CHAPTER FOUR

RUSSELL’S FORMULATION OF THE CONFLICT OF FREEDOM AND ORGANISATION
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In this chapter, we will discuss Russell’s formulation of the conflict of freedom and organisation vis-a-vis (1) the State (2) economic organisations (3) the Church (4) educational organisations and (5) the family.

4.1 THE STATE

The Russellian doctrine of the State holds that force is the essence of the State. The force that a State wields is absolute in two senses. One, the State has sole monopoly over the use of force. No association or individual within a State can challenge this monopoly over force. Two, the State’s monopoly over the use of force is not subject to any external control.

Here the nature of force on which the State is founded needs to be explained. So is its absolute character.

The force on which the State is founded is a complex one. Many factors go into the making of this force. Unlocking the secrets of Nature and harnessing the physical forces through revolution in science and technology adds to the physical prowess of the State. In our own times, discovery of the secrets of atoms led to the manufacture of nuclear weapons which in their turn gave rise to the modern mega-States. A revolution in communication facilitates greater mobilisation of natural and human
resources under a Central Authority and hence increase the material force at the command of a State. Discovery of new techniques of control of human behaviour generates hitherto untapped social force that can be placed at the service of the State. Control over the means of production, the process of production and distribution of commodity also gives to the State power over the individuals. But the unique force on which the State rests which is the catalysing agent of all others factors is the political force that a State derives from legal legitimisation. The State monopolising the use of force is given legitimacy by the fact that such uses are governed by rule of law. The argument in favour of the thesis that rule of law legitimises State monopoly of force is that in a free for all situation where use of force is left to the individuals themselves, only the strong will have freedom to steal, rob and murder. But the innocent, the gentle and the good will have neither the freedom to live nor the freedom to create. In a society where there are many users of force, we will have; all against one, one against all and each against the other. Where the State is the sole repository of force and arbitrary exercise of force is restrained by rule of law, it may be presumed that force is now kept in chain, leading to the triumph of civic society in which individuals may enjoy their freedoms so long as such freedoms are in harmony with the existence of civic society.

So far the Russellian doctrine is in the finest liberal tradition.

Legal legitimisation of the State which in itself is a force, puts a limitation to the absolute character of State power. Thus, internally, although the State theoretically can exercise force over all individuals and associations of individuals such an exercise is limited by the operation of the rule of law. Here it is obvious that force employed according to law is
less pernicious than force employed capriciously. In the external exercise of force against other States and foreign nationals, however, the State is not constrained by any rule of law. The so-called international law has not acquired sufficient hold on the States to regulate the relations of States. So far conflict resolution among States are concerned, force is the ultimate arbiter. War is the highest expression of force that States apply against each other. Inherently therefore, the State is welded to two institutions at the antipodes; the rule of law on the one hand and war on the other. The right of the State to the use of force within its territory as well as outside its territory has an absolute character. But internally it is limited by the operation of the rule of law and by the fact that use of State force beyond a tolerable limit invites rebellion. Externally a State’s use of force is limited by the use of similar retaliatory force from other States.

The how and why of individual acquiescence in the power of the State is best understood from a study of the morphology of the State.

One theory towards such an understanding is to explain the growth of the State as the transition from multipolarity of force to unipolarity of force. In the beginning, there was a free for all state in which several centres of power contended for supremacy. We may cite the feudal chiefs and the role they have played in the evolution of European States as our example. Either there was a free interplay of forces among various contending powers leading to the monopoly of force by the strongest or a mutual agreement to surrender the right to use force to one centre of power, the sovereign in this case, to whom the feudal chiefs now swear personal allegiance. Here Russell opines that the social contract if there be any is not between the subject and the sovereign as Rousseau thought, but between
the contending power centres and the sovereign by which act the monopoly of force is reposed in the sovereign.

Another theory is the State power growing out of or supported by needs of human nature. Human nature is such that the individual man has the urge to belong to a group, animated by common friendship and enmities and banded together for defense and attack. When such groups are essentially enlargements of the family, what we have is essentially a Nation State. And when such groups are based upon a conscious common purpose we have organisations like the Church or International Workers Of The World (IWW) that transcends the boundaries of Nation States.

Over and above the instinctive group belongingness, two other fears reinforces the power of the State. Thus fear of anarchy within the State and fear of aggression from outside legitimises the State monopoly of force in the eyes of the citizens. Only the State power can avert the anarchy of all against one, one against all and each against the other. Only the State can protect individual freedom, private property against pillaging marauders and private armies. Here we have an exclusive ‘either or’ argument that in effect says; the only alternative to State power is anarchy.

Fear of external aggression is a sufficient reason to inspire obedience to the State in any citizen. Here Russell points to an interesting paradox deep seated in the State system. A State arms itself to the teeth to ward off external aggression by other States. As this increase of armament may also be used to invade, it arouses suspicion in other States, which in turn increases their own armaments. This again has the effect of reinforcing a corresponding fear. As a State’s defense preparedness correspondingly
increases other States’ armament, what a State does to diminish external fear has the effect of increasing it. This in turn has the result of armament race gaining its own momentum further leading to stockpiling of destructive arsenals enough to destroy whole of mankind many a times. Thus the State system is responsible for making a reign of terror universal, threatening not only human freedom, but human existence itself.

Patriotism in its religious aspect is another source of State power. The individual citizen may derive a joy akin to religious fervour in sacrificing his life for the life of the Nation. This may be reinforced and perpetuated by education. The individual may be conditioned to limit his sympathy to his Nation State and compatriots to the exclusion of the rest of mankind, even if his is a terrorist State. A State may thus sacrifice its citizens at the alter of its nationalism and endanger their freedom as well as the freedom of mankind. More so when the interest of the propertied class and power oligarchs are concealed as the interest of the Nation State.

The force a State wields has this dual character that internally within the territory of the State, it promotes security, whereas outside the borders the State force promotes insecurity. The State suppresses violence within and promotes rule of law. But it practices violence outside and promotes anarchy where force ultimately prevails. The State divides mankind into citizens and aliens; towards the former it is bound by rule of law, towards the latter only by the prudence of the highwaymen. A warring State becomes a combination of men for murder and robbery. The basic Russellian critique of the State is that preaching rule of law at home and practising anarchy abroad is a basic contradiction at the heart of the State system. He maintains rightly that external and internal anarchy must be either both right or wrong. It can never be that the former is right while the latter is wrong.
War is the highest form of expression of the contradiction at the heart of the State system. According to Russell, Nation States are permanently welded to the institution of war. War is a conflict between two groups or Nation States in which one group tries to kill or maim the other. The object of war is power and wealth. War is enduring because it is gratifying to human impulse apart from its results. In war force is applied without any rule of law. Each party is the best judge as to the rightness of its cause. Everything is left to the interplay of forces. Force used by a neutral authority according to laws previously laid down by the community is qualitatively different from force employed by one community against another on occasions of which the one community is the sole judge.

So far we are giving the Russellian exposition of the State as an institution of force. But Russell looks at the State not merely as an institution of force, but also as an institution capable of performing other functions as well. According to Russell, what the State can do and ought to do for the betterment of the life of citizens must also be emphasized to understand the tension between the State as a social organisation and individual freedom. Russell maintains that the State can and ought to intervene more actively in the following areas.

Firstly, providing security to the citizens. Protection of life and property is one of the primary purposes of the State. The State is to prevent private violence, to protect life and property, to enact criminal law and secure its enforcement.

Secondly, State intervention is most effective and desirable on matters in which the welfare of the whole community depends upon the practically
universal attainment of a certain minimum. Sanitation, prevention of infectious disease, compulsory universal education are examples of such areas. Good sanitation is essential for the health and survival of the citizens. Only the State has the resources and requisite legal authority to ensure good sanitation on such a massive scale as to reach all the citizens and of such a quality as is conductive to their health and well being. No citizen, therefore, should feel that his freedom is threatened because of State intervention to ensure good sanitation, as such intervention is for general welfare and is unlikely to violate his essential freedom. Similarly a man suffering from plague or AIDS cannot be left on his own to spread infection far and wide. The interference with liberty remains an evil, but in some cases it is clearly a smaller evil than the spread of disease which liberty would produce. The stamping out of malaria and yellow fever by destroying mosquitoes is perhaps the most striking example of the good which can be done in this way. But when the good is small or doubtful and interference with liberty is great, it becomes better to endure a certain amount of preventable disease rather than suffer a scientific tyranny.

Similarly, only the State can ensure compulsory education for all its citizens. Democracy is possible only when the citizens are literate and enlightened. This can be achieved only through compulsory universal education by the State.

Let us take the case of children, a weaker section of the society. Children are not capable of looking after their own interests. Even parental responsibility in many ways may be inadequate. For example, poor parents out of economic necessity may compel their children to labour at factories, mills and hazardous industries, thus stunting their natural mental and
physical growth. Child labour is a global phenomenon but very acute in the third world countries. Here the State can step in to stop child abuses. The State alone can insist upon the children being provided with the minimum of knowledge and health which satisfies the conscience of the community.

Likewise the State can provide insurance against unemployment, sickness and destitution in old age. This can remove from the lives of wage earners a great deal of painful uncertainties as to their future. The State can promote medical security by measures which will increase the average length of life and diminish the amount of illness. This has been achieved in most of the western countries, but yet to be achieved in the third world countries.

The promotion of scientific research is another matter which comes rightly within the powers of the State. Researches in basic sciences are very expensive, extending to long periods of time. While the investigations are going on, no one can be certain of achieving any results. As such, sustained material and logistic supports are necessary to undertake such researches. But once discoveries are made, their benefits accrue to the community. Therefore, only the State can and ought to sustain basic scientific researches.

Thirdly, according to Russell, the State power ought to be used to aim at diminishing economic injustice. At present, the law creates or facilitates monopolies and monopolies are able to exact a toll from the community. The most glaring example is the private ownership of land. Railways are at present controlled by the State, since rates are fixed by
law. It is clear that if they are uncontrolled, they would acquire a dangerous degree of power. Economic justice requires a much greater amount of State control that would justify complete socialism. We will dwell at length on the Russellian brand of socialism as the work progresses.*

Fourthly, another critical area demanding action by the State is conservation. By conservation, Russell has chiefly in mind the preservation of the world’s natural resources. Industrial revolution has led to men’s rapacious violation of Nature. Mankind has used up the raw-materials of industry and the soil upon which agriculture depends. This wasteful expenditure of natural capital has proceeded with ever increasing velocity causing on the one hand, natural resource crisis and on the other hand, ecological crisis. Oil, for example, is not unlimited, but it is recklessly consumed and the need for it just increasing. The scrambling for oil may even contribute to a world war. Modern industry depends on the expenditure of natural capital and cannot long continue in its present prodigal fashion. Here the State can intervene in the conservation of natural capital and in tuning the growth of industry to conservation for future survival and ecological balance.

Even more critical is the situation in agriculture. The prevailing method of cultivation does violence to the soil, exhausting its fertility. Food production is to increase to feed the growing population without exhausting the fertility of the soil which must be conserved for the posterity. The necessary measures are known to students of agriculture. But only the State can take up them. Here State action on conservation is crucial.

* cf. Chapter Five
The above exposition of the Russellian doctrine of State may now be used to explain Russell's formulation of the tension of the State and the freedom of the individual.

The primary contradiction is between the State as an institution of force and individual liberty. As seen above, Russell holds that the State can perform its function of protecting individual life and property only if it has the monopoly of force. Security of person and property is essential to survival; on the survival of the individual depends his freedom in the sense of flowering of the best in him through an exercise of his creativity, cultivation and integration of his faculties. But here a paradox immediately appears. The State monopoly of force which is a necessary condition of individual security also encroaches upon the life and liberty of individuals in crude as well as subtle forms. The State has the power of life and death over the individuals. Legally the State can award death sentence. Illegally also the State can kill, make a person disappear or put him in the memory hole, as in many Third World fascist banana republics. The State can attach a man's property and seize it through taxation. Therefore no citizen is secured enough to enjoy one's freedom until and unless they are protected against the arbitrary powers of the State. Here Russell rightly points out that whenever there is arrest by administrative order and punishment without due process of law, private people have no security, however firmly the State may be established. He further maintains that even insistence on due process of law is insufficient, unless the judges are independent of the executive. The freedom and the rights of the individuals that mankind sought in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries could only be secured by the State, but that if and only if the State is liberal, made to respect individual freedom, with safeguards against State encroachments upon individual
freedom. The tendency of State to encroach upon individual freedom and of individuals to rebel against State control will remain. The tension is sustained by both sides insisting on their claims.

The State as the sole repository of force is also to ensure the security of citizens against attacks by hostile States. A State seeks to ensure its citizens by preparing for defense, which is however seen as a preparation for war by other States. Therefore, the more a State seeks to secure its citizens, the more hostility and hence insecurity, it arouses from other States. Hence, the kind of security sought will become possible only when there is a single World Government with monopoly of all major weapons of war. In other words, a State can best ensure the security of its citizens only it abdicates use of force in favour of a world body. This is a paradox at the heart of the State as an institution of force.

