced but cannot be altogether dispense with. Much necessary work remains that are disagreeable painful and monotonous. For example, the work of a coal miner, or a stoker on an Atlantic liner. Russell's proposal is that those who are engaged in such types of work are to be given special privileges either in the form of enhanced wages or special awards and honours.
But it is true that much of the work necessary in material production can be rendered agreeable if thought and care are given to this object. So far it is often the long hours that make work irksome. Hence reduction of normal hours of work itself would make work less irksome than they are now. On top of this, better organisation and more scientific methods, conscious participation of the workers in the production process, would make a great deal of necessary work a source of joy. Perhaps, a necessary part of a healthy man’s life. Thus, Russell shares Marx’s vision of bearing the necessary burden of material production humanely and in freedom. He also shares the anarchist vision that there can be life and beauty even in agriculture and industry, provided they are humanely organised along with modern techniques and inventions. Filled with the spirit of freedom, they can become a source of joy, health and life. Kropotkin had said;

Overwork is repulsive to human nature - not work. Overwork for supplying the few with luxury - not work for the well being of all. Work, labour, is a physiological necessity, a necessity of spending accumulated bodily energy, a necessity which is health and life itself. If so many branches of useful work are so reluctantly done now, it is merely because they mean overwork, or they are improperly organized. But we know - old Franklin knew it - that four hours of useful work every day would be more than sufficient for supplying everybody with the comfort of a moderately well-to-do middle class house, if we all give ourselves to productive work, and if we did not waste our productive powers as we do waste them now... If there is still work which is really disagreeable in itself, it is only because our scientific men have never cared to
consider the means of rendering it less so; they have always known that there were plenty of starving men who would do it for a few pence a day.*

Russell shares Kropotkin's vision on many points. But, he introduced the category of scarcity in the latter development of his social theory, raising practical problems in the realisation of the anarchist vision. Russell's own proposal of the resolution of conflict is as follows:

Education will be free upto 16 or even 21, after which a citizen will be given the freedom to work or not to work. This means that in the Russellian scheme for social reorganisation of work, idleness as a choice will be made available to the members of the community. The proposal seems startling at first. But on a deeper reflection, we found that some of the marvellous human creations had their roots in moments of idleness. One may be lazy in the performance of necessary work, but may be very active in artistic, aesthetic and spiritual creations. Of course, such type of idleness can be indulged in by a rare few among the mankind. But even assuming that idleness means indifference to work, very few will choose idleness when given as an alternative, as there will be a strong public opinion in favour of work. Russell's basic contention is that, idleness given as an alternative to work in a social organisation of work will have the effect of making work agreeable.

In the Russellian order, there will be payment not only for work, but also for willingness to work. This means recognition of potential labour as

* Roads to freedom. 75-76
having value in itself on the one hand and social organisation of work in a manner so as to absorb any working hand willing to work on the other. When so organised, the dread of unemployment and loss of livelihood with which economic organisations have threatened human freedom so far, will no longer haunt men like a nightmare. Whether all who are willing to work will be paid equally or whether exceptional skill will still command exceptional pay is a matter which may be left to each producing units to decide freely for themselves. Once the matter is decided freely and collectively, none of the members will have any reason for resentment.

In any form of organisation of social work, it is true that some trades would always remain unpleasant. If members of community are driven into them by destitution, it will be dehumanisation and loss of liberty for them. If on the other hand, they could be attracted into these by higher pay, or shorter hours, an element of choice is introduced. Economic motive, better working conditions and promise of leisure would diminish the disagreeableness of these exceptional trades.

Russell’s proposals also include recognition of and payment for works, which are still socially not recognised as productive. Women’s domestic works are not counted as productive and they are not paid. In the Russellian reorganisation of work, women in domestic work whether married or unmarried, will receive pay as they would if they were in industry. This will ensure the complete economic independence of wives and also justice in the gender distribution of income.

Thus, Russell visualised end of economic fear as well as end of oppressive hope that conjures up fabulous wealth. In a happy world neither
will there be dread of poverty nor hope of wealth. Rather, there will be an end of false nightmares and oppressive success stories. In the world Russell had been picturing, work will be free, not excessive, full of interest that belongs to a collective enterprise in which there is rapid progress, with something of the delight of creation even for the humblest unit. This is realisation of human freedom in creativity in material production and beyond. Russell asserts with all the force at his command that such a world can be realised:

The world that we must seek is a world in which the creative spirit is alive, in which life is an adventure full of joy and hope, based rather upon the impulse to construct than upon the desire to retain what we posses or to seize what is possessed by others. It must be a world in which affection has free play, in which love is purged of the instinct for domination, in which cruelty and envy have been dispelled by happiness and the unfettered development of all the instincts that build up life and fill it with mental delights. Such a world is possible; it waits only for men to wish to create it.

Meantime the world in which we exist has other aims. But it will pass away, burnt up in the fire of its own hot passions; and from its ashes with spring a new and younger world, full of fresh hope, with the light of morning in its eyes.*

* Russell, Roads to Freedom p.138
5.3 RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN
THE CHURCH AND FREEDOM

According to Russell, the Church is founded on dogmas for which it has not been possible to provide rational justification so far. Russell’s contention is not so much that the dogmas are certainly false, but that the arguments so far advanced in defense of these dogmas are far from conclusive. The Church in dispensing that the dogmas be accepted on faith in supersession of free inquiry has come into direct conflict with freedom of thought. Russell’s proposal towards resolution of the conflict is clear and unambiguous. In any conflict between the Church and free thought it is the latter that must have a free play.

Let us see what Russell means by giving free thought a free play.

5.3.1 COSMIC PIETY

Our world is full of mystery. If we probe even the simple things in the Universe, they lead to hitherto unexpected surprises and mysteries. The world arouses curiosity in almost all men whose innate faculties of thought have not been blunted by the drudgery of routine life. Trying and getting to know things, finding that there are many things yet to know, is an adventure delightful in itself. For one thing, contemplation on the true nature of things is intrinsically valuable, apart from its instrumental value. Knowledge and delight in knowledge are valuable in themselves. And for another, cultivation of the faculty of thought is also an end in itself, since this leads to the realisation of the total man. In this connection, Russell
makes a distinction between two attitudes towards the world, one is the contemplative attitude and the other is the instrumental attitude. The contemplative attitude regards things in the Universe as intrinsically sublime in themselves. Reflection of the true nature of things in contemplation is the uniquely human activity. The reason according to Russell is that knowledge and comprehensiveness are glorious attributes, in virtue of which a Newton is to be preferred to an oyster.*

Says Russell;

The man who holds concentrated and sparkling within his own mind, as within a camera obscura, the depths of space, the evolution of the sun and planets, the geological ages of the earth, and the brief history of humanity, appears to me to be doing what is distinctively human and what adds most to the diversified spectacle of nature. I would not abate this view even if it should prove, as much of modern physics seems to suggest, that the depths of space and the ‘dark backward and abysm of time’ were only coefficients in the mathematician’s equations. For in that case man becomes even more remarkable as the inventor of the starry heavens and the ages of cosmic antiquity; what he loses in knowledge he gains in imagination.**

The manipulative or instrumental attitude on the other hand is the attitude to use or manipulate the world to man’s own advantage. Here man uses his knowledge of the world to change the world to suit his purposes.

* Russell, Education And The Social Order, p.10
** Loc, cit.
In changing the world, men experience a sense of power. Marx epitomised this attitude in his famous thesis on the historic mission of philosophy:

The philosophers have only interpreted the world in different ways; the point is to change it.*

Russell admits that the manipulative power over the world is part of what makes a man perfect. But he regards the contemplative attitude as intrinsically superior because of its pure theoretical concern with truth value. He rejects the instrumental theory of truth to which Marx subscribes and maintains that the manipulative attitude unchecked by contemplation leads to cosmic impiety, or the preposterous belief that the Universe exists for men to manipulate and master. As contrasted with this, Russell advocates what he calls cosmic piety, that is fidelity to truth in mirroring things in the Universe in their true nature and for their own sake.