When States enjoy monopoly over use of force and recognized no rule of law to regulate their relations with one another war is resorted to as a means of conflict resolution. A State at war with an enemy State suspends individual freedom and civil liberties. A warring State takes away the freedom not only of its citizens, but also of the citizens of the victim State. Man’s creative activity - what constitutes the best in men - pursuit of truth, beauty, love, the wealth of human relations, are suspended in war times. States may call upon the finest of men among its citizens, who might have enriched mankind as a whole, to kill one another in the battlefield. For example, a French painter devoted only to capturing beauty in the canvas, may be called upon to kill a German musician. If, exercising their freedom of choice, the two of them declare a mutual neutrality and decide not to shoot each other, their respective States will charge them of treason - a
crime that calls for death penalty. But if they kill one another, mankind loses from deprivation of what they might have created had they been allowed to carry on their vocations. According to Russell, the power of the State which curtails individual freedom not to participate in war and thus deprives humanity of the fruits of human creativity, is wholly evil.

In war time criticism of State policy is considered treason, punishable with death or imprisonment. The individual is thus deprived of his freedom to express his deepest conviction. Russell himself had been a victim of persecution on this score. In January, 1918 Russell wrote a pacifist article entitled THE GERMAN PEACE OFFER in which he praised the peace treaty concluded between Lenin's Bolshevik Russia and the Germans, while criticizing Anglo American alliance for their recalcitrant attitude to world peace. He had written that in case of war, famine, starvation and anarchy in Europe, "the American Garrison which will by that time be occupying England and France, whether or not they will prove efficient against the Germans, will no doubt be capable of intimidating strikers, an occupation to which the American Army is accustomed when at home". * Despite the fact that Russell had based his statement upon a United States Senate report, he was tried and convicted and sentenced to six months as a prisoner in the second division. War thus releases the destructive impulses of man, while smothering his creative impulses. War confines a man's sympathies to only a small segment of mankind, namely, his nation. It makes him incapable of realising his unity with mankind, thereby doing violence to his human essence.

Russell’s severest criticism of Nation States as perpetrators of war is, given the destructive nuclear arsenals at the disposal of modern States, a large scale war will inevitably result in the extinction of mankind and human civilisation. Reposing the authority to use force solely on the Nation States which implies their ability to declare war therefore, directly threatens individual existence and thus contradicts his freedom.

The second conflict point; Nation States using modern techniques has increased the intensity and extent of control over individual lives, directly encroaching upon individual as well as group freedom, in a scale and degree not possible in earlier State systems.

Modern techniques has radically changed the State character and this change has far reaching consequences for human freedom. The revolution in science and technology, the latest being the one in information science, has increased the intensity and the extent of State control over individual lives. Thanks to modern techniques, the psychological the material and technical problems of administering a large State have largely been solved.

The movement of social cohesion is towards spirally larger States. Modern techniques can now facilitate psychology of cohesion necessary for large States through education and fast communication. Large States can be made economically more productive and militarily more viable. Large States make it possible to organise productions on a large scale which are economically more viable. They can also organise infrastructures of agricultural and industrial production like water management, management of power station, management of atomic power stations on a large scale and hence more efficiently. Given technical feasibility, short of the whole
planet there is no visible limit to the advantages of size both in economic and in political organisations. Therefore, modern States in its spiralling expansion is likely to bring in within its ambit more and more individuals. This extent of State control has its counterpart in the intensity of control or degree of interference in the life of individual. As State functions multiply, the individual becomes increasingly dependent upon the State. The State in turn is making inroads into all aspects of individual life, circumscribing his freedom.

The increasing intensity and extent of State control robs the individual of his creative initiative. The State can constrain innovators in religion and morals, adventurers in ideas, from carrying on their work. It can prevent their works from reaching the people, if it runs counter to established State policy. In earlier State systems, innovators were not at least prevented from doing their work. The Athenian State gave Socrates hemlock to drink, but after he has taught mankind the Socratic method. Christ was crucified but after he has delivered the Gospels to mankind. Such things may not be possible in modern States. Modern totalitarian States welded to modern techniques may and can strangle creative innovations at the cradle. In such States, an innovator like a Socrates, a Christ, a Buddha or a Marx will not merely be put to death, which is a matter to which they may remain indifferent but will totally be prevented from causing their doctrines to be known. Innovations under such circumstances can come only from the State Government. But no totalitarian State Government is likely to approve of anything contrary to its immediate interests. Says Russell; “In a totalitarian State such events as the rise of Buddhism or Christianity are scarcely possible, and not even by the greatest heroism can a moral reformer acquire any influence whatever. This is a new fact in human history, brought
about by the much increased control over individuals which the modern technique of government has made possible”.*

As a corollary, the third conflict point is, the very vastness of mega States makes the individual feel helpless. The citizen unless he is a man of rare gifts can hardly influence the measures of the State. We have seen how totalitarian States can constrain even a remarkable individual from rendering service to his community and mankind. Russell points out that the individual destiny is no better even in the so called modern democratic States. For modern democratic States are more oligarchic than democratic in their functioning. Here, all important questions except a few are decided by a small number of representatives and members of an all powerful State machinery called bureaucracy. Even the few questions which are left to the popular vote are decided by a diffused mass psychology, not by individual initiative. Russell cites the example of United States of America, where instep of democracy, most men have a sense of almost complete impotence in regard to all large issues. In a vast country, instep of having democratic form of governance popular will is like one of the forces of Nature outside the control of any one man. According to Russell, all large States have something of weariness and discouragement that one associates with Roman Empire or Egyptian Empire. Modern States have failed to develop in most men any sense of ability to control their political destinies. In such States only men of abnormal ambition and thirst for domination are able to achieve power and dictate. The majority of the citizens are belittled by knowledge of their own impotence.

The fourth conflict point is, bureaucracy having its own momentum and becoming a power by itself, encroaching upon individual freedom.

Modern large States even to perform such positive functions as are in the best public interest must function through a bureaucracy. Mega States, _ipso facto_ are welded to the institution of bureaucracy. Bureaucracy develops itself into a power external to and independent of the people it is supposed to serve. It starts having a purpose which by no means coincide with those of community. Russell mentions love of power and dislike of work as such extraneous purposes. To this we may add bureaucratic corruption which is now a global phenomenon but more acute in the Third World countries. A civil servant who says 'no' to a project satisfies at once his pleasure in exercising his authority and his disinclination for effort. And so he comes to seem and to a certain extent to be, the enemy of those whom he is supposed to serve. Thus the relation between the State bureaucracy and the individual is the problematic of modern States. The so-called democracy of modern States is limited, restricted or perverted or smothered by bureaucracy. The individual taxpayer, citizen voter who theoretically is at the origin of power is in fact at the mercy of bureaucracy.

To illustrate this point, Russell cites the relation of an ordinary taxpayer to an admiral. The taxpayers, collectively, are the admiral’s employers. Their agents in Parliament vote his pay and choose the Government which sanctions the authority which appoints the admiral. But if the individual taxpayer were to attempt to assume towards the admiral the attitude of authority which is customary from employer to employee he would soon be put in his place. The admiral is vested with authority, the ordinary taxpayer is not. Suppose, a man wants to register a letter at a Post
Office. The official in charge, momentarily at least, is in a position of power. He can at least decide when to notice that the men desires attention. If what the men desires involves a complicated procedure or if the official is in a bad humor, he can cause the man considerable annoyance by playing the very rules of the game of bureaucracy. Yet both the official and admiral are supposed to be public servants. The ordinary voter no longer finds himself the source of all the power of army, navy, police and civil service. He feels himself their humble subject whose duty is as the Chinese used to say, to ‘tremble and obey’. This individual impotence will remain so long as democratic control is remote and rare, while public administration is centralized and authority is delegated from the centre to circumference.

The fifth conflict point; the expansion of mega States coming into conflict with the freedom of small nationalities. The dynamics of State power welded to modern technique leads to spiralling expansion of the State. Such expansion is by inclusion of small and weak nationalities as unwilling citizens. There is therefore, a conflict between the power of mega States and the freedom of the nationalities. Nothing short of defeat in war can induce big States to part with their territory. If it is the freedom and well being of the citizens that the States have in view, then big States should have recognized the right to self-determination of human groups of a certain area. That is to say the question whether a certain area should be included or should form a separate State, would be left freely to the decision of that area. The refusal of the big States to recognize the right to self-determination of nationalities within its political geography bears testimony to the conflict between State power and freedom of human groups.

Sixthly, the State as the coloniser and the terrorist directly contradicts the freedom of the oppressed and colonised peoples.
A State may use show of force to gain opportunities for successful exploitation of weak or underdeveloped countries. Such exploitation is on the one hand for material wealth and on the other hand for the glory of power and prestige. Where external aggression is met with resistance, a predator State will not hesitate to strike terror in the territories of the victim countries offering resistance. Innumerable innocent citizens of the victim country may be put to death or their freedom and happiness if found incompatible with exploitation or subjection, may be curtailed. A State may be democratic in the management of its internal affairs, but colonial and imperialist in external relation with other countries and rest of mankind, using terrorism as a method of having its way. This thesis which Russell advanced as early as 1916 is argued out with great persuasive force by Prof. Noam Chomsky from his deep study of the behaviour of the United States in relation to the Third World countries. According to Chomsky, what the United States has done to the South-East Asian, Latin American and African countries bears out the truth; “the common view that internal freedom makes for humane and moral international behaviour is supported neither by historical evidence nor by reason”.

According to Russell, modern States manipulate the emotions of pride and fear built in the citizens and the power elite to facilitate compromise of individual liberty in favour of its programme for extra-territorial domination. Citizens are made to feel pride in their countries’ domination. They are made to participate in their States’ robbing the freedom of other States. In extreme case the power elite may seek to sustain itself in a

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perpetual war situation, demanding of the individuals the sacrifice of their freedom in the name of national pride and fear. The German Third Reich led by Hitler exactly did that. Just as at home the power elite eagerly put the State machinery at the service of the industrial capital, it may place State power at the service of business interest abroad even if it leads to a conflict situation in the relation of States in which individual liberty is to be curtailed.

Seventhly, the State as the manipulator of opinion and thought comes into conflict with the freedom of thought or the freedom to think creatively for oneself.

As pointed out above, according to Russell one of the positive functions of the State is financing and control of education so that (i) education may be universal (ii) the community may achieve a minimum level of excellence (iii) citizens may be prepared for the spirit of dialogue and free discussion as the democratic method of managing human affairs. So is State participation in scientific and technological research positive and fruitful. But Russell also points out that State intervention in education and research is also a double edged sword equally fraught with dangers. Education is one of the most powerful tools of opinion formation. The State may use its control over education either to encourage creative thinking or to indoctrinate such opinions as suits the reasons of the State. The latter rather than the former is more often the case. Constant indoctrination of the mind with official views and ideologies for reasons of the State, robs the mind of its creative ability to think, the freedom to think. Citizens may become increasingly dependent on official views on such matters such as marriage, morals, war, politics and so on. Menticide or murder of mind is
the worst form of violence a State can perpetrate on its citizens. As pointed out earlier Russell regards the faculty of thought as constituting what is most sublime in human nature. Apart from instrumental value, cultivation of the faculty of thought and creations of thought are valuable as an end in themselves. Thought questions status quo, challenges the established order and it is for that reason the severest critique of State power. Freedom of thought means freedom to cultivate the faculty of thought, freedom to form one's opinion independently on all vital matters affecting individual and collective life, by using one's faculty of thought. It also means the freedom to communicate the results of free inquiry to one's fellow beings. Thought is revolutionary in character, as it strikes at the heart of status quo and established but unjust order. Modern mega States founded on unjust status quo, have reasons to curb the freedom of thought. The control of curriculum, school, colleges, universities - in short - control of education is the surest way to control the minds of the citizens. State control comes into direct conflict with the individual's freedom of thought.

To the extent the State curbs the individual freedom of thought, it also can mould public opinion through oratory, control of media and skillful use of information science. Public opinion can be so moulded as to be favourable to State control and iminical to individual liberty. Such an oppressive public opinion is a dead weight that comes down heavily on men's creative urge to think for himself. A free community according to Russell, requires not only legal freedom but also a tolerant public opinion that does not insist on dead uniformity nor indulge in the disposition to cruelty and persecution of dissenting individuals. Where public opinion is not tolerant and where the State can manufacture public opinion, public opinion always tends to be part of the State power that directly comes into conflict with the individual freedom of thought.
4.2 ECONOMIC ORGANISATIONS

Two forms of activity are essential to human existence. One is biological reproduction, and the other is material production. The two processes are mutually complementary and inseparable. Biological reproduction ensures the continuity of the species and thus provides the community’s future work force. But to reproduce man must live first and also ensure the existence of his offspring. To ensure his existence and also that of his offspring man needs first of all, food, shelter from the elements of Nature. Beginning his adventure as a food gatherer and hunter, man took the turning point in the shaping of his destiny by choosing to produce his own food. Agriculture undoubtedly is the first economic revolution in the history of mankind that ensured mankind a stable source of food supply. On the basis of a stable food supply, man also learn to produce other useful things to satisfy his own needs. The ontology of man the producer is at the basis of the formation and growth of economic organisations. Let us therefore look at this process of production.