It is this fidelity of truth that will emancipate man from the dogmas of the Church. Now, the foundational dogmas of the Church are; 1) the existence of God (2) the immortality of the soul and (3) the divinity of Christ. Russell points out that the arguments advanced so far in defense of these dogmas are inconclusive. Take the dogma of the existence of God. No logical impossibility is involved so far the existence of God is concerned. God may exist as well and simply his existence may be beyond our comprehension. But the arguments advanced so far are fallacious and fail

to establish the existence of God. If so, love of truth demands that the existence of God be left an open question. But in spite of keeping the issue an open question the Church decreed that man suspend his free inquiry and accept the dogma on the authority of the Church. Here the conflict between the authority of the Church and free inquiry is resolved by simply rejecting the authority for the cause of free inquiry.

There is a line of argument in which the dogmas of Church are presented for acceptance, not on the ground of truth, but on the ground of social utility. The argument then extends to the conclusion that it is better to suspend free inquiry on the dogmas of Church in the interest of social utility and moral order of the society. The strategy is, to resolve the conflict between the Church and human freedom in favour of the former, on pragmatic grounds.

Take for example, the dogma of the existence of God. It is argued that the dogma is essential to social fabric and maintenance of moral order. If God exists and He is feared, there will be no crimes like theft nor sins like adultery. For, as fear of God is all pervasive and above everybody, no member of the community will be free from it. In other words, fear of God can reach even at such places where the criminal law, the police and social institutions cannot reach.

Similarly, if the soul is immortal and hell fire is certain, a man shall have to think many a times before risking eternal torment in hell fire through commission of sins.

Likewise, faith in the divinity of Christ gives mankind hope of redemption from sins and promise of an afterlife in Heaven.
Russell rejects all these pragmatic persuasion. His first reason is, cognitive assent to propositions must be on the basis of their true value, apart from the utility that may follow from a belief in these propositions.

Secondly, the social utility in terms of moral order and virtue that one attaches to the dogmas of the Church, can as well be gained through means other than belief in these dogmas. Thus, crimes like theft and murder are better combated through better social organisations and more perfect social institutions. As to virtue and moral excellence, it has been found out on many occasions that free thinkers fare much better than many of the believers.

Thirdly, no barrier is good enough to close the human mind forever. The faculty of thought is part of human nature and its untramelled exercise is free inquiry. Sooner or later, the dogmas of the Church or any dogma for that matter, are bound to come under the scrutiny of free inquiry. When that happens, the dogmas are to stand on their intrinsic merit, i.e., truth value apart from their social utility. At that point where the dogmas fail to pass through the screening of free enquiry, the Church starts intervention perniciously, like suspension of free inquiry, intimidation with the prospect of hell fire, burning of heretics (in medieval times) subtle moves of deprivation of faculty posts and positions of responsibility. The pernicious methods of enforcing these dogmas therefore, far outweigh their so called social utility. In all these conflicts, it is free thought that had won the day. That the Church had gradually shed many of its cruelties we owe it to the assault of free thinkers on the dogmas of the Church. Thus the conflict between the Church and free inquiry is to be resolved in favour of the latter for the cause of freedom.
Fourthly, as love of truth is not a matter of convenience, but must constitute the fabric of moral life of man, indifference to truth and lack of intellectual integrity renders a man incapable of doing good. Hence to be good and to be free, a religion based on dogma must be replaced by morality based on free inquiry and genuine feeling, and intellectual integrity. By intellectual integrity, Russell means “the habit of deciding vexed questions in accordance with the evidence, or of leaving them undecided where the evidence is inconclusive”. *

5.3.2 COMPREHENSION OF MAN’S TRUE NATURE AND HIS PLACE IN THE UNIVERSE

The next point of conflict is between the Church and man’s freedom from fear. We have seen how according to Russell the Church introduces new forms of fear for the old ones. Fear of sin, fear of hell, fear of defeat, fear of death and fear of finitude compel men to look up to God and the Church for a safe haven. A world without God, so the argument goes, is not a safe home for mankind. A human community without the Church is like a flock of sheep without the shepherd. Here Russell argues that this method does not root out fear. Fear is implanted at a deeper level of the psyche and in a more pervasive form. Fear of God and fear of the Church now replaces other forms of fear. But according to Russell, the emotion of fear is unworthy of human nature. Freedom from fear is a necessary component of freedom. Now how to resolve the tension between freedom and fear?

* Russell, Why I Am Not A Christian, P.154
The Russelian resolution consists in the first place, in a firm rejection of the cosy but illusory world constructed by the dogmas of the Church. Thus belief in the existence of God may give us the hope that ultimately all is well under heaven, if God's laws which ultimately are laws laid down and interpreted by the Church are followed. If the world is controlled by God and God can be moved by prayer, the world becomes amenable to us, as we as children of God share in His Omnipotence. Eternal life hereafter is also assured in Heaven for those who obey the Church.

The problem with such kind of security is that they are short lived. When it is found out that the dogma has no rational foundation or is at least uncertain, the initial sense of security yields to an altogether new sense of despair and abandonment. Similarly, evidences thrown up so far goes against the theory of survival after death. But people cling to the doctrine of immortality for fear of death. Russell's considered opinion is that our fond illusions howsoever soothing they may be are bound to collapse sooner of later. They cannot dispel fear. For, once they are gone, fear returns with a vengeance, unless of course man has a true comprehensive view of himself and his rightful place in the Universe.

This brings us to the other component of the Russelian conflict resolution. Conquest of fear is possible only when we know the true nature of man and his rightful place in the Universe. Human nature and Nature must be taken at their face value without projecting our desires and illusions. A sober appraisal of man's place in the Universe will emancipate man from the bondage of fear. This Russelian resolution bears striking resemblance to what Buddha discovered before the birth of Christ. The Sakyamuni saw as early as Sixth century B.C. that impermanence is the
fabric out of which existence is woven, man and Nature included. The desire to cling to something permanent is illusory and hooks us to fear. Russell also maintains that Nature is to be understood in terms of the laws of physics and perhaps the last frontier of Nature is about to be opened to us. Man himself is part of this physical Nature. His body follows the laws of Nature. His mind also seems to be bound up with material structure, namely, the physics and chemistry of the brain. There is nothing like indivisible soul substance which is permanent and survive bodily death. For, everything that is of interest in the realm of matter and mind is a result of organisation.

Thus, according to Russell, the central dogmas of the Church, namely, God and immortality, find no support in science. Does this human predicament warrant fear and despair? Russell’s reply is firmly in the negative. A true world view of man and his place in the Universe will emancipate man from the dogmas. Freed of the dogmas, man can make the best of life, savouring every moment. In Nature, he can seek beauty and knowledge. In human relations he can find love. In Nature and society, he can realise the best his self is capable of, i.e., his creativity. Our Universe and the best human nature is capable of do not lose their intrinsic value, simply because life must come to end while Nature follows the second law of thermo dynamics. Every moment of creativity, of love and happiness is eternal freedom realised in transient moments. In what follows, we have Russell's own testament:

I believe that when I die I shall rot, and nothing of my ego will survive. I am not young, and I love life. But I should scorn to shiver with terror at the thought of annihilation.
Happiness is none the less true happiness because it must come to an end, nor do thought and love lose their value because they are not everlasting. Many a man has borne himself proudly on the scaffold; surely the same pride should teach us to think truly about man's place in the world. Even if the open windows of science at first make us shiver after the cosy indoor warmth of traditional humanising myths, in the end the fresh air brings vigour, and the great spaces have a splendour of their own*.

Fear of sin can be conquered by understanding human nature, the psychological mechanism that give rises to the sense of guilt or sin. In a society where free cooperation takes the place of fierce competition, there will no longer be fear of defeat. Fear of finitude can be transcended in knowledge. Fear of death can be conquered by creating a heaven here in this earth through the realisation of the best in man in Nature and society. Likewise fear of hell is gradually losing its hold on man under the assault of the free thinkers. Even the highly religious people in the present day hardly expect to go to hell for human lapses.

Gradually they are finding that "Hell is neither so certain nor so hot as it used to be" **

According to Russell, a true view of man's place in the Universe must consist of both philosophy of Nature and philosophy of value. Our philosophy of Nature says that we are a tiny part of the Universe and that

* Russell, Why I Am Not A Christian p. 47
** Ibid., p. 155
our significance from that angle is inversely proportionate to the vastness of the Universe. But howsoever insignificant man may be in Nature, he is at centre of the world of value that he only can create. In the world of value, Nature is only a part of what we can imagine. We create value. We judge value. We use our own standard. There is no outside standard to show that we are wrong. In the world of value, Nature in itself is neutral, neither good nor bad. But we confer value on Nature. We are ourselves the ultimate and irrefutable arbiters of value. “In this realm we are kings, and we debase our kingship if we bow down to Nature”. * Here it is man who realise his freedom by determining what is good life. Nature, even the Spinozistic nature personified as God, is not above man. Determining what is good life and living a good life is a freedom that belongs exclusively to man. It is this freedom that will take the place of old religion and the authority.

This leads us to the Russellian conception of good life as yet another focal point in the conflict resolution. A good life conquers fear, cruelty, orthodoxy, superstition, authoritarianism and individualism.

5.3.3 THE GOOD LIFE

According to Russell, the good life is one inspired by love and guided by knowledge. Knowledge is knowledge of man and the Universe. Knowledge has both intrinsic value and instrumental value. Knowledge is a delightful self satisfying experience in itself and at the same time it gives power to intervene humanely in Nature and society. Love likewise is an

* Ibid., p.48
emotion that moves between two poles; pure delight in contemplation and pure benevolence. Love takes delight in pure contemplation of the object of love. Love is also purely benevolent towards the object of love. Russell rightly points out that love at its fullest is an indissoluble combination of the two elements, delight and well-wishing. When we love men and the world, we are benevolent and wish them well. Love and knowledge make a fruition of the best in us.

Love gives the passion, knowledge the technique and the power to gradually change human nature and Nature so that the highest freedom may be realised. The power of knowledge can make the world our best home. The change is not to be cataclysmic or sudden, involving jerks or revolutionary discontinuities. The change has to be gradual, slow and painful but never missing its mark. The good life is to substitute the Christian life as envisioned by the orthodox Church and it is in this substitution that the conflict between the Church and human freedom is to be resolved. Knowledge will conquer dogmatism, obstacles to free inquiry, authoritarianism, sense of sin, a sex morality that ignores the demands of instinct and is at the same time cruel as well as irrational. Knowledge will strike at the roots of the false virtue preached by the Church and the privileged status quo of the Church fathers. Knowledge will expose the opposition of the Church to the progressive social movements. A life full of love for men and the world will have no place for the tendencies to cruelty and persecution and desire for individual salvation that isolates a man from his society. Love, which is a mode of relationship, is possible only in relation to his fellow beings and the world. The Russelian ‘total man’, as contrasted against the ‘Christian man’ is realisation of the best in the individual in society and Nature.
5.4 RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN EDUCATIONAL ORGANISATIONS AND FREEDOM

A radical reorientation of the end of education in consonance with the fullest development of human faculties is the number one point in the Russelian conflict resolution between human freedom and educational organisations. In an education for human freedom, the children to be educated must be considered as an end in themselves. The aim of education must be to teach the students to think freely, to choose intelligently. Educational organisations be it one run by the State or the Church or the economic organisations, must not have any extraneous aim other than cultivation of the faculty of thought. The moot point, according to Russell, is to respect the rights of the children to grow into a total man. This means cultivation of all the faculties. If we respect the rights of the children, education as a political weapon could not exist. If their rights are respected they will not be indoctrinated with dogmas. Rather they will be educated so as to give them the knowledge and the mental habits required for forming independent opinions.

So far the mode of training is concerned, Russell maintains that the principle of justice and liberty should be the ideal principle of education, if they could be applied. Justice means equal rights. Liberty means absence of constraints and needless interference on the one hand, and capacity for positive construction on the other. Both the principles cannot be fully applied to the child, although the ideal condition would be one where they can be applied. It is not wholly possible for the educator to treat the child as equal, although it should be so. Similarly, a child should be instructed liberally in the spirit of freedom as far as practicable. Where it is necessary
for instruction, the child’s freedom may be curtailed. But such curtailment must be commensurate with the needs of instruction. Where the child’s freedom is thus curtailed for the sake of instruction, it has to be entrusted in some authority. How to reconcile the demands of education for freedom with authority in education? Here the Russelian solution is, educational authorities exercising their authority in accordance with the spirit of freedom, using authority only to train the child to think for himself. Russell also opines that authority in education is unavoidable. But he maintains that this authority can be made to serve the cause of freedom.

5.4.1 THE SPIRIT OF REVERENCE

The question now arises, how can the educator exercise his authority in the spirit of freedom? Russell’s answer is, the educator can exercise his authority over the child in the spirit of freedom only if he has the spirit of reverence for the child. Now, what does this spirit of reverence for the child mean? By the spirit of reverence Russell means the ability to envision in imagination what the child can become and respect of what the child is to unfold in future. To all appearance, the child is weak and foolish; The teacher strong and always wiser than the child. So the teacher or any educational authority for that matter may think it a duty to mould the child and give him a preconceived shape. Not unlike what the potter does to the clay. The educator thus appropriates the role of the potter and sees in the child nothing but a malleable material, a clay to be moulded. But in reality, the child is not a clay to be given a preconceived or unnatural shape. What the child can become is infinitely superior to any preconceived ends, more sacred and strangely precious. The unfoldment of the faculties of the child
represents the principle of growth towards freedom. It also represents the silent and secret striving of the Universe towards self consciousness and realisation of the best in men, society and Nature. The true educator who educates for freedom therefore feels a profound humility in the presence of the infinite potentialities that the child may become. He feels a deep reverence for what is to be unfolded in future. It is this reverence that makes him exercise his authority in the spirit of freedom. The conflict between authority and freedom is to be resolved in a reverence for the child. In the beginning the child needs help and he has to depend on the teacher for the cultivation of his capacity of free thought, which is a form of human freedom. The destiny of human freedom hinges on how the teacher trains his student, on whether he develops or thwarts the student's faculties. This dependence on the one hand and the possibility of freedom on the other, put a trust on the teacher, the trust that the teacher will discharge his responsibility in the best interest of human freedom. Reverence for the child makes the teacher realise the trust and responsibility thrust upon him. It is therefore, reverence for the educand that will resolve the conflict of freedom and authority in education.