Material production is in the first place a process in which both man and Nature participate. It is a process in which man makes things for his use from Nature’s own material. Use of natural objects as raw material is thus fundamental to material production. Now man cannot use natural objects as raw materials to make things of utility unless he knows their properties. To produce material objects therefore, one has to know the physical and chemical laws underlying the natural objects. Thus material production is at the same time a theoretical as well as practical enterprise. History of material production is part of history of science and vice versa.
In material production, Nature presents herself as something to be used, manipulated and appropriated. And therefore man develops a sense of power in material production. In contemplation, Nature presents herself to man as something mysterious. Thus in contemplation, man develops a sense of the sublime and wonderful. Contemplation gives rise to reverence, material production to power. As we shall see, this power dimension of material production creates tension between economic organisations and individual freedom.

To manoeuvre and use the pliant raw materials, man must know not only what things are but also how to do things. In material production, man act and react on material objects around him. In transforming matter he thus exerts his own physical and mental energy measurable by a time unit, on the thing acted upon. In thus acting on the object, he first uses his bodily organs as the conductor of physical and mechanical forces to the object. Man’s first experience of power and motion begins with use of his bodily organs. With the use of the mechanical and physical forces generated from his bodily limbs, man opposes himself to Nature as one of her forces. From the use of bodily organs to the use of things in Nature that the hand can handle is but a logical step in the evolution of Man-Nature relation. Things in Nature that man uses as his extended hand become the tools or the conductor of his activities to the raw-material. Thus Nature in the first place provides man his tools and our mother Earth herself is the original store house of tools. As the range of adaptation of Nature’s material by a change of form to the wants of man increases, the need for more complicated tools not available ready made in Nature also increases. This led to men’s fabrication of tools, the beginning of man’s adventure as the toolmaking animal subsequently culminating in technology - the discovery that both
man and Nature can become part of an elaborate instrumental complex. Now man, technique and Nature form a complex relationship.

Man has not only the bodily and physical needs, but also the essential powers to satisfy them. He can understand and use Nature. He can use tools. He can exert mechanical and physical forces. He can make use of the mechanical, physical, and chemical properties of some substances in order to make other substances subservient to his aims. He has the capacity to envision a product in imagination before actually creating it in reality. He has not only the capacity to create but also the corresponding need to create. Thus material production is a process founded on the essence of man as free creative being. Man is creative when he creates new objects of utility. He is free when he can rise above Nature in thought, comprehend the laws of Nature and integrate natural necessity in the process of production.

Men engage in material production not in isolation, but in unison with his fellow beings. When production is carried on in large scale and instruments of labour become an organised complex as in modern machinery, a corresponding organisation of workers working in co-operation with one another is necessary. Material production on a large scale therefore must have its basis at social organisation of the process of production.

Man's creative freedom so far material production is concerned, therefore, moves within the bounds of (i) natural necessity (ii) the momentum of technological growth and man-to-man relation in material production or social organisation of material production.
Mankind has passed through various modes of production. Beginning with the early man’s simple appropriation of Nature mankind has passed through tribal and agricultural feudal modes of production. Agricultural revolution led to surplus production which in turn gave rise to the intercourse of trade and commerce among Nations. Trade and commerce increase the extent and velocity of circulation of material goods, giving rise to a mercantile class, concentration of capital in the hands of the middle class or the potential capitalist. Thus dawned the era of material production as production of commodities for exchange value. Industrial revolution through innovative technology transformed production of commodities into full-fledged classical capitalism. Global in character, classical capitalism which aims at creation of ever increasing surplus value leads to a spiralling expansion of capital, giving rise to giant size economic organisations. Neocapitalism or post industrial technological revolution has given rise to giant corporations transcending national boundaries, dominating nations without politically annexing them. It is the government, the management, function and the ends of these giant economic organisations that Russell has in mind, when he formulates the tension between economic organisations and individual freedom.

Alienation of the worker from his work and the fruits of work in large economic organisations is the first conflict between freedom as individual creativity and the dynamics of large economic organisations. As seen in the earlier chapters the Russelian freedom is an active mode of striving in pursuance of such activities as are satisfying in themselves as ends.* Freedom is also cultivation and integration of human faculties through

* cf. Chapter Two
active mode of striving. Material production as a form of activity is Nature's necessity imposed on man by the conditions of his own existence. Therefore work associated with material production is most of the time a means to some other end. Work as means to some other ends may in themselves be either pleasant or unpleasant depending on the nature of the work and the position the worker occupies in the social organisation of work. Where the workers are their own masters and is in full control of the production process, the workers derive artistic pleasure from his work. Such is the case with the artisans in the era of handicraft production. Even the Stone Age man might have derived artistic pleasure from his primitive tool and work, which were simple and in tune with life. As production becomes more complicated and the fruits of work taken away from the worker, the purposes of the worker gets divorced from the purpose of the work in which he is engaged. For example, in large scale agriculture based on slavery, the slave is altogether divorced from the purpose of the work. As industrial revolution ushered in the capitalist mode of production or the era of material production as production of commodities for exchange value, the divorce of the worker from the purpose of the work has acquired a new dimension. The worker has nothing to sell except his labour. Thanks to modern technique, to be productive an individual must now belong to an economic organisation. And the economic organisations that modern technique have created are quite huge. They are at cross purposes with workers whom they are employing. Russell cites the example of a car factory.* The purpose of the organisation is to make cars and earn maximum profit. The purpose of the workers is to earn wage or to sell his labour power for the best

* Russell, Bertrand, Authority and Individual (Re-printed London: Unwin Hyman Limited, 1990) pp.52-54
bargain he can have. So the factory as an economic organisation and the factory workers as employees do not share a common purpose. In essence, there are unresolved conflicts between the factory organisation and the workers. The worker who is overpowered with a sense of being used and overwhelmed by the organisation, does not feel the work as his work, and the product as his own product. Only the owners and those who are in the management may identify themselves with the production process and purpose of the factory. But here also the identification is with the production process as profit making enterprise, but not as a creative experience. Some of the workers may be proud of the excellence of the cars produced, but most through their unions are concerned with their wages and hours of work. The worker therefore is divorced from any concern or participation in the work itself or in the product of the work. Human creativity is human freedom. Even in such Nature imposed necessity as material production man can find his creative freedom provided the worker is not alienated from the production process and the fruits are not taken away from the workers. For this, goals of production must not be too remote and irrelevant. Works are to be rendered less wearisome and more creative and joyful through a radical social organisation of work. The conflict therefore is between freedom as human creativity and the dynamics and structure of present economic organisation, that smothers human creativity in imposing work as a burden upon men.

The second point of conflict is between division of labour inherent in large economic organisations and expression of individual creativity. Modern industries aim at profit making. To make profit industries shall have to produce more and to produce more they have to expand. To expand, industries have to mechanise. Mechanisation again leads to expansion and
expansion in turn leads to further mechanisation. The essence of the matter simply is; the spiralling cycle of profit making seeking its own level of technology. This dynamics constitutes the life cycle of large size industries. They have to be based essentially on the division of labour. Now division of labour confines the worker to a minuscule part of the manufacturing process, which is repetitive and monotonous and does not give scope to the expression of individual creativity. Take the case of the car factory again. The organisation is so large, the functions so multifarious that each of the workers confined to a functional section hardly has knowledge or concern in what is happening in other sections. The worker becomes an appendage to a part of the whole machinery, which corresponds to his involvement in making a small part of the car. Neither does he realise his purpose in the product nor does the collective to whom he belongs realise their purpose in the product. As such, there is no sense of solidarity between management and employees. Whatever solidarity is there among the wage earners, is not in relation to the product. It is concerned with increase of wages and diminishing hours of work. The management may have solidarity and some pride in the product. But the profit making dynamics ultimately prevails over any creative or artistic impulse and pride in the product per se. Thus economic organisation as profit making enterprises come into direct conflict with human creativity which is the essence of freedom. Production, commoditisation and monetisation of material products rob human creations of their intrinsic value and workers of creative satisfaction.

According to Russell, vast modern economic organisations welded to modern techniques lead to two consequences that tend to diminish the producer’s interest in the product.
One, the production and distribution network of modern manufacture is so vast that the gain to be expected from the work is too remote for the worker to take any interest in the product.

Two, divorce between the management and the worker. The management becomes an independent force over the workers, coming into conflict with the interest of the workers. The government of economic organisations, be they capitalist enterprises or State enterprises, becomes remote from the worker.

As vast economic organisations have these two consequences that diminishes the creative interest of the producing community in the product, they come into direct conflict with freedom as human creativity in material production. Russell elucidates this point thus.* Suppose a worker X in Britain is engaged in the manufacture of subordinate part of motor cars for export. The worker is told that he must work hard and take interest in the production, because export of motor car is necessary to buy food. This appeal however is unlikely to arouse any response in the worker because the gain is too remote for him. The extra food that is bought as a result of his labour does not come to him personally, but is divided among the millions that inhabit Britain. It is only by an intellectual or moral effort that the worker can make himself do more work than is necessary to keep his job. But where the gain is obvious and pressing, for example, in a shipwreck, the workers can work, co-ordinate and obey orders without much difficulty. The most glaring example from History is; in the 1930s and 1940s, Stalin could mobilise all the workers in the State run

* Ibid., pp.53-54
Soviet factories in the name of the Great Patriotic War. In most of our economic activities however, the end is not so obvious as in these emergencies. And the emergency method of arousing the workers interest in the work is least desirable in normal times, from the standpoint of human freedom. In normal material production, the end is remote and the worker is alienated from his work.

In the capitalist mode of production, the management of large corporations and economic organisations are in the hands of a self-perpetuating oligarchs. Their interests are far removed from the interests of the workers. Suppose the State government intervenes and fixes prices and wages. Here the government has to take into consideration all the sectors and interest groups of the economy, placating one sector or interest group may be disadvantageous to others. For example, a rise in the price of coal may be advantageous to the coal industry and facilitate an increase in miner’s wages, but is disadvantageous to everybody else. But when the government fixes prices and wages in the general interest every decision must disappoint somebody. The consideration, which should weigh with the government are so general and so apparently removed from the everyday life of the workers, that government can hardly instill a common purpose in the workers. Nor can the government arouse in the workers interest in the work. The worker therefore is alienated from his work which presents itself to him as something repetitive and monotonous imposed on him by the conditions of his survival.

The situation is no better even when the State directly runs industries and economic enterprises. The worker’s participation in the production, his creative interest in the work and expression of his individual creativity
is not enhanced. A bureaucracy backed by State power with all the moral
t Material and ideological arsenals at its command emerges as the new
managerial class in power. They now control the workers in the name of
equitable justice, progress and humanity. But their interests are in direct
conflict with the interests of workers, and they are more powerful than the
industrial oligarchs whom they replaced. The fact of vast modern
organisations, be it in capitalism or State socialism, coming into conflict
with individual freedom remains as ever. This is the third conflict in the
Russellian formulation.

The fourth conflict Russell points out is the one between the predatory
impulse released by modern giant economic organisations and human
freedom. Let us dwell on Russell’s formulation of this conflict.

To have a deeper understanding of Russellian formulation of this
conflict we may compare Russell’s position with that of Marx.

According to Marx, there are two modes of human creation; material
production within the kingdom of necessity and spiritual creation within
the kingdom of freedom. Production of material goods is a necessity
arising out of man’s metabolism with Nature. Human creation here moves
within the bounds of necessity inherent in the laws of Nature and in the
mode of social organisation of material production. Realisation of human
freedom demands that this necessity inherent in material production or in
other words, the kingdom of necessity must shrink as far as possible by
(1) increasing the productivity of labour (2) reducing working hour
(3) increasing leisure hour (4) humanity enduring the surd of necessity
that remains by getting rid the productive system of its exploitative
mechanism. Once the material conditions of his embodied existence is satisfied, he can engage in such creations which can be enjoyed as ends in themselves, i.e., aesthetic, spiritual and theoretical creations. But to enjoy the freedom of creation and also the freedom of enjoyment of spiritual goods, the problem of material production must be solved first. Thus the kingdom of freedom must have the kingdom of necessity as its basis; one cannot be severed from the other.

Corresponding to Marx’s two kingdoms, Russell points to two sorts of goods. There are material goods regarding which the possessive impulse predominates. Men feel like possessing them exclusively. There are also spiritual goods regarding which the creative impulse dominates. Men is passionately engaged in their creation. But once they are created, it is for whole of mankind to enjoy them. The category of scarcity applies to material goods and therefore to the greater part of the present economic life of the world. The food and clothing of one man is not the food and clothing of another. If the supply is insufficient, what one man has is obtained at the expense of some other men. Besides, even where the supply is sufficient or even plenty, one man may have more to the deprivation of others. Thus scarcity, necessary or contingent, is the hallmark of material possession.

Plenitude, on the other hand, is the hallmark of mental and spiritual goods. They do not belong to one man to the exclusion of another. If one man knows a science, that does not prevent others from knowing it. On the contrary, it helps them to acquire the knowledge. If one man is a great artist or poet, that does not prevent others from painting pictures or writing poems, but helps to create the atmosphere in which such things are possible. The beauty and enigma in Da Vinci’s Mona Lisa is ever present for all
those who can see. If one man is full of good will towards others, that does not mean that there is less good will to be shared among the rest. The more good will one man has, the more he is likely to create it among others. Thus in matters of mental and spiritual goods, there is not a definite amount but a plenitude to be shared. As their creation and enjoyment by nature is universal, there is no private possession to the exclusion of others.