Reverence for the child is not possible if extraneous ends other than cultivation of the faculty of thought is introduced in education. As Russell has shown again and again, it is the political or religious use of education that introduces this extraneous element. What is necessary therefore, is the disengagement of the education of the child from the political, religious or economic motives of the State, the Church and economic organisations respectively. The question is how to disengage?
5.4.2 DIENAGEMENT OF EDUCATION FROM EXTRANEOUS ENDS

Let us begin with the State use of education. The State builds up an elaborate education machine and uses this machine to inculcate loyalty of the citizens to the State. But this loyalty is a narrow loyalty. It confines the sympathy of the individuals within the territories of a Nation State and to a segment of mankind, namely, his fellow compatriots. Every State will always try to inculcate this narrow loyalty and use education for the purpose so long as the sovereignty of the Nation States are absolute and the use of war as a method of conflict resolution among the States remains. So long as the need of war remains, the Nation States will use education as a means of propaganda and indoctrination. The cultivation of thought as intrinsically valuable in itself will recede in the background. To prevent the pernicious use of education by the State, therefore, a radical change is to be introduced in the relations of States and the danger of war is to be averted. To do this, the sovereignty of the Nation States to wage war must be limited and the authority to use force must be reposed in a World Government who will have the sole monopoly of force. With the World Government firmly established to arbitrate the disputes between the States, the need to wage war will gradually disappear. Correspondingly the need to use education as a means of propaganda and indoctrination to the neglect of cultivation of thought will also vanish. The World Government will train men to become citizens not merely of Nation States, but of the whole world. Men's loyalty will transcend the national boundaries as children will be taught, according to Russell, to become free citizens of the Universe. It is in the extension of human loyalty to embrace the whole Universe under the aegis of a World Government that Russell finds the conflict resolution between the political ends of education and education as cultivation of human
thought. The need for human unity, of living together, of social cohesion at
the highest level is moral as well as existential imperative. Where social
cohesion of the whole mankind, a necessary condition of human survival,
is the political end of education; such an end can be reconciled with the
cultivation of the faculty of thought for the emergence of free men. In
reality, under the changed scenario, the social cohesion of mankind as the
political end of education on the one hand, and the unfoldment of the
faculties of man as the liberating ends of education on the other, now form
an indivisible unity. The World Government will see to it that History is
taught properly, as a study of mankind’s collective struggle for progress
and freedom. All teaching of History is to be submitted to an international
commission, which should produce neutral textbooks free from patriotic
bias which is now demanded everywhere. Indoctrination of religious dogmas
through education is to be stopped. Rather, education will be used to
eliminate superstition by discouraging the habit of deciding questions on
other than rational grounds like mere respect for the wisdom of our
ancestors.

A difficulty that stands in the way of harmonising universal social
cohesion and individual freedom in education is according to Russell, a
too great love of uniformity in men and administrators of education alike.
The morons and the average have a tendency towards uniformity or universal
stupidity and persecution of the exceptional individual. In the educational
organisations the creative thinker, the teacher who is inspired by love of
his subject and students is getting sidelined by the bureaucrat who loves
uniformity and control. The creative thinker cultivates thought and serves
the cause of freedom. The bureaucrat imposes conformity, likes everything
cut and dried, and achieves universal stupidity, easy classification and
statistical results. If the World Government is to supervise education for
universal social cohesion in consonance with the cultivation of thought for
individual freedom, the problem of bureaucrats and executives imposing a
deadly uniformity must be addressed to. The Russelian solution to this
administrative problem is the application of the principle of devolution
again. According to Russell, the World Government is to exercise a certain
degree of supervision over all education. It would forbid excessive teaching
of local patriotism, prohibit dogmas and superstitions. But in all other
respects, the World Government would leave education to be organised
locally. Most important of all, it would be imbied with a scientific spirit,
allowing various experiments in new methods of education. The growth of
the experimental spirit is the most effective antidote against the imposition
of deadly uniformity. A scientific spirit imbied with the spirit of
experimentation can tolerate loopholes, exceptions and individualities than
any other forms of organisations. Thus, a liberal, democratic, scientific
World State applying the principle of devolution and filled with the spirit
of experimentation is the solution to the political abuse of education by
the State. It can create conditions for cultivation of the faculty of thought
for the cause of freedom.

The next consideration is, how to disengage education from the
extraneous ends of economic organisations?

So long as society is organised on the capitalist principles of economic
competition, education is bound to be used as a means of economic struggle
in search of jobs and other economic opportunities. Schools will devote
their energy to training the students for professional and economic success
only. According to Russell, this is particularly true of middle class schools.
These schools survive on the number of students they could enlist, which in turn depends on the good opinion of parents. They therefore, try to secure the good opinion of parents by advertising the successes of pupils. They treat instruction as training for a livelihood, think only of examination, diplomas, and degrees, discourages spontaneous and disinterested desire for knowledge. They lead the young to regard knowledge from a purely utilitarian point of view, as the road to money, not as gateway to wisdom. Cultivation of the faculty of thought and free inquiry which are inalienable parts of human freedom, are abandoned. One is reminded of Mao Zhe Dong's famous remark that examination does what one does to the enemy, it kills. From the grind in the education machine to the prison of economic machine is but a logical step.

Russell's solution to the problem is a change in the economic structure of society. If we use our intelligence inspired by human feelings, society may be economically so organised as to eliminate unnecessary oppressive economic struggle or at least lessen such struggle to a harmless degree. For such an economic re-organisation of society, Russell proposes his own brand of liberal socialism which we have discussed already.*

In a politically liberal society organised on economically socialist lines, there will be economic justice, employment for all and creative participation of all the members of the community in the process of production. In a society where the problem of economic needs is humanely solved, education need not be hooked to economic needs generated by the dynamics of oppressive economic organisations. Men will no doubt continue

* cf. pp 194 - 207 (5.2.5)
to be trained professionally for such trades or vocations, otherwise they will not be able to become useful members of the society. But training in any such trade or vocation will be a matter of choice in following one’s own aptitudes, not one of economic compulsion. It will never stand in the way of liberal education. It will never go against the spirit of freedom, cultivation of the faculty of thought and free inquiry. Rather education as cultivation of the faculty of thought and free inquiry, can be a delightful activity in itself.

5.4.3 Mental Adventure into the Mystery of Existence

The disengagement of education from extraneous ends must go together with positive encouragement of the joy of mental adventure. Mystery is the fabric of existence, the world in which we live. It lies within the power of thought to fathom the mystery of the Universe through genius and industry. Unravelling the veil of Nature to have a peep into the richness of what is inside is a joy in itself. Such an adventure of thought also increases the dignity of man because it represents the triumph of human spirit in sharing the mystery of the unknown. According to Russell, this joy of mental adventure must be the supreme end for which the education of the mind is to be valued. Once this is realised, no organisation, be it the Church, the State or economic organisation, will be able to use education as a means of realising their extraneous ends.

According to Russell, what stands in the way of mental adventure is men’s fear of thought. Men fear thought because thought challenges
authority and age old wisdom. Thought destroys status quo, established institutions and comfortable habits. Thought can look reality in the face be it in the depths of hell or in the sunshine of heaven. Although man is a tiny creature in the vast Universe, thought makes him lord of this Universe. It is fear of freedom and responsibility that goes along with thought, that makes men fear thought. This fear must be conquered by realising the intrinsic value of thought if we are to resolve the conflict between educational organisations and freedom of thought.

To cap all his arguments, Russell rightly points out that our institutions must be inspired by hope and not by fear. Similar must be the case with education. Education must not be motivated by fear of losing status quo, fear of unemployment, fear of losing the glory of the past, fear of defeat of one's country in war. Rather, education must be inspired by “a shining vision of the society that is to be, of the triumphs that thought will achieve in the time to come, and of the ever-widening horizon of man’s survey over the universe”.*

To cultivate free inquiry, education must arouse in men a passionate longing for truth, not for the cock-sureness of dogmatic beliefs. The aim of education must be teaching men to think rather than produce beliefs. Only with this positive aim shall we be able to prevent other organisations using education for their extraneous ends. True education is neither a form of drill, nor a means of producing unanimity through slavishness nor a training in credulity nor a means of acquiring power over the pupil. Russell even opines that even obedience and discipline must not be insisted at the expense

of free thought. When classes are large and teachers overworked due to a false economy, it is natural for the teachers to insist upon quick obedience and discipline. But such imposition interferes with genuine instruction in the spirit of freedom. The solution lies not in deadly conformism, but in reorganisation. The workload of each teacher must be lessened to make teaching a real pleasure. A teacher ought to have only as much teaching as can be done with pleasure. This will enable the teacher to have a more intimate and friendly relations with the students, a necessary condition of genuine instruction. More expenses may have to be incurred in education, but cultivation of the mind is worth the expenses.

As contrasted with this, true discipline is that which comes from within. It is the power of pursuing a distant object steadily, inspite of obstacles and sufferings. Such a kind of discipline can result only from strong creative desires for ends not immediately attainable. Education can foster such strong creative desires and thus inculcate inner discipline necessary in any free exercise of thought. The power of giving prolonged attention to a subject or prolonged meditation on a phenomenon is necessary in any intellectual cultivation. The role of the teacher in education is to actively encourage the power of meditation without involving passive acceptance of externally and mechanically imposed slavish obedience and discipline.

5.5 RESOLUTION OF THE CONFLICT BETWEEN THE FAMILY AND FREEDOM

The old family system which still persists is based on the authority of the husband. But social institution based solely on authority are giving way to the assault of free inquiry and emerging human freedom. Given the
conflict between human freedom and family as formulated by Russell earlier, we now dwell on Russellian resolution of the conflict. His proposed solutions towards resolution of the conflict are as follows:

1. A new sex morality that can reflect the contemporary reality of man woman relationship of love and sex. Society must evolve a new morality that takes into account the newly emerging human freedoms in love and sex so that such freedoms may co-exist with family as a system of pairing of male and female for the procreation of children.

2. The State gradually taking over many of the functions that traditionally belonged to the father will ensure the rights of the child, prevent child labour, regulate procreation for race improvement on eugenic principles.

3. State interference with family will be tyrannical, parochial and militaristic so long as there is anarchy and threat of war because of the sovereignty of the Nation States. State interference therefore must be regulated by a World State in accordance with international rule of law, imperatives of human survival, democracy and freedom.

4. The principle of transcendence of fetters to be achieved by the individual by reaching out to the Universe through the family and the child. This is an emancipating act through which man realises his union with the Universe in comparison with which even love is a fleeting moment of happiness. Man
and woman loving each other in family and child transcends themselves to reach out to the infinite Universe. Love of self which however pure is always conditioned, is transcended in love of the creation. This, according to Russell, is a new religion which must take the place of the old if family is to survive the new freedom in man woman relation.

Let us see Russell’s exposition of these solutions and the arguments he adduces in their defense.

5.5.1 RUSSELL’S NEW SEX MORALITY

According to Russell, a new sex morality must be the response to the problem of adjustment of man and woman relation consequent upon the emancipation of women leading to gender equality. The possibility of this new sex morality arises from the discovery of contraceptives.

Let us see, what in Russell’s view, are the implications of women’s emancipation and gender equality. It means, if premarital and extra-marital relations are allowed to men, women should also be allowed the same. If men demand chastity of women, women has a right to expect the same from men. If society gives tacit nod to the institution of female prostitutes for men to sin in secret without overtly violating traditional morality, then women should also be provided with a counterpart institution of male prostitutes to have the same privilege without appearing less virtuous than men. If all these alternatives are unpalatable, given the fact of late marriage and gender equality these days, a free sex relation outside conventional
morality but based on love, freedom of choice and sense of responsibility is to be recognised.

If women’s emancipation and gender equality have given rise to a new morality, can this new morality be reconciled with family?

Russell’s answer is in the affirmative. Family, as a social institution need not break up. Its essence can be preserved because we now have new methods of safeguarding the procreative function of family without compromising human freedom in matters of love and sex. The method, of course, is the selective and purposive use of contraceptives.

In Russell’s opinion, the revolutionary discovery of contraceptives has made it possible to make a fine discrimination between sex as a relation of love between partners and sex as procreative relation between husband and wife within family. A man may have the relation of sex and love with many women, so may a woman with many men. Such a relation may be pre-marital or extra-marital, but must be based on love and mutual respect of each other’s freedom. It must also be disengaged from the social function of procreation of children which is to be fulfilled within the family system. Russell opines that procreation must occur within marriage because it involves a serious commitment of bringing a new life into the world, preparing the child for the adventure of becoming a total man. At the same time, freedom as sexual love outside marriage can be tolerated as all extra-marital sexual intercourse can be rendered sterile by the use of contraceptives. Under the changed sexual morals, husbands may become tolerant of their wife’s lovers as orientals are of eunuchs. For contraception can rule out wives being impregnated by their lovers and therefore the
biological continuity of the husband within the family can be ensured beyond doubt. A woman may then be capable of performing two apparently incompatible roles, a wife bearing her husband’s child and a woman finding her freedom in love beyond family and conventional morality. Needless to say contraceptives must be efficient and women as authentic as they are free. This may be expecting more than what seems rational. But according to Russell nothing stands in the way of both conditions being fulfilled with the passage of time.

Russell’s argument in defense of the new morality is, adherence to the old morality means curtailment of women’s freedom which is no longer possible now. Women can be robbed of their freedom by keeping them stupid, superstitious and ignorant, by imposing a strict censorship of information on sex. Restrictions on freedom can go to a ridiculous extent if chastity and virtue of young girls in the form demanded of them by the old morality is to be preserved. Examples are, young girls must not be alone with men at any time. Girls should not earn their living by working outside the home. Girls on outing are to be accompanied by their mother or aunt. Unmarried women are to be subjected to monthly virginity test. The use of contraceptives is to be banned. If all these are not enough perhaps all men have to be castrated with the exception of ministers of divinity. Here Russell sardonically remarks that even this exception may not be wise.* As women’s emancipation cannot be ruled out without these ridiculous consequences and mankind cannot be free with more than half of its members enslaved, the only alternative left is new morality and a corresponding restructuration of family.

* Russell, Marriage And Morals, p.65
An inalienable component of the new morality and new freedom is a wholesome and rational attitude towards sex. Sex must be disengaged from any association with taboo, prohibition, ignorance, obsession and sense of guilt. Matters relating to sex can become subject of intellectual curiosity and free inquiry. Scientific knowledge of sex must be made available to young people in a form that makes them sensitive to beauties of emotional life. They should not be deceived on matters of sex. Lying by parents and teachers on matters of sex has the adverse effect of associating sex with a sense of guilt in the minds of young men and women. It make them cynical and hypocritical when they discover that the liars are none other than their benefactors, parents and teachers. This sense of guilt and of being deceived poisoned their attitude towards life and people in general, rendering them incapable of experiencing love in man woman relation.

The next inalienable component of the new morality, according to Russell, is love. A humanising condition of the new morality is that sex be based on a deep pure and serious emotion like love. Emancipation from the traditional morality of the Church must not lead to trivialisation of sex, rendering it a mere physiological outlet devoid of higher values. Love is an emotion that shines in its own intrinsic merit and has its own moral standard. When sex is inspired by love, it is not without moral, but has its own morals.