Where material goods are scarce and the possessive impulse or property impulse is strong, there develops in man a tendency towards accumulation by depriving others. Thus property impulse inevitably leads to predatory use of force. It leads to competition, envy, domination, cruelty and almost all the moral evils that infest the world. Just as the kingdom of freedom must be founded on the kingdom of necessity, some amount of property and power is necessary for man to realise his freedom. But concentration of material goods and power in the hands of a few to the deprivation of the majority of mankind leads to the deprivation of their freedom. Concentration of wealth and power leads to an abnormal increase of the possessive impulse. This in turn leads to the development of the predatory impulse in man, to prey upon one another. The predatory impulse in man is an enemy of human freedom. Large scale economic organisations be it in capitalism or State socialism are predatory. They make men predatory and thus come into conflict with human freedom.

According to Russell, the governments of large economic organisations, apart from being remote from the workers, are also monarchical or oligarchic in character. This rules out the democratic participation of the workers in the economic organisations. There can never be human freedom, until the conditions of material production are free. And until the workers freely participate in the democratic management of
economic organisations, be it corporations or State run organisations, the conditions of material production will not be free. As large economic organisations are monarchical or oligarchic in character, they rule out worker’s participation and thus come into conflict with expression of human creativity. Every limited liability company or corporation is run by a number of self-appointed or co-opted directors who can normally perpetuate their existence through manoeuvres. There can be no real freedom or democracy until the men who do the work in a business also control its management. Till then, the conflict between economic organisations and human freedom will remain.

According to Russell, there are four purposes at which an economic system may aim:

1) the greatest possible production of material goods and facilitating technical progress.

2) securing distributive justice.

3) giving security against destitution.

4) liberating creative impulses and diminishing possessive impulses.

Russell maintains that the last one is the most important aim. He further opines that capitalist economic organisations fail in all the four purposes. Capitalism is defended on the ground that it achieves the greatest possible production of material goods. But it does this in a very short-sighted way, by methods, which are wasteful in the long run both of human material and
of natural resources. Capitalism, therefore, comes into direct conflict with human freedom as expression of human creativity.

In a manner reminiscent of Marxian critique of capitalism as violator of Nature, human nature and technology, Russell writes:

Capitalistic enterprise involves a ruthless belief in the importance of increasing material production to the utmost possible extent now and in the immediate future. In obedience to this belief, new portions of the earth’s surface are continually brought under the sway of industrialism. Vast tracts of Africa become recruiting grounds for the labour required in the gold and diamond mines of the Rand, Rhodesia and Kimberley; for this purpose, the population is demoralised, taxed, driven into revolt, and exposed to the contamination of European vice and disease. Healthy and vigorous races from Southern Europe are tempted to America, where sweating and slum life reduce their vitality if they do not actually cause their death. What damage is done to our own urban populations by the conditions under which they lived, we all know. And what is true of the human riches of the world is no less true of the physical resources. The mines, forests and wheat-fields of the world are all being exploited at a rate which must practically exhaust them at no distant date. On the side of material production, the world is living too fast; in a kind of delirium, almost all the energy of the world has rushed
into the immediate production of something, no matter what, and no matter at what cost. And yet our present system is defended on the ground that it safeguards progress!*

What makes capitalism and the wage system inimical to human freedom is that it

1) encourages predatory instinct
2) allows economic injustice
3) gives great scope to the tyranny of the employer

Russell opines that within the capitalistic system, there are ways and means of becoming rich without contributing anything to the wealth of the community. Capitalism forbids highways robbery, but has laws to legalise economic robbery, grab of unearned income. Private ownership of land and capital, whether acquired or inherited, gives the capitalist a legal right to a permanent income, which need not be an earned one. Although Russell does not wholly endorse Marx's theory of surplus value, he is well aware of the fact that accumulation of capital riches by a few is at the expense of others, i.e., by appropriation of the labour of those who work. In essence, they are not part of the community of producers, those who are active in the creation of material or spiritual goods. The capitalist class who fatten themselves on the labour of others are respected, despite the fact that there is no justification whatever for incomes derived in this way. The methods of acquiring wealth in capitalist society, according to Russell, are largely predatory. "It is not, as a rule, by means of useful inventions, or of any

other action which increases the general wealth of the community, that men amass fortunes; it is much more often by skill in exploiting or circumventing others".* This acquisitive spirit and animal like economic struggle which permeates the life of the members of the society, does violence to the human essence and comes into direct conflict with human freedom.

As regards economic injustice, Russell opines that a man must not have and accumulate more than his share. Otherwise there is economic injustice. A man may be given more or rewarded for some specific efficiency or definite service or extraordinary work. But beyond this if he acquires more, there is economic injustice.

The genesis of monopoly capital in the shape of trusts, cartels, the federation of employers and so on has greatly increased the power of the capitalist to levy on the community. They can acquire more and thus concentrate economic power in their hands to the detriment of economic freedom of others.

The most dangerous component of the capitalist economic organisations that directly comes into conflict with human freedom is the tyranny of the employer. Russell is emphatic in pointing out that at present the tyranny of the employer robs men of all liberty and initiative. In the name of inculcating efficiency and incentive to work among the workers, the employer retains the right of dismissal of any employee with consequent loss of pay. But here Russell rightly points out, incentives

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* Ibid., pp.26-27
be based on hope rather than fear, rewards rather than punishments. An employee must not be dismissed from service unless he commits some exceptional crime such as murder. Means of livelihood is the primary condition of freedom. Therefore a person must not be deprived of his job at the sweetwill of the employer so long he is willing to work. Otherwise, the most dangerous dimension of the employer’s right to dismiss an employee is the control he has over the means of livelihood of the employee and as a consequence the encroachment he can make upon the freedom and personal life of the employee. It may be the employee’s religion, or politics or private life or spirit of independence or even his being too intelligent and educated for the employer to control him. According to Russell, in State socialism, where the State is the only employer, the encroachment upon the freedom of the employee can be even more far reaching. By controlling the means of livelihood of the citizens, the State can acquire ideological moral and material control over the citizens. A modern State can reach the inmost recesses of an individual’s private life. Hence the State running economic organisations and performing the role of the sole employer may come into fundamental conflict with the freedom of the individual. Thus, according to Russell, be it capitalism or socialism, in the era of large economic organisations, an individual has to work in an economic organisation for his livelihood. And economic organisations in their role as employers may come into direct conflict with freedom of belief, freedom of opinion, freedom of expression, love of truth and initiative of the individual. In such a situation men may ultimately be condemned to live by bread alone.

Here we may also point out the area of convergence between Russellian critique of economic organisations and Marxian critique of the
capitalist mode of production. Marx primarily aimed at overcoming the blind economic forces released by anarchy in material production so that mankind may achieve freedom from their domination and enter into the kingdom of freedom where he may enjoy the freedom of his creativity. So does Russell. He visualised a good community as one in which the production of the necessaries of existence would be a mere preliminary to the important and interesting part of life, namely, free exercise of man’s creativity in such activities which are pursued for their own sake. Like Marx, he believed that economic needs need not dominate men as they do at present. The fault lies with the ways present economic organisations function. They are, according to Russell, wasteful of human and natural resources, on the side of production; unjust on the side of distribution. The conquest of physical necessity through science and technology, diffusion of the necessary burden of material production through structural changes in the social organisation of work, and distributive justice will lay the moral and spiritual foundation of human freedom. What stands in the way of human freedom are economic organisations that concentrate wealth in the hands of a powerful oligarchs either in the form of private/corporate owners or de novo managerial class in the shape of socialism.

Russell, therefore, holds that the tension and contradiction between economic organisations and individual freedom may still remain even if the State is the owner. He takes the example of the State take over of railways. Even when a State takes over the railways after full compensation to the shareholders, there may not be any real advance toward democracy, freedom or economic justice. As Russell points out, the reasons are;

One, in a State purchase, the holders of railway share are given government stock to replace their shares. They are thus entitled to an income
in perpetuity equal to what they may derive from their shares. This means they are entitled to a proportion of national income, which normally goes to the recipients of rent and interest. Thus the State take over hardly alters the distribution of wealth.

Two, for the workers and employees, there is little advance toward freedom. Their effective and democratic participation in the decision making process is not ensured. Earlier they fought the directors, now they have to fight the government and contend against organised power of the State. They may not be able even to mobilise public opinion in their favour. And State governments are unlikely to be sensitive to their claims and problems. As Russell put succinctly; "experience does not lead to the view that a government department has any special tenderness toward the claims of labour"*

Three, there is no real advance toward democracy either. The administration will be, in the hands of officials; the State bureaucracy in their new role as the managerial class, to be precise. As Russell says;

The democratic machinery by which these officials are normally controlled is cumbrous and remote, and can only be brought into operation on first-class issues which rouse the interest of the whole nation. Even then it is very likely that the superior education of the officials and the government, combined with the advantages of their position, will enable them to mislead the public as to the issues, and alienate the general sympathy even from the most excellent cause.**

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* Russell, Political Ideals, p. 38.
** Ibid p.39
Hence, the conflict between economic organisations and individual freedom remains, perhaps even in a greater degree, in socialism. Ayer comments on this Russelian insight:

When it is considered that this passage was written in 1917, thirty years before the nationalization of the railways actually took place in this country, it seems astonishingly prescient.*

This brings us yet to another conflict, namely, the conflict between power as a distinct dimension of economic organisation and human freedom. An economic organisation having control over human and natural resources, generates its own power. Those who control economic organisations also wield power over men and Nature. The larger the organisation, the greater is the power. The more one gets used to wielding power, the more one develops a love of power. A stage comes when creation and accumulation of wealth is valued not for the utility it gives to men, but for the power it gives over men and Nature. Thus love of power actuated the great millionaires to control world finances. Love of power is overriding motive not only of politicians but also of financial magnates. Now power is the greatest enemy of human freedom. For the operation of power in most cases tends to be negative of what is creative and living in men. As Russell puts it; “the only sure proof of power consists in preventing others from doing what they wish to do”.**

In Britain nationalisation took place in 1947.

** Russell, Political Ideals, p.42.
4.3 THE CHURCH

Russell regards the Church as an organisation universal in scope, monolithic in character, founded on certain basic dogmas to be accepted as a matter of faith and exercising such control over men's mind as has never been achieved by any other organisation. According to Russell, the Church, the Catholic Church to be precise, is a synthesis of two components namely, the dogma centering on the teaching of Christ and the organisation inherited from Imperial Rome. On the historicity and nature of this synthesis, Russell has the following remark to make:

The Catholic Church, as it existed from the time of Constantine to the time of the Reformation, represented a blending which would have seemed incredible if it had not been actually achieved, the blending of Christ and Caesar, of the morality of humble submission with the pride of Imperial Rome. Those who loved the one could find it in the Thebaid; those who loved the other could admire it in the pomp of metropolitan archbishops. In St. Francis and Innocent III the same two sides of the Church are still represented. But since the Reformation personal religion has been increasingly outside the Catholic Church, while the religion which has remained Catholic has been increasingly a matter of institutions and politics and historic continuity. This division has weakened the force of religion: religious bodies have not been strengthened by the enthusiasm and single-mindedness of the men in whom
personal religion is strong, and these men have not found their teaching diffused and made permanent by the power of ecclesiastical institutions.*

In his extensive writings, Russell dwells on the historical genesis of the Catholic Church at many places. But his most penetrating insights are on the conflict between the Church as a functioning organisation based on certain dogma on the one hand and human freedom on the other. The conflict is also between the Church on the one hand and the cultivation and integration of faculties towards the emergence of the total man on the other.

The essential dogmas of the Church, according to Russell are;

(i) The existence of God,
(ii) The immortality of the soul and its continuance in a life hereafter,
(iii) The divinity of Christ or the belief that Christ is Son of God and that one reaches God only through the Son. There must at least be the belief that Christ is at least the best and wisest man. Russell opines that in a full blooded sense dogmas of the Church includes such beliefs as belief in eternal hell fire and also other accompanying beliefs. Many of these beliefs however ceased to be essential, following the assault from the free thinkers.

According to Russell, the problem with these dogmas is not so much that they are false, but that they are founded on insufficient evidence. For example, let us take the dogmas of the existence of God. It is said that Russell was once asked at a public meeting what he would say if after his death he found himself confronted by his Maker:

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He replied without hesitation; I should say: “God! Why did you make the evidence for your existence so insufficient”?

We are not sure whether Russell confronted his Maker, but his intended question is a testament to his attitude towards the question of the existence of God. He finds the proposition that god exists, neither unintelligible nor logically impossible. He only maintains that there are no reasons to think it true. In his book, *Why I Am Not A Christian*, Russell examines the classical arguments to establish the existence of God. He finds all of them to be inadequate. But the fact that they are inadequate does not also prove that God does not exist. Thus Russell is never an atheist, but an agnostic. In his *Autobiography* he tells us how on entering Brixton on 1 May 1918 the warder at the gate asked his religion and what his reply was:

I was much cheered, on may arrival, by the warder at the gate, who had to take particulars about me. He asked me my religion and I replied ‘agnostic’. He asked how to spell it, and remarked with a sigh: ‘Well, there are many religions, but I suppose they all worship the same God’. This remark kept me cheerful for about a week.**

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Thus, Russell is not a dry sceptic, but a warm hearted man full of feelings that aspire to run through the cosmic thread.