Russell in one of his rare insights points out that love is the best relation human nature is capable of. Love is something far more than desire for sexual intercourse, although it goes with it. It is the principal means of escape from the loneliness which afflicts most men and women. Men fear a cold world and the cruelty of herd. He longs for affection. Only love can
conquer the hard wall of ego and the feeling of loneliness. Lovers discover their freedom in the bond that binds one to the other. Fulfilment in love and sexual relation is necessary to make a man happy, free and kind. Without the experience of love, men and women cannot attain their full stature. Those who are unsatisfied in love and sex become cruel and persecuting in the name of public spirit and high moral order. Here, a point which can hardly be overemphasized is, Russell is never in favour of just throwing away the institution of marriage and family overboard. Rather his demand is that marriage be based on love and freedom of choice of the partners concerned. A fruitful marriage that satisfied these conditions ought to last life long despite the contingencies of circumstances. A marriage which begins with passionate love and lead to children who are desired and loved, a marriage and love mellowed by companionship and time have intrinsic value and are not lightly thrown away. Thus, Russell opines that even after women’s emancipation and new sex morality, it is possible for men and women to be happy in marriage. But to be happy, marriage must be based on complete equality and mutual freedom; the most complete physical and mental intimacy, a shared standard of values. Russell asserts;

Given all these conditions, I believe marriage to be the best and most important relation that can exist between two human beings. If it has not often been realised hitherto, that is chiefly because husbands and wives have regarded themselves as each other’s policemen. If marriage is to achieve its possibilities, husbands and wives must learn to understand that whatever the law may say, in their private lives they must be free.*

* Ibid., p.96
Freedom in marriage and love may have to be constrained by the appearance of the child towards whom both the husband and wife have now a moral responsibility and through whom both are linked to the society and the world. Moral responsibility to the child may have to override the claims of passionate love and freedom on appropriate occasions. Otherwise love and freedom in marriage must not be constrained by extraneous considerations.

To emphasize the importance of freedom of partners within the institution of marriage, Russell approvingly refers to the institution of companionate marriage as proposed by Judge B.B. Lindsay. Only he intends to go further. His proposal is that all sex relations which do not involve children should be regarded as a purely private affair. Thus, if a man and a woman choose to live together without having children, that should be no one’s business but their own. A sort of trial marriage before a man and a woman seriously decide to settle in marriage and have children will be very helpful, as that would give the partners previous knowledge of their sexual compatibility. Once the biological purpose of marriage is seriously recognised, society may agree on the convention that no marriage will be legally binding until the wife’s first pregnancy. As children are the true purpose of marriage, marriage may be regarded consummated only when there is a prospect of children. Contraceptives have separated procreation from sex. This has opened up new possibilities requiring new moral distinctions. Now people come together for sex alone, as occurs in prostitution, or for companionship involving a sexual element as in companionate marriage, or finally for the purpose of rearing a family. Family is the only social institution where man and woman can come together exercising freedom of choice in love and sex, at the same time fulfilling
their social commitment to society. But for man and woman to be together in freedom, changes in family must be commensurate with the demands of new morality.

Another component of the new morality is a reasonable approach to the problem of divorce so that husband and wife may always have a feel of their mutual freedom vis-a-vis a commitment to children. In the new morality, divorce cannot altogether be ruled out. But divorce as alternative to family is to be preferred only under extraordinary circumstances where the continuation of the marriage will be either torturous for the partners or disastrous for the progeny. For example, divorce may be the only desirable solution when either the husband or wife becomes insane after marriage such that insane stock may spring from the union or when already born children may be affected by their insanity. Here the sane partner must have the freedom to start a new life. Similarly, when one of the partners had deserted the other, it should constitute a genuine cause for divorce. In Russell’s opinion, adultery in itself need not be a cause for divorce. Occasional adultery ought to form no barrier to subsequent happiness in marriage. But these extramarital relations must be such as not to lead to children. For, having children out of wedlock goes against the biological basis of marriage and must be avoided especially when we have scientific techniques at our command to do so.

Divorce may also be the best alternative in cases where without blame to either party, it is impossible for a married couple to live amicably or without some very grave sacrifice. If family is to come to terms with emerging human freedom, both partners in a marriage must have the freedom to divorce through mutual consent, in case where children are not involved.
As children are the purpose of marriage, to hold people together to a childless marriage against their will is a cruel cheat.

But when marriage leads to children, stability in marriage is important in the interest of the children. The child has a right to a chance of a happy and healthy development to which the parents ought to be committed. Married husband and wife may have to compromise some of their freedoms in the interest of children. But in Russell’s opinion, such a compromise need not be with a strait jacketed sexual morality. He maintains that even with some occasional extra-marital freedoms and adventures, husband and wife can co-operate in the rearing of the child. Love of child will interfere as little as possible with mutual freedom when they realise that it is possible to make a subtle discrimination between marital relation with moral responsibility to the child and merely sexual relation. They will become less jealous of each other’s freedom and more conscious of their responsibility. Russell is clear on this point;

I do not pretend that marriage can be freed from onerous duties. In the system which I commend, men are freed, it is true, from the duty of sexual conjugal fidelity, but they have in exchange the duty of controlling jealousy. The good life cannot be lived without self-control, but it is better to control a restrictive and hostile emotion such as jealousy, rather than a generous and expansive emotion such as love. Conventional morality has erred, not in demanding self-control, but in demanding it in the wrong place.*

* Ibid., pp.153-54
The new morality will not seek to constrain the instincts and put a brake to impulses. Rather, instincts and impulses must be given a direction. For this, men’s instincts should be trained from the very childhood through right education. Guilt, shame and fear should not compel men to bury their impulses in the depths of unconscious since childhood. If individuals are to grow into upright men and women intellectually honest, socially fearless, vigorous in action and tolerant in thought, their instincts must also be trained from the very beginning. Men’s animal and spiritual natures, the faculties of instinct and spirit must not be at war with each other. Rather each can develop fully only in unison with the other. Man woman relation in love and sex has basis in instinct, in the animal life. But it grows out to reach the Universe with the purificatory help of the mind and the universalising tendency of the spirit. Russell puts this point so succinctly:

The love of man and woman at its best is free and fearless, compounded of body and mind in equal proportions; not dreading the physical basis lest it should interfere with the idealisation. Love should be a tree whose roots are deep in the earth, but whose branches extend into heaven. But love cannot grow and flourish while it is hedged about with taboos and superstitious terrors, with words of reprobation and silences of horror.*

Full development of one’s emotional life is necessary to realising the total man. Emotional life is developed through myriads of human relations. The love of man and woman and the love of parents and children are crucial relations that enriches an individual’s emotional life. These forms of love do not conflict with one another. Rather each one enriches the other, each

* Ibid., p.183
is necessary for realisation of the other. Husband and wife who do not enjoy each other's love cannot give healthy robust love and joy to their children. Similarly, those who have not loved their parents cannot bequeath parental love to their children. Of these, bracketing out love of man and woman for lack of a new sexual morality will only deprive other forms of love their legitimate nutriment. The passionate love of man and woman for each other is not to be feared, for in Russell's mind;

To fear love is to fear life, and those who fear life are already three parts dead.*

We now come to the last component of the new sex morals, namely, the placement of sex among other human values vis-a-vis the new sexual freedom possible in new morality. In Russell's view, the new morality recognises sex as natural need, like food and drink.** As such, negation of sex as well as undue preoccupation with sex are both obsessions. And obsession with sex makes a person self-absorbed, incapable of reaching out to the wider horizons of life by cultivating all his faculties. The glutton, the voluptuary and the ascetic are all self-absorbed persons whose horizons are limited by their own desires, either by way of satisfaction or by way of renunciation. The only way to avoid obsession with sex is freedom in sexual morals combined with a balanced development of the sexual impulse through a wise education on sexual matters.

---

* Loc. cit.
** Ibid. p 185
Russell further points out that although sex is a natural need, it is not just that. Rather, sex is connected with some of the greatest goods in human life. The three good things connected with sex are, lyric love, happiness in marriage and art. Man realises his freedom in artistic creation and artistic creation derives nourishment from the sexual impulse. For those who have artistic capacity, given the right environment sexual impulse leads to artistic expression. Sexual freedom and creative release of the sexual impulse is closely related with artistic freedom. Societies free from sexual repression and do not interfere with the creative activities of its artists, are bound to produce great works of art than conventionally virtuous repressive societies. This is because art has its roots in the joy of life, which in its turn depends upon a certain spontaneity in regard to sex. In sexually repressive societies men channelise their energies in work. But it is joyless work for economic motives and in ruthless competition for survival. The gospel of work for work's sake is extolled. But paradoxically in a society where work is valued for the sake of work only, there is really no work worth doing. Work loses all its creative joy and becomes a burden. Society becomes dull, deadly uniform and mechanical. To overcome this, life must be restored its joys and the joy of life can be restored with the liberation of the sexual impulse. Release of sexual impulse does not mean more opportunities for the bare physical sexual act with its corresponding social institutions like prostitution, and sexual perversions. This has led to commoditisation and reification of sex. The sexual freedom that makes the artist create is the freedom to love, not the gross freedom to relieve the bodily need with some unknown woman.

The new morality differs from the traditional morality in maintaining that instincts and impulses, including sex impulse should be trained rather
than thwarted. But the new morality is not simply letting loose of instincts and impulses, saying merely, follow your impulses and do as you like. Sometimes instincts and impulses may have to be constrained for the sake of consistency in the pursuit of distant goals or even for the sake of giving a better direction to the impulses themselves. At such times self control may be necessary. But Russell rightly points out that self control must not be interpreted as a repressive mechanism to be exalted as an end in itself. In the making of the free person, institutions and moral conventions ought to require the minimum rather than a maximum self control. Here Russell observes:

The use of self-control is like the use of brakes on a train. It is useful when you find yourself going in the wrong direction, but merely harmful when the direction is right. No one would maintain that a train ought always to be run with brakes on, yet the habit of difficult self-control has a very similar injurious effect upon the energies available for useful activity. Self-control causes these energies to be largely wasted on internal friction instead of external activity; and on this account it is always regrettable, though sometimes necessary.*

Russell rightly holds that sane freedom of impulses must be learnt from the earliest years, otherwise the so called freedom will be only a frivolous, superficial freedom, not freedom of the whole personality. His clear doctrine on sexual freedom vis-a-vis human freedom is:

---

* Ibid., p 198
The doctrine that I wish to preach is not one of licence; it involves nearly as much self-control as is involved in the conventional doctrine. But self-control will be applied more to abstaining from interference with the freedom of others than to restraining one's own freedom.*

5.5.2 STATE INTERVENTION IN FAMILY

According to Russell, State intervention with some qualifications may contribute to a great extent towards the resolution of the conflict between freedom and family. The State can take over many of the functions that traditionally belong to the family. The State can intervene on behalf of the child, woman and the weaker sections in matters of prevention of child labour, education, health, gender equality in family income distribution. Thus the State can intervene in favour of individual freedom against oppressive patriarchal family. The State also can intervene to ensure population control, which is a necessary condition for a minimum quality of life and human freedom. Most important of all, the State may intervene in the family system to ensure selective breeding for improvement of the human race. The State intervention of family on eugenic principles will help mankind in the road to freedom through a selective breeding of a species of mankind with the best faculties and possibilities.

To begin with, State intervention on behalf of the child against familial and other forms of cruelties. Any modern State now protects the child

* Ibid., p 202
against violence - a function earlier performed by the father. In extreme cases, the State even prevents the father from committing excessive cruelty against the child. A modern welfare State provides medical and dental care, midday meal at the school if the parents are destitute.

The State prevention of the child labour is the most vital step in ensuring the child’s right to a happy childhood, to a full development of his faculties to become a total man.

The economic order that emerged after industrial revolution demanded child labour, cheap and easy to use. Marx in the Capital Vol-I recorded the details of how children from destitute families were recruited to the army of industrial workers and condemn to labour in the inferno that was the nineteen century factory. Helpless parents were compelled to drive their children to factory as ‘family extra’ by exercise of their parental authority. That was a tragic yet ironic conflict between parental authority and the child’s freedom. He whose covenant it was to see the child grow into freedom is stunting his growth. Yet proposal for State interference to prevent child labour was fiercely resisted on the ground that it would weaken parental authority. The rights of the parents to sacrifice the rights of the child was defended by parents, employers and economists. Ultimately, the moral sense of the community was aroused to pave the way to Factory Act. The State prevention of child labour has restored to the child his natural right to be free and to develop into a full human being.

The State enforcement of compulsory education was also in a sense a serious interference with the rights of parents. Now, children have to learn things that the State wants them to. The State can further control the
lives of children through the schools. The State can take care of the children's health, providing if necessary special schools for the mentally deficient. The State may even provide special arrangement for food for children from the poorer section of the community. In other words, the State may concern itself with education, health and food for children and in these respects gradually take over the functions of the biological father. The State take over may be one of the ways to resolve the conflict between freedom and family as a social institution. But this mode of interference has its own dangers. We will take up this point a little later.

The State may also interfere with the family system to ensure gender equality in income distribution. For example, let us take the case of working wives. During her period of confinement, she cannot work. But child bearing is a community affair, being a means for the propagation of species. Therefore, the State may provide family allowance to working mothers during her confinement and child care period to compensate her wages. A woman must also be paid for the work she does at home for the family. With women's emancipation, their economic independence, quest for individual identity put a question mark to culturally accepted feminine instincts such as motherhood, desire for child etc. In future, a woman may have to be paid for child bearing and State intervention in this regard might even be necessary.

The State may also interfere with the family system to ensure population control for human survival and freedom. Exponential population growth threatens human freedom and survival by causing, overpopulation, war, famine, depletion of resources, lowering of quality of life, making sustainable growth impossible. Negative population growth also threatens
human survival and freedom by tending towards zero population. Now the discovery of contraceptives has made it possible to control population in such a way that both exponential growth and negative growth are avoided. Science has given the technique, the State has to decide on the policy. The State interference with the family system to ensure population control is one of the ways in which the State can step in to resolve the conflict between freedom and family as a social institution.

Control of population means control of the number of population as well as improvement of the quality of the population. Contraceptives and eugenics have made both forms of control possible. Russellian argument in favour of State intervention of population control on eugenic principles is as follows.

Human excellence is a necessary condition of human freedom. To be free human beings must attain a certain level of excellence. The more excellent a human being is, the more likely is he to become free. Now two factors contribute to human excellence, good breeding and good education. Human race can be gradually improved to approximate the ideal level of excellence through education and propagation of favourable hereditary traits. Favourable hereditary traits can be preserved and propagated while unfavourable ones are eliminated through a process of selective breeding of the best stock. In simple terms, it means individuals with valued genetic endowments, physical, mental and spiritual, will be allowed to multiply. But those with defective genetic traits will be discouraged from propagating. Contraceptives have made procreation voluntary. The State has already taken up a seizable part of the social and economic role of the father. Therefore, nothing now need stand in the way of a woman choosing the
father of her child on eugenic grounds, while preferring another individual as a lover or a companion on emotional or private grounds. Similarly men may select the mothers of their children on eugenic ground. Ultimately the State may intervene in marriage as male-female pairing for procreation on the ground that where children are involved sexual behaviour concerns the community and therefore must come under the purview of the State. The relation of love apart from children concerns the individual man and woman only and human freedom demands that neither the community nor the State should interfere with love. But human freedom also demands that mankind attain the highest excellence possible as a gateway to freedom. Where selective breeding helps mankind in the pursuit of excellence, but traditional family stands in the way, the latter may be construed as standing in the way of human freedom. Here the Russellian resolution is State intervention. The State can intervene and where necessary, make changes in the present family system to see that procreation is carried out in accordance with the principle of selective breeding of the best stock. Given that contraceptives have made it possible to regulate conception at will and also that the State can now take over many of the functions of the father, the State intervention in the family is now no longer a far cry. Russell also argues that once the advantages of selective breeding are known, the eugenic outlook will grow and become widespread till it becomes embodied in laws enacted by the State, possibly in the form of pecuniary rewards and penalties.