As to immortality, Russell maintains that modern philosophy’s banishment of substance from the realm of matter has led to a similar banishment of soul substance from the realm of mind in psychology. He thinks it highly improbable that we survive our physical death. His passion for making our world a happier and better world was strengthened by the belief that if people cannot be made happy in this life, there will be no opportunity for them to be happy in any other.

Nor does Russell agree with the view that Christ was divine or that he was the best and the wisest of men, although he would vouch for many of His doctrines. For example, with many of the teachings of Christ such as loving one’s enemy, non resistance to evil, moral forgiveness, humane charity and non-possessiveness etc., Russell finds himself in agreement more than many of the professing Christains. On this point, not unlike Kierkegaard, he feels that the Christian world had turned hypocritical and cruel. But many of these maxims were already taught by sages like Lao - Tze and Buddha. Hence we may say that other teachers also have contributed equally or even more than Christ towards the moral upliftment of mankind. But apart from these positive elements in the teaching of Christ, there were darker sides also. At times Christ was vindictive towards his opponents, showing threats of fiery furnaces and the weeping and gnashing of teeth, the consignment of sinners to eternal punishment. As contrasted with this Socrates was a perfect gentleman, bland and urbane towards the people who would not listen to him; calm at the time of departure with no malice toward those who offered him hemlock. Buddha’s compassion was
unfailing at all times. Russell would therefore put Buddha and Socrates above Christ in knowledge and virtue.*

Russell thus finds himself unable to nod assent to any of the dogmas on which the Church is founded. This is however less of a problem. The problem is not that there is this dogma or that dogma or even that some dogmas are true while others are false. The real problem is that there are dogmas at all; any dogmas for that matter. Dogmas have to be accepted on faith and inculcation of faith presupposes suspension of free enquiry, closing of one’s mind to new evidences. Here Russell succinctly points out;

Christians hold that their faith does good, but other faiths do harm. At any rate, they hold this about the Communist faith. What I wish to maintain is that all faiths do harm. We may define “faith” as a firm belief in something for which there is no evidence. Where there is evidence, no one speaks of “faith”. We do not speak of faith that two and two are four or that the earth is round. We only speak of faith when we wish to substitute emotion for evidence.**

The real conflict therefore is between the Church as a functioning organisation and free inquiry or freedom of thought which is the essence of human freedom. The conflict according to Russell may be explained as follows.

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Free inquiry is an unique human activity which has intrinsic value in itself. To be engaged in free inquiry is a freedom which only human beings can enjoy. Any constraint to free inquiry is a constraint to human freedom. Free inquiry is an active process of forming beliefs about the world not on the basis of authority or faith, but on the basis of the evidences available in favour of one's own beliefs. It is also a painstaking process of forming hypothesis, testing them, collecting facts, selection of facts and weighing them; accepting an explanation till strong evidences to the contrary turn up. In free inquiry, truth is hooked to a rational method and not to authority or faith. To be able to form one's own beliefs from one's own free inquiry is such a precious freedom for Russell that he considers defending such freedom against the onslaughts of organisations to be the crucial issue of mankind. (It is not the dogmas themselves, but the method of their indoctrination that makes the Catholic Church oppose free inquiry.)

Free inquiry regards Nature as intrinsically valuable in itself for the mystery it affords to man. In free inquiry, man celebrates the mystery that is Nature by transcending his finite self to reach the cosmos. This is Russell's 'cosmic piety' celebrating man's freedom in the contemplation of Nature. Free inquiry extend its operation gradually to cover the whole physical Universe. But on matters like the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, the divinity of Christ, heaven, hell, salvation, second coming etc., we have been taught by the Church to accept its dogmas on faith, even though evidences and arguments so far advanced in their favour do not bear reason's close scrutiny. In demanding of the human mind to suspend free inquiry, the Church is violating human nature in the following manner:
The Church is encroaching upon man's freedom to creative exercise of his thought.

When a man is asked to entertain certain beliefs on faith, he has to close his mind against evidence. If a man closes his mind against evidence in some areas, he develops a tendency to do so in other areas. In proportion as he disavows his freedom of thought, his capacity for creative and scientific thinking diminishes gradually. Dogmas, whether they come from the Church or from monolithic political parties like the communist party or Nazis, weigh heavily on the minds of men. Throughout the ages the Church have consistently opposed the free progress of the human mind. Apart from the Church, an example of dogma coming from political parties. Even in such areas as genetics, Stalin following the dogma of dialectical materialism ordered Russian biologists to toe the official line as represented by Lysenko's erroneous theory. The result was an irreparable damage to free scientific inquiry in Russia and also to the application of the science of genetics to food supply. What is pernicious about the dogmas is the way how they are instilled and sustained. Therefore, Russell says; "The important thing is not what you believe, but how you believe it". *

The tendency to persecute others and deprive them of the freedom of opinion is a logical corollary of the demand that some beliefs be based on faith. If beliefs are based on faith, then the last resort to convince others will not be arguments but force. Force may operate in two forms. It may be in the form of persecution, physical or social. Or it may be in the more subtle but abominable form of menticide, by stunting and distorting the

* Russell, Human Society In Ethics and Politics, p.220.
minds of the young using `education' as the technique of doing so. Russell's
critique of the Church is that throughout the history, the Church had been
preparing human mind for orthodox dogmatic habits. The minds so prepared
become a fertile ground for new dogmas. And dogmas are eternal enemies
of the freedom of the spirit which is the essence of human freedom;

Says Russell:

I do not believe that a decay of dogmatic belief can do
anything but good. I admit at once that new systems of
dogma, such as those of the Nazis and the Communists, are even
worse than the old systems, but they could never have acquired
a hold over men's minds if orthodox dogmatic habits had not
been instilled in youth. Stalin's language is full of reminiscences
of the theological seminary in which he received his training.
What the world needs is not dogma, but an attitude of scientific
inquiry, combined with a belief that the torture of millions is
not desirable, whether inflicted by Stalin or by a Deity imagined
in the likeness of the believer.*

Russell holds that the Church had undergone structural strains and
aberration in the course of its historical evolution, transforming it into an
organisation coming into conflict with a man's intellectual integrity. It has
become a convention with the Church to propagate that clergymen are more
virtuous than other men. This in fact is responsible, to a great extent, for
the setting in of moral rut among the clergymen in the Church. As Russell

* Ibid., p.221
says; "any average selection of mankind, set apart and told that it excels the rest in virtue, must tend to sink below the average".* Another moral strain the Church suffers from is the professional endowments it gives to the clergy. The clergy enjoy use of property, social consideration and opportunities for petty power by the belongingness to the Church. Such privileges coming from an institution founded on an ancient dogma inspire a class of professional to oppose freedom of thought. Here Russell's contention reminds us what Marx said:

In the domain of Political Economy, free scientific inquiry meets not merely the same enemies as in all other domains. The peculiar nature of the material it deals with, summons as foes into the field of battle the most violent, mean and malignant passions of the human breast, the Furies of private interest. The English Established Church, e.g., will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income. Now-a-days atheism itself is culpa levis, as compared with criticism of existing property relations.**

One's intellectual honesty is sacrificed when one accepts a creed because of the income, position and power it will give. Nothing good will come out of such sacrifice. Once a man loses intellectual integrity, he is unable to see truth simply. A man who fails to see the truth is ipso facto,

* Russell, Principles of Social Reconstruction, p.139
** Marx, Capital, Vol-I, p.10
incapable of doing good. This Russelian insight on the nexus between capacity for cognition of truth and capacity for doing good, in other words, between pure thought and pure feeling is a fruitful insight opening up new vistas of inquiry. In a political Party, adherence to Party ideology and Party discipline demands sacrifice of intellectual integrity. Adherence to the Church dogmas also demands sacrifice of intellectual integrity. Of these two, Russell opines that the evil is greater as regards Church, because the Church has more deeper control over human life.

Russell's next point of criticism is that the Church as an institution is opposed to social movements aimed at emancipation of men from cruelties, if such movements do not conform to the Church dogma. The popular belief had been that religion would make men more humane. As against this Russell points out that just the opposite had been the case. In the history of mankind, the more fiercely religious dogmas were held, the greater had been the cruelty. In the ages of faith when men believe Christian religion in all its completeness, there was the Inquisition, burning of heretics at the stake, witch hunting and many other cruelties in the name of religion. And the Church has been consistently opposing all radical social movements aimed at emancipation of men from cruelties. Russell remarks:

Every single bit of progress in humane feeling, every improvement in the criminal law, every step towards the diminution of war, every step towards better treatment of the coloured races, or every mitigation of slavery, every moral progress that there has been in the world, has been consistently opposed by the organised Churches of the world. I say quite deliberately that the Christian religion,
as organised in its Churches, has been and still is the principal enemy of moral progress in the world.*

To show how the Catholic Church opposes mitigation of cruelty when such steps run counter to the Church dogmas, Russell cites the following example.

Suppose an inexperienced girl is married to a syphilitic man. According to Catholic Church marriage is an indissoluble sacrament and therefore the couple must stay together for life. Church dogmas also prohibit them from practicing birth control or abortion. Therefore, there is no way the woman can prevent herself from giving birth to syphilitic children and thus increase syphilitic population. This is fiendish cruelty.

Russell's next point of analysis is the conflict between the Church and men's need for freedom from fear. Freedom from fear is an inalienable part of human freedom. Men must be free from fear, because fear goes against the finest grain of human nature, namely, the courage to act and think freely. But the Church and religion is founded on fear. Primitive animistic religions had their roots in fear. Fear of the blind forces of Nature, fear of the mysterious, inspire the primitive men to look for imaginary beings as supports and allies in an otherwise hostile Nature. They believed that natural forces could be controlled by appeasing the presiding deities/beings through prayer. Prayer to imaginary beings gradually gave way to mastery of natural forces through science and technology. Men is on the way to the discovery that prayer and worship offered in awe and fear is not worthy of

* Russell, Why I Am Not A Christian, pp.24-25
his true essence. Christianity and the Church gave the old fears a new form. Fear of sin, fear of hell, fear of defeat, fear of death and fear of finitude are the new fears that motivated men to look for immortality in an eternal life in Heaven. The need for an omnipotent, omniscient omnipresent being is as overriding as before. Fear of God is necessary to the exercise of the authority of the Church as a social organisation. But this is exactly what stands in the way of realisation of man's true nature and a rational comprehension of his place in the Universe. Russell therefore opines that the need for imaginary support must give way to the need to stand on one's own legs and make this world a fit place to live instead of the sort of place that the Churches in all these centuries have made it. It is the Church more than the Gospel that stands in need of inculcating fear. According to Russell, it is to the Church as a powerful social organisation, rather than to the Gospels that Christianity owes it success. The spirit of Gospels and the Church have fallen apart. The Christian world is now farther away from the spirit of Christ as far can be.

It has already been pointed out that Russell regards cultivation of the faculties, instinct, thought and spirit inherent in human nature, as essential to freedom. In his opinion, the Church does violence to human nature, by not regarding sex as part of human nature, fulfilment of which makes the complete man. The Church regards enjoyment of unalloyed sex as sin. Sex therefore is permissible as long as it moves within the institution of marriage and aims at procreation. The Church therefore is opposed to birth control and also to the cultivation of healthy attitude towards sex through scientific dissemination of knowledge about sex. The result is, sex come to be associated with guilt. This sense of sin and the Church taboo on sex knowledge results in morbidity, timidity, cruelty and stupidity in later life.
The Churches even use control over education to indoctrinate the Church dogma on the young minds. The Church circumscribes an individual's freedom to know resulting in moral perversion by the very nature of the case on which blanket ignorance is imposed.

The next point Russell dwells upon is how the Church and Christianity constrain the individual from realising his social self, which is the essence of freedom. In the Christian conception of a good life, individual goodness is separated from doing good to the society. An individual is good if he is holy regardless of lack of contribution to society. Conversely, an individual is bad if he fails to come up to the measure of Christian holiness even though he has contributed significantly to human welfare, like reforming the finances or the criminal law or the judiciary. The virtuous or the holy men are one who has retired from the world. This separation of the social and the moral person had its metaphysical counterpart in the separation between soul and body.

Thus, the body represents the social and public part of a man, whereas the soul represents the private part. In emphasising the soul to the neglect of the body, Christianity has made men more egoistic and individualistic. Men are rendered more shut up in themselves than Nature made them. Christianity thus stand in the way of the realisation of the social individual. As an embodied being man can transcend his ego in his relation with other fellow beings. In love, sex, parenthood, patriotism or herd instinct men lose their ego in their relationship with fellow beings. But the Church oppose all these natural modes of men's relation with one another. Sex relationship which is the most natural relationship between a man and a woman is not valued in itself but only as a means to procreation. Family relation likewise
is to be decried if it stands in the way of realisation of the kingdom of Heaven. Christ himself had no need for family relation, not excepting even that of his mother. For the sake of the kingdom that is to come Christ will not hesitate to set a man at variance against his father, the daughter against her mother and the daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law. One who loves his father and mother more than God is not worthy of Him. Any kind of human relationship must not stand in competition with men's relationship to God. The meaning is crystal clear. The break up of the biological family tie, if necessary, hardly matters if it is to uphold the faith. What ultimately remains is the soul. The doctrine of immortality of soul, therefore, is a natural corollary of individualism growing out of undue Christian emphasis on the soul and private virtue.