One may object to State sponsoring selective breeding on the ground that this will mean science interfering with our intimate personal impulses. To this, Russell’s reply is that earlier men have acquiesced to religion, now they will acquiesce to science. In future, men will not hesitate to submit to science for the welfare of the posterity. Gradually science may
come to dominate human lives so much that scientific tyranny take the place of religions tyranny. So much so that Russell foresees a time when all who care for the freedom of the spirit may be forced to a rebellion against scientific tyranny. But ironically, when faced with the prospect of scientific tyranny, Russell gives the verdict that if there is to be tyranny at all, it is better that it should be scientific tyranny. This is a point on which we will dwell again when we examine the Russellian resolutions.

5.5.3 WORLD STATE TO REGULATE STATE INTERVENTION

Although Russell opines that the State take over of many of the social and economic functions of the traditional family has an emancipating effect, he is equally aware of the grave dangers of State take over. Parents have feelings for their children, with whom they have a living personal relationship. But the State as an impersonal institution does not have any such relationship and feeling. Parents normally do not regard children as raw material for political schemes. But the State almost invariably does. The State is in essence an institution run by administrators and bureaucrats who insist on uniformity. Hence children left to the care of the State tend to become uniform. Their individuality and unique potentialities stand the risk of being destroyed.

Moreover, if States are allowed to have the kind of sway that parents have normally over their children, then even more grave consequences follow. Militaristic Nation States may then bring up children to become willing cannon fodder for war. The State may use its care of health, food and education of children to inculcate sole loyalty to their State, making
the younger generation more blood thirsty against other State. So long as international anarchy arising out of the sovereignty of Nation States remains, State take over of the functions of the family has grave danger that outweigh its advantages.

According to Russell, another danger of State control of population arises from the correlation of the size of population with the balance of power of Nation States. Other factors remaining more or less same, Nation States with larger man power are likely to win war against Nation States with lesser man power. Therefore, given the State control of population, Nation States will try to tilt the balance of power in their favour by increasing the size of population. But ironically, however, the already militarily powerful nations will refuse to sit idle while other nations reverse the balance of power by the mere process of breeding. The State control of population policy and intervention in the family system to this effect, is therefore fraught with tensions.

Even the State use of the science of eugenics is fraught with danger. A State may use the principle of selective breeding to breed intellectually and physically superior generation. By inculcating a fierce sense of loyalty to one’s Nation State and hatred of other States, such a genetically superior generation may be used to win war against other States and dominate the rest of mankind. Other Nation States seeing the advantages of the State use of eugenics for quality control of population will follow the same example and use it for the same purpose. The tension among the Nation States will be heightened and there will be a threat to human freedom at large. This shows that if science advances while international anarchy continues and the world filled with malevolence and hate, the result is disaster. For science will be hooked to evil purposes.
On the basis of the above arguments, Russell concludes that the State intervention of the family system to resolve the conflict of freedom and the family is not complete unless there is a World State to enforce international law and order. The presence of a World State will make a difference on how the State make use of its control of education, health and food. In other words, the presence of a World State will make a difference on how the State takes up the role of the traditional family. A World State will not allow the Nation States to use its guardianship over children to preach national chauvinism and inculcate narrow loyalties. It will make the Nation States exercise their guardianship over children which includes looking after education, health and food, to let them grow into citizens of the world. The only form of citizenship ultimately compatible with human freedom is, in Russell’s opinion, world citizenship.

Similarly the World Government must see to it that Nation States do not use their control of population policy for militaristic purposes. The World State must stop the race of propagation among the Nation States in a bid for demographic superiority. The World State must pass decree limiting the rate at which any military nation may increase its population thus foreclosing any struggle among the Nation States to tilt the balance of power by the mere process of breeding. As the international authority, the World State will take into consideration the population question seriously and insist upon birth control in any recalcitrant nation. Only thus can the world be spared of not only nuclear warfare, but also demographic warfare. Thus State intervention in the family system to control population in consonance with human survival and human freedom can be complete if and only if there is an international authority who will impartially enforce a demographic pattern in keeping with international harmony, peaceful co-existence and freedom for all.
Similarly, Nation States applying the principles of eugenics to breed the best stock and make themselves powerful, may use their newly acquired power to wage war against each other. Thus even genetic improvement to breed the best stock may lead mankind to disaster unless there is international peace, law and order. The best stock of each Nation State may use their intellectual and physical prowess to eliminate one another. Only the presence of the World State can make eugenics complementary to and consistent with human freedom, by inculcating world citizenship in the breeding of the best stock. Thus the State intervention in the family system (i.e., control of population, increase of population and improvement of population) in favour of human freedom have to be controlled by international authority if the purpose is to be realised at all. The World State therefore is an inalienable component in the resolution of the conflict of freedom and family through State intervention.

5.5.4 THE PRINCIPLE OF TRANSCENDENCE

Another important point in the Russelian resolution of the conflict between freedom and family is his proposal for transcendence of individuality in man and woman relation in marriage and family.

According to Russell, in the western world freedom has come to be associated with individuality so much so that a woman conceives her freedom and identity in terms of her individuality only. Men on their part feel that free expression of their sexual passions and impulses need dominance (mastery), vigour and initiative. These apparently opposing emotions makes fusion of their personalities difficult and as a result, man
and woman remain hard separate units. Their relation, inspite of being a satisfying emotional union tends to become trivial. They are consumed by a gnawing loneliness, which has become a part of civilised life.

Russell's solution to this conflict is to bring man and woman relationship in marriage and love under a new religion of transcendence, a religion in the true Russellian fashion that will take the place of old religion. This religion of transcendence means according to Russell that men and women in their relationship are to realise that individuality is not the ultimate end and aim of their being. They must realise that clinging to individuality is not identical with freedom.

They must see that outside the individuals, there is the community, the future of mankind, the immensity of the Universe in which all our hopes and fears are a mere pin-point. In their relationship in love and marriage men and women can satisfy their sexual impulses and achieve genuine emotional union without interfering each others liberty. But this can be so only when instinctive impulses are freed of their narrow repetitive cycles by the faculty of thought and the corresponding emotion of love gets transmuted into universal love by the universalising principle of love. The love of two people for each other becomes fruitful and an enjoyment of freedom even within the institution of marriage, if through the family their love can reach out to the community and hence to the entire Universe. Here Russell rightly observes that if the love of two people for each other is too circumscribed, "it becomes, sooner or later, retrospective, a tomb of dead joys, not a well spring of new life". The emotion of love can

* Russell, Principles Of Social Reconstruction, p.133
become free and yet within family if it can stretch into a future which is growing and infinite with the infinity of human endeavour. The relationship of love between men and women can have seriousness and depth only when love is linked to some infinite purpose. Therefore, the religion of transcendence of individuality is one way to resolve the conflict of freedom and family by bringing love in marriage and family under its sway in such a way that love and freedom is possible within family system itself.

To sum up, we have attempted at an exposition of the Russellian resolution of freedom and social organisations vis-avis their taxonomy, by identifying and analysing the principles used. Examination of the Russellian principles of resolution will be taken up in the next chapter.