Russell also makes the point that the monolithic character of the Church is inimical to plurality of views, which is the hallmark of freedom. The Church is a monolithic organisation that tolerates of no other religion except Christianity and no other God except the Christian God. This has led the Church to persecution of individuals and groups having different beliefs. He also reminds us the fact that the Church had persecuted Christians as well as non-Christians far more fiercely than the Roman State before the time of Constantine did the Christians. The modern Church has yielded the ground to some extent because of the relentless critique coming from the freethinkers. But the spirit of persecution persists. Russell cites an interesting example. Russell's great-great grandfather, after observing the depth of the lava on the slopes of Etna, came to the conclusion that the world must be older than the orthodox supposed, and published this opinion in a book. For this offence he was cut by the County and ostracized from society.*

*Russell, Why I AM Not A Christian, P.35 Russell is referring to Mr.Brydon, his grandmother's grandfather.
The Church according to Russell, embodies three overriding impulses which are as follows:

One, the impulse of fear of the unknown.

Two, the conceit that man is a privileged being in the creation having a special relation to God. Men are not a crawling worm whose destiny is dusty death, but has ontological dignity as children of God.

Three, a hatred or impulse to persecution of those who do not belong to the Church or share the Church’s particular brand of righteousness.

Russell’s argument against the moral viability of the Church is that the Church regards these impulses as inalienable part of human nature and in the name of channelling them do in fact perpetuate them. But perpetuation of these impulses is neither socially desirable nor unavoidable. Fear, conceit, hatred can be wholly eliminated from human nature by changing the society, humanising the environment, educating children to grow up without complexes. The Church in tending to perpetuate these impulses arrest the unfolding of an individual to a full person.

According to Russell, our world is full of injustice, cruelty and preventable misery. Their ultimate causes are economic. Life and death competition for the means of sustenance and for appropriation of wealth has made our world what it is now at present - a place where man cannot discover his human essence in his relation with other human beings. Growing up in this very world activates the negative impulses in man.
Fortunately for mankind, the struggles and competition of the earlier ages are no longer inevitable. We have the knowledge and the technique to ensure the survival as well as happiness for all. But at this very juncture when mankind is ready for a momentous leap to freedom, such as, freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom from hatred, ignorance and superstition, the dogmas of the Church and religion are standing in the way. For example, we all know that population control will considerably diminish tendencies to war, pestilence and famine. We now also have the scientific technique to this end. But the Church is opposed to techniques of population control, like use of contraception, on the basis of its dogmas. The Church and its dogmas constitute the chief obstacle to the application of knowledge and technique towards attainment of universal happiness of mankind. Says Russell;

Religion prevents our children from having a rational education; religion prevents us from removing the fundamental causes of war; religion prevents us from teaching the ethic of scientific co-operation in place of the old fierce doctrines of sin and punishment. It is possible that mankind is on threshold of a golden age; but, if so, it will be necessary first to slay the dragon that guards the door, and this dragon is religion.*

Russell further makes the point that the institutional morality of the Church in matter of conception, birth, marriage and sex, has subjected an individual to an avoidable destiny. Let us take the example of conception. A child conceived out of wedlock has a stigma for no fault of his own. A child inheriting venereal disease from either of the parents did not come to

the world of his free choice. To be born in an overcrowded poor family is a destiny thrust upon the child because of the parents’ refusal, in the name of the Church, to use contraception. As if this is not enough, the Church is in unholy alliance with the forces of economic status quo and is opposed to social reforms for distributive justice. For example, a child born to a worker’s family is deprived of even the basic nourishment. But even then cynical social system will cut down the supply of milk to nursing mothers to save funds for paving rich residential districts where there is little traffic.

Radical movement for social reforms that may mitigate the plight of suffering mothers and their children is opposed by the Church on the plea that such reforms smacks of socialism and atheism. In reality, it pays the Church to uphold the existing status quo. The Church, with the Pope at their head, have pledged the vast forces of superstition throughout the world to oppose the cause of institutional reform.

Russell also opines that the Christian dogma of individual salvation as the unique human destiny has led to the conception of an atomised individual whose freedom and good life is remote from the welfare or otherwise of the society he is in. The dogma stands as a barrier to the realisation of the individual’s freedom in society. In Russell’s view, in the realisation of freedom and all that is best in the individual, the world is a unity. “The man who pretends to live independently is a conscious or unconscious parasite”*

A very interesting Russelian insight is that the Church dogma of individual salvation as resulting from catastrophic change or conversion has its social counterpart in the romantic ideal of social transformation through sudden or violent revolution to liquidate the old order. It was

* Ibid., p.60
uncritically presumed that once the old order is liquidated there would be a change of heart ushering in an era of freedom, prosperity and happiness for all. Russell sardonically remarks that revolutionaries who had the misfortune to emerge victorious were soon to see their glowing hopes belied. The moral is, there is no short cut to the millennium of freedom and that the road to freedom is rather a long one needing the utmost preparation of the faculties and dispositions of mankind.

The manner in which the Church stands opposed to individual freedom may be highlighted by assessing how the Church is opposed to academic freedom. Russell’s arguments in this regard are as follows.

Academic freedom demands that teachers should be chosen for their expertness in the subject they are to teach, and that the judges of this expertness should be other experts. Whether a man is a good mathematician or philosopher can only be judged by other mathematicians or philosophers. The opponents of academic freedom hold that other conditions besides a man’s skill in his own department should be taken into consideration. For example, he should have never expressed any opinion which controverts those of the holders of power. Communism, Christianity and even Western Democracy are opposed to academic freedom in varying forms. Communism is opposed to academic freedom for fear that free inquiry will undermine the dogmas on which it is founded. Free inquiry questions the dogmas of the Church and precisely for this reason, the Church is opposed to academic freedom. Liberal democracy is founded on the principle that controversial questions should be decided by argument rather than force. Liberals have always held that opinions should be formed by untrammeled debate, not by allowing only one side to be heard. The fundamental
difference between the liberal and illiberal outlook is that the former regards all questions as open to discussion and all opinions as open to a greater or less measure of doubt, while the latter holds in advance that certain opinions are absolutely unquestionable and that no argument against them must be allowed to be heard. There is the danger of this spirit of liberalism being throttled even in a democracy because of the abuse of political power that is vested in the majority. Majority opinion prevailing on practical issues affecting all is one thing. The same opinion exercising authority over exceptional individuals on issues which does not concern the majority and on which the majority is not competent to form judgments is quite another. In matters of science, arts and philosophy, the judgment of the majority is not necessarily the sound one. Here expecting the exceptional individuals to conform to majority opinion and pursuing those who fail to do so is a violation of the liberty of opinion. Academic freedom means freedom to form, profess and express opinions on academic matters on the basis of evidence even if such opinions are contrary to prevailing popular opinions and prejudices. Democracy in America suffers from this tendency to persecution. Thus, not only communism and Christianity, but democracy also takes her own share of persecution. Persecution is no less real when voice of God is substituted by voice of people. If revelation is no substitute for free inquiry and analysis, neither is collective wisdom for individual intelligence. Democracy in thinking so betrays its own brand of dogma. Communism has as its infallible dogma, dialectical materialism; the Church, the infallibility of the Pope and the Gospel; democracy, the infallibility of majority opinion. Russell himself was a victim of persecution of the Church dogma. In February 26, 1940 Russell was appointed Professor of Philosophy of the City College of New York. The Church fathers and leaders of orthodox opinion reacted to the appointment. Using all means ranging from the
whipping up of mass hysteria to subterfuge legal action they made the charge that Russell’s unorthodox views on marriage, sex and morals as well as his methods of free enquiry will corrupt the morals of the youth. Thus, the Athenian sin against philosophy was repeated against this twentieth century Socrates in ‘democratic’ America. The incident proved that monsters against free thought lurks at large even in the familiar countryside of democracy provided dogmatic social institutions like the Church are allowed to have their way.

4.4 EDUCATIONAL ORGANISATIONS

We have seen that according to Russell, there is such a thing as freedom of thought. By freedom of thought he means the freedom to search, profess and propagate true propositions. Such a freedom must not be trammelled by the authority of any social organisation, be it the State, Church or economic organisations. But we cannot have freedom of thought unless the faculty of thought is developed. This faculty is inherent in human nature. Cultivation of the faculty of thought or in other words, the faculty of free inquiry, has intrinsic value in itself. It is also valuable for the propositions that it discovers. The training or cultivation of the faculty of thought is therefore an essential component of freedom.

Russell links freedom of thought with the realisation of the free and complete man. Through free inquiry man can know the Universe. Knowing the Universe, man reflects on the Universe. Reflecting on the Universe, man loves the Universe. Loving the Universe, man can act and intervene in the Universe for a better world. Thus, knowledge love and action make the
full and complete man. But it all depends on knowing and reflecting on the Universe for which cultivation of thought is a must.

The faculty of thought can be developed or trained for free inquiry through education. But paradoxically, education can also be the cause of the impairment or distortion of the faculty of thought. So, we have one kind of education that emancipates the human spirit and another kind that enslaves.

An education that emancipates considers the students as an end in themselves. They are to be nurtured in accordance with the principle of justice and liberty. Here the teacher is to guide the student to develop his faculties for the ultimate freedom to be able to think for himself. But not for any other extraneous purposes. In such an education system, the educator has reverence for the child or student. He knows that the child is not to be moulded according to idiosyncratic set pattern. The reason; what the child can become is more original, unpredictable and mysterious than the wildest dreams offered by the so called systems.

As contrasted with this the teacher or bureaucrat or the education system who think it their duty to mould the child according to their set pattern, as does the potter with the clay, come into conflict with the freedom of the child to follow his natural growth. The unnatural shape that they want to impose and the full growth the child is capable of comes into conflict with one another.

An education that enslaves has purposes extraneous to the growth and freedom of the student or child. Such purposes are invariably those of
powerful social organisations. The Church, the State and economic organisations are the powerful social organisations that do not necessarily have as their purposes the cultivation of human faculties and the realisation of all that is best in man. They look at human beings as so much of malleable raw materials to be moulded according to a set pattern. To be able to handle human beings as raw-materials, these social organisations aim at exercising power over man. Control over mind is the surest way to exercise power over man. Human minds can be controlled by educating or training in a particular way from childhood. Such type of education is imparted through organised gigantic education machines. Any social organisation that controls the education machine control the means to power over the minds of man. But this is an education that does not emancipate, but enslaves.

So we have education that emancipates and education that enslaves. The problem is all the more compounded by the fact that education is a social practice, tending to get crystallized in the form of social institutions, Administration, authority, finance, recruitment of manpower are essential to education as social institution. Powerful social organisations therefore do not just stand aside and let the cultivation of the human mind take its own momentum.

Given these two dimensions of education as a social institution, Russell like Tagore rightly points out that the school can be a place were one can escape into freedom or be caught in a gilded cage depending on who runs and what kind of school it is. For the urban children whose parents are not rich, the school can give; (1) fresh light and air (2) proper diet in schools where meals are supplied at State expense. (3) space to romp and play (4) a place where a child can make noise which is necessary at their stage but
which is forbidden at home (5) companionship of other children of the same age (6) escape from too much of parental interest (7) need for an environment containing appropriate amusements, but artificially safe, e.g. communal playgrounds are still a need for children, even for the children of the rich. Thus, schools can provide safe places where children can be free without too much of intense emotion.

But the above mentioned freedom are given provided the school authorities have affection for children. The tragedy according to Russell is, this is hardly the case. School authorities seldom have affection for children.

The reason is not too far to seek. Schools are run by States, Churches and other economic organisations. They hardly consider the student as intrinsically valuable in themselves. They may encourage the individual to achieve worldly success, making money, achieving a good position or even acquire the art of getting on. But the unfoldment of the potentialities of the individual is not considered as the intrinsically good. In almost all the cases, educational organisations run by the Church, the State or economic organisations aim at strengthening some group, national or religious or even social in the competition with other groups. This political motive determines the kind of education to be given to the students, which is not to foster the inward growth of mind and spirit. Rather, Russell maintains that those who are educated under the system get their mental and spiritual life atrophied. This is a clear case of educational organisations violating the richness of human nature and coming into conflict with human freedom.
The most glaring examples, according to Russell are in the teaching of History and Religion. All the Nation States use their education machine to teach distorted History and their choice brand of national chauvinism to the detriment of human unity. State and religious bodies also use education machines to inculcate their own brand of dogmas to the detriment of free inquiry. The defenseless child is taught false propositions and is deprived of the faculties as well as the opportunities to discover true propositions on matters of extreme importance.

States, Churches, political parties and like institutions use educational organisations to inculcate beliefs, creeds or dogmas and to prevent free inquiry in these matters. The reason; creeds are supposed to hold men together in fighting organisations. The stronger the belief is, so the argument goes, the surer victory is. But this way, education becomes destructive of freedom of thought. The morons are rendered full of prejudice while the few intelligent ones become cynical, their creative impulses being perverted. Education is thus used as a means of acquiring power over the pupil, not as a means of nourishing his growth.

Let us now enter into the Russellian analysis of how the social organisations use education to circumscribe human freedom, in detail.

First the Church. Russell maintains that the Church demands assent to propositions which no unbiased person can believe. This animosity to truth and adherence to dogmas is a serious matter because religious institutions control education to a greater extent than is generally supposed. In England for example all public schools and almost all preparatory schools are either Anglican or Roman Catholic. Children who are inculcated with
dogmas in schools run by the Church retain those beliefs throughout their adult lives. The immense majority of adults believe throughout life most of what they were taught in youth. Therefore, according to Russell, the argument that children saturated with religious dogmas in Church run schools will outgrow these beliefs in their adult life is fallacious. If religious dogmas are false, they must be taken at their face value and must not be propagated through educational institutions. If one believes religious dogmas to be false but socially tolerates their propagation through educational institutions (Church or State administered) at public expenses, one is giving tacit consent to these dogmas at the level of social practice.

Says Russell;

If you believe privately that two and two are four, but avoid, proclaiming this opinion, and hold it right that public money should be spent in teaching your children and the children of others that two and two are five, your effective opinion, from a social point of view, is that two and two are five, and your private personal conviction to the contrary becomes unimportant. So, those who, while not themselves religious, believe a religious education to be desirable, have not in any effective way reacted against their own religious education, however they may protest to the contrary.*

Arguments have been advanced to the effect that the dogmas of the Church, be they true or false, are helpful to men in leading a good life.

* Russell, Bertrand, Education And The Social Order (Reprinted;Great Britain:Routledge, 1993)p.68
Fear of God is a strong motive for not committing sin, not doing wrong. The immortality of the soul is a reason good enough to save it from eternal damnation. It is therefore argued that assent to these dogmas must be tolerated on pragmatic considerations apart from their truth value.

But this line of argument sacrifices intellectual integrity, free inquiry, in other words, freedom of thought at the altar of expediency. Russell argues that religious propositions such as, there is a God, the soul is immortal etc. are matters of greatest importance. If true, they will give one picture of man and his place in the Universe. If false, the picture will be altogether different. It is therefore, extremely important that these propositions be either accepted or rejected at their face value, i.e., on the basis of their intrinsic truth value. Russell succinctly makes the point that mankind, more specifically children should not be duped on matters of extreme importance. He also makes the point that it is not reasonable to expect good life out of habitual and deliberate lie on subjects of genuine importance. Nor can ‘good’ be good if false beliefs are its only available motivations. Educational organisations run by the Church come into conflict with human freedom partly because of the dogmas taught and partly because of the insistence that free inquiry and healthy doubt be suspended so that doubtful propositions may be accepted as true.

As assent to Church dogmas is insisted upon in educational institutions run or influenced by the Church, to survive as a teacher in these institutions, an academic must be either stupid or hypocritical. Either he must be too stupid to question the dogmas or having understood the dogmas to be indefensible must give hypocritical assent to them. Both stupidity and hypocrisy have their own price to pay, that is; closure of minds against adventurous thoughts. The teachers thus become timid and conventional.
As upholders of the Church and the State nexus, they start making timid and conventional students in their own image. They become inquisitors against free thought. Their promotion and exalted place in their academic institutions is then assured. The education machine that kills free thought thus perpetuates itself.

Another difficulty according to Russell is that the Church regards certain propositions to be sacrosanct and not open to question. But once a domain of propositions is closed to free inquiry, the closure attitude is bound to extend to other domains of propositions also. Therefore, it is impossible to instill scientific spirit when the Church is in control of education machine.

The Church is essentially conservative, standing almost invariably on the side of status quo, superstition, war and social injustice. The comforts that the Church offers through its dogmas are short-lived. Comforts give way to despair, the moment these dogmas are discovered to be unfounded. In place of fear of death and uncertainties in the Universe, the Church instils fear of God. And fear is not an emotion worthy of human dignity. Living with fear on one hand, and pleasant but false beliefs on the other, is not living in the best way possible.

The Church regards sufferings on this earth as the price to be paid for eternal life in heaven. Hence indifference to poverty, famine and disease, encouragement of social practices that increases misery on earth on the ground that they will lead to happiness in heaven. Here Russell like Marx, points to the unholy alliance between the Church and capital, the clergy and the rich. The suffering of the proletariat in this life and making the hell
of modern factories are welcome as their reward in heaven is assured, thanks
to the captain of industries. These prejudices and vested interests render
educational organisations run by the Church violative of human nature and
human freedom.

Next to the Church comes the State in using educational organisations
in a manner that comes into conflict with human freedom. Like the Church
the State uses educational organisations to inculcate dogmas. The State
also uses the education machine to suspend free inquiry, freedom of thought
and impartial judgment among the citizens.

The dogma that the State inculcates by using educational organisation
is nationalistic patriotism. Citizens are taught that their most important
social loyalty is to the State of which they are citizens and that their duty
to the State is to act as its government may direct. To foreclose any free
inquiry in these regards, citizens are taught false history, false politics,
false economics.

Says Russell:

They are informed of the misdeeds of foreign States, but
not of the misdeeds of their own State. They are led to
suppose that all the wars in which their own State has
engaged are wars of defence, while the wars of foreign
States are wars of aggression. They are taught to believe
that when, contrary to expectation, their own country does
conquer some foreign country, it does so in order to spread
civilisation, or in the light of the gospel, or a lofty moral
tone, or prohibition, or something else which is equally noble. They are taught to believe that foreign nations have no moral standards, and as the British national anthem asserts, that it is the duty of Providence to ‘frustrate their knavish tricks’ - a duty in which Providence will not disdain to employ us as its instruments. The fact is that every nation, in its dealings with every other, commits as many crimes as its armed forces render possible. Citizens, even decent citizens, give a full assent to the activities which make these crimes possible, because they do not know what is being done, or see the facts in a true perspective.*

Thus, according to Russell, education makes the ordinary citizens unconscious accomplice in murder for the sake of robbery. He rightly points out that virulent nationalism is a danger to the continuance of civilised way of life in this earth. To propagate virulent nationalism, the State uses education to teach people how to kill and how to hate. Worse still, the State also uses education to teach false propositions, such as, one’s country is the best. History teaching at present is glorification of one’s nation at the expense of other nations, war at the expense of culture: emphasizing victory in the battlefield while forgetting the wounded, the homeless and the devastated regions.

The connection between educational organisations (propagating aggressive patriotism) and imperialism is really sinister. A nation State driven by a highly concentrated and developed capital finance becomes a predator State, seeking to exploit the rest of the world. The Leninist thesis,

* Russell, Bertrand, Education And The Social Order, pp.87-88
imperialism is highest state of capitalism is still relevant. Russell also points out that rich citizens of a predator State, who are capital finance personified benefit from investments in undeveloped countries. Undeveloped countries have two uses from the standpoint of the investor: as markets, and as sources of raw materials. They can be exploited more effectively on both the counts, provided they are under the control of the State to which the investor belongs. French capital finding a profitable field of investment in North Africa: British capital in India: American capital in Central America - are some of the examples. The capitalist investor therefore becomes interested in imperialism, i.e., conquest or control of undeveloped countries. But imperialism or control of other countries is a costly enterprise, needing elaborate logistic support - military, political and diplomatic. The capitalist investor does not finance this expensive enterprise all alone. He sees to it that a considerable part of the expenses of this imperialistic enterprise is shifted to the shoulders of the tax-payer. To win the cooperation of the tax-payers, they have to be persuaded that there is glory in their country exploiting other countries. Persuasion is best done through propaganda. A predator State finds the education machine the most effective means for saturating the citizen with patriotic propaganda - a brand of patriotism which in essence is imperialism. The citizen is taught to suspend free inquiry and believe false dogmas to be true. This is clear example of education organisations coming into conflict with the freedom of thought and human freedom.

Economic organisations in an unjust economic order using educational organisations as their handmaid also leads to an encroachment upon free inquiry and freedom of thought.
Industrial capitalism had introduced free competition as the ideal in all provinces of human life. Competition has made its inroads on education also. According to Russell, educational organisations operating under the principle of free competition has led to the impairment of the faculties of the young, damaging their creativity and freedom of thought. Free competition has led to over education, that is, putting in more inputs than can be assimilated and straining the student for competitive examinations. This is damaging to the imagination, intellect and even physical health of the students. According to Russell, the best brains and the best imaginations in each generations are the first to be immolated upon the altar of the Great God competition. Says Russell;

To one who has, as I have had, experience at the university of some of the best minds of a generation, the damage done by overstrain in youth is heartrending.*

What is necessary is love of knowledge, an enthusiasm for research, a freshness of intellectual initiative and a feeling for mystery of the Universe. To learn without ceasing to love learning is difficult and educational organisations so far have not found a solution to this difficult problem. Rather, education come to be looked as training for a livelihood. Students are taught to regard knowledge from a purely utilitarian point of view, as the road to money and worldly success, not as the gateway to wisdom. Teachers are compelled to prepare the students for examinations that will fetch diplomas and degrees.

* Ibid., p.102
Such a training also encouraged passive acceptance of what is taught in the educational institutions. This mental habit of passive acceptance paves the way for the formation of the fascist personality in men, i.e., the human type that seek a leader to worship, that accepts as leader anybody who is established in that position. The Churches, Governments, party caucuses and other organisations can easily mislead such human types into supporting old systems. Thus educational organisations inculcates passive acceptance, which is a way to mental slavery, destructive of independence of thought.

Functionally an educational organisation has two components. One, teachers who teach and impart knowledge. Two, administrators who govern the organisation. Unfortunately, the credit for the delivery of goods is wrongly apportioned to the administrators. In a great gigantic educational machine, the administrator is more likely to be valued. This scale of valuation may produce the wrong type of teachers, namely the administrative type who encourages uniformity rather than teachers who love teaching.

As the world gets more and more organised and giant organisations grows up to control men’s activities, the executive type of man tends to make it at the top. They need not handle things or work or man directly. They need not love them or have intimate knowledge of them. Their ability is of a more abstract kind, that of getting things done through management of people who in their turn directly handle things and work. The more they distance themselves, the more lacking they are in intuitive love of man, material and work. This development in education is disastrous. As education gets more and more organised, administrators who have no
intimate knowledge of the child tends to acquire control. They have no love and patience to delight in the unfoldment of the peculiar talent of the child. But the teacher who teaches a small group of students loves them, knows them as individuals and feels great about their peculiarities. To the administrator, a child is just another number soon to get lost in official statistics. For him one child is as good as or as bad as any other as all equally make their entry in the uniform official statistics.

To sum up. Freedom of thought is constitutive of human freedom. Freedom of thought means free inquiry to discover, profess and propagate true propositions. Freedom of thought as embodied in free inquiry depends on the cultivation of the faculty of thought inherent in human nature. Cultivation of the faculty of thought is done through education. That is why, education is such a sublime thing. But paradoxically education can also be used to impair or distort the faculty of thought, subvert free inquiry and fill the mind with dogmas. The problem is made acute and compounded by the fact that education is a social practice getting crystallised into social institutions. Powerful social organisations, namely the State, the Church and economic organisations use organised education for political purposes. Their ends are extraneous to the cause of the cultivation of the faculty of thought. Hence, educational organisations when used to subvert free inquiry and inculcate dogmas, come into conflict with freedom of thought which is constitutive of human freedom.

4.5 THE FAMILY

Survival of mankind in any form depends on material production and biological reproduction. Biological reproduction is primarily a biological
mechanism through which a living species, human or animal, perpetuates itself. But at the level of human species, biological reproduction is not only biological, but also social. In other words, among the humans, biological reproduction through sexual pairing of male and female does not proceed at random; but is regulated through highly structured social institutions. Such institutions are what we call the family.

Russell gives us an elaborate, historical, social, anthropological and political analysis of the institution of family. For the purposes of the present thesis, we will concentrate only on those aspects of Russellite analysis which have a direct bearing on the formulation of the conflict between human freedom on the one hand and family as a social organisation on the other.

The most fundamental conflict according to Russell is between the relation of love on the one hand and the family on the other. Man finding the fulfilment of his self in the women and vice versa is the relation of love between the two sexes.

Marx had said that man and woman relationship is the most natural human relationship. Both Marx and Russell are at one when they maintain that freedom is the enjoyment of the wealth of human nature, of which the relation of love is one. Love transcending the prison house of ego to find fulfilment in the other is the highest form of freedom realised in human relation. Both Marx and Russell are critical of family vis-a-vis the relation of love. Let us go through the Russellite analysis.

In the first place love is an intense emotion involving both the faculties of instinct and spirit. Love is extra-rational, if not anti-rational. Love
between man and woman includes sex as one of its components, but transcends sex in the universalisation of the emotion. Love of men and women extends to the child, through the child to one’s community and through the community to the whole Universe. But a commitment through exercise of free choice is a fundamental condition. Love, therefore, is a relation in which an individual loses and at the time finds his freedom in the other, through one’s own choice. Love consists in this transcendence which universalises the individual. Love is also the emotional experience of the transcendence that makes man a complete being. This is precisely the reason why love is such an inalienable component of freedom.

Family in civilised societies is now almost universally patriarchal and monogamic. As it is, family represents two kinds of continuity, biological continuity and continuity in the ownership of property. Symbolically speaking biological reproduction is Nature’s own modality to man’s prayer for immortality. The parents feel that they survive their death in their children. Once the fact of paternity is discovered, it is the ego of the father that continues in a patriarchal family. To establish paternity beyond doubt, to ascertain that a child is biologically one’s own, insistence on the chastity of the wife became imperative. This necessity put severe constraints on the relation between man and woman, the relation of love included. The imperatives of biological reproduction and ascertaining paternity gains precedence over the relation of love within the family system.

Matters are made worse by the pervasive influence of the Church on marriage. In the Old Testament, God made Eve from Adam’s rib and she is called woman because she was taken out of man. Hence it is that woman is to man the bone of his bones and the flesh of his flesh. One possible
interpretation of the Biblical account is that it marks a turning point in the
evolution of family towards its present patriarchal form, since the very
making of woman had been made dependent on man. Male domination is
made as natural as the beginning of creation. The New Testament added a
new dimension to the institution of marriage by its very attitude towards
sex. The birth of Christ as the son of Virgin transcending the laws of
biological reproduction, itself marks the beginning of the stigma Christianity
will be associating with sex in future. St. Paul, in his First Epistle to the
Corinthians expounds with a stunning clarity the Christian views that “it is
good for a man not to touch a woman, but to avoid fornication
a man may have his own wife and a woman her own husband”. * To remain
celibate is the best alternative for human beings, but if they cannot remain
so, they may marry, “for it is better to marry than to burn”. ** Sex is divested
of love and love of sex. All sexual intercourse even within marriage is
regrettable and to be avoided as far as practicable. Love within marriage as
well as love outside marriage were not considered seriously as possibilities.

After St. Paul, the Catholic Church took a different view. According
to the Church marriage has two purposes. One, to contain sexual intercourse
within family for those who cannot be celibates. Two, even between husband
and wife sexual relation is legitimate only if it is prompted by the desire
for procreation. Thus according to Catholic Church, desire for legitimate
offspring is the only motive which can justify sexual intercourse. There
need not be any love lost between the wife and husband, but the husband
can still insist on his conjugal rights provided his motive is to beget a
child. This Christian morality still dominates family in its present form.

* Quoted by Russell in Marriage And Morals (Reprinted, London:
Routlodge, 1994) p.35
** cf. Ibid., p.36
The result is that love outside family is considered sinful and wicked. Within the family love between man and woman must give way to the purpose of biological reproduction. Sex as component of love and love as the emotional union between man and woman, one finding fulfilment in the other, comes at cross purposes with the ideologically projected function of the family. Outside marriage, love between man and woman is made to feel guilty, as such relations are considered sinful and wicked. As such marriage as a social institution come into conflict with love born out of the free choice of the individuals concerned. Within marriage, the biological, social and functional aspects of man-woman relationship tend to gain the upper hand over the relation of love. A woman is supposed not to love freely of her own free will, but submit by convention. For a man too, if it need be, love must give way to playing the father figure, who is the centre of power in the family. It is thus that family as a social organisation come into conflict with the freedom to love and to be loved which is a fulfilment of human faculties and realisation of the total human being.

Gender equality is a must if man and woman are to love each other, out of their own free choice. But since the emergence of patriarchal family, the family had been the bastion of male dominance throughout the ages. Man as the progenitor and as the economic provider is the centre of power. Thus, male domination is based on two important functions of the family as a social institution. One is biological, and the other is economic. Biologically, family is to continue the seed of the ‘man’ through whom, the family line and nomenclature is now traced. Economically, man is at the centre of material production, and hence a provider of material needs and comforts for the family. True, women also participated in material production, but only as playing second fiddle to men. In feudal times, the wife was considered property of the husband, and her economic
participation was as good as that of a hired labour attached to her husband. Economic dependence of women on men was further enhanced by the fact that inheritance of property was through the male line.

According to Russell, many factors led to the movement for gender equality better known as movement for emancipation of women.

The first is the invention of contraceptives. For the first time in the history of mankind, contraceptives have made sexual freedom for women compatible with the biological function of family, namely, the biological fidelity of continuing the husband's seed, by ascertaining paternity beyond doubt. Contraceptives have made it possible to avoid pregnancies at will. But for traditional moral scruples, nothing need stand now between a woman and her premarital love. Similarly, a woman may have love and sexual relation, outside marriage; and yet avoid being impregnated by man other than her husband through use of contraceptives. The possibility of this newly found sexual freedom is coming up against the conventional family system, which may soon face stress and strain unless there is a radical change in sexual morals. This is a Russelian point on which we will dwell in subsequent chapters.

The second factor according to Russell is the gradual economic empowerment of women, which is a consequence of the industrial revolution. Industrial revolution opened up work places where woman can labour at per with their male counterparts. The expanding labour market absorbed women's labour, diminishing women's economic dependence on men. Science and technology again made possible proliferation of women's participation in skilled professional jobs. The emerging economic independence of women had its impact on property rights. The passage of
the Married Women's Property Act (1882) recognised a married women's legal right within the family system. Where pecuniary considerations no longer exists, the relation of husband and wife is to be based on mutual love and respect arising out of the free-will of the partners concerned. Economic emancipation of women enables them to exercise choice in relation to their husband, which may come into conflict with a male dominated family structure where the husband as the father figure is the centre of power.

The third factor is the political emancipation of women culminating in the right to vote. The message of the French Revolution, namely liberty equality and fraternity, gave a new impetus to the democratic movement. Movement for gender equality gradually became part of the democratic movement. The French Revolution even altered the laws of inheritance in a sense favourable to daughters. Ideas expressed in Mary Wollstonecraft's Vindication Of The Rights Of Women (1972) and John Stuart Mill's Subjection Of Women espoused the cause of women's emancipation. The feminists' struggle resulted in the passage of the Married Women's Property Act (1882). On the one hand, democratic theory vindicated the demand for women's emancipation and on the other hand, women's economic independence made the emergence of women as a free person in their own rights, inevitable.

When earlier constraints no longer exists and women emerged as a person in their own rights, the most natural relation between man and woman is love. There has to be a convergence point of love and family. Otherwise, there is bound to be a tension or conflict between women's newly found freedom and the traditional family system. The family system is undergoing
stress and strain, yet unable to change because of a lack of radical sexual morality commensurate with freedom in the partnership of men and women.

The next conflict Russell points out is the conflict between the rights and freedom of the child to grow on the one hand, and parental authority centering around the father on the other. The child in a sense is the most important member of the family, the bond that binds the husband and the wife together. Although the mother cares more for the child, the child grows under the protection of the father. The father and the father image is both a physical and spiritual need for the child. But as family becomes more developed, the child becomes the father’s property. He has absolute control over the child. All major religions of the world hold up the majesty of fatherhood. Children are enjoined to have a sense of duty towards the father. Just as the child is dependent on the father, filial piety binds him to the father forever. This relationship may transform the family into an oppressive power structure within which paternal authority is in conflict with the growth of the child towards a free total being. The tension between the father figure and the emerging ego of the child was deeply felt in all societies. All ancient civilisations have sought to deify the father figure and establish its power against any real or potential rebellion. Rebellion even in thought is sacrilegious. This is reflected in the horror of parricide entrenched in early civilisations. According to Russell, “the horror of parricide which one finds in early civilisation shows how great was the temptation to be overcome; for a crime which we cannot imagine ourselves committing, such as cannibalism for example, fails to inspire us with any genuine horror”.*

* Russell, Bertrand, Marriage And Morals, p.113.
Industrial revolution led to classical capitalism, which introduced child labour in factories. For optimal utilisation of the instrument of production and profit maximisation factories introduced relay system. Relay system stretching working hour to 24 hours a day absorbed cheap labour of children and women. Working class families which could not depend only on the wages of the fathers are compelled to send their children to labour in the factories. Although much against their will here is a convergence of economic organisations and parental authority in the exploitation of the child and stunting of his growth. The rise of the labour movement on the one hand and the emergence of the welfare State as response to the labour movement on the other, led to State intervention on behalf of the child. Now in many advanced countries the State has gradually taken over the functions of the parents in providing the minimum economic, educational and health care facilities, thus providing minimum facilities for the child to grow up as a normal human being. Legal enactments have been made prohibiting child labour. But in the third world countries, child labour is endemic. Inspite of so many legal enactments, parents below the poverty line are compelled to force their children into child labour. The fact that they are also victims of social and economic forces does not alter the character of the tension between the parental authority so exercised and the freedom of the child to grow.

The family always has a deep impact on the psychology of the individual. Especially the family has profound effect on the emotional development of the child either for good or bad. If the effect of the family on the emotional development of the child is positive and if the family helps in the cultivation of the faculties of the child, then the family can be regarded as preparing the child for the road to freedom. On the other hand the family may emotionally pervert the child, deaden his faculties and render
him incapable of pursuit of freedom. In such a case, the family as a social institution may be regarded as standing in the way of freedom. Sigmund Freud pointed out the dangers arising out of oedipus complex present in the child. A boy sees in his father a rival for the affection of his mother. He may hate his brothers and sisters because they absorb some part of the parental attention he would like for himself alone. The effects of these turbulent passions in later life could be of the most diverse and terrible kinds, varying from homosexuality at best to mania at worst. Unless these violent emotions are creatively channelised and transmuted, family system playing havoc with the emotions of the child may render them incapable of enjoying the fruits of freedom in later life.

Biological reproduction is the essential function of family. Now what do we do if emancipated women no longer desires children? Will her newly found freedom come into conflict with the fundamental function of family. Earlier it was taken for granted that women desire children, that her natural instincts pine for motherhood. But after emancipation of women, it was discovered that many women who can think and feel genuinely do not desire to have children. Many intelligent and active minded women resent the slavery to the body which is involved in having children. Ambitious women who desire a career have no time for children. Now that it is possible to have men and women relationship within family without children,, women’s newly found freedom of social choice may come into conflict with the biological purpose of family. As a theoretical extrapolation, it may even be maintained that women’s emancipation in the long run may bring about either genetic degradation or negative population growth. It is very difficult to locate the area of convergence between the biological function of marriage and the freedom of social choice inherent in women’s emancipation.
The possibility of genetic degradation makes Russell ponder over the problem of eugenics in relation to the family system. Eugenics is the attempt to improve the biological character of a breed by deliberate methods adopted to that end. It is yet to be a science. Russell maintains that both heredity and education are equally important factors in human achievement. He approaches the problem of application of eugenics to human beings with two assumptions. One, human beings differ in regard to congenital mental capacity and two, intelligent people are preferable to their opposite. Granting these two assumptions and the possibility of transmission of desirable heredity traits through selective breeding, Russell would opt for the continuance and expansion of intelligence as an acquired heredity trait in human beings by a transmission through selective breeding. If somehow good stocks or breeds with desirable acquired traits can be encouraged and bad stocks or breeds with defective traits be discouraged mankind will be better prepared for the road to freedom. Encouragement of good stock is positive eugenics and discouragement of bad stocks is negative eugenics. When it comes to human beings, the problem of application of eugenics is that, it is very difficult to identify the parameters that define good stock of human beings and bad stock of human beings. Attempts in the past to define good human stock and bad human stock have been loaded with false sociological theories arising out of racism, nationalism, class bias and other false ideologies. But supposing we all agree that intelligent human beings are better than morons and eugenics can encourage the stock of intelligent human beings, what happens to our family system? At present family is the only socially recognised institution of biological reproduction as far as human beings are concerned. But family as a social structure has its own dynamics, constraints and established sexual morals. As such, family in its present form must come into conflict with the purposes of eugenics or improvement of good human stock through selective breeding.
Thus in case eugenics lends support to mankind's long march to freedom by its improvement of the race through selective breeding and family in its present form comes into conflict with the fundamental principle of eugenics, then we have a specific area in which family as a social organisation comes into conflict with human freedom.

To sum up:

The State as the repository of force, the perpetrator of war, the user of modern technique, the mega-bureaucratic structure becoming a power by itself, the prison house of small nationalities, the coloniser and the terrorist, the manipulator of opinion and thought; comes into conflict with individual and collective human freedom.

Large scale economic organisations have brought about alienation of the worker from his work and the fruits of work, division of labour smothering individual creativity, loss of creative interest of the producing community in the product, conflict of interest between the management and the workers. They have also generated predatory impulse, power impulse, oligarchic forms of control and tyranny of the employer. In all these, economic organisations have come into conflict with human freedom.

The Church by its insistence on dogmas and dogmatic habits of sustaining these dogmas, has come into conflict with free inquiry or freedom of thought, which is the essence of human freedom. The Church's strait jacketed view of human nature has come into conflict with the cultivation of human faculties and the realisation of the total man. The Church's view of individual salvation in a life hereafter, its insistence on the concept of sin and personal purity to the neglect of creation of a good society here on
this earth; has created a dichotomy between the social and moral person, an opposition to progressive social movements, a tendency to cruelty, persecution and perpetuation of status quo. The very monolithic character of the Church has made it inimical to individual human freedom as well as academic freedom.

Educational organisations as used by the State, the Church and economic organisations have introduced extraneous ends other than cultivation of the faculty of thought for free inquiry and have thus come into conflict with human freedom.

Traditional family committed to biological continuity, continuity in the ownership of property, male dominance and parental authority; comes into conflict with love as a mode of man - woman relationship, gender equality, the right of an individual to grow into a total man, and possibilities of race improvement.